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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to explore the evolution of the doctrine of natural 
justice in Australia, with particular emphasis on the work of the High Court of 
Australia. The essence of the argument is that today, the Court views natural 
justice as a doctrine of constitutional law -  that in the Court’s mind, natural 
justice amounts to a central principle of the “common law constitution”.
This argument is borne out, it is argued, by a consideration of the High 
Court’s holdings in natural justice cases during the past twenty-five years. 
Through these holdings, natural justice has undergone a dramatic expansion in 
its scope and compass. Moreover, the Court has made it plain that the obligation 
to accord natural justice in Australia today arises as a matter of common law 
implication, independently of legislative intent.
In this sense, the Court has been signalling a shift in Australian 
administrative law to an older vision of natural justice. But therein lies the 
difficulty with the Court’s holdings. At the same time as the Court has been 
moving to dissociate procedural fairness from legislative presumption and the 
so-called “ultra vires principle”, it has also been denying the historical basis by 
which a common law constitution could be said to exist in Australia. It is argued 
that a profound contradiction has come to exist in the High Court’s public law 
discourse, and that a common law basis for natural justice cannot exist within the 
constitutional framework that has been enunciated by the Court. Associated 
with this is an argument that the Court has largely failed to enunciate a modem 
purpose for the protection of procedural rights. These flaws, it is contended, 
have left the Australian doctrine of natural justice in a less healthy state than 
may at first glance appear to be the case.
The study consists of both an historical and a present-day consideration 
of the Australian doctrine of natural justice. It also places the Australian 
developments in context through comparison with contemporary developments 
in England.
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INTRODUCTION
NATURAL JUSTICE AND THEORIES OF THE
STATE
I  roadly speaking, administrative law concerns two themes: power and 
JL J  ambivalence.
Over the past century or so we have come to expect the state to play an 
active part in our day-to-day lives; to provide us with assistance if we are sick, or 
poor, or unemployed. The problem, though, is that we have not surrendered the 
instinctive yearning for autonomy that had been groomed in our ancestors over 
the course of several centuries, and which had come to be entrenched in the form 
of liberal ideal. Thus the theme of ambivalence. We want the state to do things 
which we feel will make our lives better, but we are reluctant to cede to it the 
tools that it thinks it needs to do the job: the discretions to coerce and categorise, 
to lump us in with others and to treat us as members of classes rather than as 
individuals.
The accompanying theme of power emerges when it comes to 
reconciling the push and pull that stems from our ambivalence. Central to every 
administrative law case is tension among the branches of government. 
Administrative law litigation has at its base a conflict over power -  over whether 
the executive has the power under law to take a course of action which it has 
chosen and which one of us disputes. But if the theme of ambivalence lies
within us, the theme of power is rooted in the constitution. It is trite, but the 
modifying clause, “under law”, in the penultimate sentence is the critical one, for 
it means that the dynamics of dispute resolution in administrative law cases are 
legal, rather than political. The disputes themselves may be a consequence of 
political choice but, given our conception of the rule of law as enshrining the 
judge as the ultimate interpreter of law and legality, it is the nature of judicial 
predisposition -  the inherited instincts, traditional beliefs and acquired 
convictions of the bench, to borrow Cardozo’s words' -  that in the end plays the 
determinative role in setting the parameters by which our ambivalence is to be 
reconciled. And, as Dicey reminded us, the source of our evolving corpus of 
public law is the ordinary adjudicative work of the courts. It is thus that judicial 
review of administrative action is properly conceived of as an exercise in 
constitutional adjudication.1 23
It was for that reason that in their book, Law and Administration,4 
Harlow and Rawlings began famously with the observation that underlying 
every theory of administrative law, there is a theory of the state.5 T R S Allan 
was making the same point when he said that public law, rationally construed, is
1 The Nature o f the Judicial Process (1921), at 12.
2 The Law o f the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), at 191:
We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground 
that the general principles of the constitution ... are with us the result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought 
before the courts.
I should note that in this thesis, 1 shall refer in the main to the 8th edition of The Law of the 
Constitution, for that is the last that Dicey edited himself. The 8th edition has a lengthy 
introduction, and at pp xxxvii -  xlviii, Dicey set out his refined thoughts on the perils of the 
growth of the administrative state. It accordingly contains Dicey’s own last word on the place of 
administrative law in the common law system.
3 See T R S Allan, “The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First 
Principles”, in C Saunders (ed), Courts o f Fined Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia 
(1996) 146, at 148.
4 (1984).
5 At 1.
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an exercise in political theory.6 The concern of this thesis is with one aspect of 
Australian public law cum political theory: the doctrine of natural justice, or 
procedural fairness as it is sometimes referred to, as it has been developed over 
the decades by the High Court of Australia. Simply stated, my object is to 
examine the High Court’s evolving holdings in natural justice cases and to 
explore the theories of the state which have been embodied in them.
THE HYPOTHESIS: NATURAL JUSTICE AND
FOUNDATIONAL LAW
Natural justice has been described as “fair play in action” ,7 *and “fairness
o
writ large and juridically.” But perhaps a more vivid way of putting it is to say, 
as Aronson and Dyer have, that along with the rest of administrative law, it is 
concerned with the “civilising” of government discretion.9 Natural justice is, 
Aronson and Dyer have written, “a principle of common sense and common 
decency.” 10 In this sense, natural justice might be seen as the quintessential 
Australian legal doctrine, for it is at base a legal formula for the “fair go”. One 
aspect of this work is to consider this -  to examine the way in which natural 
justice has been employed by the High Court as a means of redressing 
governmental unfairness.
In this respect there are, as will be seen in the chapters which follow, 
three major natural justice issues which have emerged in the High Court in
6 Supra, n 3.
7 Harman LJ, in Ridge v Baldwin [1963] 1 QB 539 (CA), at 578.
s Lord Morris, in Furnell v Whangerei Schools Board [1973] AC 660, at 679.
9 M Aronson and B Dyer, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (1996), at 124.
10 Id, at 385.
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recent years: why natural justice can be said by the courts to apply, even in the 
face of parliamentary silence on the question (ie, the doctrinal basis of natural 
justice); when natural justice applies (ie, the range of interests protected by 
natural justice); and to whom natural justice extends (ie, the range of actors on 
whom the courts will impose natural justice obligations). Each of these issues 
will be examined in depth (in chapters seven, five and six, respectively), but my 
interest in the doctrine of natural justice runs also at a deeper level.
In my view, natural justice is a matter of interest precisely because 
judicial review is an exercise in constitutionalism. Administrative law doctrine 
is traditionally thought to be rooted in the Whiggish values of the Glorious 
Revolution. The doctrines of ultra vires, and of jurisdictional control generally, 
are premised on the twin foundations of the separation of powers and the 
sovereignty of parliament, both of which established themselves in our legal 
discourse as a result of the constitutional tumult of the seventeenth century. Yet 
a reading of today’s cases makes it clear that the courts regularly act in such a 
way as to show that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty only goes so far. 
Quite apart from overt constitutional limitations on legislative power in 
Australia, the substance of the holdings in the recent natural justice cases in the 
High Court leads to the observation that the notion of legislative paramountcy 
has become partially fictionalised in this country, and that it is limited by 
vaguely-defined and subjectively-interpreted, yet clearly authoritative, notions of 
“foundational” justice. This thesis is largely concerned with the exploration of 
this development -  what one might describe as the transition from a lex to a jus 
of the doctrine of natural justice.
4
Therein, in my contention, lies the real academic fascination with the 
doctrine of natural justice. The cases which will be examined show that in 
recent years, the High Court has formulated the compass of natural justice in 
extremely broad terms. Briefly to foreshadow the analysis, the High Court has 
come to eschew the conventional understanding of the basis of judicial review -  
rooted, as has been said, in the twin foundations of the separation of powers and 
the supremacy of parliament. Instead, the Court has said that the common law, 
rather than assumptions or presumptions about parliamentary intent, is the basis 
for the imposition of the duty to observe natural justice.
To this extent, the High Court has been enunciating a doctrine of natural 
justice that retains an element of “naturalness”, and connection with its historical 
roots. But the cases demand the question: what theory of the constitution is 
implicit in such a view of natural justice? To state it in Harlow’s and Rawlings’s 
tenns, which constitutional philosophy inheres in a view which enshrines the 
common law, rather than legislation, as the source of procedural rights against 
the state? The Court’s holdings in the recent natural justice cases seem to 
signify a return to an older constitution; one in which the law, rather than 
sovereignty of the parliament, lies at the foundation of the constitutional order. 
But at the same time, the Court has explicitly denied the existence in Australia of 
the historical foundation by which such a constitution could exist. My argument 
is that a dissonance has come to characterise the High Court’s public law 
discourse, which needs to be resolved if the rule of law is not to suffer damage.
5
A second argument which will be made is that notwithstanding the broad 
phrasing of the reach of natural justice, the High Court has largely failed to 
anchor the doctrine by reference to any legal or social purpose. We are said to 
have a purposive constitution, yet it is difficult to see what purpose the High 
Court sees the doctrine of natural justice performing, except in vague and 
shapeless terms. As will be seen in the chapters to follow, the trigger for the 
doctrine has come to be expressed so broadly that natural justice now exists in 
the High Court in an inchoate, reactive form. It is my contention that if it is to 
become a useful tool to protect individual interests in the new governmental and 
administrative environment, the Court must be more definite in explaining what 
objects the observance of procedural fairness is intended to serve.
WHAT THIS THESIS IS AND IS NOT
A word about what this thesis does not purport to be may be worthwhile. 
It is hoped that the reader will feel that the legal principles set out herein are 
accurate in substance and well-founded in context, but there are many aspects of 
the substantive law of procedural fairness which do not fall within the purview 
of the work. While many of the cases to be discussed constitute the leading 
authorities in Australian administrative law (and will be well-known to the 
Australian administrative lawyer), my work does not claim in any way to be a 
definitive study of the law of natural justice in Australia today. There are 
already at least three such works available: Aronson’s and Dyer’s Judicial 
Review o f Administrative Action,11 and Nicola Franklin’s and Margaret Allars’
11 Supra n 9, chapters 8 - 1 0 .
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titles in the Australian legal encyclopaedias. “ Their completeness in coverage is 
something which I doubt I could emulate.
Rather than being a study of law per se, this is intended to be an 
examination of judicial behaviour and the evolution of judicial attitude. 
Accordingly, my thesis does not intend to deal with the actual procedural 
requirements of the rules of natural justice so much as with the entitlement to 
natural justice -  with those circumstances in which the courts have felt it 
appropriate to impose obligations of procedural fairness upon the executive. To 
borrow Cardozo’s words again, my concern is not so much with the legal rules 
themselves, as with the influence of judicial instincts, beliefs and convictions on 
the way in which the rules are formulated and placed within the wider Australian 
constitutional framework.
In this regard, I hope that the reader will find the historical element of my 
work to be distinctive. The history of public law is something which remains 
not much studied in Australia. More particularly, to date there has not been any 
real attempt to analyse the evolution of the High Court of Australia’s attitude 
towards natural justice in historical terms, or to place the Court’s holdings in 
their broader historical context. This is something that I attempt to do, especially 
in the first four chapters. But rather than being solely an exercise in legal 
history, I also attempt -  in the final three chapters -  to make use of this historical 
consideration as a lens through which the constitutional significance of today’s 
cases can be better understood.
12 Chapter 2.5 in The Laws o f Australia and paras 10-1775 f f  in Halsbury’s Laws o f Australia,
12
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THE PLAN OF THE WORK
This thesis consists of seven chapters, plus a lengthy Conclusion. The 
first chapter considers the idea of “natural” justice. This includes a review of the 
doctrine’s historical roots, as well as its place in the ancient constitution. 
Chapter one will also consider the impact on the early administrative law of the 
constitutional revolution which began in England in 1688. Among other things, 
my argument is that if it is considered more broadly as a revolution in thinking 
about government, the revolution was not in fact completed until the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. The point will also be made that though it was 
English in genesis, the values inherent in the constitutional revolution were 
transmitted throughout the settled parts of the Empire, and came to form part of 
the legal cultural fabric in the Australian colonies.
Chapters two through four deal with the actual evolution of natural 
justice through this century, up to the early 1970s. This was the period of 
maturation for administrative law, and the period during which it came to be 
acknowledged by common lawyers as a body of “real” law. It was also a time of 
protracted political conflict between the judiciary and the executive about the 
nature of government and, more specifically, about the extent of the legal power 
of the executive to engage in collective enterprise and enforced wealth 
distribution. For the reasons discussed earlier, much of this conflict found itself 
channelled into the courts. The chief focus of these three chapters will be this 
conflict as it was manifested judicially, but an integral part of the discussion will
respectively. Another useful summary of the Australian law (though now somewhat dated) is G
8
involve a consideration of the academic debate that took place in the middle 
decades of the century about the role of the central government in the modem 
state. To anticipate the substance of the chapters, the picture which emerges is, 
among other things, one of an Australian doctrine of natural justice which was 
theoretically stunted when compared with its English counterpart.
The specific subject of chapter two is the emergence in the first half of 
this century of the “planned state”, and the challenges that that posed to the 
understandings and assumptions of the ancient constitution. It was during this 
period that hints of a divergence of view among judges about the place of the 
common law doctrine of natural justice came to be seen. Some judges -  notably 
Griffith CJ in the Australian setting -  continued to view natural justice in 
“ancient” terms. Others, including Isaacs and Higgins JJ, indicated an awareness 
of the changes in the day-to-day workings of the constitution and began to 
enunciate a view of natural justice which attempted to reconcile common law 
values with a new style of governance in which considerable discretionary power 
was vested in the executive.
Chapter three deals with the post-War period -  roughly from 1945 to the 
late 1950s. During this period, the divergence injudicial attitude continued, but 
now it manifested itself in national terms, in the form of a cleavage in approach 
between the High Court in this country and the House of Lords in England. Sir 
William Wade has described this period in England as the “twilight” of natural
A Flick, Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application (2nd ed, 1984).
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justice.13 It was a time during which the English courts seemed to renounce 
natural justice’s ancient constitutional foundation, and to reduce common law 
procedural rights to a highly structured, yet effectively neutered, shell. In 
Australia, in contrast, natural justice reverted during much of this period to a 
distinctly un-structured form. The High Court’s holdings in natural justice cases 
between the end of the Second World War and the end of the 1950s enunciated a 
doctrine that was, compared to its English counterpart, largely unconstrained by 
technicality. It was only at the very end of the 1950s, as the twilight period was 
coming to an end in England, that an Australian version of “twilightism” came to 
appear.
Chapter four is concerned with natural justice in the 1960s and early 70s 
-  the era when natural justice began a renaissance which has continued unabated 
to this day. What characterised this revival in both Australia and England was a 
new willingness in the law to recognise things other than legal rights as being 
deserving of procedural protection. Chapter four will also set the scene for the 
second half of the thesis: chapters five through seven. There, I shift my attention 
to the present, to consider the recent developments in the Australian law of 
natural justice, as set out in the judgments of the High Court in the Barwick, 
Gibbs and Mason eras.
Chapter five deals with the idea of the “legitimate expectation”, whereby 
natural justice can be triggered to protect not just legal rights or entitlements, but 
also the expectation of entitlements. As will be seen, it is the legitimate
13 “The Twilight of Natural Justice?” (1951) 67 LQR 103.
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expectation which has acted as the driving force behind the evolution of natural 
justice in Australia in the past twenty-odd years. Chapter six examines the 
process by which the High Court has extended the reach of natural justice (and 
judicial review generally) to cover not just the administration per se, but also the 
Cabinet and the Crown -  entities which, until relatively recently, were thought to 
be largely immune from the reach of judicially imposed procedural values.
Chapter seven, which is in some ways a “prequel” to the Conclusion, 
looks at the process by which the High Court has in recent years renounced the 
need to rely on presumptions about legislative intent as the basis for judicial 
review and for the imposition of natural justice obligations. It is this feature, 
more than anything, which leads one to the observation that the High Court’s 
holdings on natural justice have implicit in them the terms of an alternate, yet 
unarticulated, constitutional settlement. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion 
itself, where it will be argued that the theory of the state implicit in the High 
Court’s recent holdings is an inconsistent one, which requires refinement if 
natural justice is to survive as a useful tool into the future.
ENGLISH JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP
It is appropriate to say at this stage that much of the discussion of 
Australian legal developments will consist of their juxtaposition against 
contemporary events in England. In this day and age, such an approach might 
otherwise be open to criticism, particularly given that comparatively little 
attention is devoted to the judgments of Australian courts other than the High
1 1
Court. Nevertheless, the approach is defended in the context of this thesis on 
three bases. First, throughout much of the period with which this thesis is 
concerned Australia still considered itself very much a British country, and 
British legal and political thought had an important impact on Australian law and 
politics. As Geoffrey Sawer once noted, much of the inspiration to reform 
administrative law in Australia, especially with respect to first principles, has 
come from England. 14 The point is that it is impossible to understand the 
evolution of the High Court’s vision of Australian public law without a good 
historical sense of the law as it evolved in England during the same period.
Secondly, it will be one of my arguments that the doctrine of natural 
justice has suffered in this country as a result of its under-theorisation as an 
element of constitutional law. To make such an argument, a comparator is 
needed. So while the focus of this thesis is on the evolution of the Australian 
version of the doctrine of natural justice, a good deal of the discussion 
necessarily will involve consideration of English developments. Thirdly, there is 
the tyranny of the word limit. It would be impossible to do justice to a study of 
the work of all of the Australian superior courts within the constraints of the 
dissertation rules. I have therefore chosen as my focus the High Court -  the 
keystone of the Australian federal arch, as legal historian J M Bennett once 
described it. 15
14 Ombudsmen (1964), at 23 -  24.
15 Keystone o f the Federal Arch: A Historical Memoir o f  the High Court o f Australia to 1980 
(1980).
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A WORD ABOUT USAGE
As may have become evident already, I am in this thesis using the 
expressions “natural justice” and “procedural fairness” more-or-less 
interchangeably. In fact, as will be discussed in chapter six, there was for a time 
in the 1970s a spirited debate about whether the two expressions represented 
different legal concepts. Moreover, there are some who think that the term 
natural justice ought not to be used any longer on the grounds that it is 
misleading. Lord Roskill, for instance, once said that the expression “natural 
justice” is “no doubt hallowed by time and much judicial repetition, but it is a 
phrase often widely misunderstood and therefore as often misused. The phrase 
perhaps might now be allowed to find a permanent resting place and be better 
replaced by speaking of a duty to act fairly.”16
There are others who acknowledge that the two expressions may be 
synonyms, but who say that procedural fairness should be the preferred 
expression because it is flexible and does not carry with it any of the emotive or 
legalistic baggage associated with the older term “natural justice”. Sir Anthony 
Mason, for example, once said that “the expression ‘procedural fairness’ more 
aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which
1 7are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case.”
16 Council o f Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (the "GCHQ Case") [1985] 
AC 374, at 414.
17 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, at 585. More pointedly, in Local Government Board v 
Arlidge, [1915] AC 120, at 138, Lord Shaw said:
In so far as the term ‘natural justice’ means that a result or process should be 
just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as 
it attempts to reflect the old jus naturale it is a confused and unwarranted
13
Sir Robert Megarry made this same point with characteristic humour, 
when he said: “justice is far from being a ‘natural’ concept -  the closer one gets 
to a state of nature, the less justice does one find.”. Less jocularly, Ormrod LJ 
once said that “the romantic word ‘natural’” served little purpose except to 
couch the proceedings with an air of nostalgia. 19 In my view, however, “natural 
justice” is the more appropriate general term for the doctrine, at least in the 
Australian setting, precisely because of the ancient baggage. As has been 
suggested, and for reasons which will become apparent in the chapters to follow,
I am of the opinion that the terms of the constitutional vision implicit in the 
recent natural justice cases embody an attempt to return to ancient constitutional 
understandings.20
NATURAL JUSTICE OR JUDICIAL REVIEW?
The reader will also note that parts of this thesis deal not with the law of 
natural justice strictly speaking, but with the law of judicial review more 
generally. Indeed, in some sections discussion shifts back and forth between the 
two almost unconsciously. This is so for three reasons. First, many of the 
leading cases on natural justice are also leading cases on judicial review. Many 
of the cases discussed in chapter six, for example -  concerning the application of 
a duty to observe natural justice on the Crown and Cabinet -  fall within this 
class. Secondly, two of the cases which, for many years, were treated as leading
transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for other distinctions; and, 
in so far as it is resorted to for other purposes, it is vacuous.
18 Mclnnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR1520, at 1530.
19 Norwest Holst Ltd v Secretary o f State for Trade [1978] Ch 221, at 226.
20 Moreover, it is an expression still found in Australian legislation. See, eg, the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), para 5(1 )(a).
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authorities on natural justice (Board o f Education v Rice and R v Electricity 
Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee ), in fact dealt 
with the question of reviewability, not natural justice stricto sensu. Thirdly, as 
will be seen in chapter six, one of the important questions to be examined with 
respect to the scope of natural justice is whether the existence of a duty of 
fairness necessarily implies that the courts must have jurisdiction to enforce it. 
There have been some in Australia, including Lionel Murphy, who have 
expressed the opinion that natural justice can exist as a parliamentary duty as 
well as a legal duty. But in the eyes of the majority of the Court, the question of 
the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice necessarily 
presupposes the existence of a justiciable issue.
In sum, what follows is an attempt to contribute to the better 
understanding of the evolution of our system of public law in Australia. Crescat 
scientia.
21
21 [1911] AC 179.
22 [1924] 1 KB 171. Both of these cases are discussed in chapter two.
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ONE
THE IDEA OF “NATURAL” JUSTICE
A ntiquity is something that we tend to value highly in the common law. 
JL ^R adical reformers may decry it, but in the common law scheme of doing 
things, change is almost always justified, at least in part, by demonstrating that it 
enjoys the sanction of the past. This is because as a precedent-based system, the 
common law represents an inherently conservative scheme of social ordering. 
The yardstick against which the propriety of present conduct is measured is 
always the past -  in the form of previously-decided cases.
To dwell for a moment on this point of first principle, the precedents that 
we apply in common law adjudication are evidence of the derivative nature of 
today's law. Precedent represents a connection with the law as it was understood 
by our grandparents, and by their grandparents before them. John Wisdom may 
have been correct in asserting that the process of reasoning in the common law 
resembles the legs of a chair, together supporting a premise, rather than the links 
in a chain leading logically to one.1 But the commencement point for any 
systemic evaluation about the Australian legal system must be the observation 
that the legs which we use to construct today’s chairs of legal reasoning are ones 
which are made from wood which grew in the English forests in the time of the 
Angevins and the Tudors.
1 “Gods”, Chap X, in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (1964), at 157 - 158.
ANTIQUITY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC LAW
This is as much the case with respect to reasoning in public law as in any 
other area of the common law. So it was, for example, that in Commissioner of 
Police v Tanos, a case from the 1950s dealing with proceedings under public 
morals legislation, Dixon CJ and Webb J thought it necessary to draw upon 
authority dating from the time of Queen Elizabeth I,2 and to make note of the 
classical foundations of the idea of fairness in administrative decision-making.3 
It was likewise that the Kerr Committee -  whose task was to lay out the 
framework for a “new” Australian administrative law -  felt it appropriate to 
premise its recommendation that a right to procedural fairness be enshrined on 
the basis that the doctrine of natural justice had existed in the common law for 
several centuries.4 5
Even in the case of an “activist” judge, who claims to be making change 
to public law doctrine in order to bring it into line with present-day conditions, 
the change will invariably be justified by reference to public policy, underlying 
principles, foundational values, or some like thing. Dworkin once wrote of what 
he called “background rights”, which he described as “rights that provide a 
justification for political decisions by society in the abstract.”'’ In a similar vein,
2 (1958) 98 CLR 383, at 395 (referring to Boswel’s Case (1583) 6 Co Rep 48b, 77 ER 326).
3 “The older authorities even recur to the lines from Seneca’s Medea ... Quicunque aliquid 
statuerit, parte inaudita altera, Aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuerit." (98 CLR, at 395 -  
396).
4 Report o f  the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (1971), para 39.
5 Taking Rights Seriously (1978), at 93.
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Dawn Oliver has written recently of public law’s “underlying values” .6 But 
expressions like these are in fact codes for something which lies deeper in a 
desire for change. Such references -  to policy, principle, or values -  are almost 
always metaphors for a desire to recapture a balance in the relationship between 
law, morals and society that was thought to exist at some time in the past. To 
put it another way, a judicial activist is spurred to want to effect change in order 
to right an imbalance, and “imbalance” is a relative description -  generally used 
in our legal discourse to relate the present to the past. 7 It is for this reason that 
any discussion of the present-day Australian law of natural justice must begin in 
the England of several centuries ago.
6 See “The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law”, in M Taggart (ed), The Province o f 
Administrative Law (1997), at 217, “Common Values in Public and Private Law and the 
Public/Private Divide” [1997] Pub L 630.
Consider, for example, the holding of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 
CLR 1. At the time, it was widely heralded as instigating a "legal revolution” (see, eg, the essays 
in M A Stephenson and S Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution (1993)). Moreover, 
much of the criticism of the decision was founded on the belief that the judges of the High Court 
were inappropriately using present-day social values to judge historical facts (see, eg, the 
comments of Sir Harry Gibbs, id, at xiii). But the reality of the judgments arguably shows quite 
the opposite. One way to interpret the case is to say that the majority judgments reflect a clear 
desire simply to bring today’s Australian law into conformity with western European 
philosophical values which have been in existence for hundreds of years. When Brennan J 
spoke in his judgment of the “expectations of the international community”, and the 
“contemporary values of the Australian people” (175 CLR, at 42), for instance, he was implicitly 
drawing upon the authority of fundamental Judeo-Christian values, in an attempt to shame the 
positive law of Australia into accepting modification. It was in a similar spirit that Deane and 
Gaudron JJ felt constrained in Mabo to justify their proposal for change in the law by noting that 
the case before them was an extraordinary one. They seem to have felt decidedly uneasy being 
cast in the revolutionary role. “If this were any ordinary case”, they said, “the Court would not 
be justified in reopening the validity of fundamental propositions which have been endorsed by 
long-established authority and which have been accepted as a basis of the real property law of 
the country for more than one hundred and fifty years” (175 CLR, at 109).
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NATURAL JUSTICE AND THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION
It is sometimes thought that we are not aware of the exact origins of the 
modern doctrine of natural justice. In fact, this is a bit of an oversimplification, 
for we can point with reasonable precision to the earliest judicial references to 
the two traditionally-accepted limbs of natural justice today: audi alteram 
partem8 and nemo judex in causa suaj Moreover, we know that natural justice 
has its foundation in a concept of rather broader reach -  the notion of “natural 
law”.
Natural law was probably the original English constitution. The idea that 
there were some things that one simply did not do -  even if one were King -  
unless one wished to be condemned to suffer eternal damnation, was the first 
limit on the power of government. In its very earliest form, natural law may 
have been no more enforceable at law than a constitutional convention is today, 
but as between a ruler and his conscience, the law of God undoubtedly had some 
controlling force. 10 But leaving aside for the moment the extent to which the 
spiritual constitution provided much day-to-day benefit for the King's subjects, 
the courts over time came to view themselves as seized, as the King's agents,
s Bagg's Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 93b, 77 ER 1271, is typically cited as the case which 
establishes the proposition, but H H Marshall noted that there are also several references to it in 
the Yearbooks. See Natural Justice (1959), at 18. For more on Bagg’s Case and its 
significance, see E G Henderson, The Foundations o f English Administrative Law (1963), at 46
ff-
9 The Earl o f Derby’s Case (1613) 12 Co Rep 114, 77 ER 1390 (though Marshall noted several 
references to it in the Yearbooks as well. See id, at 16).
10 Remembering, of course, that in the past, people used actually to believe Scripture. As Harold 
Laski once argued, things for most people are quite different now. He wrote that “[t]he decline 
of the traditional religious faiths into a polite ceremonial expressing a creed upon which most
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with jurisdiction to apply natural law. In the formative period of the common 
law, natural law was used as a stop-gap, when there was no earthly law to apply. 
It was in this vein that Yelverton CJ once said:
We shall do in this case as the canonists and civilians do where a 
new case comes up concerning which they have no existing law; 
then they resort to the law of nature which is the ground of all 
laws, and according to what they consider to be the most 
beneficial to the common weal they so, and so also we shall do.
If we are to make a positive law on this point we ought to see 
what is most necessary for the common weal and make our law 
accordingly. * 11
The early references to natural law point to something which is often 
overlooked in our discussions of the modern-day version of natural justice. This 
is that the doctrine arose as a part of a European, rather than solely English, legal 
tradition. 12 As Maine noted (and notwithstanding Coke’s characterisation in 
Calvin ’s Case), the expression “natural law” as invoked by the courts most often 
referred in fact to principles of Roman law, rather than to a Hobbesian-type of 
law of nature or to an Aristotelian-based “law of reason”. The practice of 
identifying the Roman law with the law of nature, he said in his lectures on 
international law, was an old practice, and it was done as a means of allowing 
Roman legal principle to be quoted and used in a country in which its authority 
was not recognised. 13
people do not dream of acting has been remarkable” (Where Do We Go From Here? An Essay in 
Interpretation (1940), at 25).
11 (1468) YB 8 Edw IV 21 (quoted in Marshall, supra n 8, at 7).
12 For more on the notion of a “Western” legal tradition, see P Parkinson, Tradition and Change 
in Australian Law (1994), chap 2, and R C van Caenagem, An Historical Introduction to 
Western Constitutional Law (1995).
13 H Maine, International Law (1888), Lecture 1, at 20 -  21.
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Nevertheless, as a rhetorical device, at a time when the various organs 
of state were jockeying for power, reference to natural law understandably could 
prove to be quite effective. It is not at all surprising therefore to learn that Coke 
made liberal use of it. In Calvin ’s Case, for instance, he said:
[T]he law of nature is part of the law of England ... [T]he law of 
nature was before any judicial or municipal law ... [T]he law of 
nature is immutable. The law of nature is that which God at the 
time of the creation of the nature of man infused into his heart, for 
his preservation and direction; and this is lex ceterna, the moral 
law, called also the law of nature.14
In a like way, Lord Mansfield made use of the concept as part of his 
project to modernise the customary law merchant and incorporate it into the 
common law. In Moses v Macferlan, he said: “In one word, the gist of this kind 
of action is that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by 
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.”1'
The high point of natural law in the common law system was 
undoubtedly the assertion that it could trump statute law.16 When read in 
context, the famous passage in Dr Bonham ’s Case, that courts could declare void 
Acts of Parliament which were “against common right and reason”,17 amounts to 
such a claim. But even more pointed in this respect was the judgment in 1614, 
in Day v Savadge, that “an Act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to
14 (1608) 7 Co Rep 1 a, at 12b, 77 ER 377, at 391 - 392.
15 (1760) 2 Burr 1005, at 1012,97 ER 676, at 681.
16 On this question, generally, see Sir F Pollock, A First Book o f Jurisprudence (1929), at 265 -  
271.
17 (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b, at 118a, 77 ER 646, at 652.
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make a man judge in his own cause, is void in itself Vs In a similar way, Holt 
CJ once said that “[i]f an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person 
should be party and judge, or, which is the same thing, judge in his own cause, it 
would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be judge 
and party. ” 19
The sheer baldness of assertions like these was not to be seen again in 
English law after the seventeenth century.20 Yet, the sentiment, and the 
confidence with which it was expressed remains significant, for they provide 
evidence of the comparative antiquity of today's law. Simply put, any notion 
that “activist” judges in the field of judicial review are a recent phenomenon is a 
false one. Moreover, the old cases also highlight the fact that the ancient law of 
judicial review is rooted in the constitution -  in a mechanism for limiting the 
power of what we would now know as the legislative and executive branches of 
government.
18 (1614) Hob 85, at 87, 80 ER 235, at 237.
19 City o f London v Wood (1702) Mod 669, at 687, 88 ER 1592, at 1602. He continued: “[A]n 
Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd.”
20 Though it is worthwhile to note that Blackstone actually referred to the principle in one part of 
the Commentaries. He said that the law of nature “is binding over all the globe, in all countries, 
and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this”. (I Comm 41). And as 
late as 1824, in Forbes v Cochrane 2 B & C 448, at 469 -  470, 107 ER 450, at 458 - 459, Best J 
suggested that in the case of slavery, natural law might still trump parliamentary law. After 
referring to two West Indian statutes which permitted the sale of slaves, he said:
Both these statutes, however, were local in their application being confined to 
the West India Islands only. I do not, therefore, feel myself fettered by 
anything expressed in either of them ... If indeed there had been any express 
law commanding us to recognise those rights we might then have been called 
upon to consider the propriety of that which has been said by the great 
commentator upon the laws of this country: ‘That if any human law should 
allow or injoin us to commit an offence against the divine law we are bound to 
transgress that human law’ ... We have the authority of the civil law for saying 
that slavery is against the rights of nature.
22
At the same time, though, it should be recognised that the notion of 
natural law was somewhat different from the rather more limited doctrine of 
natural justice as we understand it today. Marshall claimed that it was not until 
the latter half of the last century that the bias and hearing rules came to be 
referred to together under the umbrella of natural justice.21 In fact, there were 
references in positive law to what we would understand today to be the bias rule 
as early as the thirteenth century, in both Magna Carta and the Provisions o f 
Oxford.22 Whatever the case, the fact is that together or separately, both limbs of 
the doctrine became firmly entrenched as principles of constitutional 
adjudication (to use T R S Allan’s characterisation2') during the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In this respect, the judgements in Day 
v Savadge and its successors are important in that they provide among the 
earliest examples of the link between natural law (though it was described in Day 
v Savadge as “natural equity”) and the bias rule. The link was well-encapsulated 
by Holt CJ, when he said in City o f London v Wood:
It is against all laws that the same person should be party and 
judge in the same cause, for it is a manifest contradiction; for the 
party is he that is to complain to the judge and the judge is to hear 
the party; the party endeavours to have his will, the judge 
determines against the will of the party and has authority to 
enforce him to obey his sentence: and can any man act against his 
will or enforce himself to obey? 24
21 He dated it to Spackman v Plumstead Board of Works (1885) 10 App Cas 229 (supra n 8, at 15 
-16).
22 See, eg, the 1215 version of Magna Carta, arts 24 (“No sheriff, constable, coroner or other 
bailiff of ours shall hold pleas of our crown") and 40 (“To no one will we sell, to no one will we 
deny or delay right or justice”). Similarly, the Provisions o f Oxford (1258) ordained that 
“justices shall accept nothing unless it is a present of bread and wine and like things ... as have 
been customarily brought for the day to the tables of the chief men”.
23 “The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles”, in C Saunders 
(ed), Courts o f Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 146, at 148.
24 12 Mod, at 687, 88 ER, at 1602.
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The link between natural law and the other present-day element of 
natural justice -  the “hearing rule” -  was explicitly made in 1723, in the famous 
case of Dr Bentley, in which Fortescue J is reported as having said that “The 
laws of God and man both give [a] party an opportunity to make his defence, if 
he has any”.2' In the latter part of the eighteenth century, Lord Kenyon CJ did 
much to add authority to the hearing rule. Indeed, it was through his judgment in 
R v Gaskin that we were bequeathed the Latin formulation of the hearing 
requirement. He spoke of “one of the first principles of justice, audi alteram 
partem ’, which he described as of paramount importance: “It is to be found at 
the head of our criminal law that every man ought to have an opportunity of 
being heard before he is condemned”.26 Similarly, in Harper v Carr, he said that 
it was “an essential rule in the administration of justice that no man shall be 
punished without being heard in his defence.”27
NATURAL JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
IN EARLY COLONIAL NEW SOUTH WALES
Similar statements, and similar judicial sentiments, can be found in the 
early judgments of the colonial courts in New South Wales. Indeed, the New 
South Wales cases are of special interest in the context of this thesis for they 
provide further illustration of the way in which judicial review can be said to be
25 R v Chancellor of the University’ of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str 557, at 567, 93 ER 698, at 704.
26 (1799) 8 TR 209, at 210, 101 ER 1349, at 1350.
27 (1797) 7 TR 271, at 275, 101 ER 970, at 972. In R v Benn and Church (1795) 6 TR 198, 101 
ER 509, he made the point once more. It is, he said, “an invariable maxim in our law that no 
man shall be punished before he has the opportunity of being heard”.
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a foundational element of the constitution, in terms of providing the basis for 
the establishment of the rule of law.
In part, the establishment of the rule of law in New South Wales 
stemmed from the fact that through the passage of the New South Wales Act in 
1823, which marked the transition from military to civil rule in New South 
Wales, the Imperial government intended to set up a “proper” legal system in the 
colony. But, given the endemic corruption in New South Welsh political culture, 
simple legislative change would not alone have been enough. The critical 
element in the transformation of New South Wales from an «-constitutional to a 
/?/Y?to-constitutional state was the preparedness of the colonial courts to engage 
in judicial review. In this regard, when the present Supreme Court of New South 
Wales was established (by the New South Wales Act) in 1824, it was formally 
vested with all the “Jurisdiction and Authority” of the three English common law 
courts.28 The colonial court thereby acquired the power to issue the prerogative 
writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto.2" 
This meant that a public law dynamic could develop in New South Wales in the 
same way that it had in England. '0
In fact, it was through the use of prerogative writs in cases involving 
review of what we would today think of as administrative action that the law
28 4 Geo IV, c 96 (“the New South Wales Act"), s 2.
29 On this generally, see J M Bennett, A History o f the Supreme Court o f New South Wales 
(1974), 178 -  182 and A C Castles, An Australian Legal History (1982), 185 -  188.
0 On this point, I have argued elsewhere that it is incorrect to speak of a reception of English law 
in Australia. In my view, Australia did not receive English law, but it received -  and this serves
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began, for the first time in an effective way, to impose legal control upon the 
institutions of power in the colony. From the very beginning of his tenure in 
1824, Chief Justice Sir Francis Forbes31 took it as being without question that he 
had the authority to assert a supervisory jurisdiction over the Executive. Any 
other view would have been anathema to the common law tradition of which 
Forbes was to prove himself an extremely jealous custodian. For example, in R v 
Wentworth, Campbell and Dunn, one of the famous civil jury cases,32 his Honour 
summed up his view, when he noted that “every court has of necessity a power 
to compel [the Executive] to execute its process. This is a power necessarily 
incident to the creation of courts.”33 This was a view that Forbes reiterated 
several times during his tenure as a judge. In one judgment, while he was still 
sitting in Newfoundland, he drew an express link between judicial review and 
constitutional principles. “It is,” he said, “part of the constitutional law of the 
land that there must reside somewhere a supreme judicial authority to watch over 
the proceedings of all inferior tribunals, and to keep the scales of justice even 
and uniform”.34
as the foundation stone of today’s Australian constitutionalism -  English legal culture ("Sir 
Francis Forbes and the Earliest Australian Public Law Cases", unpublished paper, 1998).
31 A few biographical words on Forbes might be of interest. Forbes had been bom in Bermuda 
and, while he had been educated in England, nearly all of his professional practice had taken 
place in the colonies. Between 1810 and 1817, he served as the Attorney-General and King’s 
Advocate of Bermuda. In 1817, he was appointed Chief Justice of Newfoundland, where he 
served until 1822. In that year, he went to England where he played a role in the drafting of the 
New South Wales Act. In 1823, he was appointed Chief Justice of New South Wales, in which 
office he served until 1837. He was knighted shortly after his retirement, and he died in Sydney 
in 1841. For more on his life, see C H Currey, Sir Francis Forbes: the first Chief Justice o f the 
Supreme Court o f New South Wales (1968).
32 On the so-called “civil jury cases”, and their place in Australian legal history, see A C Castles, 
“The Judiciary and Political Questions: The First Australian Experience, 1824 -  1825” (1973 -  
76) 5 Adel L Rev 294.
33 (18 2 5) www.law.mq.edu.au/~bruce/html/r v wentworth_campbell and dunn__1825.htm.
34 Clift v Holdsworth (1819) 1 NLR 167, at 168
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It is notorious that in the period from the ascendancy of the ill- 
remembered New South Wales Corps in the 1790s up to 1823, corruption and 
bias among the magistrates was perhaps the chief concern with the 
administration of justice in the colony.35 This being the case, among the most 
important of Forbes’s early judgments were the ones concerning the notion of 
procedural fairness, and the standards of official conduct which would be 
expected of the magistracy. In the early period, there were at least three cases -  
now largely forgotten'6 -  in which failures to observe natural justice figured 
importantly in the reasons for questioning the propriety of magisterial 
proceedings.
The first case of the trio was R v Rossi, Principal Superintendent o f 
Police f  Rossi was accused of having attempted to induce a prosecutor to drop a 
case against an accused thief. The alleged thief was a young woman, and the 
suggestion was that Rossi had, for improper motives, tried to act as an informal 
mediator between her and the complainant. In the end, Forbes found for Rossi, 
but in the course of his judgment, he made comments which foreshadowed by 
almost a century the famous comments of Lord Flewart CJ that justice must not
35 See, eg, B Kercher, An Unruly Child: A History o f Law in Australia (1995), at 25 -  27.
36 I should say a word about the reports of these early cases. The first published law reports in 
New South Wales were Legge’s Reports, compiled in the 1890s, and in which the earliest 
reported case dates only from 1830. Apart from some scholarly consideration of a few 
celebrated cases, little is now known of the foundation years of the Australian court system. 
Professor Bruce Kercher of Macquarie University, however, is embarked on an Australian 
Research Council-funded project to publish on the Internet annotated copies of the extant 
records of the early workings of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Through the Kercher 
project, lawyers and legal scholars will now be able to have access to many of the Court’s early 
judgments that have effectively been lost to working law for a century and a half.
37( 1826) www.law.mq.edu.au/~bruce/html/ 
r v rossi__principal superintendent of_police_1826.htm
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only be done, but it must be seen to be done .38 In one report of his reasons for 
judgment in the case, Forbes CJ is reported to have said: “a Magistrate should 
never step aside from the simple line of Magisterial duty; he should not afford 
the world a shadow of suspicion; he should be free from taint, and pure as an 
angel, if  possible . ” 39
Similarly, in Ex parte Matthews, 40 the second case, Forbes CJ held fatally 
flawed a judgment of an inferior tribunal which had been based upon a 
combination o f unsworn evidence for one party and a refusal to hear evidence 
from the other. Forbes is reported as having said that “audi alteram partem is a 
maxim in the British Jurisprudence which [a decision-maker] is not at liberty to 
set aside”. In the same vein, in the third case, the Newspaper Acts Opinion, 41 he 
said: “By the laws of England, founded in the law of nature, every' man enjoys 
the right of being heard before be can be condemned either in his person or 
property”.
38 “[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done”: R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, at 259.
39 In another, he was reported as having put the point rather less poetically:
I would say, taking all the circumstances of the case together, that most 
conscientiously I believe, the error of the Magistrate did not proceed from a 
corrupt motive, but from a mistaken feeling, though it certainly was of a 
reprehensible character. The motives and conduct of a Magistrate, should not 
only be correct, but above suspicion (supra n 37).
40 (1827) www.law.mq.edu.au/~bruce/cases 1827-28/html/ex_parte_mathews_1827.htm
41 (1827) www.law.mq.edu.au/~bruce/cases 1827-28/html/newspaper acts opinion_1827.htm
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THE PARADIGM NATURAL JUSTICE CASES
But, as has been noted, these early New South Welsh cases have been all 
but forgotten by the Australian legal system. Notwithstanding their historical 
significance when considered in retrospect, the starting point for most 
discussions of the law of natural justice in Australia has been a series of 
decisions of the English courts dating from the middle part of the last century.42 
They form the paradigm from which later cases were patterned. An appreciation 
of them is, therefore, essential to any informed understanding of today’s law.
The first of these “paradigm” cases, Capel v Child,4? involved the 
question of whether the Bishop of London was required to hear a parish priest 
whom the Bishop felt had been neglecting his duties. In holding that he was 
required to hear the vicar, Bayley B said that
it is considered an invariable maxim of law, that you cannot 
proceed against a party without his having the opportunity of 
being heard ... I know of no case in which you are to have a 
judicial proceeding, by which a man is to be deprived of any part 
of his property, without his having an opportunity of being 
heard.44
42 This is apparently the case in England, as well. See, for example, R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary/ Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (“the Pinochet Case'’’) [1999] 2 WLR 
272, where the legal analysis focussed almost exclusively on Lord Campbell’s judgment in 
Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759, 10 ER 301.
43 (1832) 2 C & J 558, 149 ER 235.
44 2 C & J, at 579, 149 ER, at 244.
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This view was reiterated with approval in another of the paradigm cases, 
Wood v Woad.4" Wood v Woad considered the case of a member of a mutual 
insurance society who had been expelled under a term of the society’s rules 
which gave the society’s committee the power to do so in any case where it felt 
that a member’s conduct was “suspicious.” 46 The society’s position was that it 
had an unfettered discretion in such matters, and that Wood (the expelled 
member) had agreed to this upon joining. Kelly CB acknowledged the text of 
the rules, but he said the committee was
bound in the exercise of their functions by the rule expressed in 
the maxim audi alteram partem, that no man shall be condemned 
to consequences resulting from alleged misconduct unheard and 
without having the opportunity of making his defence. This rule 
is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is 
applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with 
authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences 
to individuals.47
The third paradigm case, Dimes v Grand Junction Canal, 48 concerned the 
bias rule, rather than the hearing rule. The case involved a decision in equity by 
Lord Cottenham LC, in a suit between a public company and a property owner. 
The Vice-Chancellor had initially ruled in favour of the company and, on appeal, 
Lord Cottenham affirmed the ruling.46 It then became known by the property 
owner that Lord Cottenham had a financial interest in the company. On further 
appeal, the House of Lords held that the Lord Chancellor’s interest should have 
disqualified him from hearing the case. In his speech, Lord Campbell (the
45 (1874) LR 9 Ex 190.
46 See LR 9 Ex, at 192.
47 LR9 Ex, at 196.
48 (1852) 3 HLC 759, 10 ER 301.
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author of The Lives o f the Chancellors and a future Lord Chancellor himself) 
said that the issue was not whether Lord Cottenham was biased in fact, but 
whether in the circumstances, there could be said to have been a fear or 
apprehension of bias. He said:
No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be, in the 
remotest degree, influenced by the interest he had in this concern; 
but it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be 
a judge in his own cause should be held sacred. And that is not 
confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause 
in which he has an interest."1’
Lord Campbell’s speech displayed a concern not merely with systemic 
integrity of the judicial system itself, but also with the educational effect that 
judicial review can have on administrative decision-makers. “It will”, he said,
have a most salutary influence on these tribunals when it is 
known that this high court of last resort, in a case in which the 
Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his 
decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and was 
set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care 
not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their 
personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of labouring under 
such an influence."1
Probably most frequently-cited today of the paradigm cases, however, is 
Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works f  decided eleven years after Dimes. Like 
Capel v Child and Wood v Woad, it concerned the reach of the hearing rule. 
Section 76 of the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 empowered the local 
authorities to demolish any house built without prior notice to the authorities.
49 For some of the early proceedings, see Dimes v The Grand Junction Canal Company (1846) 9 
QB 469, 115 ER 1353.
50 3 HLC, at 793, 10 ER, at 315.
31 Ibid.
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Cooper was found to have so constructed a house and an order was made by the 
local Board o f Works to tear it down. All of the judges in the Common Pleas, 
though, held that Cooper was entitled to have the order set aside. Erle CJ said:
[Although the words of the statute, taken in their literal sense, 
without any qualification at all, would create a justification for the 
act which the District Board has done, the powers granted by the 
statute are subject to a qualification which has been repeatedly 
recognised, that no man is to be deprived of his property without 
an opportunity of being heard. "3
Willes J said that he was
of the same opinion. I apprehend that a tribunal which is by law 
invested with power to affect the property of one of Her Majesty’s 
subjects, is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being 
heard before it proceeds; and that that rule is of universal 
application, and founded upon the plainest principles of justice ."4
But most famous of all is the judgment of Byles J, who said:
[A] long course of decisions, beginning with Dr Bentley ’s Case, 
and ending with some very recent cases, establish that, although 
there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party 
shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the 
omission of the legislature. ""
52 (1863) 14 CB(NS) 180, 143 ER 414.
53 14 CB(NS), at 187, 143 ER, at 417.
54 14 CB(NS), at 190, 143 ER, at 418. Cf however, Willes J’s views on the sanctity of 
legislative law as expressed in Lee v Bude & Torrington Ry Company (1871) LR 6 CP 582.
55 14 CB(NS), at 194, 143 ER, at 420. Keating J concurred (14 CB(NS), at 196, 143 ER, at 420).
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FROM SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO NINETEENTH: THE 
CHANGING CONTEXT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The timing of these paradigm cases -  particularly Cooper v Wandsworth 
Board o f Works, with its Dr Bonham 's Case-like enunciation of the relationship 
between the common law and legislation -  is striking, for they were decided as 
England was in the midst of a profound change in the nature of government and 
administration. Constitutional scholars date the advent of the parliamentary era 
to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the installation of William and Mary on 
the throne “on terms.” From an administrative law' perspective, though, this is 
only partly accurate. The more complete view is to say that the parliamentary 
era was the product of a sustained period of evolution in the philosophy and 
practice of government which began in 1688, but which did not reach its 
completion until the early years of this century. It is this factor which makes the 
paradigm natural justice cases, with their pre-Revolutionary expression, seem so 
out of place.
There is a charming story, perhaps apocryphal, that one of the first things 
that Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, had to explain to the newly-acceded 
Queen Victoria in 1838 was what was meant by the expression “bureaucracy”. 
As Sir Cecil Carr told the story, the Prime Minister was able to comfort the 
young Queen that she need not trouble herself overly about the term. “Lord 
Palmerston”, wrote Carr, “felt able to assure the Queen that bureaucracy was a 
phenomenon exclusively continental”.''6 The fascinating aspect of the story seen
56 Concerning English Administrative Law (1941), at 1.
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from our standpoint today is that we know that just as his Lordship was 
speaking, the very basis of government in England and her colonies was 
undergoing a metamorphosis -  and that British society was coming to embrace 
the idea of bureaucracy with considerable relish.
Insofar as Lord Palmerston was commenting on size, however, he was 
more or less accurate at the time of Victoria’s accession. In 1838, the central 
government -  what we know today as the bureaucracy -  was very small. Paul 
Craig has noted, for instance, that in 1833, the Home Office had a staff of only 
twenty nine."5 *7 * Furthermore, the impact of the government in London upon the 
lives of the citizenry, at least in a direct sense, was quite limited."* In Great 
Britain, the traditional approach to governance was very much one of Tory 
“squireocracy”: local responsibility and control, based on the remnants of 
feudalism and generations-old connections of families with the land. 
Responsibility for local government lay, for the most part, with Justices of the 
Peace (who were often local squires) and other unpaid parish, borough and 
county officers."9
Sitting alongside the Justices of the Peace were a series of so-called 
“Boards”. For those limited functions of state in which the Crown wanted to 
maintain a direct role, a specialist Board, whose members were appointed under
5 Administrative Law (3rd ed, 1994), at 42.
58 On this point, see generally, N Chester, The English Administrative System, 1780 - 1870
(1981) and H Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy: The Development o f British Central 
Administration Since the Eighteenth Century (1969). See, also, J Willis, The Parliamentary
Powers o f  English Government Departments (1933) and H W Arthurs, Without the Law:
Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (1985).
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royal authority, would be set up. The Board of Trade and Plantations (or 
“Board of Trade”, as it is known in shortened form) is perhaps the most familiar 
example of the old Board system, but at the height of the Board system, in the 
eighteenth century, a number of others existed.60 Yet most of the central 
governmental work as was required tended to be (to use the modem expression) 
contracted out. As Patrick Atiyah once put it, “[i]t seemed ... natural to farm out 
the jobs that needed to be done to officials or institutions who could then raise 
the money needed to defray the cost of the services by charging for their use. ” 61
The point is that it is not inaccurate to argue that at least as it is 
understood in the modem sense, there was no real “government” in those days. 
Not only was there no civil service to speak of, but the idea of a “prime” 
minister, acting as chef de cabinet, was only beginning to take shape by the end 
of the eighteenth century.6“ This was the constitutional and governmental 
context in which the law of judicial review and the rules of natural justice were 
developed. As the apparatus of judicial control of the administration {viz, the 
prerogative writs) was developing, much of the actual administrative 
responsibility rested with Justices of the Peace -  members of what we would 
today consider to be to the judicial branch of government. To put it another way, 
the milieu in which judicial control had to be exercised was generally one of like 
controlling like: Justices of the King’s Bench controlling, under what Sir Edward
59 On this, see especially Chester, supra n 58, chapter 8.
60 Eg, the Board of Woods, Forests and Land Revenues, the General Board of Health, the Board 
of Admiralty, etc.
61 The Rise and Fall o f Freedom of Contract (1979), at 19.
6: On this, see id, at 17.
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Coke described as an irrevocable delegation from the Crown,6' Justices of the 
Peace. This was the constitutional setting in which the very early administrative 
law took root.
There were a few exceptions to this, 64 but the observation to be made is 
that at the time when the early public law was at its most expansive, and in its 
most creative phase -  when the register of prerogative writs was being compiled, 
so to speak -  the people who required control were for the most part fellow, 
albeit inferior in the organisational scheme of things, members of the judiciary. 
So it was that the writs of certiorari and prohibition, the two remedies most 
commonly used when checking executive action (in the days before the use of 
the declaration became commonplace), came to be said to lay only against 
inferior judicial officers.6'' The fact that the courts would only issue the writs 
against judicial bodies, or their analogues, meant that the existence of a legally 
enforceable right to procedural fairness became inextricably wrapped up with 
the identity of the decision-maker. As will be discussed in the next two chapters, 
this came to lead in this century to a series of arcane decisions on the indicia of 
“judicial” decision-making. From our perspective today, when we are for the 
most part free of concern about procedural intricacies, all of this seems not only 
highly restrictive, but quite off-point. But viewed according to the terms in
63 The King “hath committed all his power judiciall, some in one court, some in another ... the 
King hath wholly left matters according to his laws to his judges. (4 Inst 73).
64 The story of the Sewer Commissioners, for instance, is an interesting illustration of a very 
early use of what we would today think of as an administrative tribunal, and of the extent to 
which the courts bridled at the notion that they could be excluded from their supervision. On the 
story of the Sewer Commissioners, see L L Jaffe and E G Henderson, “Judicial Review and the 
Rule of Law: Historical Origins” (1956) 72 LQR 345 and I Holloway, “A Sacred Right: Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action as a Cultural Phenomenon” (1993) 22 Man L Rev 28.
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which they were written, the two great prerogative writs made perfect sense in
their scope.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS
After the scope of the prerogative writs became more-or-less settled, 
though, several things happened which contributed to a change in the dynamics 
of the relationship between the judiciary and the other arms of government. The 
first, of course, was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 -  89. There is a good deal 
of exaggeration in the way in which the Glorious Revolution is spoken of. 
Parliamentarians view the passage of the Bill of Rights66 as the moment of 
supreme triumph -  as the culmination of the long, evolutionary project to restore 
the “ancient rights of Englishmen”.67 Likewise, Diceyists view the enshrinement
65 For a summary of the old law, see Hals bury’’s Laws o f England (1st ed, 1909), Vol 10: “Crown 
Practice”, paragraphs 310 (certiorari) and 299 (prohibition).
66Arguably, the first modem example of revisionist history was the nineteenth century 
interpretation of the events of 1688 - 89 as a manifestation of the English love of liberty. As 
John Willis once noted wryly:
Neither the economic nor the constitutional historian is equipped to tell the 
whole story of the Tudor and Stuart periods, but today many educated men, 
and lawyers in particular, are inclined to attribute to the commons, in their 
famous political manoeuvres against the king, a devotion to abstract concepts 
which is without parallel, certainly in modem politics, and to neglect the very 
real conflict of economic interest between the regulatory traditions of the 
aristocratic royalists and the free-trade aspirations of the middle-class 
parliamentarians.
“The Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the
Functional”( 1935) 1 UTLJ 53, at 54. For illustrations of what he describes as the “vulgar” Whig 
interpretation of the Glorious Revolution, see M Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory 
(1992), chapters 1 and 2.
67 Blackstone, for example, described constitutional evolution in England as “a gradual 
restoration of that ancient constitution whereof our Saxon forefathers had been unjustly 
deprived, partly by the policy and partly by the force, of the Norman” (IV Comm 413). See also 
M Loughlin, Id, at 4 -  7, 13-17.
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twelve years later, in the Act o f Settlement,68 of the principle of judicial 
independence as the linchpin of the rule of law. Hyperbole aside, however, the 
structure of the Australian constitution, with its entrenched separation of powers 
and its provision for judicial tenure,60 bears living witness to the abiding nature 
of the values which underlay the constitutional revolution which gave rise to 
them.
But a different way of looking the Glorious Revolution is to say that it 
resulted in -  or, rather, that it gave rise to a dynamic which would result in -  a 
hardening of the constitutional arteries. In the century and a half prior to 1688, 
the roles of what we would today call the three branches of government were in a 
state of tension and constant flux.70 After 1689, the tension did not completely 
dissipate, but the existence of a written vision of the Revolutionary settlement in 
the form of the Bill o f Rights and the Act o f Settlement served to confine the 
various governmental actors within a broad late seventeenth century conception 
of the nature of governance. In the case of countries like Australia (and the 
United States), which did not merely enact the revolutionary vision, but rather 
which constitutionalised it in a formal way, the imperative to confinement in role 
has been even more stark.
Front and centre among the revolutionary values, of course, was the felt 
need to divide and separate governmental power. It has for some time been
68 12 & 13 Will III, c 2.
69 The Constitution, s 72.
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fashionable to point out that formal constitutional text notwithstanding, a strict 
separation of powers has never been a part of our constitutional inheritance, and 
that Montesquieu was guilty of a gross misunderstanding of the way in which 
things actually worked in England.71 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Glorious 
Revolution enshrined a vision of functional separation, especially between the 
judiciary and the political branches, within the British model of government.72 
Coupled with the limitations that had been written into the use of the writs of 
certiorari and prohibition, namely that they only lay against judicial officials, this 
proved to be the foundation-stone for a problem which the courts three centuries 
later would still find tremendously perplexing. The question was a stark one: 
when actors who were clearly not judicial in character began exercising power 
that had formerly been exercised by justices of the peace, was judicial review to 
follow?
70 Consider that falling within this period were the Reformation, the struggle leading up to the 
accession of Elizabeth I, the union of the Crowns under the Stuarts, the Civil War, and the 
Restoration.
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, for example, wrote of Montesquieu: “[T]he England of the 
threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial was a fiction invented by 
him.” (The Common Law (1881), at 263). In a similar vein, Maitland once wrote:
It is curious that some political theorists should have seen their favourite ideal, 
a complete separation of administration from judicature, realised in England -  
in England of all places in the world, where the two have for ages been 
inextricably blended. The mistake comes of looking just at the surface and 
showy parts of the constitution.
(quoted in Sir H Shawcross, “The State and the Law” (1948) 11 Mod L Rev 1, at 2) See also J 
Finkelman, “Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative law”(1935) 1 UTLJ 313.
72 See F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973), vol 1, at 128:
Although it is true that the actual constitution of Britain then did not conform 
to that principle, there can be no question that it did then govern political 
opinion in England and had gradually been gaining acceptance in the great 
debates of the preceding century.
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ENLIGHTENMENT VALUES AND THE “SCIENCE OF 
LEGISLATION”
Of equal importance in considering the place of natural justice for present 
purposes is the Enlightenment. Accompanying the Glorious Revolution in time, 
and infusing it in philosophical respects, the intellectual renaissance which we 
know as the Enlightenment has played an overarching role in shaping the course 
of the evolution of the doctrine of natural justice. If from the Glorious 
Revolution came a rationalisation of the constitution, from the Enlightenment 
came a move to rationalise the system of governance more generally. If Aronson 
and Dyer are correct in saying that administrative law is concerned with the 
civilising of government, 73 then the Enlightenment was concerned with the 
rationalising of government. This took many forms: Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 74 for example, represented the product of a generational instinct 
to conceptualise the common law as a single corpus, and to bring order and 
rational coherence to what had thus far been little more than a disparate 
accumulation of judicial rulings.
Similarly, the substantive law of contract, tort and property all underwent 
dramatic reform during and after the Enlightenment. 75 Benthamism and 
Beccarianism76 were both outgrowths of the Enlightenment. And from a legal
' Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (1996) at 124.
74 Commentaries on the Laws o f England 4 vols (1765 - 1770).
75 On legal theory and law reform generally during this period, see D Lieberman, The Province 
o f Legislation Determined: Legal Theory> in Eighteenth Century Britain (1989).
76 The Marchese de Beccaria (1738 -  94) was the author of Dei Delitti e della Pene (“On Crimes 
and Punishment”), which represents one of the earliest attempts to study the criminal law in a 
systematic way. Among other things, Beccaria was an early advocate of social and legal reform
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process point of view, the great procedural reforms of the early to mid­
nineteenth century which culminated in the passage of the two Judicature Acts in 
1873 and 1875, were reflective of the same tendency -  as were the moves to 
“professionalise” the judicial work of the House of Lords and the Privy 
Council.77 Simply stated, the advent of the modem era brought about an 
amendment to the terms of the Whiggish conception of the social contract. 
Dicey discussed this in his work Law and Public Opinion in the Nineteenth 
Century.78 He dated the naissance of the change to the publication of John Stuart 
Mill’s Political Economy, 79 and Mills’s attempt to marry economic concerns 
with concerns of social welfare, but in his view in the modem era, “an alteration 
becomes perceptible in the intellectual and moral atmosphere of England”.80
All of these things -  including the Glorious Revolution itself (at least as 
it came to be cast in Whig mythology) -  can be seen as part of a broader trend to 
apply the scientific method to social life. We laugh today at some of the 
excesses of Victorian-era social mores, but to the Georgians and Victorians 
themselves, their era was all about progress.81 “Progress” denoted rationalism 
and logic generally, but applied to governance, it meant two things:
to prevent crime, rather than the use of the majesty of the law simply to punish it. He is said to 
have been an important influence on Bentham. See H L A Hart, “Bentham and Beccaria”, in 
Essays on Bentham (1982), at 40, and C Phillipson, Three Criminal Law Reformers: Beccaria, 
Bentham, Romilly (1923).
On this, see R Stevens, Law and Politics: The House o f Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800 - 1976 
(1979), chapters 2-5,  and L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House o f 
Lords in its Judicial Capacity (1972), 23 - 43.
78 (1905; 2nd ed, 1914).
79 Principles o f Political Economy With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (1848).
80 Law and Public Opinion in England, supra n 78, at 245.
81 For an interesting, and thought-provoking, reassessment of Victorian society and Victorian 
notions of progress, see G Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization o f Society: From Victorian Virtues
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professionalism and expertise. It is in this vein that Martin Loughlin has 
written about the emergence of a “science of legislation” in the late eighteenth 
century. He described the project as one of “social, political and legal thought, 
the object of which was to draw connections between such facets of social 
character as property, opinion, manners and justice . . . ” 82
According to Loughlin, this new legal science was rooted in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, particularly in the work of Adam Smith and John Millar, a 
Professor of Law in the University of Glasgow. Its aim was to create a model for 
mapping social dynamism, and to tailor to it (for the work built on 
Montesquieu’s admonition that there had to be a “fit” between society and law) a 
model of the legislative process which would enshrine progress as the paramount 
legal and constitutional aim. As Loughlin put it, the objective of the legal 
scientists “was to formulate criteria for evaluating the laws and institutions of 
society and which could then be used to guide government on the use of the 
legislative power” . 83 It was in this sense that the Enlightenment posed a 
challenge to the old public law -  to adapt principles which had developed under 
pre-Revolutionary thinking about the constitution to a different way of thinking 
about government and its place in the constitutional order.
to Modern Values (1994). See also M Valverde, The Age o f Light, Soap, and Water: Moral 
Reform in English Canada, 1885 -  1925 (1991), especially chapters 3 and 7. 
s: Supra n 66, at 4.
8? Ibid.
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THE FRANCHISE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
SOCIAL STRAIN AND
For the reasons just discussed, it is wrong to think that social welfare is 
exclusively a twentieth century concern. Indeed, ancient feudalism represented a 
not ineffective (if offensive to our sensibilities today) means of providing a crude 
“safety net” . 84 And despised as they may be as a consequence of Dickens’ 
fiction, the old Poor Laws were actually aimed at reducing the level of poverty in 
society. But it is true to say that a centrally-administered system of social 
welfare provision is of comparatively recent creation. In large measure, it 
stemmed from the onset of the Industrial Revolution, which came to place the 
old, localised system of administration in England under an intolerable strain, 
particularly in London, the Midlands and the north.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, the 
population of Birmingham increased by over three hundred per cent, and those of 
Manchester and Liverpool by over four hundred per cent.8"' Clearly, a system of 
social welfare provision which relied on generalists and volunteers could not 
cope with this. The result both in the big cities and in the country was anarchic. 
JA G  Griffith once described the impetus for the introduction of bureaucracy in
84 As an aside, S F C Milsom once made the interesting observation that it is easier for an 
administrative lawyer today to appreciate the concept of land ownership under Feudalism than it 
would have been for legal historians like Maitland, writing in the last century:
We can see the language and ideas of our own property law being rendered 
inappropriate by governmental powers of the same juristic nature as those once 
exercised by lords. You are less of an owner when you cannot effectively 
realise your property without planning permission, for example, in the same 
way as you had not quite become owner so long as you needed your lord's 
licence to alienate.
“F W Maitland”, in Studies in the History o f the Common Law (1985) 261, at 275.
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England in characteristically provocative terms, when he said that “[arguments 
about the nature of epidemics gave way to the beginnings of bacteriology and 
did more to shape the British constitution than the activities of Lord John Russell 
or Lord Palmerston”.86 Even Dicey was moved by the extent of poverty and 
social dislocation, and saw therein the seeds of governmental transformation. He 
said of the first half of the last century:
The time was out of joint. The misery and discontent of city 
artisans and village labourers were past dispute ... The wages 
earned by labourers in the country were miserably low. The 
horrors connected with factory life were patent. Widespread was 
the discontent of the whole body of wage-earners ... There was 
rick-burning by labourers in the country, there were acts of 
violence by trade unionists in the towns. The demand for 
[reform] was the sign of a social condition which portended 
revolution.87
Coinciding with the industrial revolution in time was a move towards 
parliamentary reform. With the passage of the Great Reform Bill in 1832^ (the 
year of Bentham's death, incidentally) people began not only to take a greater 
interest in the working of parliament, but also to make greater demands of it. To 
put it in today’s language, with the broadening of the franchise, parliament began 
to be “relevant” to ordinary people in a way that it had not hitherto been. One 
should not overstate the effect of the 1832 Reform Bill, for even after its passage 
less than five per cent of the population could vote.84 But 1832 marked the first 
time that places like Birmingham, Sheffield and Leeds -  places which had
85 W R Cornish and G de N Clark, Law and Society in England 1750 -  1950 (1989), at 322.
86 "Administrative Law and the Judges", Pritt Memorial Lecture, 1978, at 5.
87 Law and Public Opinion in England, supra n 78, at 211 - 212. 
ss Representation o f the People Act 1832.
89 Craig, supra n 57, at 54.
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experienced the most serious social dislocation as a result of the industrial
revolution -  received parliamentary representation.
Furthermore, the early decades of the nineteenth century were also the 
time of Benthamism, and of Bentham’s dicta on the importance of uniformity of 
administration throughout the country. As Carr has noted, implicit in Bentham’s 
writing was the view that uniform administration depended upon a large increase 
in the activity of the central government.91 So the reformed British Parliament 
began to pass, with increasing rapidity as the century went on, a series of statutes 
which attempted to frame some sort of national response to the huge shifts in 
demography, and to their attendant problems.92 As Carr described it, “[t]he new 
Parliament, impulsive, rather undisciplined, and very serious, knew that the 
country expected it to experiment and to risk the impact of State interference 
upon individual liberties. ” 94 He continued:
A series of non-party royal commissions and committees explored 
social conditions; their conclusions shocked public opinion and 
revealed the gap in the local administration of those times 
between efficient government in some places and scandalous 
neglect in too many others. Parliament, fortified by the reports 
and recommendations of these exploratory bodies, gave a smooth 
passage to several controversial Bills which were in no way the 
product of the governmental machine. And so Britain got a quick 
and quiet revolution in the laws of factories, poor relief, 
municipal corporations, prisons and presently public health . . . 94
90 See M Gilbert, The Dent Atlas o f British History (2nd ed, 1993), at 84.
91 Supra n 56, at 9.
92 These included acts with short titles which are suggestive of the mind-set that parliament was 
bringing to the problem: the Factory Act 1833, the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834, the 
Municipal Corporations Act 1835, the Railway Regulation Act 1840, the Towns Improvement 
Clauses Act 1847, the Public Health Act 1848, the Nuisances Removal and Disease Prevention 
Act 1848, the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 and the Local Government Act 1858. For 
a more complete listing, see Arthurs, supra n 58, bibliography.
93 Supra n 56, at 3.
94 Ibid. He concluded with a suggestion of a lesson for a world in crisis:
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This legislation frankly puts the lie to the notion that the nineteenth 
century was a period of laissez faire. Indeed, it shows that it is quite mistaken to 
label the nineteenth century as the high point of “classic liberalism” -  or at least 
that it is mistaken to equate classic liberalism with laissez faire, as many of us 
reflexively do. To be sure, people held dear the institution of private property, 
for it was private property which was the engine for the creation of private 
wealth. But at the same time, it was the property-owning class, as much as the 
radical reformers, who drove the move to bureaucratise. As Atiyah put it:
The new industrial middle classes of England brought with them 
some very insistent desires and demands, and it was their gradual 
success in achieving these which in the end largely destroyed the 
individualist society and the free market economy which had 
brought them power and prosperity. They wanted law and order 
in the streets; they wanted an end to filth and slums and insanitary 
houses; they wanted regularity in life, in business, in the payment 
of debts and the observance of contracts; they wanted greater 
decency and refinement in life, an end to barbarities and cruelties, 
to the slave trade, to the pillory and public executions, to public 
drunkenness, to the employment of children as chimney sweeps 
and women in coal mines.9"
Importantly, though, while the new legislation sought to provide a 
national response to the challenges of the industrial era, it retained for the most 
part a model of local responsibility and local administration. It is true that a 
common feature of this post-Reform Bill legislation was the replacement of the 
generalist Justices of the Peace with “task-specific” administrative bodies. But
This reinforcement of the governmental process by a concentration of the 
intelligence of men of independent mind, not always attached either to 
Parliament or to political parties, is an object lesson to which our eyes turn in 
these no less stimulating times.
95 Supra n 61, at 231.
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only in a minor way did the nineteenth century legislation involve the national 
government in the direct administration or regulation of local affairs. The 
Benthamite view of the importance of centralisation was largely limited to the 
appointment of national inspectorates.96 This meant that in England, even after 
the local government reforms, public administration remained the province of a 
myriad of different entities, which varied dramatically in resources, ability and 
integrity.97 As Atiyah has noted, the growth of government during the nineteenth 
century was no more the result of a national plan than was the Industrial 
Revolution in the century which preceded it.98 England, he wrote, “stumbled 
into the modem administrative state without design, and even contrary to the 
inclinations of most Englishmen. ” 99
It is also important to note that the nineteenth century attempts at 
introducing an effective bureaucracy pre-dated the national income tax. Most 
taxes were levied by local authorities as rates. So whatever governmental 
interference there was with rights in private property tended to occur at the local 
level. The point to be taken is that given that the Queen’s judges in London had 
a well-established tradition of exercising control over local authorities, it is not 
surprising that even in the mid-nineteenth century, the courts might not have 
seen as manifestly apparent a conflict between the ancient constitutional values
% Eg, the Poor Law Commissioners.
97 Chester, for example, noted that as late as 1870, responsibility for local administration in 
England and Wales was shared by 65 county units and 97 quarter sessions boroughs, 224 
municipal borough councils and no less than 637 boards of health! {supra n 58, at 347).
98 Supra n 61, at 224.
99 Id, at 236.
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(such as were expressed in Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works and the other 
paradigm cases) and the newer philosophy of government.
LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT IN 
COLONIAL AUSTRALIA
This English exegesis is necessary for, as noted, the English case law 
from the nineteenth century is still considered elemental in Australia. But while 
in Australia, the pressures of progress were largely the same as in England 
during the nineteenth century, the administrative situation here was really quite 
different. As Paul Finn has put it, in England the forces driving the evolution of 
public administration were centripetal, and led “piecemeal but inexorably to an 
accretion of power to the central government” . 1(1(1 In Australia, in contrast, the 
forces were centrifugal. “In shaping the administrative system, the potent central 
authorities controlled (and often retarded) the devolution of power to local and 
regional units.” 101 “Their augmented responsibilities”, he continued, 
“particularly in developmental activity, exaggerated their pre-eminence in the 
colonial scheme of things. ” 102
In the nineteenth century, neither Australia (nor New Zealand) had the 
tradition of local government that the English had. On the contrary, from the 
very beginnings of the settlement of Australasia, the central government had 
exercised the lion’s share of control and direction. All administrative initiatives
100 Law and Government in Colonial Australia (1987), at 2.
101 Id, at 2 -  3.
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accordingly came within the purview of central authority. As Pember Reeves, 
one of the leading Australasian liberals of the late nineteenth century, described 
it:
Before 1890, the State was already the great landlord, the chief 
employer of labour, was virtually the sole owner of the land 
transport, as well as of the telegraphs and telephones. It 
undertook the business of land registration and transfer, and in 
one colony, New Zealand, had established a large life insurance 
office, and a public trust office ... In addition to railway-making, 
the governments were spending millions on roads, bridges, 
harbour works, and water-supply. They had always taken the 
completest powers of inspection over flocks and herds, and in the 
eighties were beginning to inspect factories in the interests of 
women and children workers.103
Necessarily, therefore, there was less of the ad hoc-Qry in colonial 
Australia that Atiyah has written of in the English context. This is not to say that 
the colonial governments were not inept or corrupt (for every student of 
Australian colonial history knows just how deeply both ineptitude and corruption 
came to be entrenched in governmental practice in the early years after 
settlement104). But in terms of actual systemic design, there was an integrity in 
government in Australia that was lacking in the Mother Country at the time.
Sir Frederic Eggleston, the great modem Australian liberal thinker,105 
suggested that a related difference between Australia and Great Britain was that 
here, there was not the same instinctive distrust of governmental involvement in 
private affairs. This was because an Australian grundnorm was one of state
102 Id, at 3.
102 State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (1902), vol 1, at 50.
104 See, eg, B Kercher, Debt, Seduction and Other Disasters (1996) and L A Whitfield, Founders 
o f the Law in Australia (1969).
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intrusion upon what in England would have been considered the private. “In 
the smaller communities of Australia”, Eggleston wrote in the 1930s, “thrown 
from the beginning upon the State for development of their untouched resources, 
there has been little feeling against State action, and no resistance to its constant 
use for all sorts of purposes.”106
In this regard, a feature of governance from the beginning in Australia 
was the prevalence of the Board system, at a time when, in England, Boards had 
largely fallen into disuse. As Finn noted of New South Wales, between 1856 
and 1900, more than fifty acts of parliament were passed to set up or re­
constitute statutory bodies.107 Given that the proliferation of the boards 
coincided with the introduction of responsible government in the colonies,108 
Finn has argued, the notion of ministerial responsibility -  on which Dicey had 
set so much store -  did not develop here in the same way that it did in Great 
Britain.109 As Stephen J once noted, the practical consequence of this was that 
even after the adoption of responsible government in the 1850s, the Australian 
colonial Governors exercised a degree of real governing power that was not 
possessed by Queen Victoria in the United Kingdom.110
105 See, infra, chapter 2.
106 State Socialism in Victoria (1932), at 11.
107 Supra n 100, at 58.
108 In New South Wales, representative government was introduced in 1842 by virtue of the 
Australian Constitutions Act (No 79 (13 & 14 Viet, c 59). Responsible government was provided 
for by the New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 (18 & 19 Viet, c 54). See, generally, 
Castles, supra n 29 (chapter 8), Kercher, supra n 35 (chapter 7) and A C V Melbourne, Early 
Constitutional Development in Australia (2nd ed, 1963).
109 Supra n 100, at 13 - 14.
110 FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, at 354 -  355. See also G Sawer, “Councils, 
Ministers and Cabinets in Australia” [1956] Pub Law 110.
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Another difference that is significant for present purposes is that Crown 
liability legislation (which, among other things, rendered the Boards liable to 
suit) was introduced much earlier in Australia than in Britain.111 And this, of 
course, built on the so-called “repugnancy” clauses that had been a feature of the 
various colonial constitutions since the 1820s.112 By these, the colonial courts 
had been vested with jurisdiction to determine whether locally-enacted 
legalisation was repugnant to the law of England and, consequently, 
unconstitutional.112 So from the very early days, the Australian courts became 
accustomed to pronouncing on the vires of colonial legislation.114 Together, 
these things: the retardation of the development of local government in the 
English style and the existence of legislation which permitted governments to be 
sued, suggest that the parallel between the conditions in which the nineteenth 
century English law of natural justice developed, and the conditions in which 
public law had to operate in Australia was not an exact one.
THE PARADIGM CASES RECONSIDERED
In light of this, some question is thrown on the appropriateness of 
reliance upon the paradigm cases as leading authority. As has been suggested,
111 (1853) 16 Viet, No 6 (SA), (1857) 20 Viet, No 15 (NSW), (1857) 21 Viet, No 29 (Vic), 
(1859) 23 Viet No 1 (Tas), (1866) 29 Viet, No 23 (Qld). In Great Britain, equivalent legislation 
was not introduced until 1947 (Crown Proceedings Act 1947). See, also, Finn, supra n 100 
(chapter 6), Kercher, supra n 35, at 100 - 101.
112 See Castles, supra n 29.
113 See, eg, the New South Wales Act (4 Geo IV, c 96), s 29.
114 The high point of this, of course, was the work of Boothby J in the 1860s, who effectively 
rendered South Australia lawless. Among other things, he held that the South Australian 
constitution was unconstitutional. It was Boothby’s excess that led to the passage of the
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the striking thing about the paradigm cases when they are read in context is 
their tone, which is in many ways reminiscent of the seventeenth century and 
before. The cases (particularly Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works, with its 
reference to the common law “supplying the omission of the legislature”) seem 
to have taken little account of the shifting context of government in which they 
were decided. To return to the Harlow and Rawlings point,11'' the theory of the 
state implicit in the paradigm cases was one in which rights in individual 
autonomy preceded governmental interests in collective efficiency. Taking them 
in the English milieu, there is little or no acknowledgment -  overt or otherwise -  
of the changes in government, and in approaches to administration, that were 
taking place. Taking them in the Australian setting, their dissonance is even 
more stark.
Nevertheless, in a practical way, this gulf of understanding between law 
and government may not have been especially problematic when, in England, the 
executive still did not involve itself much in the day-to-day administration of 
local affairs. Nor, possibly, was it a great concern in Australia in the days when 
recourse to the superior courts was logistically difficult for anyone who did not 
live in Sydney, Melbourne or Adelaide. Accordingly, in the nineteenth century 
in both Australia and England, the opportunity for conflict over the supervision 
of local administration was relatively narrow. But, as will be seen in the next 
two chapters, in the twentieth century, as the central executive began to wish to
Colonial Laws Validity' Act 1965. For more on this remarkable man and his legacy, see Kercher, 
supra n 35, at 97 -  102.
115 See supra Introduction, at 2.
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play a significant role in local affairs, the constitutional clash was to come into
the open.
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TWO
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE PLANNED
STATE1
r I  There is a tendency to think that ours is the first generation whose system 
_A. of public law has had to wrestle with the problem of the co-existence of 
the administrative decision-maker and the court of law. The truth is, however, 
that ours is at least the fifth or sixth generation of twentieth century 
administrative lawyer which has had to grapple with the problems that follow 
from what one might loosely call “administrative adjudication”, and the judicial 
reaction thereto. In fact, the major conceptual difficulties facing administrative 
law in Australia today are all direct lineal descendants of a series of 
jurisprudential doubts that began to trouble minds in the latter years of the last 
century and the early years of this one regarding the basis by which inexpert, 
irresponsible (in the political sense) judges could, or should, exercise 
supervision over “expert” decision-makers. The story of natural justice in the 
common law for the first sixty-odd years of this century has been the story of 
these doubts, and of the struggle between the competing claims of bureaucratic 
expertness and judicial fairness.
1 This title is adapted from W Friedmann, The Planned State and the Rule o f  Law (1948).
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY PHASES OF NATURAL 
JUSTICE
The historian Eugen Weber once admonished the scholar to remember 
that history cannot be seen as a linear progression.2 3 Nevertheless, the evolution 
of natural justice in this century can be seen broadly in four phases. The first of 
the phases ran roughly between 1911, with the judgment of the House of Lords 
in Board o f Education v RiceJ' and 1929, with the publication by Lord Hewart, 
the Lord Chief Justice, of his polemical attack on executive discretion, The New 
Despotism. The second ran roughly from 1929, with the appointment in the 
United Kingdom of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers4 as a reaction to Lord 
Hewarf s book, to the end of the Second World War, when the House of Lords 
and Privy Council began to deliver a series of judgments which seemed severely 
to cut back the doctrine’s scope to a weakened, emaciated form.
The third phase ran from the end of the War to the 1960s. In England, 
the end of the third phase would be dated at 1963, with the judgment of the 
House of Lords in Ridge v Baldwin.5 In this country, it dates from 1968, when 
the High Court delivered its judgment in Banks v Transport Regulation Board!" 
As hinted at in the Introduction, there was something of a divergence in 
approaches to natural justice in Australia and England during this period, but in
2 “History is not a linear progression, but rather like a meandering river” (televised lecture 
entitled “The Western Culture”, 3 May 1992).
3 [1911] AC 179.
4 Commonly known as “the Donoughmore Committee”, after its first chairman, the Earl of 
Donoughmore. Sometimes also known as “the Scott Committee”, after its second chairman, Sir 
Leslie Scott (later Scott LJ).
5 [1964] AC 40.
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both countries, the doctrine came to suffer from the effects of non-theorisation,
which seemed to render it in danger of becoming moribund. The final broad 
phase began in the 1960s and to date has not stopped. In the words of Bernard 
Schwartz, there has been since the 1960s a “judicial revolution” with respect to 
the doctrine of natural justice. For reasons which will be discussed in chapter 
four, it might actually be more accurate to describe it instead as a judicial 
renaissance, but whichever term is used, in the past thirty years the retrenching 
attitude has been all but forgotten in an era of seemingly boundless judicial self- 
confidence.
It is the first two phases which will be the subject of this chapter. As 
foreshadowed at the end of the last chapter, the picture that will emerge is one of 
considerable tension between law and politics, and between rival visions as to 
the place of common law values in the modem state. Briefly stated, the first 
phase represented an intellectual commitment on the part of substantial segments 
of the higher judiciary to “softening”, or “thinning” the requirements of natural 
justice when applied to the work of the bureaucracy. This reflected a view, 
shared with the political branches of government, of the problems associated 
with a move to larger, more centralised, bureaucracy. In some ways, it was the 
most jurisprudentially sophisticated of the four phases -  in the sense that it was 
during this period that the judiciary displayed its most sophisticated level of 
sensitivity to the problems facing government.
6 119 CLR 222.
B Schwartz, Lions Over the Throne: The Judicial Revolution in English Administrative Law 
(1987), at 11.
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The second phase, in contrast, represented a sharp judicial reaction to 
perceived abuses of power on the part of the executive, and a corresponding 
wave of criticism of the judiciary on the part of academic lawyers. If the first 
phase was the most sophisticated, then the second phase was certainly the most 
complicated in the doctrine’s history, for the applicability of natural justice came 
to be determined according to a series of semantic distinctions about the nature 
of the decision-making process. And in the English context, it was this second 
phase that gave rise to the first outpouring of real administrative law scholarship 
-  much of which, it should be noted, was hostile to the imposition of common 
law values on the administration.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE COLLECTIVE 
STATE
Sitting alongside the theoretical tensions stemming from the 
Enlightenment and the Glorious Revolution that were discussed in chapter one, 
there were certain factors which made the twentieth century the scene for 
concerted conflict over the reach of judicial review in a way that its predecessor 
had not been.* As discussed in chapter one, while there had been a dramatic shift 
in the nature of governance in England during the nineteenth century, which 
became more tangible after the passage of the first Representation o f the People 
Act in 1832, the fulcrum of administration remained at the local level throughout 
the century. So the dynamics of the relationship between the judiciary and the 
central executive did not change appreciably before the 1900s. In the twentieth
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century, however, the focus of administrative effort shifted discemibly to the 
centre, with the result that judicial views of fairness and political views of 
necessity were brought into direct clash.
One of the causes of this, of course, was the fact that more often in this 
century than at any other time since the demise of feudalism as a working 
system, society has been mobilised en masse in the interests of the state. Ours 
has been the century of both total war and cold war, and of citizen armies. It has 
also been the century of Great Depression, long-term recession, and jobless 
recovery. The existence of a succession of perceived national crises -  which 
stretched in a near un-broken line from about 1903° to the mid-1960s8 *10 -  served 
to give the state a much greater claim on the private lives of the citizenry than it 
had previously had.
The Demographic Shift
A second, and related, factor was the explosion in population that took 
place in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In chapter one, the effect of 
population growth on government in the mid-nineteenth century was discussed,
8 These factors were discussed by W Friedmann, in an article published in 1951 in the Canadian 
Bar Review. “Judges, Politics and the Law”, 29 Can Bar Rev 811.
l) With the publication of Erskine Childers’ novel The Riddle o f the Sands, which raised a 
popular fear in Great Britain and the Empire of German imperial expansionism. For Australian 
purposes, one special significance of this book is that it led to the repatriation of much of the 
Royal Navy to home waters. In August -  September 1908, the so-called American “Great White 
Fleet” visited Australia. In some respects, this marked the first step in the shifting of Australia’s 
national security posture from a British to an American orientation.
10 The 1960s are chosen here because viewed with the hindsight that the passage of thirty years 
gives, they seem to represent a sea change in the attitudes of people in the Western world to 
authority.
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but the rate of growth in fact increased as the century went on. Cornish and 
Clark have noted, for example, that the population of England and Wales almost 
doubled between 1871 and 1941." A similar pattern in population growth could 
be seen in Australia. In 1871, the total population of Australia (excluding 
Aboriginal peoples) was a little over 1.6 million. By 1921, it had increased more 
than three hundred per cent.12
This was accompanied by an increased trend towards urbanisation that 
began with the Industrial Revolution, but which accelerated into the early years 
of the twentieth century. In 1871, there were thirty-seven cities and towns in 
England with a population of 50,000 or more. By 1901, this increased to 
seventy-five, and by 1931, it had reached one hundred and thirteen.12 Here in 
Australia, it is well-known that the vast majority of the population has always 
lived in a thin belt stretching along the eastern and southern coasts. But in the 
fifty year period between 1871 -  1921, the proportion of workers employed in 
primary industries in Australia dropped from forty-four per cent to just under 
twenty-six per cent.14 By 1927, no less than sixty-two percent of the non- 
Aboriginal Australian population was living in urban areas.1'' Simply put, in this 
century people were living in much closer contact with one another than in the 
past. So even if it had been true at some point in the past that man could be an
11 They note that in the decade 1871 - 1881, it increased from 22.8 million to 26 million. By 
1901, it was 32.6 million. Despite the losses of the First World War, by 1921, it had grown to 
37.9 million. In 1941, it was 41.7 million. See W R Cornish and G de N Clark, Law and Society 
in England 1750 - 1950 (1989), at 74, n 95.
12 G T McPhee, “The Urbanisation of the Australian Population”, in P D Phillips and G L Wood 
(eds), The Peopling o f Australia (1928), at 170.
13 Cornish and Clark, supra n i l .
14 McPhee, supra n 12, at 167.
59
island, this became quite impossible after he forsook the bush or the pasture for 
the city.
What is also interesting in the Australian context, apart from the simple 
increase in numbers of people living in towns and cities, is the demographic 
make-up of the urban population. For unlike Great Britain, Australia was 
throughout much of the nineteenth century still a sparsely-populated, non- 
industrialised settler nation. In the 1850s, there had been a massive influx of 
immigrants into the Australian colonies, accompanying the Gold Rush. But as 
the alluvial gold supplies petered out, many of the unskilled members of the 
mining population made their way to the cities, especially Melbourne. At the 
same time, technological improvements in the agriculture industry reduced the 
need for unskilled labour. So not only was the urban population on the rise, but 
much of the increase was taking the form of unskilled, poorly-educated working 
men.
Partnered to this was the fact that for much of the period in question, 
Australia had a relatively young population. The immigrants attracted by the 
Gold Rush tended to be young, and of family-raising age. Likewise, the assisted 
passage programmes which existed prior to the First World War were aimed at 
encouraging migration by young adults and parents with children.16 When taken 
with the Australian culture of government which was discussed in chapter one,
15 Ibid.
16 W D Borrie, The European Peopling o f Australasia: A Demographic History 1788 -  1988 
(1994), at 181.
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the inevitable offshoot of such a great population shift was a growth in the role 
of government in private life: both as planner of public works, and as arbiter of 
disputes over competing claims on public wealth.
Evolving Social Philosophy and “the Cult of Expertise”
A third cause for the expansion of government in this century is related 
to, and in a metaphysical sense underlies, the first two. As Friedmann described 
it, there was in the modem era “an evolution of social philosophy” . 17 Dicey 
described this alteration as the “growth of collectivism” , and he attributed it to a 
combination of moral philanthropisin'* and perceived commercial necessity. 19 
The result was a decided push towards executive-empowering legislation (which, 
of course, Dicey thought anti-constitutional20), and away from the emphasis on 
local regulation that had been the feature of welfare provision up to and 
including the last century.
A fourth factor, which stemmed from the Victorian and Edwardian 
obsessions with progress, was an extreme faith in science, and growth of a “cult” 
of expertise. This was touched upon in the last chapter, but throughout the latter 
half of the last century and the first half of this one, it was an article of faith that 
the non-partisan application of scientific expertise could remedy most of
1 “Judges, Politics and the Law”, supra n 8, at 822.
18 Law and Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century (2nd ed, 1914), at lxi:
In truth a somewhat curious phenomenon is amply explained by the 
combination of an intellectual weakness with a moral virtue, each of which is 
discernible in the Englishman of today.
19 Id, at 247.
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society’s ills. As part of this broad project, the then-new field of political 
“science” (the name itself being a significant one) began to propound a new 
vision of government, in which the state assumed an active role as provider -  a 
vision of, as some put it, a “public service” state. William Robson, one of the 
leading English administrative law scholars of the middle part of the century, 
was making this point when he paraphrased Maine, and said that in the twentieth 
century, “we are moving from contract to public administration.”21
One aspect of this shift in thought which is of special interest for present 
purposes was the foundation of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 1895. Unlike the ancient universities in 
England, the LSE was dedicated to the “the impartial scientific study of 
society.”22 As Lord Beveridge, who served as Director between 1919 -  1937, 
once wrote, the aim of the college was “treating economics, politics and social 
sciences primarily as sciences based on observation and analysis of facts, rather 
than analysis of concepts.”23 As a part of this endeavour, Beveridge placed great 
emphasis on the study of law, and among his accomplishments were the creation 
of the first full-time chair of law in the University of London24 and the 
foundation of a law journal -  tellingly entitled the Modern Law Review,25 
During Beveridge’s tenure, the LSE became the centre for the “scientific” study
20 See The Law' o f the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), at 198.
21 Public Administration Today (1948), at 3 (quoted in M Loughlin, Public Law and Political 
Theory (1992), at 201).
22 The Rt Hon Lord Beveridge, Power and Influence (1953), at 168.
23 Id, at 175.
24 Whose occupant was Edward Jenks, who had formerly been Professor of Law in the 
University of Melbourne.
2:> Founded 1937.
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of public law in the modem state, 26 and the influence of its scholars on 
administrative law will be returned to shortly.
POSITIVE LIBERTY, THE PLANNED STATE AND THE 
“NEW LEGISLATION”
Inherent in the shifts in social feeling -  which Dicey deplored and the 
London School of Economics applauded -  was a burgeoning desire for what Sir 
Isaiah Berlin would come to describe as “positive liberty” .27 This is the notion 
that if it is to have any substantive meaning, freedom must amount to more than 
the absence of external restraint. It must also include the ability actually to fulfil 
one’s desires. “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish 
on the part of the individual to be his own master”, wrote Berlin:28
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external 
forces of whatever kind ... I wish to be a subject, not an object; to 
be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, 
not by causes which affect me, as it were, from the outside.29
The yearning for positive liberty is another offspring of the 
Enlightenment. It stems from the idea that “the essence of man is that they are 
autonomous beings. ” 30 It is a craving for positive liberty that lies at the heart of 
much of today’s talk about “empowerment”. Proponents of empowerment often 
gloss over the fact that the realisation of positive liberty must involve
26 On this, see also Loughlin, supra n 21, at 174 -  176.
27 “Two Concepts of Liberty”, inaugural lecture as the Chichele Professor of Social and Political 
Theory, Oxford, 1957 (reprinted in Four Essays on Liberty (1969), 131 ff).
28 M a t 131.
29 Ibid.
30 Id, at 136.
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considerable coercion -  including a forced redistribution of opportunity­
providing resources (to wit, property). But leaving aside the metaphysical 
question (that Berlin wrestled with) of whether this renders the notion a self- 
negating proposition, 31 it is clear that a clamour for positive liberty involved a 
change in the ideal of governance.
Until comparatively recently our legal history was the story of the 
deliberate exclusion of the state from the sphere of private activity. From Magna 
Carta onwards, the story of the common law was the story of the evolution of 
“negative liberty”, in Berlin’s tenninology -  of liberty in the sense of being 
liberated from governmental interference. “Liberty”, as our passports say, meant 
the freedom to go about one’s affairs without let or hindrance. Under this 
conception of liberty, the expectations of the state are very limited. One expects 
the state to do very little: to provide an army to protect from without and a police 
force to protect from within, and a series of law courts in which to resolve private 
disputes in a peaceful manner. Apart from that, one wants just to be left alone. 
But as Dicey and others noted, in the nineteenth century this began to change. 
People began to expect the state to do a great deal, indeed. Rather than leaving 
them alone, people expected the state to play an active part in their day-to-day 
lives. They expected it to do things to make our society better; more just. In a 
word, people expected the state to help shape society.
31 As his biographer described Berlin's thesis, "it might be necessary to increase taxation on the 
incomes of the few in order to bring greater social justice to the many, but it was a perversion of 
language to pretend that no one's liberty would suffer as a result" (M Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A 
Life (1998), at 228).
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Together, these shifts drove governments to increase their levels of activity, 
and their consequent output. For the purposes of administrative law, the critical 
factor was that while the state was quite willing to accede to demands to make 
society better, it demanded a quid pro quo. It demanded the ability to coerce the 
citizenry and to categorise it; to lump citizens in with others and to treat them as 
members of groups. As part of this, the nature of legislation began to change. The 
“new” legislation vested significant amounts of discretionary power in the 
Executive, including broad delegated law-making power. This was because to 
cope with the new pressures and new demands, governments demanded the power 
to plan and to regulate, rather than merely to react:
The planned state is today an irrevocable reality in modem society, 
far more than party controversies would admit. Every modem state 
exercises a multitude of supervisory regulating and managing 
activities which no modem government, whatever its complexion, 
could afford to drop. The notion of a government which concerns 
itself with military defence, foreign affairs, police and legal justice, 
is now a thing of the past.32
AUSTRALIA AS A “NEW” STATE
The circumstances of Australia’s establishment as a federated 
commonwealth showed that these concerns were also apparent here. Indeed, in 
some respects, the concerns about state planning were perhaps even more 
pronounced in Australia than in England. The Australian experience with 
centrally-administered boards during the colonial period has already been
'2 Friedmann, “The Planned State and the Rule of Law”, supra n 1, at 5.
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mentioned^' but, arguably, the federation movement itself was partly reflective of a 
feeling that in the modem polity, planned efficiency was more important than old- 
fashioned notions of individual negative liberty. As Geoffrey Sawer once noted, 
the allocation of powers in section 51 of the Constitution suggests that one of the 
new Commonwealth’s main purposes was to provide “the convenience of a 
number of codes and Australia-wide administrative agencies relevant to the 
conduct o f commerce and industry.”34
Whatever the case, in an essay published in 1933, W G K  Duncan wrote 
that “the whole conception of government, and governmental functions, has 
changed during the course of this century.” 35 “The state”, he continued,
can no longer be conceived as a policeman ‘keeping the ring’ and 
enforcing a few Marquess of Queensberry prohibitions. The state 
must now assume an active and positive role in the regulation of 
the whole social process. In particular, it has been forced to 
undertake an elaborate network of ‘social services’ in order to 
mitigate the consequences of economic and social inequality.36
In an article written two years after federation, Harrison Moore alluded to 
some of the practical implications of the demands of modem government for a 
country in Australia's position, as well as the impact of the demands on the old 
constitutional order:
33 See supra chapter 1.
34 Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901 -  1929 (1956), at 323
35 “Modem Constitutions”, in G V Portus (ed) Studies in the Australian Constitution (1933), at 
10. See, also, W P M Kennedy, “Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada” (1934) 46 Jurid 
Rev 203, at 207:
[There is a] growing conviction in Canada, that the development of new 
industries, natural resources, colonisation, transportation, communications, due 
to the vastness of the country, and the unremunerative character of these 
enterprises and undertakings in their early stages, imposes an obligation on the 
governments to aid and to supervise.
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The statute book abounds with instances not merely of new 
functions of administration cast upon old or new authorities, but 
with powers of a very far reaching kind. This is largely due to a 
change in the working of our constitutional forces. During the 
nineteenth century, the preparation of legislation has come to be 
one of the principal duties of the Government, and it takes its 
modem form from the fact that it is no longer devised by a body 
distinct from and jealous of the Executive, but expresses to a very 
great extent the views of the Executive as to the public needs. Thus 
we have in an ever increasing degree the delegation of a power of 
supplementary legislation to the Government . . . 37
In fact, in the years following federation, the new Commonwealth 
governments -  of all political stripes -  embarked upon a programme of regulation 
with considerable vigour. This was particularly the case with its adoption of a 
significant degree of regulation, enforced by arbitration, in the labour market. 
Insofar as the hallmark of the modem approach to legislation included, as Moore 
suggested, the delegation of law-making power to the executive, it is interesting to 
note that in the first twenty-seven years after federation, the Commonwealth 
government alone proclaimed no less than three thousand six hundred pages of 
regulations!38
Australian Scholarship and the Progressive Movement
The Moore and Duncan pieces are in fact merely part of a rich body of 
Australasian scholarship on the new style of governance, or “progressivism”, as it
36 Ibid.
37 “The Enforcement of Administrative Law”(1903) 1 Comm L Rev 13, at 14.
38 K H Bailey, “Administrative Legislation in the Commonwealth” (1930) 4 A U  7, at 9. See 
also his evidence before the Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees, 1929 -  1930, at 
18- 19.
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is often referred to . 39 This included work by W Jethro Brown,40 Alfred Deakin,41 
W Pember Reeves,42 H B Higgins4' and, in a slightly later period, Sir Frederic 
Eggleston.44 Deakin, of course, was one of the framers of the Australian 
Constitution and the second Prime Minister of the Commonwealth. Higgins was 
another framer of the Constitution, an Attorney-General, President of the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court and a Justice of the High Court. Brown and 
Reeves were professors -  Reeves subsequently to become a Director of the LSE, 
and Brown, President of the South Australian Industrial Court. Eggleston was 
variously a senior public servant, a state cabinet minister, a diplomat, and a 
founder of the Australian National University.
Read today, much of this scholarship rings of a usually charming 
chauvinism, which is probably rooted in a sense of pride and confidence at a young
39 See G Davison, “Progressivism”, entry in Davison et al (eds), The Oxford Companion to 
Australian History (1998), at 529.
40 See, eg, “The Hare System in Tasmania” (1899) 15 LQR 51, The New Democracy: A Political 
Study (1899), The Austinian Theory o f Law (1906), The Underlying Principles o f Modern 
Legislation (1912), The Prevention and Control o f Monopolies (1914), “The Separation of 
Powers in British Jurisdictions” (1921) 31 Yale LJ 24. See, generally, on Brown’s work, O M 
Roe, “Jethro Brown: The First Teacher of Law and History in the University of Tasmania” 
(1977) 5 U Tas L Rev 209 and O M Roe, Nine Australian Progressives (1984).
41 Unlike the others, Deakin did not commit his views to published form, as such. But there can 
be no doubt either as to the substance of his views or to the effect that they had on the young 
Commonwealth. See his book The Federal Story (published posthumously, 1944). See, also, his 
“secret” correspondence on behalf of the London Morning Post, a selection of which was 
published under the title Federated Australia (J A La Nauze ed, 1968). For more on his political 
views generally, see W Murdoch, Alfred Deakin: A Sketch (1923) and J A La Nauze, Alfred 
Deakin: A Biography (1965).
42 See, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (1902). On Reeves, see K Sinclair, W P 
Reeves, New Zealand Fabian (1965).
43 See A New Province for Law and Order (1922). See also J Rickard, H B Higgins, The Rebel 
as Judge (1984).
44 See State Socialism in Victoria (1932), Search For a Social Philosophy (1941), Refections of 
an Australian Liberal (1953), “A Theory of Social Integration” (unpublished MS at author’s 
death). See also W Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics (1985).
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society seeming to have accomplished so much.45 Some of the writing also 
displayed a faith in scientific progress that in many respects went beyond charming 
innocence -  eugenics and the desirability of maintaining a racially pure population 
stock formed an integral limb of much of the pre-First World War work, for 
instance.46 So, too, did some of the work have an air of proto-fascism about it.4/ 
But it is clear that it was all rooted in a desire, as Jethro Brown's biographer has put 
it, “to endow liberalism with stronger elements of social sympathy and recognition 
of human and historical complexity” .48 Eggleston described Australian 
progressivem as “constructive liberalism” .46 It was, he said, rooted in “the 
liberalism of Lloyd George and not that of Gladstone” .60 The Australian 
constructive liberal, he continued, “believes that the scope of human action can be 
enlarged by social re-organisation and cooperation, provided that the machinery 
created does not smother individual initiative and diminish personal 
responsibility” .51
Jethro Brown's work is of special interest in this respect, for it offers the 
most juridically complete vision of the new society that was being striven for. In
“5 Eggleston, for instance, wrote that “[i]n the Australian Commonwealth ... there is a political and 
social system which more nearly approaches the idea of a social laboratory than any other 
community in the world” (State Socialism in Victoria, at 5).
'6 See, eg, Reeves, supra n 42, at xxv - xxviii, 100, Roe, supra n 40, at 229.
7 In The Underlying Principles o f  Modern Legislation, for instance, Jethro Brown wrote:
A community where each individual desires to promote the common good, and 
where this desire exercises a controlling influence over his will, is a much 
higher and more efficient type of social union than a community where 
popular decisions represent a mere coincidence of a multitude of particular 
wills, each of which is bent upon some private gain ... By the proclamation and 
reiteration of such ideals, the world of sordid actualities has been transformed 
in the past and will be transformed in the future (at 146 - 147).
48 Roe, supra n 40.
79 Reflections o f an Australian Liberal, at 1.
50 Ibid.
■1 Id, at 6.
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his 1912 book, The Underlying Principles o f  Modern Legislation, he set forth a 
comprehensive argument for a new approach to law-making and parliamentary 
governance. Underlying Principles is a rambling work full of spiritual and poetic 
metaphor, which even now is infectiously exciting to read. But if one stands back 
from its prose, what emerges from the pages is a clear vision of government based 
not on spirituality, but rather on a linear rationality, and on a scientific quest for the 
improvement of humankind. In his own words, Brown’s was a project of “re­
birth”."2 First of all, he said, the old notion of legal sovereignty had to be re­
defined, to accord with modem understanding. “The older theory of sovereignty”, 
he said, “has become increasingly untenable”:
Loyalty to rulers is felt, not as loyalty to persons, but as loyalty to 
the State for which those rulers act. The making of laws by the 
legislature and their interpretation by the courts, as well as all the 
administrative actions of government, are effected by individuals 
who possess no inherent authority but derive their right to exercise 
their functions, mediately or immediately, from the community of 
which they, like the humblest citizen are a part.53
Importantly for present purposes, Brown discounted the importance of 
individual autonomy in the progressive state. The object of those in political 
power, he argued, was to determine what he described as the “social will”. But 
this was not the same thing as governing according to opinion poll. Social will 
was not to be equated with “actual will”, which Brown thought could be corrupted
■2 Supra n 40, at 107 - 110.
■ ' Id, at 132. Cf Mason CJ, in Australian Capital Television v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 
CLR 106, at 137:
The very concept of representative government and representative democracy 
signifies government by the people through their representatives. Translated 
into constitutional terms, it denotes that the sovereign power which resides in 
the people is exercised on their behalf by their representatives.
See also infra chapter 6.
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by several factors, including the population's ignorance of what was in its own best 
interests."4 In Brown's conception, the social will -  which amounted to a “true 
unity of will” 55 -  could only be detennined by legislators once they had become 
conscious of the community of interest, which might well differ from the 
community’s actual will. 56
In return, the citizen had to seek to become conscious of his dependence 
upon the collective: “The more the citizen reflects upon his daily life, the more he 
will realise how completely dependent he is, in living that life, upon the support of 
the State of which he is a member’’.'' And once the legislature had determined the 
social will, Brown thought that it was justified in acting for the benefit of citizens, 
even where the citizenry preferred to be left alone: “[T]he liberty of an individual 
may be promoted by restrictions that the State imposes upon him in his own 
interests. ” 58
The Pragmatic Element o f Australian Progressivism
In this regard, the Australian version of the programme for the new state 
was similar to that of English progressives like T H Green, L T Hobhouse (who 
was the first professor of Sociology at the LSE) and the Webbs.59 Yet, Australian
54 Reeves id, at 143 - 148.
55 Id, at 144.
56 Id, at 153.
51 Id, at 125.
58 Id, at 63.
59 See, eg, Green, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (1898), Lectures on the Principles o f  
Political Obligation (1921), and J R Rodman (ed), The Political Theory o f T H  Green (1964); 
Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction (1904), Liberalism (1911), The Elements o f  Social Justice
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progressivem differed in some important respects from English progressivem. 
For one thing, Australia had no real landed aristocracy. Nor did it have hereditary 
lower classes. So while, as in Great Britain, there was a significant degree of 
tension between wage-earning labour and those who employed it, in Australia the 
conflict tended to be grounded more strongly in simple economics, rather than in 
political class theory.
There was also a certain pragmatism in Australian progressivism, which 
allowed it to forsake some of the doctrinal purity deemed integral by English 
progressives. Pember Reeves, for example, once described Australian 
progressivism as an “ill-defined blend of Radicalism, Socialism, and Trade 
Unionism” .60 Accordingly, he said, “it is of more use to examine what the 
Progressives have done than to try to define what they believe”.6' Jethro Brown 
described his own work as “scientific, not political” .62 He contrasted it with that of 
J A Hobson, one of the leading English liberal theorists, who, he said, had a 
“militant purpose” .62 It was in this same vein that Mr Justice Higgins said of the 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration -  which was one of the Australian 
progressives' chief accomplishments64 -  that it had “nothing to do with” with 
abstract theory. Rather, it saw its duty as “to shape its conclusions on the solid
(1922); S Webb Socialism in England (1890), S & B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1914), The 
Problems o f Modern Industry (1902), A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth o f Great 
Britain (1920).
60 Supra n 42, at 91.
61 Ibid.
62 The Underlying Principles o f Modern Legislation, supra n 40, at vii.
63 Id, at 167.
64 See Sawer, supra n 34, at 40.
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anvil of existing industrial facts”.6'' The “new” Australian legislation, therefore, 
enjoyed the freedom of being able to deal with each piece of proposed legislation 
on its own merits, and without having to consider whether it fitted with some 
overall programme of “social reconstruction” .66
The point to be taken from this is that the legal and political contexts in 
which the superior courts both in Australia and Great Britain faced the new century 
was one which was really quite different from the contexts in which the doctrines 
of judicial control of administration, including the doctrine of natural justice, 
initially developed. Whereas in the old days, the courts felt more-or-less 
comfortable in applying the doctrine of natural justice in a manner unencumbered 
by technicality -  as seen, for example, in the paradigm cases of Wood v Woad and 
Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f  Works -  by the early twentieth century some 
judges would come to feel themselves on a less secure footing. Judges now found 
themselves having to balance their instinctive concern for common law values and 
the fairness of individual treatment, with evidence of a political will to accord 
primacy to the demands of collective efficiency.
65 Supra n 43, at 37. Interestingly, though he was to sit on it for twenty-two years, Higgins was 
initially opposed to the creation of the High Court. He was of the view that constitutional 
interpretation could best be carried out by the state courts and the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. See Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 9 June 1903, at 632 -  635.
66 Ibid. Probably the best analysis of the issue-by-issue nature of the “new” Australian 
legislation during this period can be found in Geoffrey Sawer’s books Australian Federal 
Politics and Law 1901 -  1929 (1956) and 1929 -  1949 (1963).
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A DOCTRINE IN TRANSITION
Municipal Council of Sydney v Harris
A neat illustration of the theoretical tensions involved in attempting to 
balance the progressive project with common law assumptions, and of the path 
that natural justice was to take from the older, more fluid, form it occupied in the 
nineteenth century and before, to the more restrictive conception that came to 
characterise it in parts of this century can be seen in the different judgments in 
the now usually-overlooked 1912 judgment of the High Court in Municipal 
Council o f Sydney v Harris f
In light of the authorities considered in the last chapter, Municipal 
Council o f Sydney v Harris is not at all exceptional in its result. Griffith CJ and 
Barton and Isaacs JJ concurred in holding that someone whose substantive rights 
in real property were to be interfered with by the executive had a procedural right 
to a hearing before this could take place. But what is striking about the case is 
that there were three different approaches to the question of why natural justice 
applied. Griffith CJ’s was very much a judgment cast in the old, “paradigm” 
tradition, in which natural justice would be held applicable as a matter of 
common law reflex to protect private property rights. Barton J’s view was 
similar, but he tempered his approach with an acknowledgment that modem 
legislation sometimes demanded that common law rights be curtailed in the
67 14CLR 1.
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name of the collective good. The judgment of Isaacs J, in contrast, revealed an 
awareness of the changing legislative landscape, and a willingness to take 
account of governmental context in determining whether traditional natural 
justice rights were to be accorded.
Harris involved a set of stables in Sydney, owned by Sir Matthew Harris, 
a prominent municipal politician.'^ Section 84 of the Sydney Corporation Act 
1902 (NSW) gave the City Surveyor the authority to issue condemnation notices 
against buildings and to require their repair at the owner’s expense. If an owner 
of a condemned building proved to be recalcitrant, the Act provided that the City 
Council could direct the Surveyor to carry out the work himself, with the 
expenses to be borne by the owner. Such an order was made against Harris’s 
stables. But rather than carrying out the work, Harris disputed the accuracy of 
the Surveyor’s conclusions, and his solicitor wrote to the City Council 
requesting a hearing to “[furnish] evidence to show that the stables in question 
are not in a ruinous state as alleged in the said notice”.64 The Council refused the 
request and issued a direction to the City Surveyor to carry out the repair work at 
Harris’s expense. Harris then obtained a writ of mandamus from the Supreme 
Court, directing the Council to hear him.70 The City, in turn, appealed to the 
High Court.
68 Harris (1841 -  1917) sat on the Sydney Municipal Council between 1883 -  1900, and served 
as mayor between 1898 -  1900. From 1894 -  1901, he also represented Sydney-Denison on the 
Legislative Assembly.
69 14CLR, at 2.
70 Ex parte Sir Matthew Harris (1911) 11 SR(NSW) 524.
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As has been said, Griffith CJ’s judgment echoed the tone of the
nineteenth century paradigm cases. He stated simply:
The general rule of law is that a person so circumstanced -  that is, 
who is liable to be called upon by some public authority to incur a 
heavy burden or loss -  is entitled to be heard and to have the 
opportunity of giving reasons why such an order should not be 
made and enforced against him. 71
The Chief Justice then referred to Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works 
and other nineteenth century cases72 as authority for the proposition that it did 
not matter that the City Council was not a court. He said:
[The obligation to observe natural justice] is not confined ... to 
strictly judicial proceedings, but applies to any case in which a 
person or public body is invested with authority to decide. 
Whenever a public body is entrusted with power to decide 
whether a person shall suffer pecuniary loss the principle 
applies. 77
In fact, all three judges made liberal reference to Cooper v Wandsworth 
Board o f Works and its nineteenth century sisters. Barton J, for example, said: 
“That the right to be heard is not confined to cases where the proceeding is 
strictly judicial is shown in the case of Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works.”1* 
He said that on the basis of the Common Pleas’ decision in Cooper, “the 
principle [of audi alteram partem] therefore applies to this class of case unless it 
can be gathered from the terms of the statute that the legislature intended it to be
71 14 CLR, at 5.
72 Including Wood v Wood (1874) LR 9 Ex 190 and Hopkins v Smethwick Local Board o f Health 
(1890) 24 QBD 712. Griffith CJ also referred to Lapointe v L ’Association de Bienfaissance et 
de Retraite la Police de Montreal [1906] AC 535.
14 CLR, at 7 -  8. See also Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90, at 104 and 145 -  146, where 
Barton ACJ and Powers J used similar language.
74 14 CLR, at 9 -  10.
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exercised without giving the owner an opportunity of being heard.”7" But where 
a statute is silent on the matter of a hearing right, he said, “the courts will not 
assume that the legislature intended to prohibit it, unless such intention can be 
gathered from the statute by clear implication” .76
Isaacs J also cited Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works, 11 but he took a 
slightly different view of the legal context. Unlike the Chief Justice and Barton 
J, he attributed the obligation to accord natural justice (and, implicitly, the right 
to engage in judicial review for procedural unfairness) to a presumption of the 
intent of the legislature. This represented a discernible move away from the 
“natural” sense of the doctrine’s basis, as had been expressed in the paradigm 
cases:
[I]f the requirement of a direction by the Council concerns 
primarily and ultimately the property and mutual obligations of 
others, it is plain on ordinary principles of construction that the 
persons affected must have some opportunity to be heard in their 
own defence.78
The differences in approach to the question of the source of natural 
justice obligations between the three judges in Harris will be returned to in 
chapter seven. But notwithstanding differences as to the ultimate source of the 
duty, as to result the Court was ad idem: in circumstances like these, where a 
public body was to deprive an owner of the full enjoyment of his property, there 
was an obligation to provide some sort of a hearing. Of the three, though, only
75 14CLR, at 10 -11 .
76 14CLR, at 11.
77 14 CLR, at 15.
78 14 CLR, at 14.
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Isaacs J ventured to offer a view as to exactly what sort of a hearing was
required:
No formalities are necessary here. All that is required is a full 
and fair opportunity of putting the case before Council ...
The proper method of procedure depends, of course, largely on 
the nature, constitution and ordinary course of practice of the 
body to whom the power is entrusted. All that must be taken to 
be held in view by the legislature when creating the power and the 
connoted duty, and to be part of the implication. Natural justice 
looks only to substance, not to form. If form is necessary that 
must be founded on other considerations than natural justice.71'
It is also significant, and perhaps not surprising, that of the three 
members of the High Court, it was Isaacs J who expressed himself in “new” 
terms. Sir Owen Dixon once described Sir Samuel Griffith as a “legal mind of 
the Austinian age, representing the thoughts and learning of a period which had 
gone.”8" Geoffrey Saw er described him as “right of centre” in his approach to 
collectivist legislation. 81 Isaacs J, in contrast, once said that he thought it was 
“the duty of the Judiciary to recognise the development of the nation and to 
apply established principles to the new positions which the nation in its progress 
from time to time assumes. ” 82 Otherwise, he said, “[t]he judicial organ would 
otherwise separate itself from the progressive life of the community and act as a
79 14CLR, at 15 - 16.
80 “Address upon the occasion of retiring from the office of Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia”, in Jesting Pilate (1965) 255, at 258.
81 Supra n 34, at 55, n 129.
s: Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421, at 438 
-439.
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clog upon the legislative and executive departments rather than as an 
interpreter.”*3
Board of Education v Rice and the “Thinning” of Procedural Rights
The first of the “thinning” cases, which symbolised the beginning of the 
first of natural justice’s twentieth century phases, was the decision of the House 
of Lords the year before Harris, in Board o f Education v Rice*4 Rice was a 
judgment of the House of Lords in the pre-World War I period of Liberal reform 
ascendancy. H H Asquith had become Prime Minister in 1908, and together 
with Haldane, David Lloyd George and the young Winston Churchill in his 
cabinet, he embarked on a concentrated programme of reform, much of which 
involved the expansion of the executive powers of the central government. As 
all know, this soon led to a constitutional clash with the Lords (in their political 
capacity) of monumental proportions, but in his speech in Rice -  which Robert 
Stevens described as “gently chiding”85 -  the Liberal Lord Chancellor Lorebum 
gave a clear indication of the judicial attitude towards social legislation that the 
Asquith government wished to foster.86
The issue in Board o f Education v Rice was whether mandamus would 
issue against the Board of Education, to require it to determine whether a local
83 Ibid.
84 [1911] AC 179.
85 R Stevens, Law and Politics: The House o f Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800 -  1976 (1979), at 
178.
86 Though it should be noted that the controversy in Rice actually involved a piece of legislation 
passed by the preceding Conservative administration.
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school authority was avoiding its duty under the Education Act 1902 to maintain 
the efficiency of its schools, by pennitting lower salaries to be paid to teachers in 
church-associated schools than in state-run ones. For reasons which are not clear 
from the report of the case, but which presumably reflect the political sensitivity 
of the matters in issue (Cozens-Hardy MR, for example, said that the passage of 
the Education Act had “effected a revolution”87), the Board of Education 
declined to rule on the issues placed before it by the voluntary schools. The 
voluntary schools succeeded in obtaining a writ of mandamus against the Board 
from the Divisional Court,88 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.89 The 
Board then appealed to the House of Lords.
The actual issue for decision in Rice, therefore, was not whether natural 
justice applied. It was accepted that some sort of a duty of fairness was 
incumbent on the Board. Rather, the question was whether mandamus would 
issue against the Board of Education, requiring it to make a decision. But in the 
course of discussing whether the prerogative remedy of mandamus would issue 
against an entity like the Board, Lord Lorebum LC delivered what came for 
several decades to be one of the most commonly quoted judgments in English 
administrative law. He began by discussing the changed context of the 
determination of “questions” by the executive government, which had come 
about as a result of the increased involvement of the state in private life:
87 [1910] 2 KB, at 172.
88 [1909] 2 KB 1045.
89 [1910] 2 KB 165 (sub nom R v Board o f Education).
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Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not 
originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers 
of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various 
kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for 
determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, 
involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an 
administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter [sic] of 
law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law 
alone.90
Having done this, his Lordship noted the actual procedural obligation that 
arose in the circumstances -  what was incumbent upon these new types of 
decision-makers in order for them to satisfy the demands of procedural fairness. 
It is interesting to note how similar it was to what Isaacs J had said in Municipal 
Council o f Sydney v Harris:9'
In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the 
law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing 
either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, 
for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But 
I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it 
were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need 
not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way 
they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are 
parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any 
relevant statement prejudicial to their view.92
90 [1911] AC, at 182.
91 Quoted supra 78. In light of the fact that Board o f Education v Rice preceded Harris, it is 
interesting to note that Rice was not referred to by any of the judges in the High Court. This 
seems to have been a not uncommon phenomenon in Australian administrative law -  which 
perhaps should lead to a re-evaluation of the commonly-held assumption that until very recently 
a “cultural cringe” monopolised the Australian judicial mind. There have been at least four 
instances where the High Court did not consider recent decisions of the House of Lords in 
important administrative law cases. Apart from this one, they were Metropolitan Meat Industry 
Board v Finlayson (1916) 22 CLR 340 (failing to consider Local Government Board v Arlidge 
[1915] AC 120. See infra 83 f f ) ,  Testro Brothers Pty Ltd v Tait (1963) 109 CLR 353 (failing to 
consider Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. See infra chapter 4), and Craig v South Australia 
(1995) 184 CLR 163 (failing to consider R v Hull University Visitor, Ex parte Page [1993] AC 
682).
92 [1911] AC, at 182. On this in an Australian context, see also Randall v Northcote Corporation 
(1910) 11 CLR 100, at 105 - 106, in which Griffith CJ held that while natural justice per se did 
not attach to the proceedings of a town council, the councillors nevertheless had a general duty 
to make decisions in accordance with “the rule of reason and justice, not according to private
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All of this was, strictly speaking, obiter dicta?' But Lord Lorebum’s 
speech in Board o f Education v Rice nevertheless came to have an important 
effect in later years in shaping the scope of the obligation to observe natural 
justice. It did so in two different ways -  which in some respects sit in opposition 
to one another. First, by saying that the duty lay upon “every one who decides 
anything” -  in other words, by describing in broad terms the circumstances in 
which the duty was present -  he was providing ammunition for those who were 
in favour of continued judicial involvement in the review of the work of the 
executive. 94
At the same time, by making the same point that Isaacs J had made in 
Sydney Corporation v Harris, namely that natural justice ought not to be viewed 
as a synonym for the judicial process, he was overtly injecting a note of 
“thinness” into the doctrine. When taken with their Lordships’ actual holding on 
the matters in issue -  that when it heard the dispute, it would be permissible for 
the Board to countenance discriminatory treatment of the church schools, 
provided only that their efficiency was not impaired, which was something for
opinion”, and must not be “arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular” (quoting Lord 
Halsbury, in Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173, at 179).
93 Moreover, it was a point which the respondent voluntary schools were not called upon to 
argue.
94 See, eg, Dicey's note, “The Development of Administrative Law in England” (1915) 31 LQR 
148. This piece is sometimes taken as an admission by Dicey that he had been wrong in denying 
that a droit administratif was alien to English legal culture, but it is instructive to remember that 
in the very first paragraph, he asserted a robust claim for judicial control of the executive. He 
said that the principle arising from Board o f Education v Rice was that “any power conferred 
upon a Government department by statute must be exercised in strict conformity with the terms 
of the statute, and that any action by such department which is not so exercised should be treated 
by a court of law as invalid”.
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the Board to decide92 -  this added fuel to the fire of those who opposed judicial 
involvement in the administrative process. For anti-judicial reviewists, this 
proved to be the lever with which the procedural impositions of natural justice 
could be pared back. Indeed, in a way, the subsequent story of natural justice 
can be described as a fight between the two competing visions inherent in Lord 
Lorebum’s speech.
The Arlidge Case and the Haldane/Shaw View of Procedural Fairness
The Liberal reformist line of deference to the executive was made even 
more plain, three years later, in the House of Lords’ judgment in Local 
Government Board v Arlidge Arlidge was heard by what we would today 
describe as a “stacked” bench.97 Viscount Haldane LC deliberately chose a panel 
of Law Lords (himself, 98 Shaw," Moulton100 and Parmoor101) who had all been 
active Liberal politicians. He wanted to ensure that the government's reformist 
programme received a sympathetic hearing. 102 And in this respect, he succeeded. 
The speeches in Arlidge, particularly those of Lords Haldane and Shaw, took the
98 On the issue of whether discrimination between schools was permissible, his Lordship said:
I do not find anything ... in the statute itself which prohibits the local authority 
from doing for some schools more than it does for others, even if the 
circumstances are indistinguishable ([1911] AC, at 183).
96 [1915] AC 120, rev’g [1914] 1 KB 160 (CA), rev’g [1913] 1 KB 463.
97 Supra n 85, at 198.
98 MP 1885 - 191 1, LC 1912 - 15. Lord Haldane was in his day widely credited with having 
great skill at, and faith in, the science of public administration. See Sir J Anderson, 
Administrative Technique in the Public Service (1949).
99 MP 1892 - 1909.
100 MP 1885 - 86, 1894 - 95, 1890 - 1906.
101 Conservative MP 1895 - 1914, but thereafter he voted as a Liberal in the House of Lords. 
Parmoor was, some may be interested to note, the father of Sir Stafford Cripps, and the brother 
in law of Beatrice Webb.
102 He is also alleged to have done the same in Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1915] 1 Ch 274 (Prof 
W R Cornish to author, 30 October 1998).
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“thinning” aspect of Lord Lorebum’s speech in Rice much further. As Stevens 
put it, the decision in Arlidge “removed any serious threat that the courts might 
exercise even procedural due process over departments of the central 
government”.103
Local Government Board v Arlidge involved a statutory scheme not 
dissimilar to that in issue in Sydney Corporation v Harris. The Housing and 
Town Planning Act 1909 conferred upon local authorities the power to make 
closing orders in respect of any dwellings which they found to be unfit for 
human habitation. Arlidge was the owner of a house which had been made the 
subject of a closing order. He appealed the order to the Local Government 
Board. A public hearing was duly held by an inspector on behalf of the Board, at 
which Arlidge and his solicitor were in attendance, and at which Arlidge gave 
evidence. When the Local Government Board upheld the closing order, Arlidge 
applied for a writ of certiorari, on the basis, inter alia, that he had been denied 
natural justice. He argued that he was entitled to know the identities of the 
actual decision-makers within the Board and to appear in person before the 
Board before it made a determination in his case.
Arlidge had lost at first instance,104 but had succeeded on appeal.10" In his 
judgment in the Court of Appeal, Hamilton LJ106 said “[b]y all means let the 
appellant and the Local Authority too, if it wishes see and address the judge, it is
103 M a t 192.
104 [1913] 1 KB 463.
105 [1914] 1 KB 160.
106 Later Lord Sumner.
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all in his day’s work”.107 He also suggested that the decision-making process 
could benefit from more openness: “Time spent in removing a grievance or in 
avoiding the sense of it,” he said, “is time well spent, and the Board’s officials 
will, like good judges, amplify their jurisdiction by rooting it in the public 
confidence.”10^ In the House of Lords, however, Viscount Haldane LC began 
with an admonishment about paying attention to the different juridical context 
involved in the new types of case. While there was no doubt in his mind that the 
matter before the Local Government Board was one affecting property rights, 
this alone was not enough to dispose of the issue -  at least not in 1914. For the 
reality, his Lordship said, was that the nature of parliamentary goals had changed 
with the onset of the modem age. At one time, the preservation of individual 
liberty may have been the paramount concern of legislation. But parliament now 
considered “higher interests than those of the individual”.100 Accordingly, it was 
“dangerous for judges to lay much stress on what a hundred years ago would 
have been a presumption considerably stronger than it is today”.110 As will be 
seen, statements like this about “the new legislation” came to play a highly 
significant role in clipping natural justice's wings during the twilight phase.
107 [1914] 1 KB, at 203 -204.
108 Ibid. The full passage reads as follows:
[I]f it was our function to advise the Local Government Board as to its 
procedure generally, or to criticise the procedure actually adopted as such, I 
should for my part suggest that the more open the procedure is the better. By 
all means let both the appellant and the Local Authority see the inspector’s 
reports; a discreet and careful officer is not likely to offend, and if, in spite of 
discretion and care, he is harassed by actions for libel he may well be defended 
and indemnified by his Department. By all means let the appellant, and the 
Local Authority too, if it wishes, see and address the judge, it is all in his day’s 
work. By all means let the appellant have the last word and as many of them 
in reason as he likes. Time spent in removing a grievance or in avoiding the 
sense of it, is time well spent, and the Board’s officials will, like good judges, 
amplify their jurisdiction by rooting it in the public confidence.
109 [1915] AC, at 130.
1,0 [1915] AC, at 130 - 131.
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In Lord Haldane’s view, natural justice was required to be observed by 
the Local Government Board, but this did not include the trappings of the 
ordinary judicial process. “The decision must be come to in the spirit and with 
the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice”, he 
said,111 but “what [the] procedure is to be in detail must depend upon the nature 
of the tribunal”.112 In this case, he noted that the Local Government Board was 
an entity charged with “executive functions” which were required to be carried 
out “in the interests of the community”.11' This negated any obligation on the 
part of the Board to provide an opportunity for people to appear before it in 
person. And since the Board was represented in Parliament by a responsible 
minister, there was no requirement to identify individual decision-makers.
So, too, did Lord Parmoor hold that the requirements of natural justice 
(which he called “substantial justice”114) had been satisfied in the 
circumstances,11" as did Lord Moulton."6 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline (who had 
also sat on Board of Education v Rice) was strongest of all, though, in his 
denunciation of the notion that Arlidge had any more procedural rights than he 
had already been given. He described Arlidge’s claim that he had a right to
111 [1915] AC, at 132.
112 Ibid.
1,3Ibid.
114 [1915] AC, at 140.
115 [1915] AC, at 142.
116 [1915] AC, at 146- 147.
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know the identity of the actual decision-maker as a “grotesque demand to 
individualise the department for private purposes” . " 7
With respect to the question of natural justice and the Board more 
generally, Lord Shaw allowed that “when a central administrative board deals 
with an appeal from a local authority it must do its best to act justly, and to reach 
just ends by just means.”"s But he rejected completely the suggestion that the 
proceedings of the Board could be likened in any significant respect to those of a 
judicial tribunal. The curial model could in some cases provide a guide to 
administrative tribunals, but “that the judiciary should presume to impose its 
own methods on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the 
assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of Courts 
of justice is wholly unfounded. ” " 9
He then dealt the mortal blow -  and sounded the clarion call for those at 
both ends of the political spectrum who were concerned about the intersection of 
the judicial process and the bureaucracy:
In so far as the term ‘natural justice’ means that a result or process 
should be just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding 
expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus naturale it 
is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a 
term employed for other distinctions; and, in so far as it is 
resorted to for other purposes, it is vacuous. 120
117 [1915] AC, at 136.
118 [1915] AC, at 138.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
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In these respects, Local Government Board v Arlidge is possibly of more 
jurisprudential interest than Board o f Education v Rice.m Lord Lorebum’s 
speech in Rice has tended to be more frequently quoted than Lord Shaw’s in 
Arlidge, but the explicit doctrinal relaxation in Lord Shaw’s formulation of the 
obligations associated with the doctrine of procedural fairness, together with the 
sheer forcefulness of his language, served to stake out the boundaries of the 
conflict that would dog the doctrine for forty years.
THE HIGH COURT AND THE NEW LEGISLATION
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Finlay son
An Australian bedfellow of Local Government Board v Arlidge, but 
which in fact went even further in thinning out the obligations of procedural 
fairness in governmental decision-making processes, was the judgment in 1916 
(a year after Arlidge) in Metropolitan Meat Board v Finlay son.n2 It is
interesting to see how, in Finlayson's Case, the “legislature-centric” view of the 
duty to observe natural justice which had been hinted at in the judgment of 
Isaacs J in Metropolitan Council o f Sydney v Harris was further developed.
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Finlayson involved the 
interpretation of the Meat Industry Act 1915 (NSW). The Act made it an offence
121 For another example of this “thinning” of the requirements of natural justice in action by their 
Lordships, see De Verteuil v Knaggs [1918] AC 557 (PC, Trin) and Wilson v Esquimcilt and 
Nanaimo Railway Company [1922] AC 202 (PC, Can).
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to operate private abattoirs in the Sydney metropolitan area, except with 
permission of the Metropolitan Meat Industry Board, which was established by 
the Act to oversee the meat industry. Finlayson was the owner and operator of a 
private abattoir. When he applied to the Board for permission to continue to 
operate his meat-slaughtering business, he was refused. When asked the reasons 
why, the Board replied simply that it “was not prepared to supply the particulars 
requested” . 123 Finlayson applied to court for a writ of mandamus, complaining 
that he had been denied a fair hearing. Finlayson was in fact a test case -  there 
were a series of appeals on the same point pending before the Court. 124
A review of the parliamentary debates on the Bill makes it clear that the 
intent of the legislature was to create a scheme to oversee the operation of the 
slaughtering industry in Sydney, as a means of accomplishing several “new” 
legislative goals, including pollution abatement, improving the quality of meat 
on the market, and responding to concerns about cruelty to animals. 125 
Nevertheless, what strikes one about Finlayson is just how deferential the judges 
of the High Court126 were when faced with this example of new (or, as Isaacs J 
called it, “novel” 12 ) legislation which dealt with something other than a formal 
property right in the strict legal sense. This was in sharp contrast not only to the 
approach that had been taken by Griffith CJ in Harris just a few years earlier, but
1:2 (1916) 22 CLR 340 (rev’g Ex parte Finlayson (1916) 16 SR(NSW) 591).
122 The facts of the case are summarised in the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales, 16 SR(NSW), at 597 - 598.
124 See 22 CLR, at 344.
I2:’ See the second reading speech of the Hon G Black, Colonial Secretary, New South Wales 
Parliamentary’ Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 November 1915, at 3545 -  3548.
126 Griffiths CJ, Barton, Isaacs and Rich JJ.
127 22 CLR, at 345.
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also to the way in which the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales had viewed Finlayson’s position.
In the Supreme Court, all three judges held that the rules of natural 
justice were applicable -  on the basis of an application of Local Government 
Board v Arlidge. Pring J, for example, quoted extensively from the speeches, 
and said that in their light, the Board had failed in its duty to Finlayson and his 
colleagues: “The applicant's right of property was at stake. Nevertheless, he was 
not informed by the Board what reason they had for destroying that property” . 128 
The High Court, in contrast, saw this as a simple case in which absolute 
discretion had been given to the Metropolitan Meat Industry Board, which 
displaced completely any procedural or other obligations to private abattoir 
operators. And while Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works, Harris, Rice and 
Arlidge were all referred to by counsel in argument, none of these authorities 
were referred to in the judgments. Griffith CJ, for example, simply said: “These 
words are plain enough. On their face they mean that the business of 
slaughtering cattle in the metropolitan district is to be a government monopoly, 
except in so far as the Board may consent to its being carried on by private 
persons. ” 129
Finlayson 's Case can possibly be explained as one of wartime exigency. 
But it shows how, when faced with (again, to use Isaacs J’s expression) a novel 
legislative provision, the Court could be moved to adopt a standoff-ish attitude
128 16 SR(NSW), at 601.
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towards the doctrine of natural justice, even where common law rights and 
freedoms (here, the freedom to carry on business1,0) were being infringed. But 
what of the case where the Court was faced with the infringement of interests 
which fell short of property or common law rights? Taken on its face, Lord 
Lorebum’s speech in Rice would suggest that a duty of fairness would attach to 
“everyone who decides anything”. But what if this conflicted with a statutory 
provision which seemed to vest the government with the right to make decisions 
without any hearing? This was the question posed by Gillen v Laffer.
Gillen v Laffer
Gillen v Laffef31 involved the interpretation of the South Australian 
Crown Lands Acts 1915 -  1919 and Discharged Soldiers Settlement Acts 1917 -  
1919. Under the latter Acts, provision was made for the sale of unalienated 
Crown lands to returned men, the purchase price being paid by long-term 
instalments. The agreements of purchase and sale contained a standard clause 
whereby in the event of default, the agreement would be rescinded and title 
would automatically re-vest in the Crown. The agreements also contained a 
clause which provided that if, within the first ten years from the date of sale, the 
Minister was “satisfied on such evidence as he deem[ed] sufficient” that the 
returned soldier was not capable of properly managing the land, then the 
Minister could rescind the agreement. 132
129 22 CLR, at 343.
130 See R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052.
131 (1925) 37 CLR 210 (rev’g [1924] SASR514).
132 See 37 CLR, ar 212.
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Gillen was a returned soldier, who had purchased a parcel of land through 
this scheme. But he had defaulted, and was thought by the government to have 
thereby indicated an unfitness properly to manage the land. The issue for the 
courts was whether, before re-taking possession, the Crown had to provide 
Gillen with a hearing of any sort. Today, there would be little doubt that Gillen 
would have a right to be accorded natural justice.1" In 1925, though, the issue 
was not so straightforward.
As one might have expected, some judges in the High Court saw Gillen v 
Laffer as a Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works sort of case, in which property 
rights were at stake, and in which, ipso facto, natural justice applied. Knox CJ, 
for example, tracked the language used by Griffith CJ in Harris. He said: “I 
think the case is one in which the maxim audi alteram partem applies ... The 
Minister is a person invested by law with authority to adjudicate upon a matter 
with civil consequences to an individual”.134 Similarly, Rich J said that “[t]he 
nature of the thing done -  deprivation of property -  implies a judicial act,” and 
hence, an obligation to observe the rules of natural justice.135 Higgins J, however 
(with whom the Privy Council agreed on further appeal136), saw the case
133 See infra chapter 5 (though also c f “Sydney” Training Depot Snapper Island Ltd v Minister 
fo r  Sport, Recreation and Tourism (1987) 14 ALD 464).
134 37 CLR, at 220 (quoting, without reference, Kelly CB in Wood v Woad (1874) LR 9 Ex 190, 
at 196. See supra chapter 1, at 30).
135 37 CLR, at 229. On this question of defining an act as judicial, and hence reviewable, by 
reference to its effect, see also Rich J’s views in R v Commonwealth Rent Controller, Ex Parte 
National Mutual Life Association (1947) 75 CLR 361, at 373 (discussed infra chapter 3).
136 [1927] AC 886 (sub nom Laffer v Gillen).
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differently. This was not, in his view, the type of case in which the law was
being called upon to defend ordinary rights in property.
To Higgins J, this was an archetypal “new legislation” case, in which 
interests other than the rights of a fee-holding citizen and the state inter se were 
involved:
The imagination must grasp the concrete position. The power [to 
rescind sales] is confined to the first ten years, as years of 
probation; the contract is one in which the chief object of the 
vendor is to benefit the purchaser, because the purchaser is a man 
who served in the Great War; the facts of which the Minister is to 
be satisfied involve issues of such a character as might lead to 
endless debate; and the Minister, as administrator, is under a duty 
to other returned soldiers to see that the first holder is not 
blocking them without advantage to himself, and under a duty to 
the State to see that its generosity be not wasted.137
So rather than being a property case, this was in his opinion one of “mere 
contractual relation”.138 In 1925, natural justice rights were bound up in the 
notion of “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” decision-making.130 Accordingly, he said 
that “nothing is further from the intendment of this clause than a judicial or 
quasi-judicial inquiry”.140 As noted, the Privy Council agreed with Higgins J.141 
Their Lordships -  who, significantly, included both Lord Haldane and Lord 
Shaw -  said that it was “obvious that the authorities contemplated that amongst 
the more or less experimental cases there would be a certain number of
137 37 CLR, at 225 - 226.
138 37 CLR, at 227.
139 See infra 114 ff.
140 37 CLR, at 225.
141 See [1927] AC, at 896.
93
failures” 142 and that parliament had “intended to put into the hands of the 
responsible minister means whereby such cases might be readily dealt with, and, 
if necessary, a fresh start made.” 143
Boucaut Bay Co Ltd v The Commonwealth
Two years after its judgment in Gillen v Laffer, the High Court was again 
called upon to determine the extent to which natural justice attached to “novel” 
relations between the state and the citizen. The issue in Boucaut Bay Co Ltd v 
The Commonwealth144 was whether a Minister had to provide a hearing to 
someone before rescinding their contract to provide a coastal shipping service in 
the Northern Territory. The contract contained a “state of mind” provision 
respecting termination: if the Minister was of the view that the agreement was 
not properly being carried out by the contractor, he could rescind it with a 
month's notice. Speaking for a unanimous Court,14’' Isaacs ACJ said that whether 
a hearing was required depended upon a contextual interpretation both of the 
contractual provision and of the Minister’s decision-making resources. This 
was, of course, quite different from the Griffith view that natural justice applied 
“whenever a public body [was] entrusted with power to decide whether a person 
shall suffer pecuniary loss. ” 146
142 [1927] AC, at 895.
143 Ibid.
144 (1927) 40 CLR98.
143 Isaacs ACJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich JJ.
146 Municipal Council o f Sydney v Harris, 14 CLR, at 5.
94
As to the process of interpreting the contract, Isaacs ACJ said: “[I]n 
interpreting [the termination] clause, the surrounding circumstances have to be 
considered. The services contracted for had to be performed in a part of the 
Commonwealth remote from the Seat of Government, sparsely settled and with 
poor means of communication, and with not improbable necessity for emergent 
action.”14 As to the latter factor, he continued: “The Minister ... would be 
dependent in most cases on departmental officers. He would call for inquiries 
and they would send him their reports. He could be trusted to act impartially and 
honourably ...”148
Again, this sort of contextual sensitivity reads very differently from the 
absolutist tones seen in the paradigm cases. To reiterate, this first phase in the 
twentieth century evolution of natural justice showed a development of a 
comparatively sophisticated view amongst some judges of the place of common 
law principles vis ä vis new legislative goals. Particularly notable in this respect 
in the Australian context were the judgments of Isaacs and Higgins JJ. But with 
the onset of the second phase in the latter part of the 1920s, this sort of curial 
sensitivity seemed to fade from view.
147 40 CLR, at 105.
I4s Ibid. See also on this point his judgment in Moreau v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 
(1926) 39 CLR 65, in which he expressed faith in the fairness and impartiality of the upper ranks 
in the Public Service.
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THE CONFUSION OF A DOCTRINE: THE ELECTRICITY 
COMMISSIONERS FORMULATION
In fact, it was an English case, wrestling with this same problem of how 
to view non-proprietary interests for judicial review purposes, that served to 
hasten the end of the first phase. This was the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
1924, in R v Electricity Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint 
Committee, 149 Leaving aside for a moment the actual holding, the Electricity 
Commissioners case came to stand for the proposition1''1' that in order for writs of 
certiorari or prohibition to issue against an executive decision-maker -  in other 
words, in order for there to be a legally enforceable obligation to observe the 
rules of natural justice -  the decision-maker not only had to have power to affect 
a citizen’s legal rights, but he or she also had to have a “superadded” duty to act 
judicially. This was a highly significant development, for not only did it cut 
directly against the grain of the nineteenth century case-law, but it seemed to 
amount to a refutation of the formulation offered by Lord Lorebum in Board of 
Education v Rice that “anyone who decided anything” had an obligation to be 
fair (however thin this obligation may have been in the circumstances) in the 
course of so doing.151
149 [1924] 1 KB 171.
150 See, eg, W Friedmann, Principles o f Australian Administrative Law (1950), at 82.
151 A curious thing about this case -  as with Rice -  was that the actual holding ought to have 
suggested something quite different. In fact, were anyone today who was unfamiliar with its 
legacy closely to parse Electricity Commissioners, they would almost certainly come to a very 
different conclusion about what propositions the case stands for. We see it as a limitation on 
judicial review, but its contemporaries saw it differently. John Willis, for instance, described 
Electricity Commissioners as an “enlargement of the powers of the court” (“Three Approaches to 
Administrative Law”, infra n 200, at 63).
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R v Electricity Commissioners was in many ways the paradigm case to 
emerge from the new legislation. The Electricity (Supply) Act 1919 created a 
body known as the Electricity Commissioners. The intention, as set out in sub­
section 1(1) of the Act, was to establish a professional tribunal to “promote, 
regulate, and supervise the supply of electricity” within the United Kingdom. In 
the event that the Electricity Commissioners were of the view that the supply of 
electricity in any electricity district was in need of improvement, they could, 
following public consultation with those concerned, devise a scheme for the 
creation of an entity known as a “joint electricity authority” with some power to 
take over the assets and liabilities of the pre-existing providers of electricity 
within the district.
A controversy arose over the provision of electricity to greater London. 
In the process of the Electricity Commissioners’ consultation over the 
establishment of a joint electricity authority for London, a disagreement arose 
between the London County Council and the private companies that had hitherto 
been providing electricity to London. The LCC was insistent that there be only 
one joint electricity authority for greater London, whereas the companies were 
equally insistent that there be at least two.1"2 The Electricity Commissioners’ 
chosen solution was to attempt a compromise of sorts by creating a single 
London and Home Counties Joint Electricity Authority, but then requiring in its 
scheme that the Joint Authority delegate most of its effective authority to two
152 The facts are set out at [1924] 1 KB, at 172 - 180. One wonders whether the fact that eight 
pages were devoted by the editors of the Law Reports to the facts, itself speaks to the novelty of 
the dispute.
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sub-committees. The Joint Electricity Authority sought a writ of prohibition 
against the Electricity Commissioners, to prevent them from proceeding further 
with the scheme. The Commissioners, in response, argued that since they were 
not a judicial body, and that since theirs was not a judicial proceeding, the 
prerogative writ of prohibition should not issue.
The Court of Appeal found that the proposed order was ultra vires, on the 
basis that the Commissioners did not have the power to require a delegation, and 
prohibition was issued. All three Lords Justices spoke, but Atkin LJ’s judgment 
has become known as the leading one. “It is to be noted”, he said,
that [the prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition] deal with 
questions of excessive jurisdiction, and doubtless in their origin 
dealt almost exclusively with the jurisdiction of what is described 
in ordinary parlance as a Court of Justice. But the operation of 
the writs has extended to control the proceedings of bodies which 
do not claim to be, and would not be recognised as, Courts of 
Justice. Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to 
determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having 
the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they 
are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench 
Division exercised in these writs. 153
The problem was in Atkin LJ’s use of the conjunction “and”, in 
formulating the circumstances in which the prerogative writs would lie: “any 
body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights 
of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially.” In later cases, it came to be 
taken as a requirement that before an obligation to observe natural justice could 
exist, a double threshold had to be met. Gone were the easy formulations of
153 [1924] 1 KB, at 205.
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Lord Lorebum in Board o f Education v Rice and Griffiths CJ in Municipal 
Council o f Sydney v Harris that natural justice was required of “anyone who 
decides anything” ,1 4 or that it applied in “any case in which a person is invested 
with authority to decide” ." 5 Now, not only did the decision-maker have to have 
the power to affect rights, but there also had to be some external indication that 
the decision-maker was to behave in a judge-like fashion when exercising this 
power. In R v Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, Ex parte Haynes- 
Smith, decided a few years later, Lord Hewart CJ discussed the Electricity 
Commissioners decision. “In order that a body may satisfy the required test”, 
Lord Hewart said,
it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine 
questions affecting the rights of subjects; there must be 
superadded to that characteristic the further characteristic that the 
body has the duty to act judicially. " 6
His Lordship continued:
The duty to act judicially is an ingredient which, if the test is to be 
satisfied, must be present. As these writs in the earlier days were 
issued only to bodies which without any harshness of construction 
could be called, and naturally would be called Courts, so also to­
day these writs do not issue except to bodies which act or are 
under the duty to act in a judicial capacity.1"
In other words, it came to be assumed that in order for the obligation to 
observe procedural fairness to be triggered, the decision-maker not only had to
154 [1911] AC, at 182.
155 14CLR, at 7.
156 [1928] 1 KB 411, at 415 (holding that the writs of certiorari and prohibition would not issue 
to stop implementation of a new Prayer Book).
157 Ibid.
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have the power to call upon a citizen to bear a burden or loss,'"s but his decision­
making process also had to resemble that of a court. In the case before Lord 
Hewart, for example, neither the National Assembly of the Church of England 
nor its Legislative Committee were found to be amenable to the writ of 
prohibition, on the basis that they were engaged in the business of drafting of 
Church legislation for adoption by Parliament. 1"4
On the surface, this sort of construction seems indicative of the same sort 
of sensitivity to the changed context of government as the cases discussed in the 
previous section. But when it is read with other cases, Lord Hewart’s judgment 
seems really quite odd: in R v Electricity Commissioners, the preparation of an 
Order in Council which was to become incorporated in an enactment was 
deemed to be sufficiently judicial to be amenable to prohibition. But in Lord 
Hewart’s case, just four years later, which purported to apply the very same legal 
principles to the very same type of activity -  the drafting of legislation which 
would be adopted by parliament -  prohibition would not lie because there was 
found to be no duty to act judicially. The difference in result between the two 
can easily be explained on grounds of judicial disinclination to involve itself in 
the business of internal church disputes. But as a matter of application of 
enunciated principle, the line between the two cases seems a blurry one. ' 60
158 Sydney Corporation v Harris 14 CLR , at 5 (per Griffith CJ).
159 By virtue of the Church o f England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919.
160 And contrast Lord Hewart's views in the Church Assembly case with his decision in R v 
Postmaster-General [1928] 1 KB 291, where he held that the giving by a doctor of a medical 
certificate was a judicial act. in respect of which certiorari would issue.
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In fact, to apply literally Atkin LJ’s test to Electricity Commissioners 
itself, one ought to have concluded that the prerogative writs would not lie. One 
searches the facts of the case in vain for anything other than their authority to 
affect the property rights of the electricity companies that would have indicated 
that parliament intended that the Commissioners had a duty to act judicially. 
Certainly, in his own judgment, Atkin LJ referred merely to their confiscatory 
power.161 For his part, Bankes LJ noted also that the Commissioners were 
required to conduct local hearings before formulating any scheme,162 but with 
respect, one cannot imagine that this alone gave their work a judicial character. 
Were this the case, then every Royal Commissioner would be held to be acting 
judicially, which was not the law in 1923.163
Moreover, a double-threshold test like that proffered by Lord Hewart is 
circular. Judges have always (or at least since the doctrine assumed its present 
form) had an obligation to accord natural justice.164 So to say that someone must 
observe natural justice if they have an obligation to behave like a judge, 
especially in a jurisdiction like England with no constitutionally-mandated 
separation of powers, is at once both to state the obvious and to beg the question. 
Moreover, to place the emphasis on the formal constitution of a decision-maker 
rather than upon their power to interfere with the liberty of the citizen is to run 
the risk of denying procedural protection when it is needed most.
161 [1924] 1 KB, at 207.
162 [1924] 1 KB, at 198.
163 See Commonwealth Sugar Refineries v Attorney-General (1912) 15 CLR 182, var’d [1914] 
AC 237 (sub nom Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v Commonwealth Sugar Refineries Ltd).
101
LORD HEWART AND THE NEW DESPOTISM
The student of administrative law today does not know whether to pity or 
ridicule Lord Hewart. Certainly, in his own time, the latter rather than the 
former tended to be more common. But whatever one’s views, it is clear that 
there are few more quixotic figures in modem legal history. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, it was the publication in 1929 of his book, The New 
Despotism, that ushered in the second of natural justice’s twentieth century 
phases. Evaluating his role in the evolution of administrative law is not, though, 
altogether a straightforward matter. As Solicitor-General during the latter part of 
the First World War, for instance, he successfully argued the Crown's case in the 
infamous Zadig case concerning executive discretion.16"' As Attorney-General, 
he played a key role in both the preparation and passage of emergency powers 
legislation, which had a significant limiting impact on personal liberties.166 
Indeed, his skills as a government advocate in the House of Commons were such 
as to cause Lloyd George to delay his appointment to the bench in order to retain 
his services in the House of Commons.167 In fact, no less than ten of the thirty 
statutes that he was later to criticise so vehemently were passed whilst he was
164 See Cameron v Cole (1943) 68 CLR 571, at 589 {per Rich J).
165 R v Halliday, ex p Zadig [1917] AC 260 (holding that under the Defence Regulations, the 
King in Council could suspend Habeas Corpus for people deemed to be of hostile origin). The 
case was in many ways a precursor of Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206. For an Australian 
equivalent, see Lloyd v Wallach (1915) 20 CLR 299.
166 Some have also argued that Lord Hewart was responsible for the delay in introducing Crown 
liability legislation in Great Britain. See Sir C T Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law 
(1940), at 2 4 -25 .
167 Under English practice of the time, as Attorney-General, he had a de facto claim on the Chief 
Justiceship when Lord Reading CJ was appointed Viceroy of India in 1921. Lloyd George 
would not permit Hewart to be taken away from the Commons, however, so as a stop-gap, 
Lawrence J was Lord Chief Justice on the implicit -  though constitutionally quite inappropriate
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Attorney-General.If>x But overshadowing all else that he did, and nowadays 
constituting practically the only thing he is remembered for,169 was the 
publishing of The New Despotism.
It is difficult for us today to conceive of the magnitude of the Storni 
caused by this book. Perhaps the best analogy would be to imagine Sir Ronald 
Wilson offering his views on Aboriginal genocide in a commercially published 
book while still a sitting justice of the High Court who was about to hear Wik, or 
to imagine Sir William Deane offering his views on reconciliation in 
commercially published form whilst awaiting the hearing in Mabo v Queensland 
(No 2). When viewed in hindsight, it really does seem an extraordinary thing: 
that the Lord Chief Justice of England -  the senior professional judge in the 
Kingdom -  would write a book in which he accused the government of engaging 
in a conspiracy to subvert peoples’ rights. Yet that is exactly what happened.
In fact, Lord Hewart was not the first member of the English judicial 
establishment to express alarm over the extent of law-making power that had 
been vested in the Executive. As early as 1911, Lord Cozens-Hardy, the Master 
of the Rolls, delivered a public speech in which he said that “in recent years it
-  understanding that at a time of Lloyd George’s choosing, he would resign in favour of Hewart. 
See Jackson, The Chief, infra n 148, at 126 - 145.
I6S See J M Jacobs, The Republican Crown: Lawyers and the Making o f the State in Twentieth 
Century Britain (1996), at 140. For further criticism of Hewart, including criticism of his 
performance as a judge, see R Stevens, The Independence o f the Judiciary: The View From the 
Lord Chancellor's Office (1993), at 29 - 33. For a rather more sympathetic picture, see R 
Jackson, The Chief: The Biography o f Gordon Hewart, Lord Chief Justice o f England (1959).
16<) It was Lord Hewart who said, in R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, at 
258, that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done”. But though the line is famous, that Lord Hewart was the utterer is generally not so well- 
remembered.
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has been the habit of parliament to delegate very great powers to government 
departments”, which he described as a “very bad system and one attended by 
great danger.” 170 But Lord Hewart’s voice was by far the best-heard.
Briefly stated, the thesis of The New Despotism was that through the 
large-scale use of delegated law-making provisions, parliament was, 
unconstitutionally, ceding sovereignty to the executive. The result was to 
produce “a despotic power which at one and the same time places Government 
departments above the Sovereignty of Parliament and beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Courts” . 171 In a later essay, he described it as “bureaucratic tyranny” . 172 The 
New Despotism was really a reaction against the growth of the administrative 
state, and so it probably ought not to have caused surprise -  but for the identity 
of the author. Picking up on Dicey’s reference to the French droit administratif 
Lord Hewart spoke scornfully of administrative law as “profoundly repugnant” 
to English notions, and as something “which, upon analysis, prove[s] to be 
nothing more than administrative lawlessness” . 177
170 “Encroachment of the Executive: The Master of the Rolls on a Modem Danger”, The Times, 4 
May 1911 (quoted in The New Despotism, at 144 -  145).
171 (1929), at 14.
172 “The Mischief of Bureaucracy”, in Not Without Prejudice (1937) 92, at 98.
173 Supra n 171, at 13. It should not be thought, though, that Lord Hewart was completely 
without a sense of humour. Contrasting the Glorious Revolution with the “new” legislative 
environment, he said:
The old despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The 
new despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic (Id, 
at 17).
And he told the wonderful story of
a distinguished Anglo-Indian civilian, who, returning home on leave after a 
prolonged absence, passed the Houses of Parliament on his way from Victoria 
to Charing Cross. ‘What place is that?’ he asked. ‘That, sir,’ was the answer,
‘is Parliament -  the Houses of Parliament.’ ‘Really,’ he exclaimed, though his
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There is more than a little irony in the fact that Lord Hewart was moved 
to write this book. As has been noted, he was the one who was responsible for 
transforming Atkin LJ’s formulation of when the prerogative writs of certiorari 
and prohibition would lie into a firm requirement that there be a “superadded” 
duty to act judicially. He was also the president of the Divisional Court in R v 
Electricity Commissioners which had held that the prerogative writs would not 
lie in the circumstances, and which had been overruled by the Court of Appeal of 
which Atkin LJ was a member. 174 And, he was also a former Cabinet member 
who had himself sponsored the very sort of legislation of which he now 
complained.17" Moreover, there is some evidence that Hewart came later to 
regret writing the book, and using the intemperate language that he did to 
describe the civil service. 176
Nevertheless, though some of his critics denied it at the time, 177 Lord 
Hewart’s book struck a responsive chord among many people in England and 
throughout the Empire. 178 In a debate on an industrial regulation bill, for 
example, Lord Banbury spoke of the “vicious principle” of “giv[ing] power to a 
government department to usurp the functions of parliament” . 174 In a similar
exclamation was in fact slightly different, ‘does that rubbish still go on?’ (Id, at 
14- 15)
174 See [1924] 1 KB, at 180.
175 Not surprisingly, this irked his critics in Whitehall more than anything else. See, Jackson, 
supra n 148, at 216.
mIbid.
177 See, eg, F Frankfurter, “Foreword: Courts and Administrative Law -  The Experience of 
English Housing Legislation” (1936) 49 Harv L Rev 426.
I7S See, eg, the review of The New Despotism at (1930) 1 Can Bar Rev 77.
1 9 His Lordship said:
This bill perpetuates a vicious principle which unfortunately has grown much 
in the last few years. It gives power to a government department to usurp the 
functions of parliament and to pass what they call regulations which have the
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vein, the Oxford historian (and sometime MP) Sir John Marriot wrote an essay 
entitled “Law and Liberty”, in which he argued that “the prevailing and 
increasing disposition on the part of the British parliament to confer upon the 
Executive quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions is wholly misplaced and 
ought to be resisted. ” 180 Oxford Professor of Jurisprudence (and University of 
Sydney graduate) Sir C K Allen was moved to publish a series of his essays 
which touched upon like themes under the title Bureaucracy Triumphant. 181
Some other judges were inspired to join in Hewart's act of insurrection. 
Scrutton LJ once spoke patronisingly in a judgment of “an all-wise civil 
service” . 182 Sir William Mulock, the Chief Justice of Ontario, delivered a public 
address in which he spoke of “the ever-increasing practice” of “depriving our 
people of the protection of the law and of the Courts, by vesting in autocratic 
bodies the power to arbitrarily deal with matters affecting our liberties and 
rights” . 182 In Sir William’s view, administrative decision-makers were
effect of an act of parliament and which deal with His Majesty’s subjects; in 
fact, this does what in days gone by caused a king to lose his head.
Parliamentary> Debates, House of Lords, 14 February 1929, at 932 -  933 (on the Factory and 
Work Shop (Cotton Cloth Factories) Bill). While this was actually before the formal publication 
of The New Despotism, Lord Banbury made specific reference to "a very great note or warning" 
that Lord Hewart had given (ibid).
180 The Fortnightly Review, July 1928.
181 (1931).
182 R v Minister o f Labour, Ex parte National Trade Defence Association [ 1932] 1 KB 1, at 11.
183 “Address of the Chief Justice of Ontario” (1934) 12 Can Bar Rev 32, at 38. For other 
Hewart-inspired examples of this same sentiment, see J W de B Farris, “Justice of the Courts” 
(1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 509; W Johnson, “The Lawyer and Administrative Boards” (1943) 3 R 
du B 233; W Johnson, “The Rule of Law Under an Expanding Bureaucracy” (1944) 22 Can Bar 
Rev 380.
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“reviving] the Star Chamber method of conducting their proceedings behind 
closed doors” . 184
Here in Australia, Professor Kenneth Bailey wrote that the tendency to 
broad delegation “has excited considerable apprehension in Great Britain and it 
is salutary that the subject should be attracting a good deal of attention in 
Australia, too.”18' Sir Frederic Eggleston expressed the view that Australian 
“state socialism”, as he described it, had “extended to even greater lengths than 
the paternalism of the eighteenth century in Great Britain” . 186 He continued by 
saying that while “State action is looked on with favour by all the advanced 
parties in Great Britain to secure their aims, most thinking people are convinced 
that the inefficiencies of State action are responsible for many of our acute 
problems, and are looking for ways of limiting it.” 187 Even Jethro Brown was 
moved to express alarm at more or less the same time: “In Australia”, he wrote, 
“there has been a recent tendency to substitute administrative ‘discretion’ for the 
judicial process ... Encroachments upon the Rule of Law open the way to 
irremediable abuses. ” 188
1X4 Ibid. In terms of intemperateness of language, Sir William seems to have done his best to 
match Lord Hewart phrase for phrase. Consider Sir William’s description of the process of 
administrative adjudication:
The presiding officer is not required to know anything of the law which he is to 
administer; free, of his own will to hear the case in public or private, in the 
presence or absence of the parties; with or without evidence; with or without the 
assistance of lawyers to prevent perjury; free to disregard the evidence and the 
law and to give the final decision without any reasons therefor, and not 
appealable to any court. Is that the position to which anyone with British blood 
in his veins should quietly submit? (Id, at 39)
185 “Administrative Legislation in the Commonwealth”, supra n 38, at 10.
186 State Socialism in Victoria (1932), at 11.
187 Ibid.
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THE ACADEMIC BACKLASH
On the other hand, some commentary on Lord Hewart’s work, especially 
that emanating from the academy (and, in particular, from the LSE), was 
scathing in the extreme. Felix Frankfurter, for instance, wrote:
Nothing better illustrates the elder Huxley’s observation 
regarding the frequent survival of a theory long after its brains 
have been knocked out, than that the Lord Chief Justice of 
England should treat Dicey as gospel, and regard as constitutional 
spoliations those inroads upon the Rule of Law which Maitland 
had already noticed fifty years before. 189
John Willis described Lord Hewart as having “descended] from 
Olympus” in order to proffer his message of alarm. 190 He commented 
sarcastically that it “would be out of place to criticise The New Despotism as a 
work of legal scholarship.” 191 Another commentator suggested that the book 
consisted of “extravagant rhetoric” with “a core of truth” . 192 He said that it 
amounted to “a brilliant piece of journalistic propaganda, with the lights and 
shadows so skilfully heightened that the reader may easily fail to discover what
188 “The Separation of Powers in British Jurisdictions”, supra ...
189 Supra n 177, at 426 - 427. Frankfurter, as many will know, was one of the intellectual 
architects of the legal aspects of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, and had been appointed to the 
Supreme Court by Roosevelt in 1939. One of the central tenets of Frankfurter’s jurisprudence 
was that the courts ought as much as possible to defer to the expertise of departmental civil 
servants:
Legislative policies, under modem circumstances and in their different fields 
of operation must ... be given concreteness and adaptation through 
administrative agencies. Considerable areas of discretion must inevitably ... be 
committed to these agencies and, like all organisms, they must in part evolve 
their own procedure (“Foreword” (1938) 47 Yale L J  1, at 5).
190 The Parliamentary; Powers o f English Government Departments (1933), at 3.
191 Ibid.
192 “Book Review: The New Despotism'’' (1930) 1 Pol Q 125, at 127. He also wrote that “The 
spectacle of the Lord Chief Justice of England attacking with passion the bona fides of the civil 
service is not a pleasant one” (Id, at 131).
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the essential problems involved are. ” 193 Sir Ivor Jennings attacked the sort of 
people who would share Hewart's views as people who “wanted nothing which 
interfered with profits, even if profits involved child labour, wholesale factory 
accidents, the pollution of rivers, of the air, and of the water-supply, jerry-built 
houses, low wages, and other incidents of nineteenth-century industrialism” . 194
In this same vein, William Robson wrote of C K Allen that he 
represented “in a more refined and scholarly manner, the school of thought of 
which Lord Hewart was the crudest and most undiscriminating exponent”.19' 
Some of the academic rivalry at play might be evident in the fact that Robson 
later said that Allen’s work “typified the Oxford outlook of the day.” 196 For its 
part, the British government was so concerned about the book’s impact that even 
before it was published, the Lord Chancellor convened the Committee on 
Ministers’ Powers -  the Donoughmore Committee -  with a brief to “consider the 
powers exercised by or under the direction of... Ministers of the Crown”, and to 
“report what safeguards are necessary to secure the constitutional principles of 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the Law” . 197
193 Id, at 125. The author was apparently of sufficient standing that he chose to remain 
anonymous. Authorship of the piece is attributed to “XYZ”.
194 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (1933), at 309 - 310.
195 W Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (2nd ed, 1947), at 367. It is, though, appropriate 
to note that some gentleness did survive the debate. In 1935, for instance, Sir Ivor Jennings 
published a piece entitled “In Praise of Dicey” (13 Pub Admin 123). And even Harold Laski was 
moved to say that it was Dicey “who captivated me most”: “I didn’t always agree and I 
sometimes doubted accuracy, but I never stopped admiring” (quoted in R A Cosgrove, The Rule 
o f Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist (1980), at 112 -  113).
196 “Justice and Administrative Law Reconsidered” [1979] Cur Leg Prob 107.
19 Report o f the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Cmnd 4060, April 1932, at 1. For a present- 
day English assessment of the Report, see Stevens, supra n 148, and Jacobs, supra n 148.
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What makes The New Despotism so important today is not its thesis. The 
clearly exaggerated hyperbole in which it was written makes it amusing to look 
at in a kind of voyeuristically arrogant way. From an academic point of view, 
however, the book is significant in the way it served as a lightning rod for 
competing visions of administrative law. Among the leading academic critics of 
the Hewart view of administrative law (or administrative lawlessness, to his 
characterisation), four in particular stand out: Sir Ivor Jennings, 198 William 
Robson, 199 John Willis200 and D M Gordon.21" Jennings and Robson both taught 
at the LSE, Willis (though English by birth and education) taught at Dalhousie 
Law School in Nova Scotia and later at the Osgoode Hall Law School in 
Toronto, 202 and Gordon was a solicitor in private practice in British Columbia.203 
In the years surrounding publication of The New Despotism, each wrote 
significant critical pieces in response to Lord Hewart’s work and the Diceyan
198 See, eg, “Courts and Administrative Law -  The Experience of English Housing Legislation”, 
supra n 177, The Law and the Constitution (1st ed, 1933), Principles o f Local Government Law 
(T  ed, 1931).
199 Justice and Administrative Law (1st ed, 1928, 2nd ed, 1947), “The Report of the Committee on 
Ministers’ Powers” (1932) 3 Pol Q 351. For something of a retrospective view, see his “Justice 
and Administrative Law Reconsidered”, supra n 196.
200 The Parliamentary Powers o f English Government Departments (1934), “Three Approaches 
to Administrative Law” (1935) 1 UTLJ 53, “Administrative Law and the British North America 
Act" (1939) 53 Harv L Rev 251. In a notice of the inaugural issue of the University o f Toronto 
Law Journal, published in the Law Quarterly Review in 1935, Professor Goodhart said that 
Willis’s piece, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law”, “shows that a sound, realistic 
approach [to the question of executive power] is preferable to the more prejudiced views of 
certain other writers” (51 LQR, at 288). A thinly veiled reference to Lord Hewart, one assumes?
201 “Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction” (1929) 45 LQR 459, “Observance of Law as a Condition of 
Jurisdiction” (1931) 47 LQR 386; 557, “Administrative Tribunals and the Courts” (1933) 49 
LQR 94; 419.
2u: An interesting and moving obituary of Willis by a former student was published in the 
Toronto Globe and Mail, 3 July 1997. I myself was lectured by him as a law student in the early 
1980s, and I remember thinking that the passion with which he spoke seemed a rare thing in law 
school.
2(b In some ways, Gordon was the most interesting of the group. He received his legal education 
through working in a law office, and he spent his life in private practice. Despite this, over a 
period spanning nearly fifty years, he published eighty-one major pieces. For more on his life 
and work, see K Roach, “The Administrative Law Scholarship of D M Gordon” (1989) 34 
McGill U  1.
110
view of the rule of law upon which Lord Hewart had built.204 Today, this Anglo- 
Canadian scholarship offer us a valuable insight into the mind of the Great 
Depression-era administrative lawyer.20"
In considering the nature of the “administrative law mind”, it is 
interesting to reflect on the significance of the timing of both the book and the 
response. The New Despotism was published in November, 1929 -  just a few 
days after the crash of the American stock market and before the full extent of 
global depression had hit Great Britain. The responses to Lord Hewart all came 
out during the 1930s, at the height of the economic crisis. When Hewart was 
writing his book, it was still possible for someone -  even an intelligent, reform- 
minded person like Hewart206 -  to feel that the executive had gone too far in its 
involvement in the private sphere, and that a properly operating Parliament could 
still exert scrutiny over governmental affairs. A year or so later, only a naif 
could hold such a view. And by 1931, with a coalition “National” government in 
power in Britain, attitudes like Lord Hewart’s must have seemed even more silly 
and antediluvian. Perhaps that explains the bitterness on both sides: when 
Hewart wrote, he did so in a climate of relative prosperity. When his critics
204 Robson, for example, published the first edition of Justice and Administrative Law in 1928, 
before The New Despotism.
205 Other examples of important Canadian writing on administrative law during this period 
include N Tennant, “Administrative Finality” (1928) 6 Can Bar Rev 497, J Finkelman, 
“Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law” (1930) 1 UTLJ 313, and W P M 
Kennedy, “Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada”(1934) 46 Jurid Rev 203. See also F R 
Scott, “Administrative Law: 1923 -  1947” (1948) 26 Can Bar Rev 268. For other references to 
contemporary English writing, see Loughlin, supra n 21, and J Jowell, “The Rule of Law 
Today”, in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (3rd ed, 1994). Another 
interesting book published at the beginning of this period is F J Port, Administrative Law (1929). 
Even though it pre-dated The New Despotism, Port adopted a comparative approach, which reads 
as an interesting counterbalance to Hewart.
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responded, they did so in a climate of economic, social and political 
desperation.207 To borrow a description once offered in an only slightly different 
context, the sharpness of the reaction to Hewart and the world he symbolised 
represented “the huddling together of frightened people, uncertain of their way in 
a chaotic world” .208
What linked the academic critics (for on detail, there were differences 
among them -  Robson, for example, was in favour of establishing a form of 
general administrative appeals tribunal200) was an alarm at the extent to which 
the courts, in the guise of their supervisory jurisdiction, had the power to subvert 
the new legislation. In his book Justice and Administrative Law, Robson argued 
that it was the “narrowest type of legalism” to suggest that non-curial tribunals 
“must necessarily and inevitably be arbitrary, incompetent, unsatisfactory, 
injurious to the freedom of the citizen and to the welfare of society.” 210 In this 
respect, the Anglo-Canadian scholarship was very much cast in the “cult of the 
expert” mould. As John Willis once asked,
206 Hewart, for example, was one of the campaigners for women’s rights in Parliament. See his 
essay “Peeresses and Parliament”, in Essays and Observations (1930), 278.
207 In a remarkable little book entitled Government in Transition (1934), Lord Eustace Percy, a 
Conservative MP, made this point in terms which provide some idea of just how bleak the times 
must have seemed to those in positions of political authority:
Five-year plans, whatever their worth, can only be drawn up by those who 
have themselves the responsibilities and the powers of government. But it is 
not useless -  at least one hopes not -  to seek to express in words the almost 
inarticulate feeling that seems to be in all men’s minds at the present day -  a 
sense of the powerlessness of any programme, based either upon existing 
political faiths or upon present immediate necessities, to prepare the world for 
a wholly new era in its history (at 3).
:us R St G Stubbs, “Lord Bennett” (1951) 29 Can Bar Rev 631, at 653.
209 See “Justice and Administrative Law Reconsidered”, supra n 196. See also “The Report of 
the Committee on Ministers’ Powers” (1932) 3 Pol Q 346.
210 2nd ed, supra n 195, at xv.
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were the courts competent to control the administration of 
statutes, in the pith and substance of which the [bureaucracy] was 
more thoroughly trained, and of whose social philosophy it had a 
deeper understanding than a divisional court which is an 
aggregation of three judges casually meeting on Monday 
morning?2"
Robson said that “executive justice”, as he described it, was “a feature of 
the governmental order likely to grow extensively during the present century”, 
because it is “inherently connected with modem social evolution. ” 212 But a 
bloody-minded judge, the Anglo-Canadian scholars thought, could, through the 
crafty use of the prerogative writs, thwart the clearly-indicated intention of 
parliament that the executive be given lee-way to get on with its work. And the 
doctrinal tool that they viewed with most alarm in this regard was the separation 
of powers.213
The use of the separation of powers either to invalidate administrative 
actions as being ultra vires, or to impose additional procedural requirements on 
the decision-making process through the doctrine of natural justice, could neuter 
the efficient application of state power upon which the planned, efficient, public- 
service state so depended. As Sir Ivor Jennings once put it, “social reform is 
useless if it is not rapid” .214 It was for this reason that even the Electricity 
Commissioners formulation and the “thin” Haldane/Isaacs view of the actual 
requirements of natural justice,21'’ which may to us seem quite restrictive, caused 
considerable consternation among the proponents of the public service state. It
211 “Three Approaches to Administrative Law”, supra n 200, at 73 - 74.
212 Justice and Administrative Law (2nd ed, 1947), at xvi.
212 See, eg, Finkelman, supra n 205.
214 “Courts and Administrative Law”, supra n 177, at 447.
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was in this frame of mind that Willis could describe the holding in Electricity 
Commissioners as “an enlargement of the powers of the court”, something which 
he viewed with great concern.216
THE HOUSING ACT CASES AND THE PERFIDIOUSNESS 
OF SEMANTICS
As said, the essence of the academic concern was with the competence of 
judges to undertake judicial review of decisions made by “experts” under the 
new legislation. This anger was most often expressed in terms of criticism of the 
formal approach that the courts had adopted to judicial review. This had 
involved the practice of classifying the actions of the executive according to 
categories which corresponded to the separation of powers -  the “conceptual 
approach”, as John Willis called it.217
The focal point for the real legal conflict between the two visions of 
administrative law in England up to the end of the Second World War came in a 
series of cases involving an attempt by the state to provide housing for the poor, 
by requiring that slums be tom down and that unused land be given over to 
housing development. In these cases, which are collectively often referred to as 
the “Housing Act cases”, the courts almost invariably found the decision-making
213 See, supra 25 ff.
216 Id, at 63.
217 “Three Approaches to Administrative Law”, supra n 200, at 69 -  75.
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process to be one in which natural justice was required.218 The Housing Act cases 
are useful because they placed all of the key issues on the table: new legislation 
aimed at rectifying serious social problems, but which interfered with common 
law property rights, in a situation in which there was a profound political 
difference of view as to what the interests of justice required in the 
circumstances. In other areas, in which real property interests were not involved, 
the courts seemed prepared to take a rather more open-ended view of the 
executive’s authority.219
The complete story of the Housing Act cases is an involved one, and its 
details are not central to this thesis.220 The end result of the cases is that the 
courts adopted an approach to the Housing Act (and like legislation) which 
involved dividing decision-making processes into three.221 In the course of 
exercising his jurisdiction to give approvals to housing plans, the Minister could, 
before objections were lodged, inform himself as he saw fit without regard to 
natural justice. Once objections had been lodged, however, a litigation-like “//s”
218 See, eg, R v Housing Appeal Tribunal [1920] 3 KB 334, R v Minister o f Health, Ex parte 
Davis [1929] 1 KB 619 (CA), R v Minister o f Health, Ex parte Yaffe [1931] AC 494, Errington 
et al v Minister o f Health [1935] 1 KB 249 (CA), Frost v Minister o f Health [1935] 1 KB 294, 
Offer v Minister o f Health [1936] 1 KB 40, Stafford v Minister for Health [1946] KB 621, Miller 
v Minister for Health [1946] KB 626, Price v Minister for Health [1947] 1 All ER 47, Summers 
v Minister for Health [1947] 1 All ER 184, B Johnson and Co (Builders) Ltd v Minister of 
Health [1947] 2 All ER 395. See, also, Jennings, “Courts and Administrative Law -  The 
Experience of English Housing Legislation”, supra n 177.
219 Not surprisingly, but interestingly in light of the recent Australian developments (discussed 
infra chapter 5), among the least encumbered areas of executive activity in England was the 
deportation of “undesirables”. This was seen to be an area of untrammelled executive discretion. 
See, eg, Ex Parte Venicoff[ 1920] 3 KB 72. See also the first edition of de Smith (1959), at 118. 
This was the case in Australia, too. See R v MacFarlane, Ex parte O ’Flanagan and O ’Kelly 
(“the Irish Envoys Case") (1923) 32 CLR 518.
220 Though for a thorough analysis of these cases from an Australian perspective, see N A 
Manetta, “The Implication of the Principle Audi Alteram Partem in Administrative Law” 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1991).
221 For a summary of this, see Johnson and Co v Minister o f Health [1947] 2 All ER 395 (CA).
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was said to exist, which obliged the Minister to provide natural justice rights to 
the objectors -  which significantly, forbad him from discussing the project with 
local authorities in the absence of the objectors. Once the objections had been 
dealt with, the decision became administrative, and natural justice rights no 
longer existed.” 2
One can easily empathise with the view taken by the Anglo-Canadian 
scholars of this sort of semanticism, and it has long been fashionable to decry the 
Housing Act cases as an illustration of legal formalism gone awry. Sir Anthony 
Mason once referred to the sorts of distinctions made in the cases as “abstract 
complexities” which (mercifully) “have been banished from the stage or at least 
relegated to the wings” .222 As J A G Griffith, the present-day ideological 
counterpart of the Anglo-Canadian scholars,224 has said, “on any local authority 
scheme of any magnitude, central or regional civil servants of the Department 
concerned are or should be involved continuously from the early stages of 
planning”.22" The approach taken in the Housing Act cases, he argued, provided 
clear evidence that “[t]he courts have failed to understand the administrative 
system” .226
222 See, on this point, Jennings, “Courts and Administrative Law -  The Experience of English 
Housing Legislation”, supra n 177. See also S A de Smith, “The Limits of Judicial Review: 
Statutory Discretions and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires" (1948) 11 Mod L Rev 306, at 312 -  314.
223 FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, at 360.
224 And Professor of Law at the LSE. For more on Griffiths’ views on administrative law, see 
Loughlin, supra n 21, at 197-201.
225 Griffith, “Administrative Law and the Judges”, Pritt Memorial Lecture (1978), at 11 -  12.
226 Ibid.
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THE HOUSING ACT CASES IN CONTEXT: THE IMPACT OF 
COMMON LAW VALUES ON THE CLASSIFICATION 
PROCESS
But Griffiths was wrong not to recognise that to a certain extent, the 
courts had little choice in the matter. The reality was that would-be suitors were 
seeking to invoke their jurisdiction and, as discussed in chapter one, the remedies 
they had at hand -  the prerogative writs -  for the most part limited them to 
supervising judicial functions. In other words, the courts were driven by 
systemic limitation to engage in a classification process. To do otherwise would 
have amounted to a surrender of jurisdiction to the executive branch which, 
arguably, would have been unconstitutional.22 Moreover, there was at some 
point a distinction in kind to be made between types of decision-making. Even 
the legal realist Roscoe Pound argued that not to recognise this was to run the 
risk of facilitating abuse of discretion within the public service.22*
22 See Bank o f New South Wales v Commonwealth (“the Bank Nationalisation Case") (1948) 76 
CLR 1, at 362 -  365 (per Dixon J), R v Coldham, Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 
153 CLR 415, O'Toole v Charles David (1991) 171 CLR 232. See also Sir A Mason, “The 
Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Human Rights” 
(1994) 1 AJHR 1 and R Creyke, “Restricting Judicial Review” (1997) 15 AIAL Forum 22.
228 Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure and Significance (1942), at 59 -  60:
There are those today who tell us that, at least so far as administrative agencies 
are concerned, [decision-making] functions cannot be distinguished. It is true 
that no rigid, analytical distribution among distinct functionaries is expedient, 
even if it were possible. But the methods appropriate to exercise of the several 
functions are distinct and must be so under any but an autocratic policy. When 
we are told by a leading advocate of administrative absolutism that ‘little or no 
assistance is to be derived from an analysis of the distinction between 
administrative and judicial functions’, what is really meant is that from his 
postulate the separation of powers ... cannot be maintained. An absolute 
parliament having succeeded to the Stuart attempt to set up an absolute 
monarchy, an absolute administrative hierarchy is the next step.
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The key to understanding the Housing Act cases is to remember that 
formerly, the courts in England had given the notion of “judicial function” an 
expansive interpretation when property rights were at issue. The decisions in 
Wood v Woacf29 and Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works221' represent 
illustrations of this: when the state was purporting to divest someone of the full 
enjoyment of their property rights, natural justice applied. It was the effect of 
the proposed executive action -  a deprivation of property -  that served as the 
trigger for the classification. Property-depriving acts were deemed to be judicial 
in nature. As Rich J had said in Gillen v Laffer “[t]he nature of the thing done -  
deprivation of property -  implies a judicial act” .231 But, as the provisions in 
issue in cases like Finlayson (and Gillen v Laffer) illustrated, in much of the new 
legislation, parliament was seeking to vest the executive government with 
greater discretionary power to interfere with private interests, including 
conventionally-understood liberties. In order to execute the functions of the 
planned state, the executive government required a freer hand to interfere with 
private property. This was the point implicitly acknowledged by Higgins J in 
Gillen v Laffer, when he said that “nothing is further from the intendment of this 
clause than a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry” .232 Considerable freedom of 
manoeuvre on the part of the executive was a sine qua non for an efficient public 
service.
229 (1874) LR 9 Ex 190. These cases are discussed in chapter 1, at 29 -  32.
230 (1863) 14 CB(NS) 180, 143 ER 414.
231 37 CLR, at 229.
232 3 7 CLR, at 225.
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Faced with these parliamentary signals, yet being institutionally 
unwilling to countenance a complete abdication of their sense of responsibility to 
the individual (as Lord Denning put it233), the courts attempted to develop indicia 
for determining when it would be appropriate for intervention.234 This is what 
took place through the Housing Act cases. “Ministerial” activity usually referred 
to activity that was seen as non-discretionary. For example, the execution of a 
warrant was deemed to be a ministerial action. For obvious reasons, judicial 
intervention here was seen as inappropriate. At the other end of the 
classificatory spectrum sat “administrative” decision-making. This referred to 
activity that was entirely policy-based, and in which the executive official was 
vested with the maximum discretion.2'" Judicial intervention here was also seen 
as inappropriate. “Judicial” activity -  the only activity which was in theory 
amenable to the prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition -  lay somewhere 
in the middle. According to most definitions, it involved the determination of 
rights and liabilities, on the basis of the ascertained facts and the application to 
them of pre-determined standards (ie, principles of “law”).
It will be readily apparent that there were significant problems with a 
classification scheme of this nature, and that the Anglo-Canadian scholars had a 
point to their criticism. Most obviously, few, if any, of the courses of
233 In an essay written in 1951 called “The Spirit of the British Constitution”, Denning LJ (as he 
then was) spoke of “a sense of the supreme importance of the individual and a refusal to allow 
his personality to be submerged in an omnipotent state.” (29 Can Bar Rev 1180, at 1182).
234 For more on this, see Gordon, “Administrative Tribunals and the Courts”, supra n 201.
235 An interesting Australian example of this can be seen in Moses v Parker [1891] AC 245, 
which held that a Tasmanian statute which referred property disputes to a judge of the Supreme 
Court, with the direction that he be guided only by equity and good conscience, did not involve 
the exercise of judicial power. See also Fielding v Thomas [1896] AC 600 (PC, NS) (though cf
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governmental activity can be divided neatly like this. To attempt to adopt a 
multi-functional classification approach is conceptually artificial and in most 
cases also not practicable.236 Moreover, to attempt to adopt one can give rise to 
serious issues of systemic injustice. A Canadian judge once said that what 
underlay criticism of the “functional” approach was the
realisation that the classification of statutory functions as judicial, 
quasi-judicial or administrative is often very difficult, to say the 
least, and to endow some with procedural protection while 
denying others any at all would work injustice when the results of 
statutory decisions raise the same serious consequences for those 
adversely affected, regardless of the classification of the function 
in question.237
It was for this reason that the Donoughmore Committee, which 
acknowledged the necessity for executive discretion in the modem era,278 
favoured the use of an additional expression, which from time to time one saw in 
the Law Reports: “quasi-judicial” .236 Quasi-judicial decisions were ones which 
embodied the fact-finding and law-applying elements of the judicial function,
the comments of Isaacs J, in British Imperial Oil Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 
35 CLR422, at 438-439).
236 On this point, see the judgment of Lord Greene MR, in Johnson & Co v Minister o f Health 
[1947] 2 All ER 395 (CA).
23' Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board o f Commissioners o f Police [1979] 1 SCR 
311, at 325 (per Laskin CJ).
238 The Committee described the practice of delegation of discretionary authority to the 
Executive as “inevitable”. It said that it was
a natural reflection of changes in our ideas of Government, which had resulted 
from changes in political, social and economic ideas, and of changes in the 
circumstances of our time which have resulted from scientific discoveries.
(Report o f the Committee on Ministers ’ Powers, Cmnd 4060, 1932, at 5)
239 On quasi-judicial powers generally, see H W R Wade, “Quasi-judicial and its Background” 
(1949) 10 Camh LJ 216. For a very early example of the expression's use in Australia, see R v 
Arndel (1906) 3 CLR 557, at 571 - 572.
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but which did not involve the determination of rights.240 In the Committee’s 
view, quasi-judicial decisions were to be reviewable in the courts, and therefore 
attracted the obligation to accord natural justice. But it was as clear as it was 
with the original tri-partite classification system that the lines -  in this case 
between “quasi-judicial” decisions (which were to be reviewable) and 
“administrative” decisions (which were not) -  would become blurred. The 
problem was not in the labels; it was in the very process of classification itself.241
In point of fact, however, this “problem” of linguistic shading was a 
mask for a much broader concern amongst those in favour of the public service 
state, including the Anglo-Canadian scholars. This was the concern about 
judicial temperament. It is trite that given our conception of the rule of law, it 
would always fall to a judge ultimately to decide whether a given decision was 
ministerial, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. In principle, classification 
was supposed to be an exercise in statutory interpretation. The decision as to 
reviewability was something which was determined through the process of 
interpreting the legislation which vested the executive with its decision-making 
authority. It was for this reason that much of the literature in the post-Hewart 
years was concerned with statutory interpretation. 242 But, as Sir Otto Kahn
240 Supra n 238, at 73 - 75. D M  Gordon summed up the Committee’s view as amounting to 
nothing more precise than that quasi-judicial decisions were ones which were “not exactly 
judicial”(“Administrative Tribunals and the Courts”, supra n 201, at 95).
241 For examples of the contemporary criticism of the Committee’s recommendation on this 
point, see Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, supra n 194 (3rd ed, 1943), Appendix 1, and 
Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, supra n 195 (2nd ed, 1947), at 401 - 403.
242 See, eg, J A Corry, “Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1935) 1 UTLJ 
286, J Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1, M Amos, “The 
Interpretation of Statutes” (1934) 5 Camb L J  163 and W Friedmann, “The Interpretation of 
Statutes in Modem British Law” (1950) 3 Vand L Rev 544.
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Freund put it so aptly, “the power to interpret is the power to destroy”.24' When 
the common law courts approached the interpretation of “new” legislation, they 
did so from a perspective of instinctive distrust of untrammelled discretion, and a 
concern for the maintenance of private property rights.
In this respect, the Anglo-Canadian scholars were correct in their alarm. 
For common law judges, the “normal” type of decision-making process was the 
judicial one, in which individual interests were given the maximum safeguard. 
Nor did many of the judges have the background knowledge to engage in the 
sorts of purposive interpretation that the new legislation required. As John 
Willis once said, “[t]o the construction of a real-property statute the judge brings 
ready-made philosophy which has evolved by age-long decisions upon real 
property; but he has no such aid on questions of public law.” 244 So judges tended 
to view the process of conceptual classification as one of adding or subtracting 
processes from the judicial model. As D M Gordon put it, while the courts never 
acknowledged the failings of the system of functional classification, they “to 
some extent atoned for their failure by ignoring the only definitions they have 
been able to formulate”.24''
243 “The Impact of Constitutions on Labour Law” (1976) 35 Camb U  240, at 244 (paraphrasing 
Marshall CJ in McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316).
244 “jhree Approaches to Administrative Law”, supra n 200, at 59 - 60.
245 “Administrative Tribunals and the Courts”, supra n 201, at 105.
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THE MYOPIA OF THE ANGLO-CANADIAN SCHOLARSHIP
Yet, viewed from the hindsight of more than sixty years, the failings of 
the Anglo-Canadian scholarship can be seen to have been two-fold. First, in 
their spirited defence of administrative discretion on the basis of superior 
expertise, they were sometimes just as guilty of hyperbole as Lord Hewart. As 
Roscoe Pound wrote in 1937, “[tjhose who urge administrative absolutism and 
preach the psychological impossibility of an objective judicial process, and the 
futility of systems of law, make great claims just now to an exclusive touch with 
reality. But this is an old habit of jurists”.246 The fact is that there was a grain of 
truth in what Lord Hewart had had to say. The reality of government’s 
limitations inevitability gave rise to a potential for executive injustice.
This was something on which G W Keeton, who was, more than most, 
sympathetic to the ideals of the new legislation, was moved to comment. It was, 
he said, “idle to deny that the existing safeguards of private right in 
administrative tribunals are inadequate, and that increasingly wide delegations of 
power at times give officials a dangerous immunity from control”.247 The Anglo- 
Canadian scholars tended to gloss over this. In the eyes of many -  including 
people “on the inside” -  it was simply a nonsense to speak of a government of
246 “Fashions in Juristic Theory”, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club, University of 
Birmingham, at 15.
247 “The Twilight of the Common Law”, in The Nineteenth Century and After (April, 1949) 230, 
at 231. One of the notorious examples of this injustice, to which Keeton made special reference, 
was Blackpool Corporation v Locker [1948] 1 KB 349 (CA), in which a municipal council first 
confiscated a home and its contents without lawful authority, and then refused for six months to 
respond to a request by the dispossessed homeowner to reveal the source of the legal power on 
which it was purporting to rely.
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experts. Sir John Anderson (the Anderson of Liversidge v Anderson), for 
example, recalled that when he began in the public service, he “received no 
instruction and no training of any kind”.24*
If anything, this observation was more acute in Australia where, until the 
middle years of the century, the normal pattern of recruitment to the Public 
Service was to take in either boys at the age of 14 or returned men from the 
Armed Services.244 Very few public servants had matriculated from secondary 
school, and almost none had university degrees. As early as 1920, Harrison 
Moore spoke critically of the Australian Public Service recruitment practices in 
light of the new demands that were being placed on government: “[T]he system 
is based on a conception of public administration as a clerical service under a 
political head, a conception which becomes more inadequate every year as the 
functions of administration extend.”25" W K Hancock was more direct when he 
wrote in 1930 that “Democratic sentiment applauds the sound argument that 
every office boy should have a chance to become a manager and perverts it into a 
practical rule that no one shall become a manager who has not been an office 
boy.”251
:4S Supra n 98, at 6. It is also telling of the Civil Service’s own lack of progressive instincts that 
at the Exchequer, for example, officials went on using Latin well into modem times, except 
where they were specifically required by statute to use English (E Cohen, The Growth o f the 
British Civil Service 1780 -  1939 (1965), at 37, 50). And, until after the First World War, the 
Head of the Treasury was opposed to the introduction of the telephone, on the grounds that it 
would impair the handwriting of civil servants (E O'Halpin, Head o f the Civil Service: A Study o f 
Warren Fisher (1989), at 30).
249 L F Crisp, Australian National Government (4th ed, 1978), at 437.
250 Quoted id, at 437 -  438.
251 Australia (1st ed), at 142.
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Moreover, much of the new legislation seemed cobbled together and 
hastily-written. Sir Frederick Pollock once asserted that “contentious Bills 
dealing with administrative government often emerge from Committee 
disfigured by obscure and ill-drawn compromises between the views of opposed 
parties” .2''2 Such views were sometimes heard on both sides of politics. Sir 
Lyndon Macassey, a prominent Labour Party member, for example, once 
complained that “Government Bills are forced through parliament under the 
pressure of the government whips; there is little time for discussion of their 
provisions either in the House or Committee”.2"" Lord Greene later made the 
same point from the perspective of the judge sitting on judicial review, though in 
slightly less forgiving terms:
The technique of legislation, the parliamentary procedure by 
which legislation of this character is carried through without the 
necessity of critical examination, the ignorance of the legislators 
on what are often highly technical subjects, their tendency to 
concentrate their attention in debate on matters likely to excite the 
interest of the public or the press ... all these factors working 
together result in ill-digested legislation which is then thrown at 
the heads of judges, who have to do with it the best that they
But, despite all of this, and despite the myopia of the Anglo-Canadian 
scholars, the years to come were to see the sort of curial stubbornness 
represented in the Housing Act cases give way in England to a form of
252 “Note” (1915) 31 LQR 153. See, also,
253 “Law-making by Government Departments” (1923) 5 J  Comp Leg and Int’l Law 73, at 77 - 
78. He continued:
[Legislation is passed in the most general terms and left to some Government 
Department to apply as it thinks fit under machinery or rules made by it; the 
Cabinet is therefore in a position through its member at the head of a 
Government Department to embark on a particular policy which has never in 
any detail been discussed in parliament or communicated to the public {ibid).
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capitulation. They were also to see the beginning of a definite cleavage in 
Australian and English approaches to natural justice. The focus of the next 
chapter will be to explore both of these developments, and to consider their 
portent for the decades to follow.
254 “Law and Progress”, the 13th Haldane Memorial Lecture (1944), at 12.
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THREE
THE TWILIGHT OF NATURAL JUSTICE?
T udges may be politically irresponsible, but they are seldom politically 
unaware. Lord Mansfield is famous for having said that political 
consequences ought not to form part of the judicial reasoning process, 1 but in an 
area like administrative law, political considerations can seldom be far from the 
surface. The cases discussed in the last chapter make this plain. In the early part 
of this century -  during what I have described as natural justice’s first phase -  
some judges were overt in their acknowledgment of the changed political context 
in which public law litigation was being conducted. In the second phase, after 
the tumult which followed publication of The New Despotism, there came to be 
in England an ostensible retreat to legal formalism in judicial review eases. That 
is what was implicit in the Housing Act cases. But this was no less an indication 
of political awareness. As the Anglo-Canadian scholars pointed out, it was 
through the manipulative use of legal formalism that common law judges were 
able to blunt the administrative will.
Following the Second World War, however, developments in English 
public law began to give rise to a concern that the courts had finally capitulated 
to the Anglo-Canadian scholars, and that natural justice had entered its
1 “The constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence our judgments; God forbid it 
should! We must not regard political consequences; how formidable soever they might be: if 
rebellion was the certain consequences, we are bound to say Fiat justitia, mat coelum" (R v 
Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2527, at 2561 -  2562, 98 ER 327, at 346 -  347).
“twilight” phase.“ As Wade and Forsyth described it, “[t]he courts showed signs 
of losing confidence in their constitutional function and they hesitated to develop 
new rules in step with the mass of new regulatory legislation”.2 3 de Smith put it a 
bit more wryly when he wrote that by the 1950s, “valedictory addresses to the 
audi alteram partem rule in English administrative law were becoming almost 
commonplace”.4
Broadly speaking, there were two factors which contributed to this third, 
twilight phase in England. The first was the sheer magnitude of electoral 
support for Labour shown in the general election of 1945. This, coupled with 
the popularity of the programme of social reform set out in the Beveridge Report 
of 1944,5 could not help but make it clear to the judges that an obstructionist 
approach to administrative law was out of touch with the public mood. 
Secondly, and equally importantly, judges began to realise that notwithstanding 
the flaws associated with the Anglo-Canadian scholars’ arguments,6 there were 
some significant practical limitations in the ability of the common law to grapple 
adequately with the sorts of issues in dispute in administrative law cases.
2
In the Australian context, though, the legal reaction to the post-War era 
was rather more ambivalent. On one hand, there were a series of cases, which 
will be discussed shortly, in which Sir Owen Dixon attempted to introduce into
2 H W R Wade, “The Twilight of Natural Justice?” (1951) 67 LQR 103.
3 Sir W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994), at 17.
4 Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (2nd ed, 1968), at 154.
5 Full Employment in a Free Society (1944). The Beveridge Report, which was translated into 
eleven languages (including Hebrew and Serbo-Croat) served as the blueprint for much of the 
Atlee government’s programme. Lord Beveridge’s autobiography was published in 1953, under 
the title Power and Influence.
6 See, supra chapter 2,
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Australian law a doctrine of deference to administrative expertise. But there was 
here nothing like the political jolt that the election of the Atlee government 
caused in England. So Dixon CJ’s efforts notwithstanding, the doctrine of 
natural justice in Australia continued to be stated broadly by the High Court 
throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. In fact, as will be seen in chapter four, the 
Australian “twilight” period did not begin until after the English one had 
effectively ended. The result of this was that during this third phase, there came 
to be seen a discernible schism between English and Australian approaches to 
natural justice.
THE TWILIGHT PHASE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN 
ENGLAND
Franklin v Minister of Town and Countiy Planning
Three cases can be used to illustrate the state of the English common law 
inheritance at the end of the 1950s. The first is the decision of the House of 
Lords in Franklin v Minister o f Town and Country Planning -  the so-called
n
Stevenage Case. In this case, the House of Lords seemed to adopt an approach 
to the doctrine of natural justice which was the complete inverse of the 
Electricity Commissioners approach, and which had the effect of dramatically 
limiting the doctrine's reach. Specifically, their Lordships used the existence of 
a statutory decision-making procedure to negate the obligation to observe 
natural justice. Rather than using it as proof of the superaddition -  to establish
7 [1948] AC 87.
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the fact that there existed in the decision-maker a duty to act judicially -  the 
Lords in this case used it to show that there was no such duty.
Franklin v Minister o f Town and Country Planning arose out of a plan to
o
build a “new town” after the Second World War. The new towns legislation 
was part of Britain’s post-War reconstruction programme. The new towns were 
intended both to provide homes for people who had been bombed out, and to act 
as a showcase for the Labour Government’s agenda of post-war central planning. 
The case was, therefore, one of central political import.
One of the ideas in the post-War programme was to build a series of 
“garden towns” away from large population centres, in order to avoid urban 
sprawl.8 9 10 Stevenage was a small town north of London, in Hertfordshire, set 
amidst farmlands, which had been identified as the candidate for the first of the 
new garden towns. None of the landowners had indicated a firm desire to sell 
their land, however. Accordingly, in 1946, just before the New Towns Bill 
received second reading in the House of Commons, the Minister of Town and 
Country Planning visited Stevenage to meet with the landowners, purportedly to 
discuss their concerns. But by this time, the actual plans for the Stevenage new 
town were fairly well developed. So in the course of the meeting, the Minister 
suggested that it would be futile for the property owners to resist the new town 
idea.1" The owners sought to quash the draft Order in Council declaring
8 The New Towns Act 1946.
0 On the subject of the “new towns” generally, see M Clapson, Invincible Green Suburbs, Brave 
New Towns: Social Change and Urban Dispersal in Postwar England (1998) and M Aldridge, 
The British New Towns: A Programme Without a Policy (1979).
10 Although “harangue” might be a more accurate description than “suggest”. The following is 
an excerpt from the transcript of the Minister’s talk with the residents:
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Stevenage to be a new town on the basis that it had been actuated by bias. In the 
King’s Bench Division, they had succeeded, but the Court of Appeal had held 
that no bias had been made out.I 11
Rather than affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, the House of 
Lords took the opportunity to correct the law, and to hold that the question of 
possible bias was irrelevant because, in the circumstances, the Minister did not 
have a duty to act judicially. Speaking for all their Lordships, Lord 
Thankerton said that the Minister’s only obligation was to comply with the 
statutory procedure, which required him to consider all objections raised to a 
new town scheme (which, the Minister testified in an affidavit, he had done). In 
light of the statutory procedure, the common law rules of natural justice were not 
applicable in the circumstances.
Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne
The second of the English “twilight” cases (and formally more 
significant, since it was binding on Australian courts), was actually not English 
at all. It was the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
I want to carry out a daring exercise in town planning (Jeers). It is no good 
your jeering: it is going to be done (Applause and boos; cries o f “Dictator”) ... 
The project will go forward. It will do so more smoothly and more 
successfully with your help and cooperation. Stevenage will in a short time 
become world famous (Laughter) ... [W]e have a duty to perform and I am not 
going to be deterred from that duty. While I will consult as far as possible all 
the local authorities, at the end, if people are fractious and unreasonable, I shall 
have to carry out my duty (Cry o f “Gestapo!”) ([1948] AC, at 90 - 91).
11 (1947) 176 LT 312 (CA).
12 [1948] AC, at 102.
13 Lords Thankerton, Porter, Uthwatt, du Parcq and Normand.
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1951, in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne.14 In this case, the Privy Council was 
determining whether a writ of certiorari should issue against the Ceylonese 
Controller of Textiles for having unlawfully cancelled Nakkuda Ali’s licence to 
engage in business as a fabric merchant in Colombo.
In revoking the licence, the Controller of Textiles was purporting to act 
under the authority of the wartime Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations 
1945, which empowered him to order a revocation where he “had reasonable 
grounds to believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer”. 
The cancellation took place following an exchange of correspondence between 
Nakkuda Ali and the Controller. The allegation was that Nakkuda Ali had 
fraudulently falsified his books, so as to be able to unlawfully claim credit from 
the bank. It is apparent from the record1^ that Nakkuda Ali had known for some 
time that he was under suspicion, and before the cancellation took place, he had 
actually been invited to make written submissions on the allegations (the 
substance of which were fully known to him), which he did through his proctors. 
It was only after having considered Nakkuda Ali’s submissions, that the 
Controller determined that he was unfit, and cancelled the licence accordingly.
Nakkuda Ali’s argument was that he had been denied natural justice by 
not having been permitted to see the affidavits on file with the Controller, which 
had presumably been used to counter his own letter of explanation.16 But to get 
to this stage of the case, he first had to show that the Controller was amenable to 
the writ of certiorari -  ie, that he was engaged in quasi-judicial decision-making,
14 [1951] AC 66.
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and that he had the power to affect Nakkuda Ali’s rights. 17 It was on this point 
that Nakkuda Ali fell down. He argued that the inclusion of the requirement that 
the belief of unfitness be “reasonable” in the regulations imported an obligation 
on the part of the Controller to act judicially. This placed the Privy Council on 
the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, it was anxious to distance itself from the 
highly-criticised and disreputed judgment of the House of Lords in Liversidge v 
Anderson. But on the other, it was concerned (since it was effectively deciding 
a question of English law19) not unnecessarily to deviate from the principles 
espoused by the Court of Appeal in Electricity Commissioners, and which had 
since become well-entrenched in the case law.
One cannot help but wonder what the Privy Council’s position might 
have been had the alleged violation of Nakkuda Ali’s procedural rights been 
more egregious, but in the end, their Lordships found that the Controller of 
Textiles did not have a superadded duty to act judicially, and hence that the 
remedy of certiorari was not available to quash any departure from the obligation 
to observe natural justice. In reaching this conclusion, the Board pointed to the 
fact that the statutory regime did not lay down any procedure at all according to 
which the Controller was to exercise his power. Nor did the regulations provide
15 See [1951] AC, at 68 - 69.
16 [1951] AC, at 70.
17 On the basis of the Electricity Commissioners formulation.
18 [1942] AC 206 (holding that regulation 18B of the UK Defence (General) Regulations 1939, 
which provided that the Home Secretary could make detention orders if he had “reasonable cause 
to believe any person to be of hostile association or origins”, merely required the existence of a 
subjective belief on the part of the Home Secretary. Though the decision itself is now largely 
forgotten, Lord Atkin’s stinging dissent has come to represent a classic statement of the ideals of 
administrative law). On the Regulation and its implementation, see the two very interesting 
pieces by A W B Simpson: “Rhetoric, Reality and Regulation 18B” [1988] Denning LJ 123, and 
“The Judges and the Vigilant State” [1989] Denning LJ 145.
19 The Privy Council stated that the law of Ceylon on this point was the same as the law of 
England ([1951] AC, at 75).
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for a right of appeal, or anything else which might have suggested that the 
Controller was to engage in judicial-like deliberations when determining a 
licence. It is this latter point that makes Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne difficult to 
square with the holding in Franklin v Minister o f Town and Country Planning. 
There, the claim for a right to natural justice failed because there was a statement 
of legislative intent with respect to the decision-making process. Here, it failed 
because there was not one.
R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker
The third of the twilight cases was the decision of the English Divisional 
Court in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker. In fact, 
while not formally binding upon Australian authorities in the way that Nakkuda 
Ali v Jayaratne was, Parker is, for reasons which will become apparent in the 
next chapter, of perhaps equal interest in its actual holding.
Parker was a licensed taxi-cab driver in London of many years standing. 
In the course of his career as a driver, Parker had had several encounters with the 
law. As the evidence in the proceeding showed, he had been convicted on 
several occasions of traffic offences whilst driving his taxi. As a result, prior to 
this litigation, he had incurred two suspensions: one in 1947 and another in 
1951. In October of 1952, Parker was alleged to have allowed his taxi to be used 
for the purpose of allowing prostitutes to engage in their trade. Thereupon, the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police summoned Parker to a hearing before
20 [1951] AC, at 78.
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the Taxi Licensing Committee, where he was given the chance to hear the 
evidence of the two police constables who had made the allegations against him. 
Parker was given a chance to speak on his own behalf after having heard the 
evidence against him, but he was refused the opportunity to call his own alibi 
witness. At the conclusion of the hearing, the decision was taken to revoke his 
licence, which was later confirmed in writing. Not surprisingly, Parker applied 
for a writ of certiorari to quash the revocation on the basis that by having been 
denied the right to call his own witness, he had been denied natural justice.
The revocation had been carried out under the authority of paragraph 30 
of the London Cab Order 1934, which, like the textile regulation in Nakkuda Ali, 
contained a “state of mind” provision. It gave the Commissioner the right to 
revoke a taxi licence if he was “satisfied, by reason of any circumstances arising 
or coming to his knowledge ... that the licensee is not a fit person to hold such a 
licence”. Like the Privy Council two years beforehand (though it is worthwhile 
to note that Nakkuda Ali was cited neither in argument nor judgment in Parker), 
the Divisional Court“' found that in exercising his discretionary powers, the 
Commissioner of Police was not acting in a judicial capacity.24 In his judgment, 
Lord Goddard CJ said that it was
impossible to find on the wording of the order under which the 
Commissioner acted that he was either in the position of a judge 
or of a quasi-judge; exactly what a quasi-judge is nobody has ever
21 [1953] 1 WLR 1150.
22 See [1953] 1 WLR, at 1150- 1151.
23 Lord Goddard CJ, Parker and Donovan JJ concurring.
24 For earlier illustrations of Lord Goddard's mindset with respect to the reviewability of an 
exercise of discretionary power by officials, see R v Brighton Rent Tribunal [1950] 2 KB 410, 
and Dormer v Newcastle-upon-Tyne [1940] 2 KB 204. See also Ex parte Fry [1954] 1 WLR 
730.
135
attempted to define, but I suppose it is a person who has to decide 
on evidence and come to a conclusion on facts.
The continuing importance of procedural intricacy then showed its head: 
in order for the writ of certiorari to issue, there had to be something to quash. 
“One thing that weighs with me”, his Lordship said,
is that in considering whether a tribunal is a judicial tribunal or a 
quasi-judicial tribunal, one would expect to find that the tribunal 
had to make an order or something in the nature of an order, 
because otherwise there is nothing to be brought up and quashed 
in this court.26
In this case, he concluded, there was no order:
The motion is to bring up an order of the Commissioner. There is 
nothing here to show that there ever was an order. It was simply 
a decision of the Commissioner that by reason of facts coming to 
his knowledge, he was satisfied that the licensee was not a fit
97person to hold the licence, and that is all.
The most striking part of the judgment, however, was Lord Goddard’s 
discussion of the legal rights pertaining to a licence. In a word, there were none:
[T]he very fact that a licence is granted to a person would seem to 
imply that the person granting the licence can also revoke it. The 
licence is nothing but a permission, and if one man gives 
permission to do something it is natural that the person who gives 
the permission will be able to withdraw the permission. As a
25 [1953] 1 WLR, at 1155.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. With respect to his Lordship, this was rather a specious argument. As has been noted, 
paragraph 30 of the London Cab Order provided that a cab-driver’s licence was “liable to 
revocation or suspension by the Commissioner” if the requisite state of mind could be shown to 
have existed. But the mere formation of the state of mind did not equate with revocation. Even 
after the necessary frame of disposition was formed, the licence was merely liable to be revoked. 
There was still required to be a command; a direction, that the revocation take place. It was this 
that could have been removed into the Divisional Court. In this case, the letter confirming the 
revocation would, if it did not have the status of an order itself, have been evidence of the order.
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rule, where a licence is granted, the licensor does not have to state 
why he withdraws the permission.“
READING THE ENGLISH TWILIGHT CASES IN CONTEXT
In all three of the twilight cases, it is difficult to gainsay the substantive 
result. In Stevenage, their Lordships were concerned with the provision of 
housing for dispossessed people. Nakkuda Ali knew perfectly well what the 
allegation against him was, and he had been given a full opportunity to meet the 
case for revocation. Likewise, the cab driver Parker had been given an oral 
hearing, and had even been allowed to place on the record the evidence that his 
alibi witness would have given. Moreover, one cannot help but think that the 
outcome in Parker was motivated at least in part by a judicial perception of 
relative equities -  not least of all in light of the fact that Lord Goddard was 
presiding.30
But there is another way of looking at the cases, too. That is to consider 
them within the political context of their time -  the aftermath of the Second 
World War. As seen in the last chapter, before the War, the courts in England 
were faced with a barrage of criticism from the Anglo-Canadian scholars, but
2S [1953] 1 WLR, at 1154. His Lordship was expressing quite a different view on the licence 
point than had Scrutton LJ in R v London County Council, Ex parte Entertainment Protection 
Association [1931] 2 KB 215. On the other hand, a not dissimilar conclusion had been reached 
by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Ex parte McCarthy, Re Milk Board (1934) 35 
SR(NSW) 48. See also some of the comments made by the High Court in Metropolitan Meat 
Board v Finlayson (1916) 22 CLR 340 (discussed, supra chapter 2, 88 -  91) On the legal status 
of a licence, see also Thomas v Sorrell (1673) Vaugh 330, 124 ER 1098, and W N Hohfeld, 
“Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale L J  16 
(discussed infra chapter 4).
29 Its substance is referred to in the judgment of Donovan J [1953] 1 WLR, at 1 157 - 58.
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this only resulted in judicial craftiness in a semantic disguise -  as evidenced by 
the Housing Act cases. During the War, however, the private rights that were 
associated with public law understandably came to be interpreted in a limited 
fashion. One can consider the administrative law decisions of the House of 
Lords during the period: Liversidge v Anderson, 31 Greene v Secretary o f State 
for Home Affairs,32 Duncan v Cammed, Laird and Company33 and Barnard v 
Gorman,34 Each of these cases displayed a highly deferential attitude towards 
the Executive. And immediately at the end of the War, the Labour government 
was elected, with its large-scale programme of nationalisation and central 
planning. Aneurin Bevan made clear the new government’s attitude towards 
judicial review when he said in the debate on the National Health Service Bill 
that Labour would allow no “judicial sabotage of Socialist legislation” .35 Sir 
Hartley Shawcross, the Labour Attorney-General, 36 was slightly more elegant in 
phrasing when he said that “Parliament has felt that there are good reasons for 
taking the administration of certain classes of legislation more and more outside 
the province of the ordinary courts and placing them in the hands of expert 
tribunals.” 37
30 In the Oxford Companion to Law, for instance, Lord Goddard is described as a “strong, stem 
judge with little faith in lenient treatment of criminals [who] frequently increased sentences in 
frivolous appeals”.
31 [1942] AC 206.
"'2 [1942] AC 284 (holding, like R v Hallidav, Ex parte Zadig [1917] AC 260 in the First World 
War, that Habeas Corpus rights had been suspended by wartime regulations).
33 [1942] AC 624 (upholding the right of Crown privilege with respect to documents sought to be 
produced in litigation).
34 [1941] AC 378 (holding that Customs officials could not normally be liable for false 
imprisonment or malicious prosecution).
35 Parliamentan> Debates, House of Commons, 23 July 1946, at 1983.
36 And, as an aside, the Chief British Prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials.
'7 “The State and the Law” (1948) 11 Mod L Rev 1, at 5.
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Moreover, by the late 1940s, the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords had come to be dominated by Labour appointees. The Labour Lord 
Chancellor, Viscount Jowitt, was for obvious reasons not one to engage in 
sabotage himself, and it is significant that of the combined number of seven law
■> o
lords who heard Franklin and Nakkuda Ali, six (Thankerton, Uthwatt, du Parcq 
and Normand in Franklin, Oaksey and Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali) were Labour 
appointees. Only Lord Porter was appointed by a non-Labour prime minister 
(Chamberlain, in 1938). And while in his early years, Porter showed some 
antipathy towards “statism” (he had, for example, dissented in the Lord Haw 
Haw appeal in 194539), the evidence is that became significantly more “statist” 
as he got older.40
THE TWILIGHT OF THE COMMON LAW?
In an amusing passage, J A Griffith once said that the twilight-era cases 
provide an illustration of the judges “leaning] over backwards to the point of 
falling off the bench.”41 But Griffith's (predictable) anti-judicial embroidery 
aside, it is clear that the post-War period in England was one of a definite shift in 
judicial temperament vis ä vis the executive. In a piece written in 1948, Stanley 
de Smith wrote that “[t]he courts, acknowledging the supremacy of Parliament 
are now loath to accept the argument that it is their function to require the
3S Though it should be noted that Lord Thankerton was appointed by the Ramsay MacDonald 
government in 1929.
39 Joyce v Director o f Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347.
40 See, eg, Porter, “English Practice and Procedure -  More Particularly in Criminal Matters” 
[1949] Cur Leg Prob 13. He also seems to have become somewhat anti-academic. In a debate 
in the Lords over the Defamation Bill 1952, he said of legal scholars: “If it were not for the 
mercy of God, they might be judges themselves” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 15 
July 1952, at 1109).
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Executive to observe standards of fairness which the Legislature has not thought 
fit to impose expressly upon it.” 42 Stevens has described this as the period of 
“substantive formalism” in the British judiciary, in which faced first with an 
extended period of extreme national peril, and then with a government which 
enjoyed a huge electoral mandate for social and economic reform, the bench 
developed a pronounced disinclination to wish to interfere with the work of the 
executive.43
In this regard, there were several instances during this period of judges 
making extra-judicial statements which reflected a real sense of capitulation and 
loss of confidence on the part of the common law. Lord Greene, for instance, 
said that “the judiciary is not concerned with policy. It is not for the judiciary to 
decide what is in the public interest.” 44 More revealingly, perhaps, Lord Parker 
said that “in modem Britain, where no agreement exists on the ends of Society 
and the means of achieving those ends, it would be disastrous if the courts did 
not eschew the temptation to pass judgment on an issue of policy. Judicial 
preservation may alone dictate restraint . . .” 45 This was patently different in tone 
from Lord Hewart, his predecessor but two in the office of Lord Chief Justice.
The expression of attitudes such as this caused some people seriously to 
argue that the common law had ceased to have a constmctive role to play in
41 “Administrative Law and the Judges”, Pritt Memorial Lecture (1978), at 13.
42 “The Limits of Judicial Review: Statutory Discretions and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires” (1948) 
11 Mod L Rev 306, at 323.
44 See Stevens, Law and Politics: The House o f Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800 -  1976 (1979), 
chapters 10 - 11.
44 “Law and Progress”, 13th Haldane Memorial Lecture (1944), at 11.
4;> “Recent Developments in the Supervisory Powers of the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” 
(1959), at 27 - 28 (quoted in de Smith (5th ed,1995), at 7).
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public law. In an essay written in 1949, which, perhaps because it was published 
in a non-legal periodical, received considerable prominence in intellectual 
circles, Professor Keeton offered a very pessimistic view of the future of the 
common law as an instrument of constitutionalism. He suggested that “ordinary 
courts have exhausted their usefulness in the era of rapid change through which 
we are passing.”46 But this view did not stop at the academy. In 1956, Mr 
Justice Devlin (as he then was) said much the same thing: “The common law has 
now, I think, no longer the strength to provide any satisfactory solution to the 
problem of keeping the executive, with all the powers which under modem 
conditions are needed for the efficient conduct of the realm, under proper 
control.”47 This was a view echoed by many senior civil servants, who argued 
that there had been such a profound change in the nature of government since the 
Great Depression, that the old assumptions about the doctrine of separation of 
powers as a means of constitutional control no longer fit with reality.48
PRAGMATISM AND THE LAW IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
PLANNED STATE
The Lack of Judicial Antagonism to the New Legislation
While there was simply nothing like the same level of litigation in 
Australia that there was in England, either before or after the War, the dynamics 
of public law litigation not surprisingly bore many of the same characteristics
46 “The Twilight of the Common Law”, The Nineteenth Century and After (April, 1949) 230, at 
231. For a more conventional legal academic expression of his views, see “Natural Justice in 
English Law” [1955] Cur Leg Prob 24.
47 “Public Policy and the Executive” [1956] Cur Leg Prob 1, at 14.
4S See, eg, Sir O Franks, Central Planning and Control in War and Peace (1947) and H R G 
Greaves, The Civil Service in the Changing State (1947).
141
here as in England. But in order to fully appreciate the position of the High 
Court in Australia during this same period, it is first necessary to go back to the 
inter-War years, to examine in more detail the relationship that came to develop 
between the Court, the Parliament and the Commonwealth Executive.
In an article published in the Canadian Bar Review in 1937, Mr Justice 
Evatt offered a fairly broad view of the judicial role in overseeing the procedure 
of administrative decision-makers, which, notwithstanding his Labor Party and 
progressive credentials, bore some resemblance to the sorts of attitudes displayed 
by English judges of the time.49 Evatt J also had occasion to express his views 
about the place in administrative law of the curia! model of decision-making. In 
his opinion, it was integral to the proper functioning of an administrative system:
The interposition of an independent tribunal operates as a 
continuing guarantee ... By such means administrative action is 
controlled by open investigation before a judicial officer. The 
importance of a public hearing is universally recognised.M)
Yet there were also differences between the situations in Australia and 
England. For one thing, from the First World War up to the early beginning of 
the 1930s, there was in Australia a critical mass on the High Court which, as 
evidenced by cases like Metropolitan Meat Board v Finlayson, Gillen v Laffer 
and Boucaut Bay v The Commonwealth, which were discussed in chapter two, 
seemed to have accepted the philosophical premises of the new (or “novel”) 
legislation -  at least where non-traditional, non-proprietary rights were involved.
49 “The Judiciary and Administrative Law in Australia” 15 Can Bar Rev 247. See also J D 
Holmes, “An Australian View of the Hours of Labour Case” (1937) 15 Can Bar Rev 495.
50 Fletcher v Nott (1938) 60 CLR 55, at 80. See also R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal 
Tribunal, Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228, especially at 252 - 253.
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This included not only Justices Isaacs and Higgins, but also Mr Justice Evatt.^' 
Speaking extrajudicially, for example, Evatt J once said that “under existing 
economic and social conditions, decisions of an administrative character have to 
be made so frequently and speedily, and very often involve such questions of 
law and expediency, that the ordinary courts of law could not be expected to deal 
with them.”52
This was reminiscent both of Sir Ivor Jennings’ assertion that “social 
reform is useless if it is not rapid”53 and the tenor of the speeches in Board o f 
Education v Rice and Local Government Board v Arlidge, which were discussed 
in chapter two. But in England, in the years following the pre-1914 “thinning” 
cases, litigation over the new legislation tended to end in the Divisional Court 
and the Court of Appeal, where, as the Housing Act cases showed, the judges 
were less philosophically attuned to evolved theories of government. In the 
contemporary Australian setting, in contrast, appellate work on basic questions 
of judicial review still could make its way to the High Court. There, the judges 
often did a very credible job at ascertaining, and paying due faith to, the implicit 
preferences of parliament. When, for example, Sir Isaac Isaacs said in Boucaut 
Bay Co v The Commonwealth that “the surrounding circumstances have to be 
looked at”, and that the surrounding circumstances in the case before him 
included an appreciation of the environment in which the coastal shipping
51 Who sat in the Court 1930 -  1940. On Evatt’s view of administrative law, see P Bayne, “Mr 
Justice Evatt’s Theory of Administrative Law: Adjusting State Regulation to the Liberal Theory 
of the Individual and the State” (1991) 9 Law in Context 1. See also L Zines, “Mr Justice Evatt 
and the Constitution” (1969) 3 FedL Rev 153.
52 “The Judiciary and Administrative Law in Australia” supra n 49, at 252.
53 “Courts and Administrative Law -  The Experience of English Housing Legislation” (1936) 49 
Harv L Rev 426, at 447 (discussed supra chapter 2, 114 ff).
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contract was to be carried out,54 he was engaging in as sophisticated an approach 
to interpretation as one could hope to see today.
Likewise, when Higgins J spoke in Gillen v Laffer of the Minister's 
obligations to the collective welfare of the returned veterans as well as to the 
interests of individual land-owners,55 he was displaying a sensitivity to the aims 
of the new legislation. And in Shell Company o f Australia v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation, when the High Court (and the Privy Council on 
appeal) held that the taxation authorities were not exercising the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth,56 they were attempting to render workable the 
Commonwealth system of national tax collection, without which the welfare 
state could never have existed. Whatever may be said about their English 
contemporaries, when the Australian cases are considered closely, it seems quite 
wrong to assert that the judges of Australian High Court in this period were 
unthinking slaves to formalism.
Australian Conservative Political Support for Delegation
At the same time, by the time of the onset of the Great Depression in 
Australia, the Commonwealth parliament had to a degree come to accept that its 
ability to joust with the courts over judicial review was inhibited by section 
75(v) of the Constitution, which gave the High Court an original jurisdiction to
54 (1927) 40 CLR98, at 105.
55 (1925) 37 CLR 210, at 225 - 226.
56 [1931] AC 275. See also British Imperial OH Co v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1926) 
38 CLR 153.
144
issue injunctions and writs of prohibition and mandamus.57 In this respect, the 
fight over the basic premise of judicial review of administrative action had taken 
place a generation earlier in Australia than in the United Kingdom (chiefly 
concerning the effectiveness of privative clauses in the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904' ). It was in a spirit of acknowledged 
defeat that as Commonwealth Attorney-General, Billy Hughes described the 
interplay between parliament and the High Court as a “miserable battledore and 
shuttlecock business ... We throw the High Court an amending Act, and they 
hurl back its shattered remains. Then, spurred on by the demon of eternal hope, 
we pass another; again it is thrown back ...”59
Furthermore, the party political situation in Australia was different from 
England. In England, for much of the period from 1905 -  1935, what today 
would be broadly known as left-of-centre governments (Liberal, Labour or 
coalition) were in power. In Australia, in contrast, throughout the inter-war 
period, anti-Labor governments were in power for all but three years.60 For the 
period during which the controversy over Electricity Commissioners and the 
Housing Act was first brewing, the Commonwealth government was led by S M 
Bruce (in coalition with Earle Page). One of the kinder things said by Manning
"7 See Bank o f New South Wales v Commonwealth (“the Bank Nationalisation Case") (1948) 76 
CLR 1, at 362-365.
58 See R v Commonwealth Court o f Conciliation and Arbitration, Ex parte Whvbrow & Co 
(1910) 11 CLR 1, R v Commonwealth Court o f Conciliation and Arbitration, Ex parte Gulf 
Steamship Co Ltd (1912) 15 CLR 586 and Ince Brothers v Federated Clothing and Allied Trades 
Union (1924) 34 CLR 457.
59 Australia, Parliamentary’ Debates, House of Representatives, 13 November 1914, at 652. For 
the complete story of the fortunes of privative clauses in the High Court (including more of Billy 
Hughes’s views), see M Aronson and B Dyer, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action, at 962 -  
966.
60 The governments were Hughes (1915 -  1923; anti-Labor after 1917), Bruce (1923 -  1929), 
Lyons (1932 -  1939), Page (1939), Menzies (1939). Scullin, the only Labor prime minister, was 
in power 1929 -  1932.
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Clark about Bruce was that he “believed in efficient government, in a 
businessmen’s government” .61 As Brian Galligan has described it, the Bruce- 
Page government was a conservative-leaning coalition “that favoured private 
enterprise and a contraction o f state intervention in the economy and industrial 
relations”. “ Leslie Zines has noted that Bruce’s chief concern was economic 
development -  “men, money and markets” -  rather than social engineering.63 
The Bruce-Page government was followed, of course, by the onset of the Great 
Depression which, if anything, had more drastic effects in Australia than in 
Great Britain .64 The combination of all of these factors led to a possibly less 
dogmatic view of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches 
among parliamentarians. As has been noted, The New Despotism struck a 
responsive chord among some in Australia,6^  but the sorts o f high-blown rhetoric 
that accompanied Lord Hewart’s book in England did not feature so commonly 
here.
Moreover, the desire for efficiency, of which Manning Clark wrote, gave 
rise to a sympathy even amongst conservative politicians in Australia for 
delegation of decision-making power to the executive. There was, it is true, 
repeated litigation in the High Court over the constitutionality of delegated 
legislation,66 but this was more a mask for a deeper-running dispute over the 
power and place of trade unions in Australian society than a dispute over the 
power to regulate per se. For the most part, the period between the World Wars
61 A History o f Australia, Vol VI (1987), at 260.
62 Politics o f the High Court (1987), at 103.
63 “Social Conflict and Constitutional Interpretation” (1996) 22 Mon UL Rev 195, at 196. 
<>4 See, generally, C B Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression (1970).
65 See supra chapter 2, at 107.
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in Australia was characterised by what Geoffrey Sawer described as “a curious 
dissociation between politics and constitutional law”. Even Robert Menzies 
was moved to say in the 1930s that “legislation by Parliament should deal with 
principles and fundamental rules, and the details of administration should be left 
to the Executive: I have no great fear of executive legislation provided those
s o
principles are observed.” Professor Bailey reported that the practical 
manifestation of attitudes like this was that “wherever Parliament could 
reasonably hand over the work of implementing an Act, it was done. There 
[was] almost no exception to that rule.”69
The Ideological Agnosticism in Australian Public Law Scholarship
At the same time, there did not seem to be in Australia the same scholarly 
negative attitude towards the judiciary and judicial review as in England and in 
Canada. This may have had something to do with the greater Australian 
willingness to shy away from ideological purity in debating law reform that was 
discussed in chapter two. It probably also had something to do with the fact that 
there were not very many full-time legal academics in Australia at the time. 
Whatever the cause, the written debate over judicial review was in some respects 
carried out in less ideologically polarised terms in Australia than in either 
England or Canada. It was for this reason that, as noted in chapter two, there 
was in Australia some scholarly sympathy for Lord Hewart’s views.
66 See Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1931) 44 CLR 492 and Victorian 
Stevedoring Co and General Contracting Ltd v Dignan (“Dignan 's Case") (1931) 46 CLR 73.
67 Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901 -  1929 (1956), at 329.
<>s Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees 1929 -  30, Evidence at 13 (quoted in L F 
Crisp, Australian National Government (4th ed, 1978), at 419).
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Sir Federic Eggleston’s acknowledgment of unease over the extent to 
which discretionary power was being vested in the executive has already been 
referred to.70 In a similar vein, in an article published in 1935, the same year as 
John Willis’s piece “Three Approaches to Administrative Law”,71 C I 
Menhennitt took rather a different view from the Anglo-Canadian scholars. In 
the piece, entitled “Administrative Tribunals in Victoria”,72 Menhennitt spoke, 
like Willis, Jennings, and the other Anglo-Canadian scholars, of the “increasing 
control and direction of economic life” that the Great Depression had demanded 
of government.7 ’ But he concluded in a much different tone from them:
As the policy of planned social and economic life is developed, 
every precaution should be taken to ensure that individual rights 
are interfered with only in accordance with the intention of the 
legislature, and only after every possible opportunity has been 
given to the individual to show cause why his rights should be left 
undisturbed.74
Similarly, in 1936, Edward Sykes wrote a review of Jennings’ The Law 
and the Constitution which is quite pointed in its criticism of the anti-judicial 
review thesis. “Dr Jennings does not”, Sykes wrote, “really seriously deal with 
the underlying implication in Dicey’s work that under the British system the 
dominant principle is that the rights of the individual should be secured”.75 He 
took direct issue with the excessive ideological nature of the Anglo-Canadian 
scholarship:
<>Q Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees 1929 -  30, Evidence at 18 -  19 (quoted in 
Crisp, id, at 418).
70 Supra 107
71 1 UTLJ 53 (discussed supra chapter 2, 110 -  114).
72 1 Res Jud 28.
73 Ibid.
74 Id, at 37.
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Dr Jennings is as much influenced by the idea of the ‘public 
service’ state concerned with the promotion of its subjects’ 
material welfare as is Dicey by the idea of the ‘public order’ state, 
the functions of which are merely to defend the country and 
prevent disorder and crime. If the ‘rule of law’ be a political 
maxim used to bolster up a concept of the State which is now 
obsolete, one may retort that Dr Jennings’ refutation of the 
doctrine of the ‘rule of law’ looks like a political maxim used to 
strengthen another concept of the State which has not yet 
arrived.76
The Australian Administrative Law Synergy
Because of all these features, some Australian commentators suggested 
that a greater synergy existed (though of course they did not use this word to 
describe it) between the courts and the political branches of government in 
Australia than elsewhere in the common law world. In an article published in 
1931, for example, E A Beecroft wrote:
The rapid growth of [administrative] tribunals has brought with it, 
in some instances, the possibility of arbitrary administrative 
action without judicial review; yet in Australia the right of 
judicial review has, in respect of most of these tribunals, been 
carefully preserved, and no such serious protest against ‘executive
77justice’ has occurred as in Great Britain ...
He continued:
That is a good sign, because, under the conditions of modem life, 
what Mr Justice Higgins once referred to as ‘the interdependence 
of the arms of government’ will increase rather than decrease. 
Unless the new tribunals have the protection of the judiciary,
75 1 Res Jud 56, at 58.
76 Ibid.
77 E A Beecroft “Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction in Australia” (1931) 79 U Penn L Rev 1021, 
at 1050- 1051.
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administration will be seriously hampered and the ordinary courts 
will be overburdened with unnecessary litigation.78
Yet this synergy was plainly a pragmatic, working one, rather than a 
synergy of constitutional theory. It was not dissimilar to the pragmatism which 
underlay the thinking about delegation of legislative power like that of Robert 
Menzies, quoted earlier.74 As Beecroft put it:
[Australian judges] more readily than the American judges, have 
abandoned, or at least learned to qualify, the cherished doctrine 
which they derived from Montesquieu and Blackstone, perhaps 
because that doctrine, in its purest form, was never so deeply 
fixed in their minds. They show little anxiety nowadays when a 
new instrument of government cannot be fitted precisely into one 
of the three traditional categories.
This latter passage is an illuminating one. If the problem with judicial 
review (including the imposition of natural justice requirements) in England 
during the middle decades of the century was one of sematic over-complication, 
the problem in Australia was arguably the converse: under-theorisation. This 
was to become apparent in the post-War years, as natural justice in England was 
entering its twilight period.
THE HIGH COURT’S GLOAMING SHOTS
A review of the three High Court cases dealing with the entitlement to 
natural justice decided during the years which coincided with the twilight phase 
in England shows that here, the doctrine was stated in terms that were 
significantly less complicated than in England. Importantly, though, the three
781bid.
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cases also represented a visible shift away from the comparatively sophisticated 
attempts to “work with” the new legislation that was seen in the ‘teens and 
1920s, in the judgments and writings of Barton, Isaacs, Higgins and Evatt JJ.
R v Commonwealth Rent Controller, Ex parte National Mutual Life 
Association
The first of the cases, R v Commonwealth Rent Controller, Ex parte
o n
National Mutual Life Association, arose in 1947 under wartime National
o  i
Security regulations. Some members of the Court purported to apply the 
Electricity Commissioners test, but others apparently felt it unnecessary to do so. 
The case involved the question of whether the Commonwealth Rent Controller, 
who had made a determination of the fair rent for certain premises, was obliged 
to have provided a hearing before making his determination.
Regulation 23 specifically conferred upon the Rent Controller the right to 
determine fair rents of his own motion. Nevertheless, in their joint judgment, 
Latham CJ and Dixon J held that since under the legislation the Rent 
Controller was also given the power to summon witnesses and to take evidence 
under oath, it could be inferred that he was under a duty to act judicially. For 
Rich J, the matter was much more straightforward. In his view, the legislation 
empowered the Rent Controller “to determine the rights and liabilities of parties
o  T
and therefore he is bound to act judicially.” He did not refer to Electricity 
Commissioners. Instead, he approached this case in much the same way that
79 See supra n 68, and accompanying text.
80 75 CLR361.
sl The National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations.
82 Williams J concurring (75 CLR, at 377).
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Griffith CJ had approached Municipal Council o f Sydney v Harris -  holding that 
the action in question was deemed to be judicial in character simply by reason of 
the fact that it interfered with property rights. This was, of course, the same 
approach that he had taken in Gillen v Laffer, thirty years before, when he said 
that “[t]he nature of the thing done -  deprivation of property -  implies a judicial 
act.” Starke J did cite Electricity Commissioners, but he said simply that the 
Rent Controller had authority “to determine questions affecting the rights of 
subjects” (namely to determine the rents to be paid by them).8^  Like Rich J, it 
was for this reason that he held that the Rent Controller had a duty to act 
judicially.
Delta Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council
86Eight years later, in Delta Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council, 
the Court held that before a local council could issue an order forbidding 
development of a piece of privately owned property, it had to provide the owner 
with the opportunity to convince the council otherwise. In this case, Ordinances 
made under the City o f Brisbane Acts 1924 - 1954 (Qld) forbad the construction 
of buildings on land which, in the opinion of the City Council, was not capable 
of being drained. The Council refused a building licence to Delta Properties Pty 
Ltd after receiving expert advice from its Engineer that the land in question
83 75 CLR, at 373 (emphasis added).
84 3 7 CLR, at 229. See supra chapter 2, at 92.
85 7 5 CLR, at 376.
86 (1955) 95 CLR 11.
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would not drain. Nevertheless, the High Court held, there had to be an
0 7
opportunity for Delta Properties to present its case. The Full Court said:
The situation which the section creates is that a prejudicial effect 
upon the rights of individuals with respect to property will occur 
whenever the council, in the exercise of its judgment, decides that 
land is, by reason of its situation, incapable of being drained ... In 
such a situation the law insists, according to long-established 
doctrine, that the step which will have that prejudicial effect ... 
requires for its efficacy the prior observance of the fundamental 
principles of natural justice.88
Interestingly, in holding that the obligation to observe natural justice was 
triggered, there was no reference at all in the judgment to Electricity 
Commissioners or to the element of superaddition. As had been the case in Rich 
J’s judgment in the Commonwealth Rent Controller case, it was the mere fact 
that Delta Properties was being denied the full enjoyment of its property rights 
that triggered the “long-established doctrine”.
Commissioner o f Police v Tanos
A similar approach was taken in the third case from the same era, 
Commissioner o f Police v Tanos,89 Tanos involved a declaration that a 
restaurant owned by a Mr and Mrs Tanos was a disorderly house, on the basis 
that it sold alcohol without a licence. The Disorderly Houses Act 1943 (NSW) 
gave a judge of the Supreme Court the right to make such a declaration ex parte, 
upon an appropriate affidavit being filed by a senior Police officer. Regulations
s7 Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ.
88 9 5 CLR, at 18.
89 (1958) 98 CLR 383.
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made under the Act gave the judge discretion, if he thought it appropriate, to
direct that a hearing to be held prior to any declaration being made.
In Tanos, the High Court held that notwithstanding the structure of the 
governing Act, which made the ex parte proceeding the norm, hearings ought 
ordinarily to have been conducted. The judgment was reminiscent in this respect 
of R v Housing Appeal Tribunal, one of the very early Housing Act cases.90 In 
their joint judgment, Dixon CJ and Webb J said that it was a “deep-rooted 
principle of the law that before any one can be punished or prejudiced in his 
person or property by any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding he must be 
afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard” .91
Now in one sense, this holding is unremarkable -  after all, the declaration 
in question had been made by a judge, so it was hardly arguable that the 
proceeding was not judicial. But in another way, the decision was quite 
singular. " As has been noted, the parliamentary direction was that applications 
for a declaration that a given set of premises was a disorderly house were to be 
made ex parte. The right to a hearing only arose because the regulations made it 
an option to be exercised at the judge’s discretion. Yet, the Court concluded that
90 [1920] 3 KB 334.
91 98 CLR, at 395 (Taylor J concurring. See 98 CLR, at 397).
92 In an amusing way, Tanos also says a great deal about the way in which Australian social 
mores have changed in the past forty years. The record suggested that the restaurant in question 
may well have formerly deserved its unsavoury reputation. But Mrs Tanos, who co-owned the 
restaurant with her husband, testified that she had taken steps to clean up the establishment’s 
image. As Dixon CJ and Webb J put it:
The old customers were insistent on wine with their food, a fact of which the 
Tanos couple say they were unaware when they bought the business, but by 
means of Lebanese coffee, carefully brewed tea and a few soft drinks, coupled 
with the refurnishing of the room and the laying of some strips of carpet, the 
patronage of a much more desirable class of customer was obtained, a class 
which would not demand wine with their food (98 CLR, at 388 - 389).
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the effect of the regulation was to limit the judge’s discretion to do anything 
other than require a hearing inter partes. In effect, the holding was that a right to 
natural justice could be created not only by parliament, but also by the executive, 
through its own conduct.93
AN AUSTRALIAN TWILIGHT?
So at mid-century, there seemed to be a cleavage between English and 
Australian approaches to natural justice. In England, the doctrine had first 
become infected by semantics and jargon. Then ideas had given over to 
linguistics, with the result that natural justice was thought to have become a 
moribund doctrine. In Australia, in contrast, throughout the post-War period, the 
High Court’s enunciation of natural justice had a nineteenth century air about it. 
There had been hints in the 1920s that the High Court seemed poised to adopt an 
overtly contextual approach to the relationship of procedural fairness and the 
“new” legislation. But the late 1940s and 50s cases indicated a reversion to an 
older approach, whereby the existence of a duty to observe natural justice was 
thought to be a function of the effect of a given decision upon an individual, and 
derived from a “deep-rooted principle of the law,”94 rather than something which 
depended upon the ascertainment of the scope of parliament’s wishes.
93 Cf Attorney-General o f Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629, at 633 (per Lord Fraser 
of Tullybelton):
Where an administrator takes the view that he can exercise his discretionary 
power only by obtaining information from the person affected by the exercise 
of such discretionary power he is conceding that a full investigation of facts is 
necessary ... The administrator is thereby acknowledging the duty to act fairly 
in the procedure selected and adopted for that purpose.
94 Tanos, 98 CLR, at 395.
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As will be seen in later chapters, this was to prove to be a highly 
significant factor in determining the compass of natural justice in Australia in 
decades to come. But for a time, it seemed as though the twilight had descended 
upon Australia, as well. Paradoxically, this took place as the English twilight 
was coming to a close, but in two cases: one dating from 1959, and the other 
from 1963, various judges of the High Court voiced an Australian version of the 
same sort of defeatist attitude that had been seen in the English judges.
Namatjira v Raabe
The first of these cases, Namatjira v Raabe,95 concerned an appeal 
against a conviction for supplying alcohol to an Aborigine, contrary to the 
Northern Territory Licencing Ordinance 96 The Licencing Ordinance made it an 
offence to supply liquor to a person who was a ward of the state within the 
meaning of the Territorial Welfare Ordinance. Notwithstanding its short title, 
the Welfare Ordinance was intended to vest the Northern Territory government 
with broad parens authority to deal with the private affairs of the Aboriginal 
people. It did this by first defining the category of “ward” broadly, but then by 
including a wide exclusionary clause. As the High Court noted, “with the 
exception of what may be called transient aliens and a few others the exclusion 
[covered] everybody but Aboriginals.”97 Indeed, the record showed that more 
than fifteen thousand people in the Northern Territory had been declared wards
n o
at the same time.
95
96
97
98
(1959) 100 CLR664. 
Licencing Ordinance 1939 -  
100 CLR, at 667.
Ibid.
1957 (NT), s 141.
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Namatjira v Raabe was an interesting case in the sense that the denial of 
natural justice was a step removed, so to speak, from the person invoking it. The 
appellant’s argument was that the Aborigine to whom he had sold liquor had 
been denied a hearing before being declared a ward. The declaration of 
wardship, therefore, was void, so one of the elements of the offence could not be 
made out. The High Court rejected this argument, however, and held that in the 
circumstances, a hearing prior to declaration of wardship was not required.
Speaking for a unanimous bench," Dixon CJ acknowledged that 
ordinarily, one would assume that a hearing would be required in such an 
instance. " 10 But given the particular circumstances of the legislation, he said, a 
contrary conclusion was warranted. The Court offered three reasons for this 
holding. First, the Welfare Ordinance provided for an appeal de novo on a 
declaration of wardship to a judge. This obviated the need for natural justice 
rights at first instance. 101 Secondly, the original decision-making power was 
vested in the Territorial Administrator, who was the head of government. 102 
“One would not expect to find”, the Court said, “if it was intended that each 
individual case were to be inquired into and the particular circumstances of the 
case ascertained, that such a duty or function would be committed to the head of 
a government” . 103 Finally, the Welfare Ordinance succeeded prior legislation
99 Dixon CJ, McTieman, Fullagar, Kitto and Windeyer JJ.
100 100 CLR, at 668.
101 Though it ought to be noted that the Court acknowledged that in order for the appeal right to 
provide any protection, one had to have access to the legal system in a practical sense. See 100 
CLR, at 670.
102 On the legal status of the Administrator of the Northern Territory, see R v Toohev, Ex parte 
Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 (discussed infra chapter 6).
103 100 CLR, at 669.
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under which Aborigines had what amounted to wardship status, so it was 
reasonable to assume that the same presumption was to apply under the new 
legislation.104
A number of things strike one about the judgment in Namatjira v Raabe, 
particularly when it is contrasted with the English twilight cases and with what I 
have described as the High Court’s “gloaming shots” of the late 40s and early-to- 
mid 50s.105 The first is that unlike the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v 
Jayaratne, the High Court did not feel it necessary to discuss the decision in 
Electricity Commissioners or the question of superaddition. In this sense, 
Namatjira v Raabe was in step with the gloaming shots. But unlike them, it 
reads as a judgment which attempts to appreciate the context of regulatory 
legislation -  which is quite different from the impression that one gets from, say, 
Delta Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council, where the Court had said that 
the mere fact of interference with rights in real property was sufficient to trigger 
natural justice. This seeming inconsistency is in fact emblematic of the approach 
to administrative law urged by Sir Owen Dixon.
Sir Owen Dixon and the Policy of Deference to Administrative
Expertise
By any measure, Sir Owen Dixon occupies a magnificent place in the 
story of the Australian legal system. Colin Howard once said that Dixon’s was
104 See ibid.
105 Considered from the perspective of the present day, of course, the thing which is most striking 
about the judgment is the extent to which the position of the Aboriginal people as lacking full 
legal capacity was accepted without comment by the High Court. It is unimaginable that such a 
decision could be rendered today.
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“by far the greatest single judicial influence on the interpretation of the 
Australian constitution.”106 At his retirement from the bench in 1964, Sir Robert 
Menzies said that he had heard “at least two Lord Chancellors give it as their 
opinion that your Honour was the greatest judicial lawyer in the English- 
speaking world”, and that this view had been confirmed “by the most brilliant 
and celebrated occupant of the Supreme Court Bench at Washington.”107 As to 
the latter comment, Dean Acheson, the United States Secretary of State, is 
reputed to have said that had it been possible, Dixon would have been appointed 
to the US Supreme Court following his time as Australian minister in 
Washington.108
In part, Dixon’s celebration was possible because he was a lawyer’s 
judge, and because he sat at a time when the High Court and its members did not 
occupy the sort of position in the public consciousness that they do today. The 
self-described key to Dixon’s judicial method was, of course, the oft-referred to 
“strict and complete legalism.”109 There was no other safe guide to judgment 
than this, he said. And central to Dixon’s conception of legalism was his quest 
for underlying legal principle through rigorous employment of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. In his famous lecture, “Concerning Judicial Method”, he explained 
this. He said that the nineteenth century would probably come to be regarded as 
“the classical period of English law”:
106 Quoted by Sir Ninian Stephen, in Sir Owen Dixon: A Celebration (1986), at 22.
107 “Retirement of the Chief Justice” (1964) 110 CLR, at vii.
I0S Stephen, supra n 106, at 21.
109 “Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice” (1952) 85 CLR, at xiv. See also Sir D 
Dawson and M Nicholls, “Sir Owen Dixon and Judicial Method” (1986) 15 Melb U L Rev 543 
and Sir Harry Gibbs’s remarks on Dixon’s “legalism” at Gibbs’s retirement (162 CLR, at vii).
159
It was a period of legal rationalisation. The search for principle 
was a marked characteristic of many judges. Principles were not 
only used, they developed. There was a steady, if  intuitive, 
attempt to develop the law as a science. But this was not done by 
an abandonment of the high technique and strict logic of the 
common law. It was done by an apt and felicitous use of that 
very technique and, under the name of reasoning, of that strict 
logic which it seems fashionable now to expel from the system.110
Yet despite this -  and despite his reputation as a judicial polymath -  his 
role in the development of Australian administrative law is something of an 
ambiguous one. The creed of strict and complete legalism was less apparently 
applied by Sir Owen in administrative law than it may have been in other areas, 
and it is not altogether clear that his legacy has been a completely helpful one. 
Indeed, in some respects, Dixon's administrative law work was actually to an 
extent inconsistent and, for reasons which will become apparent in chapter 
seven, this may well have contributed to some of the doctrinal uncertainty facing 
the system today.
In a pair of cases decided in the late 1940s, Dixon J enunciated an 
approach to judicial review which in some respects bore a similarity to the view 
proffered by the Anglo-Canadian scholars. The first o f the cases was R v 
Hickman, Ex parte Fox and Clinton, decided within a week of the Japanese 
surrender in 1945.111 The case involved the question of the extent of the 
jurisdiction of “Local Reference Boards”, set up under the Coal Mining Industry 
Employment Regulations. In his judgment, Dixon J (as he then was) suggested 
that a decision of a tribunal should not be overturned provided that “its decision 
is a bona fide attempt to exercise its powers, that it relates to the subject matter
110 In Jesting Pilate (1965), at 157.
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of the legislation, and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power
1 1 ?given to the body.”
Implicit in this holding was a view about the relative expertise of 
“generalist” common law judges and “expert” bureaucrats. It is reminiscent of 
the Anglo-Canadian scholars’ view that the bureaucracy was more attuned to the 
problems of modem administration “than a divisional court which is an 
aggregation of three judges casually meeting on Monday morning.”113 In a like 
spirit, in Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning,114 
decided two years later, Dixon J indicated that he was prepared to defer to the 
substantive views of a government commission, even when those views were 
offensive. In Browning, the New South Wales Water Conservation and 
Irrigation Commission had declined to approve the transfer of a lease to a farm 
because the prospective transferee was not of Australian origins.11'^ 
Notwithstanding this, Dixon J said:
The grounds of suitability, desirability and advantage are matters 
for the Commission’s judgment. If the Commission considers 
divisions arising from race or from hostile affdiation undesirable, 
what is there in the statute to show that it is a consideration 
wholly outside the Commission’s province? ... There may be 
much reason to doubt the validity of the reasoning by which the 
opinions of the Commission have been reached. But that is not 
for us.116
111 70 CLR 598.
112 70 CLR, at 615. See also Gibbs J’s comments to a similar effect in Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 
CLR 110, at 119.
113 J Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law”, supra n 71, at 73 - 74.
114 (1947) 74 CLR 492.
115 The transferee was a naturalised British subject, bom in Italy. The Commission’s reasons for 
refusal were (i) that as someone of “enemy origin”, he was not desirable: lands were sought to be 
retained for returning Australian soldiers, (ii) Italians were not good farmers under irrigation 
methods and, (iii) it was undesirable to have more Italians living in the area in question (see 74 
CLR, at 503).
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The reason for this, he explained, had to do with respect for parliament’s 
judgment about functional expertise. “The Commission”, he said, was “an 
administrative body entrusted with a full discretion.”117 He continued: “The 
Commission is responsible for the successful development of irrigation areas as 
well as for superintending and controlling them. The width and variety of its 
powers are enough to show that matters of policy are by no means withheld from
1 1 ftthe Commission.”
Sir Owen’s views on the separation of powers have been subjected to a 
vigorous criticism, partly on the basis that they relied upon a process of functional 
classification119 -  which, as chapter two of this thesis showed, can, at the margins, 
be a highly arcane exercise. Yet, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in a 
constitutional regime like Australia’s, where the separation of powers is formally 
entrenched, what John Willis termed (derisively) “functionalism” must underlie 
any doctrine of deference. So in Dixon’s case, functionalism did not present any 
problems of principle -  on the contrary, it represented a logical extension of 
legalism.
Some have suggested that Dixon’s approach in Hickman and Browning 
stemmed from his time in the United States in 1942 -  44, when he became close 
to Felix Frankfurter, whose attitude towards Lord Hewart was noted in chapter 
two. Whether or not this is true, judgments like these lead one to the
116 74 CLR, at 506.
117 74 CLR, at 504.
118 74 CLR, at 505.
119 See, F Wheeler, “The Separation of Federal Judicial Power: A Purposive Analysis” 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, ANU, 1999), chapters 4 and 5.
120 See supra 108.
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conclusion that whatever else may have been his contribution to Australian law, 
Sir Owen Dixon’s legacy to administrative law is something of an indeterminate 
one. Given the deferential tone in cases like Hickman, Browning and Namatjira, 
it seems a paradox that Dixon was also the author of the very loosely-stated 
judgments in the three gloaming cases: R v Commonwealth Rent Controller, 
Delta Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council, and Commissioner o f Police v 
Tanos. In Tanos, it will be recalled, Dixon CJ joined with Webb J in saying that 
-  notwithstanding evidence of parliamentary intent to the contrary -  it was a 
“deep-rooted principle of the law that before any one can be punished or 
prejudiced in his person or property by any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding 
he must be afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard”.121 Apart from the 
fact that the three gloaming cases dealt with rights in land, it is difficult to 
reconcile this with a principled approach to deferentialism.
Testro Bros Pty Ltd v Tait
Leaving Sir Owen Dixon’s legacy aside for the moment, the most 
outstanding example of “twilight-ism” in Australian public law was seen in the 
1963 decision of the High Court in Testro Bros Pty Ltd v Tait} 22 In it, the Court 
avowedly adopted the sort of emaciating analysis engaged in by the Privy 
Council in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne and by Lord Goddard in Parker.
The Testro brothers were principals in a series of companies engaged in 
speculative building projects. The litigation involved the appointment of Tait as
121 98 CLR, at 395.
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an inspector under the Victorian Companies Act 1961, to carry out a special 
investigation into the affairs of the companies with a view to seeing whether they 
should be wound up, or whether prosecutions should be instituted against the 
Testros. Section 173 of the Companies Act conferred upon company inspectors 
the power to compel witnesses and to take examination on oath. After he had 
been so summoned, R C Testro, one of the brothers, requested leave to appear by 
counsel, which was granted. Counsel then requested the right to put questions to 
Testro following his examination by Tait. Counsel also requested that as the 
representative of the companies, he be permitted to be present throughout the 
taking of evidence and that he have the right to cross-examine all witnesses. He 
further requested to be informed of all allegations against the companies which 
might arise during the investigation.
Tait’s position was that while he would have been prepared to have 
allowed counsel to appear for Testro personally during his examination, he 
would not agree to the requests made by counsel on behalf of the companies. 
Thereupon, both Testro and Testro Bros Pty Ltd applied to the Supreme Court of 
Victoria for a writ of prohibition to stop Tait from proceeding further, or 
alternatively for a writ of mandamus directing him to accede to the requests. 
The basis of the Testro case was that Tait was obliged to observe natural justice 
because through the issuance of his report, he had a power to affect their 
reputation and, hence, their pecuniary interests. O’Bryan J refused the 
applications, however, relying on the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme
122 1 09 CLR 353.
123 1 09 CLR, at 355.
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Court of Victoria in a similar case decided the year beforehand, R v Coppel, Ex 
parte Viney Industries.124
In Viney Industries, the Supreme Court of Victoria had held that an 
Inspector under the Companies Act was not required to act judicially, and hence 
was not obliged to accord natural justice. The Full Court reviewed the 
existing authorities, including R v Electricity Commissioners, R v Legislative 
Committee o f the Church Assembly “ and Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne. It 
concluded that a Company Inspector was not required to observe the rules of 
natural justice for two reasons. First, it held that there was no superadded 
obligation on his part to act judicially. Reviewing the provisions of the 
Companies Act in issue, it found, as the Privy Council had found in Nakkuda Ali, 
that there was nothing in the Act which would suggest that parliament had 
intended that the Inspector carry out his investigation in a judge-like fashion.12'
The Court in Viney Industries also stated that having regard to “broader 
considerations as to the object, purpose and scope of the investigation”, as well 
as “the nature of the report which it is contemplated will be produced as the 
result thereof’, it was not of the view that the Inspector had the power to 
interfere with a company’s legal rights. In the Full Court’s view, a report 
could either lead to the institution of a prosecution by the Attorney-General for 
violation of the Companies Act, or to an application to wind the company up. In
124 [1962] VR 630.
I2> This was also the position arrived at in two other cases, not cited by O’Bryan J in Testro Bros 
Ltd v Tait: O'Connor v Waldron [1935] AC 76 (PC, Can) and St John v Fraser [1935] 3 DLR 
465 (SCC).
126 [1928] 1 KB 411. See supra chapter 2, at 99 -  100.
127 [1962] VR, at 638.
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either case, any actual interference with the firm’s legal rights would come from 
the Court, not from the Inspector’s report. “ As the High Court put it in Testro 
Bros v Tait, the conclusion in Viney Industries was that an Inspector’s report 
could not of its own force prejudicially affect the rights of a company.130 It is 
equally clear from the judgment in Viney Industries, though, that one of the 
things which weighed heavily upon the Court was a fear of rendering the 
inspection process unworkable, were a requirement to observe natural justice to 
be imposed.131
In the High Court in Testro Bros v Tait, Testro Bros argued that an 
amendment to the Companies Act subsequent to the Viney Industries case had 
changed the complexion of the Inspector’s power.132 The amendment in 
question was sub-section 171(10) of the Act, which provided that an Inspector’s 
report was “admissible in any legal proceeding as evidence of the opinion and of 
the facts upon which his opinion is based of the inspector in relation to any 
matter contained in the report”.133 In the version in issue in Viney Industries'34 
Inspectors’ reports were only admissible as evidence of the opinion of the 
inspector. There was no reference to their admissibility as evidence of fact. In 
the view of Testro Bros, this was sufficient to vest Tait with the power, should 
he arrive at adverse conclusions about them, to adversely affect their rights.
128 [1962] VR, at 639.
129 Ibid.
130 109 CLR, at 363.
131 See, especially [1962] VR, at 638, line 28 ff. It is also worthwhile to note that the Court was 
heavily influenced by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Grosvenor and West-End 
Railway Terminus Hotel Co (1897) 76 LT 337, which held that an Inspector acting under the 
British Companies Act 1862 was not under an obligation to act judicially.
132 As an aside, it is fascinating to note that counsel for Tait was none other than E G Coppel QC 
-  the respondent in Viney Industries!
133 Emphasis added.
134 Companies Act 1958 (Vic), sub-s 146(9).
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Unfortunately for the Testros, the majority of the High Court took a 
different view. In a joint judgment, McTieman, Taylor and Owen JJ held that 
notwithstanding the legislative amendment, one could not say that an Inspector 
appointed under the Act had a duty to act judicially. Starting from the premise 
that the interpretation given to the Act by the Victorian Full Court in Viney 
Industries -  that the Companies Act did not disclose an intent that Inspectors had 
an obligation to act judicially -  was correct, their Honours said that there was 
nothing in the new sub-section 171(10) or elsewhere which “justifie[d] the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended to make such a fundamental change as 
is suggested in the character of an investigation”.135 But having said this, they 
proceeded to dash cold water on any thoughts of aggrandisement that Tait may 
have been feeling as a result of his immunity. While it was true, they said, that 
sub-section 171(10) made reports evidence of fact, it was, the Court stressed, 
prima facie evidence only.136 “We should add”, they continued, “... that we are 
of the opinion that the report of an inspector has no evidentiary value at all 
except where the fact of his opinion is a relevant issue in any particular
1^7
proceedings”.
Kitto and Menzies JJ both dissented. In Kitto J’s view, the amendments 
did give the Inspector’s report new significance: “the report itself prejudices the 
rights by placing them in a new jeopardy”. Likewise, Menzies J noted that an 
adverse report was “an incontrovertible finding against the company which must
135 1 09 CLR, at 364.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid. Note, though, that the High Court was later to repudiate this point, in Ainsworth v 
Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564. See infra chapter 5.
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be accepted by the Court upon a petition for winding up as establishing a ground 
for making an order”.1''9 In his view, this was the critical distinction between 
this case and its predecessor:
[A]s soon as findings or opinions are given legal consequences 
and are made the foundation in law for further proceedings in 
relation to the company, then the position changes and well- 
established principles require that the enquiry be subject to the 
control of the law to prevent departures from the basic principles 
of justice which are commonly described as natural justice.140
“TWILIGHTISM” IN RETROSPECT
Testro Bros v Tait stands, with cases like Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne and R 
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker, as a testament to a way 
of thinking that was increasingly to concern observers -  both academic and 
judicial -  as the 1960s went on. Parker was perhaps the most overt in this 
respect, but in each of the cases, the way in which the court described the 
obligation to observe natural justice illustrated that the common law had become 
detached from the realities of the workaday constitution. These cases did seem 
to be proof of the views expressed by Professor Keeton and Mr Justice Devlin 
that the common law was no longer able to provide the citizen with protection 
against an unfair Leviathan.141
In the English context, the deficiency stemmed from a combination of 
doctrinal complexity and judicial brow-beatedness. In Australia, the English
138 109 CLR, at 368.
139 109 CLR, at 375.
140 109 CLR, at 373.
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way of thinking clearly had had an impact -  the judgments in Testro Bros v Tail 
make this plain. But the course of natural justice was different here during the 
period and the root cause of natural justice’s malaise may have had a slightly 
different gloss. The “gloaming shots” discussed earlier in this chapter showed 
that in the right circumstances, the doctrine of natural justice could still be stated 
robustly by the High Court. But the lack of evolved theorisation of the doctrine 
after the 1920s left the doctrine in a highly weakened state in terms of its 
compass.
This was illustrated by the holdings in Testro Bros v Tait and Namatjira 
v Raabe. The gloaming cases all dealt with real property interests (if not “rights” 
stricto sensu). But with respect to other types of interests, the High Court’s 
judgments suggest that Australian public law did not seem able or willing to take 
account of interests which, while not according exactly with traditional common 
law notions of proprietary dominion, might also be deserving of protection from 
arbitrary interference by the executive. The common law’s achievement in the 
fourth phase was to bridge this gap, and to provide procedural protection for 
non-proprietary interests. The means by which this was accomplished will be 
the focus of the next chapter.
141 See supra nn 46 and 47, and accompanying text.
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FOUR
THE NEW PROPERTY
/ \ n  10 May 1968, the High Court delivered its judgment in Banks v
Transport Regulation Board (Victoria)} Viewed from the standpoint of 
today, when we are concerned with such weighty substantive issues as the very 
foundations of our system of property ownership and the basis for our system of 
constitutional government, the anniversary does not seem like one much worth 
noting. Indeed, the only thing which strikes one when reading Banks today is its 
seeming unsingularity. In fact, the sole thing which might provoke the casual 
reader from a review of the case report is that the litigation actually made it to 
the High Court. As for the holding -  frankly, the law as expounded by the Court 
in Banks seems to the current generation of administrative lawyers trite in the 
extreme.
Simply put, Banks v Transport Regulation Board involved the question 
of whether the Victorian Transport Regulation Board was entitled to revoke, on 
the basis of non-compliance with its conditions, the licence of a taxi-cab driver 
without first putting the specific allegations of non-compliance to him, and 
without giving him a chance to refute them. In holding that such a revocation 
was unlawful -  that Banks had in the circumstances been denied natural justice -  
the High Court was mirroring a position on natural justice taken by the House of
1 119 CLR 222.
Lords nearly four years beforehand in Ridge v Baldwinr Yet in doing so, the 
Court was heralding a renaissance for Australian administrative law.
For one thing, in its judgment in Banks, the Court effectively overruled 
one of its own decisions of just a few years standing,2 3 at a time when such things 
were not so common. But even more significantly, the Court in Banks came 
expressly, if only indirectly, to embrace a change in thinking about the 
relationship between the citizen, the state, and public wealth that had been 
brewing in the common law world for some time. The aim of this chapter is to 
explore the jurisprudential line which led to Banks, and to place the judgments in 
the case in a broader legal and social context. The contention is that Banks and 
its context represents what the American Professor Bruce Ackerman would call a 
“constitutional moment”.4 In short, the argument is that when it is viewed in the 
context of the accepted assumptions of Anglo-Australian administrative law at 
mid-century, Banks v Transport Regulation Board stands out as a decision which 
heralded a much greater round of change than it is given credit for today.
THE NEW PROPERTY
In April of 1964, Professor Charles Reich of Yale Law School published 
an article entitled “The New Property”."' It was one of a series of pieces that he 
wrote in the 1960s in which he explored the more jurisprudentially troubling side
2 [1964] AC 40.
3 Testro Bros Ltd v Tait (1963) 109 CLR 353.
4 Reconstructing American Law (1984).
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of the welfare state (or the “public interest state”, as he termed it) . 0 But it is 
wrong to think of Reich’s work as reactionary in a negative, condemning sense. 
On the contrary, he regarded the use of the administrative apparatus as an 
instrument of wealth distribution as a good thing. His concern had rather to do 
with the way in which the law -  which he viewed in a Hobbesian fashion as the 
shield for the citizen against the potentially soul-less power of the state -  had 
allowed itself to fall out of step with reality of government; and had thereby 
allowed to become perilously close to irrelevant. In Reich’s view, the problem 
was that the new role for the executive state as guarantor of what Sir Isaiah 
Berlin described as “positive liberties” 5 67 had not been accompanied by an 
assumption of new responsibility by the judicial branch.
In this sense, “The New Property” and its companion pieces represented 
an important response to the sort of administrative legal scholarship that had 
emanated in Reich's own country from the New Deal, 8 and in the British 
Commonwealth from the Anglo-Canadian scholars. As was illustrated by the 
twilight cases, this was in large measure a function of the fact that the courts had, 
consciously or not, adopted the distinction between legally-enforceable “rights” 
and un-enforceable “privileges” or “licences” that Hohfeld had described in his
5 73 Yale U  733.
6 Ibid. See, also, “Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues” (1965) 74 
Yale L J  1245 and “Law of the Planned Society” (1967) 75 Yale U  1227.
7 “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), 131 ff. See supra 
chapter 2, 63 -65 .
8 See, eg, the locus classicus of Depression-era American administrative law writing, The 
Administrative Process (1st ed, 1938), by James Landis. See generally on the advent of modem 
American administrative law scholarship: M Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians (1988), 
chapter 2, J L Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1989), chapter 1, and P H 
Schuck (ed), Foundations o f Administrative Law (1994), chapters 1, 3.
172
famous articled In the Hohfeldian analysis, only the former could command any 
correlative duty -  for present purposes, any correlative duty on the part of the 
decision-maker to accord natural justice. This was precisely the premise on 
which Lord Goddard CJ had proceeded in R v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Ex parte Parker. 10 In Reich’s opinion, such a viewpoint could no 
longer stand. Or, at least, it could no longer serve as the foundation upon which 
procedural rights vis ä vis the administration could be based.
In Reich’s view, without an effective means for the law to check 
executive power, the public interest state would give rise to what he called a 
“new feudalism” . * 11 This is because American (and, by extension, Anglo- 
Australian) society retained the notion of individual dominion at the cornerstone 
of its conception of free humanity. Without the security of social tenure 
conferred by property rights, or an equivalent thereto, humankind could easily 
find itself at the mercy of a new feudal despot:
The institution called property guards the troubled boundary 
between individual man and the state. It is not the only guardian; 
many other institutions, laws and practices serve as well. But in a 
society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to 
control a particular portion of that well-being is the very 
foundation of individuality. 12
9 “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale U  
16.
10 [1953] 1 WLR 1150. See supra chapter 3, at 134 -  136.
11 Supra n 5, at 768.
12 Id, at 734.
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Similarly:
Property is a legal institution the essence of which is the creation 
and protection of certain private rights in wealth of any kind. One 
of these functions is to draw a boundary between public and 
private power ... Thus, property performs the function of 
maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by 
creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the 
owner. 13
In stating this, he noted, it is important to remember that property is a 
creature of law -  and hence, the responsibility of the law-givers to safeguard:
Wealth or value is created by culture and by society; it is culture 
that makes a diamond valuable and a pebble worthless. Property, 
on the other hand, is the creation of law. A man who has property 
has certain legal rights with respect to an item of wealth; property 
represents a relationship between wealth and its “owners” . 14
The problem, as Reich saw it, was that under a traditional analysis, 
“[gjovemment largess [sic] is plainly ‘wealth’, but it is not necessarily 
‘property’”.1'' Simply put, when choses of value were not owned by their 
holders, but instead held upon a conditional and revocable grant from the state, 
the effect was to recreate the medieval relationship of feudalism. The extent of 
state involvement in modem life is what gave rise to the sinister aspect of 
welfare-ism: “the doctrine that the wealth that flows from government is held by 
its recipients conditionally, subject to confiscation in the interest of the 
paramount state” . 16 To put it more pointedly, Reich’s concern was that when 
people’s livelihood has come to depend upon the active patronage of
13 Id, at 771.
14 Id, at 739.
15 Ibid.
16 Id, at 768.
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government, for the law to fail to appropriate to itself a role in the regulation of 
the patronage -  for the law to treat the government’s activity with respect to 
wealth distribution as non-justiciable “largesse” rather than a new form of 
justiciable entitlement, in other words -  was to undermine the very foundations 
upon which our vision of a free society was built.
The solution, therefore, was for the law to update the way in which it 
viewed the relationship between the citizen and the government; for it to 
recognise a “new property”:
There can be no retreat from the public interest state. It is the 
inevitable outgrowth of an interdependent world. An effort to 
return to an earlier economic order would merely transfer power 
to giant private governments which would not rule in the public 
interest, but in their own interest. If individualism and pluralism 
are to be preserved, this must be done not by marching 
backwards, but by building these values into today’s society. If 
public and private are now blurred, it will be necessary to draw a 
new zone of privacy. If private property can no longer perform its 
protective functions, it will be necessary to establish institutions 
to carry on the work that private property once did but can no 
longer do.17
Reich’s view eventually came to be given a judicial voice in his own 
country in two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the early 
1970s, Goldberg v Kelly18 and Board o f Regents o f State Colleges v Roth,19 
Though speaking in dissent, Marshall J adopted an almost rapturous application 
of Reich’s ideas in the context of natural justice -  or what the Americans refer to
17 M a t  778.
18 (1970) 397 US 254.
19 (1972) 408 US 564.
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as “procedural due process”:
Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits 
that governments offer in modern-day life. When something as 
valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government 
may not reward some citizens and not others without 
demonstrating that its actions are fair and equitable. And it is 
procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of 
fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable government action.20
In many ways, Reich’s work still reads remarkably freshly even now.21 
His discussion of the blurring between public and private could easily come from 
the pen of many of today’s feminist scholars. And his conclusion that one could 
not turn the clock back -  that to do so would merely be to transfer power to giant 
private “governments” -  rings very familiar to anyone interested in the debate 
over the merits of privatisation and economic rationalism. But the real genius of 
Reich’s scholarship from an administrative law perspective was that it captured 
so well the challenge to which the system had to rise if it was to survive as 
anything more than a relic of a pre-Diceyan age of local government. At the 
time that Reich was writing, not just natural justice but the whole of 
administrative law was in the doldrums. So much so that in the first edition of 
his classic work, published in 1959, de Smith felt confident in predicting that 
“[jjudicial self-restraint has won a decisive victory over judicial activism in a 
field where the contest might well have been an even one”.22 The challenge of 
the 1960s, the beginning of the post-modern evolution towards rights
20 408 US, at 589.
21 Though for a partially critical retrospective view of Reich’s writing, see R Rabin, “Reflections 
on the New Property” (1990) USF L Rev 273. For an Australian perspective on the piece, see R 
Sackville, “Property, Rights and Social Security” (1978) 2 UNSWLJ  246.
22 At 18.
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consciousness, was to re-assert an active place for the judiciary, without 
undennining the benefits that collectivist legislation was intended to provide.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE OR BUREAUCRATIC 
TYRANNY?
Part of the impetus for the revival in natural justice’s fortunes was the 
intellectual debate about notions of freedom and liberty which arose in the 
context of the pessimism over the state of the so-called “free world” during the 
Cold War. What John Willis had termed the "public service" state, whose 
watchwords were efficiency and expertise, had not fulfilled the promise that it 
had seemed to hold during the Great Depression. The Second World War had 
been over for some time, the Cold War was in hill swing, and some people felt a 
chafing at what they perceived to be bureaucratic stuffiness and authoritarian 
tendencies within the public service.
Among the leading participants in this debate were F A Hayek23 and 
Michael Oakeshott,24 but probably the best-known participant in the debate to 
public lawyers was Sir Isaiah Berlin, whose inaugural Oxford lectures, “Two 
Concepts of Liberty”, have already been referred to.2" In 1950, Berlin published
23 See, eg, The Road to Serfdom (1944), Individualism and Economic Order (1948), The 
Constitution o f Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973 -  79).
24 See, eg, On Human Conduct (1975), Hobbes on Civil Association (1975), “The Rule of Law”, 
in On History and Other Essays (1983). As an aside, Oakeshott was Harold Laski’s successor as 
Professor of Politics at the LSE. One former student has said that his appointment was made “to 
the dismay and even horror of the socialists at the LSE and elsewhere” (N Podhoretz, “A Dissent 
on Isaiah Berlin”, Commentary Online, February 1999, www.commentarymagazine.com).
2s See supra chapter 2, at 63 -  64. It is worthwhile to note that as with the Anglo-Canadian 
scholars, there were significant differences amongst these men. Oakeshott, for example, once 
introduced Berlin at a public lecture by describing him as “a very Paganini of ideas” (Podhoretz,
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a long essay, entitled “Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century.”26 In this essay, 
Berlin attacked the subversion of individual liberty that was inherent in 
communism. But “Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century” amounted to much 
more than a simple critique of Soviet Marxism. It also amounted to a 
condemnation of much Western academic thought. As his biographer described 
Berlin’s thesis:
Both Soviet Marxism and post-war Western social democracy 
were prey to the same twentieth-century rationalist illusion: that, 
with sufficient social engineering, human evils could be abolished 
and individuals happily assimilated into a seamless social 
consensus. To be sure, Soviet Marxism was more ruthless in its 
contempt for democracy and human rights. But Western liberals 
could not remain complacent. The human desire to be relieved of 
the benefit of choice might lead the West to hand the dilemmas of 
public and private life over to experts, politicians, 
psychotherapists and others ‘engineers of human souls’.27
It will be readily apparent that Berlin’s criticism extended not only to the 
theme of the Anglo-Canadian administrative law scholars of the 1930s, but also 
to much of the writing of the Australian progressives earlier in the century. 
When Jethro Brown wrote, for example, that the object of modem government 
was to implement the “social will”, but cautioned that that was not to be equated 
with “actual will”, which could be corrupted by several factors including the 
population's ignorance of what was in its own best interests,* 2* he was advocating 
the same sort of surrender of liberty that Berlin warned of. Yet the concern was
ibid). On the difference in thought between Oakeshott and Hayek, see also M Loughlin, Public 
Law and Political Theory (1992), chapter 5.
26 Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1950.
2 M Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (1998), at 198.
2S The Underlying Principles o f  Modern Legislation (1912), at 143 -  148 (discussed supra 
chapter 2, at 79 -  81)
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compounded, in Berlin’s view, by the fact that the “public service state” was in 
fact not served by experts, but by what he termed “engineers of human souls.”24
This latter concern was illustrated in a practical way by a series of cases 
which exposed particularly egregious instances of arrogance on the part of public 
servants towards the interests of private individuals. As early as 1948, in 
Blackpool Corporation v Locker,M) concern had been raised about the heavy- 
handedness of municipal officials who first confiscated a private home and its 
contents without lawful authority, and then attempted to obstruct the legal 
process by refusing for six months to respond to a request from the dispossessed 
homeowner to reveal the source of the legal power on which it was purporting to 
rely.
This was followed in England by the infamous Crichel Down case, where 
the Ministry of Agriculture neglected to provide the former owner of 
expropriated land with the right to re-purchase it alter the land was no longer 
required by the Air Ministry, which had caused its expropriation. The Minister 
of Agriculture had announced a policy of return of such lands to former owners, 
but civil servants in the Ministry had ideas about setting up a model farm, which 
they pursued despite the Minister’s announcement. In the end, the Minister was 
forced to resign on the basis that he had lost control over the administration of 
policy in his department and a commission of enquiry was set up to look into the
29 Quoted supra n 27.
30 [1948] 1 KB 349.
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affair.31 As Geoffrey Sawer put it, the enquiry’s report “sets out an incredible 
story of incompetence, muddle, folly and misjudgment. ” 32 While finding no 
evidence of illegality in the government’s action, the enquiry attributed much of 
the problem to a particular civil servant who was, as the enquiry described him, 
“a man accustomed to having his own way and strongly resenting anyone 
questioning anything that he had done or querying any decision that he had come 
to or advice he had given. ’’33
Similar attitudes were seen in two notorious cases here. The first was the 
Mudge case. 34 Mrs Mudge was the widow of a fanner whose land had been 
resumed by the Victorian government. The question arose as to the appropriate 
level of compensation to be paid. " The government took the position that it had 
an absolute discretion to determine the amount of compensation, that it was not 
required to offer any reason for its determination, and that its determinations 
were not subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that 
determinations were reviewable, and it directed the government to re-consider 
the matter. But the government effectively refused to act on the Court’s order, 
and in a subsequent application, Smith J said of the public servant chiefly 
concerned:
He is, as he made plain by his demeanour and evidence upon his
examination, a man who regards any investigation, let alone
31 On the Crichel Down affair, see R D Brown, The Battle o f Crichel Down (1955). See also 
“Administrative Tribunals”, Current Affairs Bulletin 24 April 1967, at 166.
32 Ombudsmen (1964), at 21.
33 “Report of the Public Inquiry Ordered by the Minister of Agriculture into the Disposal of Land 
at Crichel Down (Cmd 9176, 1954).
34 See Mudge v Attorney-General (Victoria) [1960] VR 43.
35 Under the North-West Mallee Settlement Areas Act 1948 (Vic)
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criticism, of his actions as an affront. When the mandatory order 
of 18 December 1959 was made he quickly took action aimed at 
either maintaining the Department’s stand that no compensation 
should be paid or limiting the compensation to as small a sum as 
possible/6
In a similar spirit is the story of the Ansett case. Ansett was a wealthy 
man with political connections who exerted pressure on the Victorian 
government to acquire property to build a reservoir in a way that best suited 
Ansett but which seriously inconvenienced other property owners. As in the 
Crichel Down case, the government was forced by the weight of public opinion 
to conduct an enquiry. While (again, as in the Crichel Down affair) no illegality 
was found to have taken place, there was “insensitivity to public opinion and to 
the feeling of the other persons affected, and an assumption by the [public 
service] that it was for authority to decide what was in the public interest and to 
go ahead accordingly.”3 Episodes like these lent credence not only to the sorts 
of concerns that had been expressed by Lord Hewart a generation or so earlier, 
but also to the spectre of bureaucratic malevolence raised by thinkers like Berlin, 
Hayek and Oakeshott. In such a setting, it can hardly be a surprise that the 
judicial instinct to act as a “sovereign guarantor” of civil rights (as Sir William 
Mulock, the Chief Justice of Ontario, once put it'8) not unnaturally began to 
revive itself.
36 Quoted in Sawer, supra n 32, at 36. See also Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 17 April 1963, at 2865.
37 Sawer, id, at 37.
38 “Address” (1934) 12 Can Bar Rev 35, at 38.
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A DOCTRINE REBORN
The first signs of a return to a more simply-defined conception of the 
doctrine of natural justice could be seen at the beginning of the 1960s. In 
University o f Ceylon v Fernandof  the Privy Council did not quite adopt an 
expansive approach to natural justice, but it is significant that in defining the 
obligation to accord procedural fairness, their Lordships did not rely on Nakkuda 
Ali or Electricity Commissioners. Instead, they reverted to the broad formulation 
Lord Lorebum in Board o f Education v Rice, to the effect that “every one who 
decides anything” has a “duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both 
sides.”40 The use of Rice as the definer of the reach of the doctrine was also 
evident two years later, in Kanda v Government o f Malaya f  Speaking through 
Lord Denning, the Privy Council said: “No one who has lost a case will believe 
he has been fairly treated if the other side had had access to the judge without his 
knowing.”42
39 [1960] 1 WLR223.
40 [1911] AC 179, at 182, quoted [1960] 1 WLR, at 231 -232.
41 [1962] AC 322.
42 [1962] AC, at 337 -  338. In R v Watson, Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, at 263. 
Barwick CJ Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ said:
It is of fundamental importance that the public should have confidence in the 
administration of justice. If fair-minded people reasonably apprehend or 
suspect that the tribunal has prejudged the case, they cannot have confidence 
in the decision. To repeat the words of Lord Denning MR which have already 
been cited, ‘Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed 
when right-minded people go away thinking: The judge was biased.’
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Ridge v Baldwin
Yet it is as much a commonplace as anything else in the common law 
that a new lease on life was given to the doctrine of natural justice by the 
decision of the House of Lords in 1963, in Ridge v Baldwinf For in the case, 
their Lordships expressly adopted the sort of “new property” characterisation 
which underlay Reich’s thesis, and of which Marshall J of the US Supreme 
Court was later to speak so ebulliently in Board o f Regents v Roth. Simply 
stated, it is Ridge v Baldwin that now symbolises the modernisation of natural 
justice in the Anglo-Australian world.
Beyond its substantive effect, Ridge v Baldwin offers an interesting study 
in common law method. It was decided before the Practice Statement of 1966, 
in which the House of Lords held that it could depart from its own previous 
decisions.44 The previous decision in issue in Ridge v Baldwin, of course, was 
Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne. As a judgment of the Privy Council, it was not, 
strictly speaking, binding on the Lords (in the way that it was on the Australian 
courts), but in the pre-Practice Statement era, it was not the norm for the House 
of Lords to depart from Privy Council decisions.4" Yet even though in substance 
Ridge v Baldwin represented a new departure for natural justice in the form of an 
embracement of the new property ideas, if it is considered in methodical terms 
the case is very much one in the old style; one in which the adoption of new
43 [1964] AC 40.
44 [1966] 1 WLR 1234.
4> Moreover, as has been noted, the Privy Council in Nakkuda said that it was deciding a 
question of English as well as Ceylonese law.
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principle was clothed in the language of distinguishment, and justified by a call 
on the authority of antiquity.
Ridge v Baldwin involved the dismissal of the Chief Constable of 
Brighton -  Ridge. Along with several colleagues in the Brighton Police, both 
senior and junior, Ridge had been charged with conspiracy to obstruct the course 
of justice.46 At trial, some of the policemen were convicted, but Ridge was 
acquitted. In the course of sentencing, however, the trial judge offered some 
highly critical remarks about Ridge’s unfitness for leadership, and the poor 
example that he had set amongst his men. Subsequently, Ridge was charged 
with another offence of taking a bribe, but of that, too, he was acquitted.47 
Nevertheless, acting on the basis of the original trial judge’s remarks, the local 
Watch Committee which, under the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, was the 
local police authority, resolved to sack Ridge from his post.
After learning of this, Ridge’s solicitor requested an audience with the 
Watch Committee. This was granted, but the solicitor was not informed of the 
specific reasons upon which the decision to sack Ridge was based. Ridge then 
sought a declaration that his dismissal was contrary to natural justice. He also 
caused it to be made clear that he was not seeking reinstatement, but rather was 
looking for the restoration of his pension rights, which had been forfeited as a 
result of the dismissal. This is important, for it shows that it would have been
46 For more on the facts of the case, see A W Bradley, “A Failure of Justice and Defect of Police: 
A Commentary on Ridge v Baldwin” [1964] Camb L J  83 and A L Goodhart, “Ridge v Baldwin: 
Administration and Natural Justice” (1964) 80 LQR 105.
4 After the Crown led no evidence. See [1964] AC, at 44-45 .
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open for the Lords to have taken a much narrower view of the case, and to have 
treated it as one in which “old” property rights were in issue. In fact, the Watch 
Committee eventually settled the case, agreeing to pay Ridge arrears of salary 
and an annuity, as well as his costs.4s Nevertheless, their Lordships took the 
opportunity to restate, and broaden, the law.
Ridge had lost at both levels prior to the House of Lords. At first 
instance, Streatfield J had held that natural justice was required in the 
circumstances, but that it had been accorded. The Court of Appeal, 49 however, 
held that the Watch Committee was acting administratively, rather than 
judicially, and hence that natural justice was not required.50 The case in the 
House of Lords involved four separate issues, but the question which occupied 
most of the time of their Lordships (and the only important question for present 
purposes) was whether the Watch Committee was obliged to observe natural 
justice in the course of determining whether to dismiss Ridge. In the view of 
counsel for the Committee, in light of the twilight cases the answer was “plain as 
a pikestaff’.51 But, with the exception of Lord Evershed, all of their Lordships 
took rather a different view from counsel.
In Lord Morris’s opinion, the fact that Ridge was being dismissed on the 
basis of unfitness was sufficient to turn the action of the Committee into a 
judicial action: “before it could be decided that there had been neglect of duty, it
48 See Bradley, supra n 46, at 84.
49 Holroyd Pearce, Harman and Davies LJJ.
50 [1963] 1 QB 539.
51 Quoted by Lord Hodson, [1964] AC, at 128.
185
would be a prerequisite that the question should be considered in a judicial 
spirit”."2 In Lord Hodson’s view, it was the consequence of the Committee’s 
action that made natural justice necessary: “the deprivation of a pension without 
a hearing is on the face of it a denial of natural justice ...”53 For his part, Lord 
Devlin rather testily attributed the problem to the attempt by the legislation to 
oust the jurisdiction of the courts over dismissals."4 Lord Evershed dissented, 
but even he would have been willing to extend the obligation to observe natural 
justice to administrative activity. Natural justice should be required, his 
Lordship said, “in cases where the body concerned can properly be described as 
administrative -  so long as it can be said, in Sir Frederick Pollock’s language, 
that the invocation is required in order to conform to the ultimate principle of 
fitness with regard to the nature of man as a rational and social being.”""
The speech which has come to be viewed as the classic, however, was 
Lord Reid’s. For it was he who, through his skilful manipulation of precedent, 
managed to render Nakkuda Ali and the other twilight cases effectively lifeless. 
Lord Reid noted that in holding that natural justice was not applicable, the Court 
of Appeal had not gone back any further in its review of authority than 1911, and 
the decision in Board o f Education v Rice. This was problematic in his 
Lordship’s view, because it had meant that the Lords Justices were only looking 
at cases dealing with the “new” legislation. They had, he noted, overlooked the
52 [1964] AC, at 121.
53 [1964] AC, at 133.
54 [1964] AC, at 140.
55 [1964] AC, at 86.
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long line of cases going back to 1 6 1 5 , in which natural justice was held to 
apply to dismissal from employment. Lord Reid then proceeded to work his way 
methodically through these cases."' His conclusion was that the law on the point 
was clear: except in the case of service at pleasure, or in the case of contractual 
terms to the contrary, no person can be dismissed from employment without a 
hearing.
The mistake that the Court of Appeal had made, in Lord Reid’s view, 
was to attempt to apply a “one size fits all” approach to discretionary legislation. 
“It appears”, he said,
that one reason why the authorities on natural justice have been 
found difficult to reconcile is that insufficient attention has been 
paid to the great difference between various kinds of cases in 
which it has been sought to apply the principle."*
This portion of Lord Reid’s judgment is interesting, for it inverted a point 
on which the Anglo-Canadian scholars of the 1930s had placed great importance. 
As was discussed in chapter two, part of their refutation of Lord Hewart was to 
note that the conferral of broad discretion on the executive was as old as the 
hills.Therefore, they argued, Lord Hewart, and Dicey before him, were wrong 
to claim either that the rights of parliament or the ancient liberties of the subject 
were being usurped by the new legislation. This argument had a three-fold 
purpose: to defuse some of the alarm raised by The New Despotism, to draw 
upon the authority of antiquity, and to show that by reading down the “new”
56 Bcigg's Case 11 Co Rep 93b, 77 ER 1271.
57 [1964] AC, at 66-71 .
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legislation, it was the courts who were usurping the rights of the executive. But 
in Lord Reid’s speech, the Anglo-Canadian scholars were hoist with their own 
petard. Lord Reid took the point made by the Anglo-Canadians -  that the 
conferral of discretionary power upon the executive was not purely the creation 
of the twentieth century state -  and used it to justify judicial intervention. He 
was able to point to old cases, in which natural justice was held to attach to the 
decision-making processes of what we would today think of as administrative 
entities. By doing this, his Lordship was able to free the law from the constraints 
which the politics of the first half of the twentieth century had placed on natural 
justice.
Lord Reid also deconstructed the Electricity Commissioners requirement 
of superaddition of a duty to act judicially. In his view, Atkin LJ’s judgment had 
been misunderstood, most notably by Lord Hewart in the Church Assembly 
case.60 What had been forgotten was the fact that certiorari had actually lain 
against the Electricity Commissioners, a “new” body if ever there were one. 
And, he noted, neither Atkin LJ nor any of the other Lords Justices in Electricity 
Commissioners had based their judgment on the existence of a superadded duty. 
Rather, what had happened was that Atkin LJ had “inferred the judicial character 
of the duty from the nature of the duty itself’.61 In Lord Reid’s view, if this were 
permissible in a polycentric decision-making process such as was in issue in
58 [1964] AC, at 65.
59 See supra chapter 2, at 108 ff.
60 For a discussion of these cases, see chapter 2, at 96 -  101.
61 [1964] AC, at 76.
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Electricity Commissioners, then it could hardly be held not to apply in a simple 
dismissal case like Chief Constable Ridge’s.62
So it was that the House of Lords managed to get around the serious 
restrictions presented by the twilight cases. But insofar as Lord Reid was correct 
in suggesting that Electricity> Commissioners had been given its life as a result of 
misunderstanding, the same thing can arguably be said about Ridge v Baldwin 
itself.63 As Lord Reid plainly noted, the reason that the twentieth century cases 
could be circumvented was that Ridge v Baldwin was a case of a much older 
class. It was, moreover, a single instance, without polycentric features. Yet, 
Ridge v Baldwin has come to be understood to have heralded an unrestricted 
approach to natural justice generally.
Perhaps the point with both Ridge v Baldwin and Electricity 
Commissioners, as with the twilight cases, is that their force is not so much in 
their exact holding, but rather in where they stand in the evolution of public 
law’s view of the executive. If the twilight cases were in part a function of the 
post-War reconstruction and the Labour government, then perhaps Ridge v 
Baldwin can partly be explained by the fact that it followed the Suez crisis and 
coincided in time with the Beatles. After the Second World War, the law may 
have been faced with an overwhelming judgment of the electorate that a 
programme of large-scale bureaucratisation was to begin. But by the 1960s,
62 Ibid.
63 For a very spirited criticism of the approach taken by the House of Lords in Ridge v Baldwin, 
particularly that taken by Lord Reid, see N A Manetta, “The Implication of the Principle Audi
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there was not only an emerging distrust of authority among many sectors of 
society, but there was also (as the Crichel Down, Ansett and Mudge cases 
illustrated) a certain weariness of bureaucratic officiousness.
Durayappah v Fernando
Yet, for all that it accomplished in stretching the reach of natural justice, 
Ridge v Baldwin largely left unanswered the question of exactly when the 
obligation to accord natural justice was triggered. If the old Electricity 
Commissioners requirement of superaddition was to be scrapped, what was to 
replace it? It was to this that their Lordships (in the guise of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council) returned in early 1967, in Durayappah v 
Fernando.M In this case, the Ceylonese Minister of Local Government had 
dissolved the Jaffna Municipal Council. The question was whether natural 
justice applied to such a decision -  whether the Minister was obliged to hear the 
Council before he determined to wind it up.
The Minister's power to dissolve was set out in a provision of the 
Municipal Councils Ordinance which gave him the right to act “[i]f at any time 
... it appears to him that a municipal council is not competent to perform”.65 
There had been a number of complaints made to the Minister that the Jaffna
Alteram Partem in Administrative Law” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 
1991).
64 [1967] 2 AC 337. For a view of the importance of this case as seen through contemporary 
Australian eyes, see G Nettheim, “The Privy Council, Natural Justice and Certiorari” (1967) 2 
FedL Rev 215.
65 Sub-s 277(1).
190
Council was misbehaving. The substance of the complaints is not apparent from 
the Law Reports, but, as Lord Upjohn put it, “[tjhere is no doubt that this 
Council went through troublous times.” 66 He noted that in the two and a half 
years since the Council had been elected, it had gone through no less than four 
mayors.
The Minister therefore dispatched a representative to Jaffna to investigate 
and to make a report. The instructions to the investigator contained a specific 
note of the urgency with which the Minister wanted to deal with the case. Upon 
receiving the investigator's report, the Minister immediately dissolved the 
Council, and the Governor-General appointed special commissioners to carry out 
the Council's duties. Several members of the Council applied to court for writs 
of certiorari and quo warranto to quash the Minister’s order and to cancel the 
appointments of the special commissioners.
The Supreme Court of Ceylon held that natural justice did not apply to 
the Minister's decision to dissolve the Council. It did so on the basis that the 
reference in the Municipal Councils Ordinance to it “appearing] to the Minister” 
that a case of incompetence existed, displaced any duty to act judicially.67 The 
Privy Council disagreed with this, and found that in the circumstances natural 
justice was required because as a result of the dissolution, the Jaffna Council had 
been deprived of its property. This brought the case squarely within the bounds
66 [1967] 2 AC, at 347.
67 See [1967] 2 AC, at 348.
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of Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works f  But in the course of their judgment, 
the Privy Council also took the opportunity to flesh out the doctrine of natural 
justice as it had emerged from Ridge v Baldwin. Specifically, their Lordships 
sought to outline the factors which would replace the old Electricity 
Commissioners requirement of superaddition as the trigger. Unfortunately, the 
judgment is written in a way which does not lend itself easily to the extraction of 
a clear ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, whether natural justice was required was 
said to depend upon a consideration of three factors:
In their Lordships’ opinion there are three matters which must 
always be borne in mind when considering whether [the doctrine 
of natural justice is applicable] or not. These three matters are: 
first, what is the nature of the property, the office held, status 
enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant of 
injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what 
occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the 
measure of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to 
intervene is proved, what sanction in fact is the latter entitled to 
impose upon the other. 69
For reasons which will become apparent in chapter seven, it is 
problematic that in Durayappah v Fernando, the Judicial Committee did not 
really speak to natural justice’s juridical basis -  if the duty of fairness was not to 
be inferred as a result of some sort of legislative command, what was it to be? 
On what basis were these “Durayappah factors” chosen as the relevant ones? 
Moreover, as will be seen in the next chapter, the new triggering test set out in
6S (1863) 14 CB(NS) 180, 143 ER 414. Their Lordships also said that they were guided by 
Capelv Child {1832) 2 C & J 558, 149 ER 235.
69 [1967] 2 AC, at 349.
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Durayappah v Fernando was not in fact applied for very long in Australia.70 But 
leaving these issues aside for the moment, it is interesting to see just how loosely 
their Lordships expressed the trigger for the doctrine, as compared not only with 
cases like Franklin v Minister o f Town and Country Planning and Nakkuda Ali v 
Javaratne, but also with Ridge v Baldwin itself. Further, it is apparent that each 
of the factors to be considered permitted considerable scope for the imposition of 
judicial values. Inevitably, this meant that the lens through which executive 
decision-making processes were to be viewed was a curial one. So even if 
decision-makers were not to be surrogate members of the bench in a procedural 
sense, it was clear that their processes could not offend judicial sensibilities if 
they were to survive. With the judgment in Durayappah v Fernando, it seemed 
that the “public service state” vision of the Anglo-Canadian scholars was 
receding even further into the horizon.
TOWARDS A RECOGNITION OF THE NEW PROPERTY IN 
AUSTRALIA
One of the most fascinating aspects of the common law method is the 
process by which some cases become leading cases while others are forgotten. 
Someone once said that in order for a case to become an instant landmark, what 
is required is notoriety -  either of the parties or of the judge. Maybe the problem 
in 1963 was that there was no Newscorp to spread the news in Australia of the 
allegations that had been made against Chief Constable Ridge. Maybe it was
70 For a discussion of their use (and modification) in Australia, see J McMillan, “Developments 
Under the ADJR Act: Grounds of Review” (1991) 20 Fed L Rev 50, at 71 -  74. See also
193
that there were no Dennings, Goddards or Atkins involved in the hearing of 
Ridge v Baldwin. Whatever the case, Testro Bros v Tait, the high-water mark of 
the Australian twilight period was actually decided after Ridge v Baldwin. The 
only reference in the case to Ridge v Baldwin71 is found in the dissent of Kitto J. 
In discussing what sort of dispositive power amounted in law to a power to affect 
rights, his Honour referred twice (but only in passing) to Lord Reid’s speech. * 12 *4
None of the other judges referred to the case at all.
That Ridge v Baldwin was not addressed in any real way by the High 
Court in Testro Bros v Tait seems really quite extraordinary to us, given the fame 
that has come subsequently to attend to it -  and especially to Lord Reid’s speech. 
Wade and Forsyth describe Ridge v Baldwin as “an important landmark”,72 and 
devote more space to it and its aftermath than to any other case in their treatise. 
The current editors of de Smith say that it “gave a powerful impetus to the 
emergent trend” of judicial activism which, as of 1995, “shows little sign yet of 
diminishing”.74 But as far as the High Court of Australia was concerned in 1963, 
it was apparently seen as not worthy of any special attention.7" It was not for
Aronson and Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1996), at 399 -  400.
1 Apart, that is, from the singularly un-enlightening statement in the summary of argument that 
counsel for Testro Bros “also referred to Ridge v Baldwin” (109 CLR, at 358).
72 109 CLR, at 369, 370.
7? Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994), at 510.
4 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, 1995), at 397.
75 Though in fairness to all involved, it can sometimes be difficult to pick a winner. Writing
shortly after the decision, Benjafield and Whitmore, for example, said that it was “doubtful” that 
Ridge v Baldwin would ever stand for the proposition that “an obligation [to observe natural 
justice] will be implied whenever there is a power to affect rights or impose obligations” (“The 
House of Lords and Natural Justice” (1963) 37 ALJ 140, at 143). Writing in 1966, they said that
it was “difficult to assess the precise effect of Ridge’s Case” (Australian Administrative Law (3rd 
ed), at 152). Another Australian writer said in 1967 that it was “to be regretted that the approach 
of Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin has to date received such a lukewarm reception from the 
judiciary” (M Cullity, “Book Review” 2 Fed L Rev 306, at 307). And an English commentator
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five years -  until 1968, in its decision in Banks v Transport Regulation Board -  
that the High Court came around to adopting the new approach to natural justice.
Banks v Transport Regulation Board
Banks is an interesting case, in that it deals with the very same question 
that was in issue in R v Commissioner o f Metropolitan Police, Ex parte Parker,16 
namely the nature of the rights of a taxi-cab driver in his licence. This question 
-  the question of the “licence-as-property” that Lord Goddard had rejected so 
directly -  had a unique significance in Banks. This is because one of the 
threshold issues which faced the High Court was whether Banks had an appeal to 
the Court as of right in respect of his loss. This turned upon whether in his writ 
of summons, he was raising a question concerning property or a civil right in 
excess of $3000.00.77
Attacking the issue just as directly as had Lord Goddard (as one would 
only expect him to have done), Barwick CJ made plain his disagreement with 
Lord Goddard’s opinion:
I do not find the description of the licence which found favour 
with the Lord Chief Justice appropriate to a statutory licence to 
which a fit and proper person has a right and which relates to 
such an occupation as that of a cab driver. I do not think such a 
licence can be equated to the mere grant of a permission by a 
private person in respect of his own property.78
wrote shortly after the decision that “[a] lasting structure of administrative law can hardly be 
built on such a brittle foundation” (Bradley, supra n 46, at 83).
76 [1953] 1 WLR 1150. See supra chapter ...
7 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), cl 35(1 )(a)(ii).
78 119CLR, at 231.
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Having stated this, his Honour then expressed “entire agreement” with 
Lord Reid’s speech in Ridge v Baldwin. } And as for Nakkuda Ali, he neatly 
dismissed it both on the basis of Lord Reid’s criticism of it not representing an 
accurate statement of the law, and on the basis that it pertained to wartime 
exigencies and therefore ought not to be applied to the circumstances of 
peacetime civil life. On the question of the Transport Regulation Board having a 
duty to act judicially, the Chief Justice said that in his view, “the nature of the 
power and the circumstances of its exercise” were the source of the obligation. 80 
This was, of course, redolent of the view taken by the Full Court of the High 
Court in Delta Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council, SI and by Rich J in 
Gillen v Laffer.*2
Barwick CJ referred as well to the obligation that the legislation placed 
on the Board to provide reasons for a revocation (which had not been the case in 
Parker), but he said that this merely reinforced the conclusion that he had drawn 
from the nature of the power itself. 83 As will be discussed below, this was a 
critically important point. The rest of the Court concurred with Barwick CJ. 
Significantly, the bench also included McTieman, Owen and Taylor JJ -  the 
three judges who had formed the majority in Testro Bros v Tait.
79 119CLR, at 233.
80 119CLR, at 234.
81 (1955) 95 CLR 11, at 18. See supra chapter 3, at 152 -  153.
s: (1925) 37 CLR 210, at 229: “The nature of the thing done -  deprivation of property -  implies 
a judicial act.” See also Lord Hodson in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC, at 133 (see supra, at 186) 
83 119 CLR, at 234.
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At the outset of this chapter, it was suggested that to today’s reader, the 
only thing which strikes one about Banks is its unsingularity. But read in its 
historical context, the judgment represents a significant advance for the High 
Court in two respects. First, the case went a long way -  further than even Ridge 
v Baldwin, in fact -  in breaking the argument of circularity created by the 
Electricity Commissioners analytical formulation that the obligation to observe 
natural justice depended upon a power to affect rights and a superadded duty to 
act judicially. In Barwick CJ’s view, the former was the source of the latter. It 
was the sheer enormity of the power (in this case, the power to deprive someone 
of their livelihood) that made procedural safeguards so imperative.
Secondly, in its holding, the Court came expressly to embrace the 
concept of the new property. Through its decision, it did exactly what Reich had 
urged the law to do: it acknowledged that the old ways of viewing the nature of 
proprietary interests were insufficient to protect civil rights in the era of the 
public service state. When the Chief Justice said that the taxi-cab licence 
amounted to a property interest within the meaning of the Judiciary Act, he was 
implicitly asserting a right within the courts to supervise the work of the 
executive with respect to new property interests. This was something that the 
Australian courts had not yet done in the modem era.
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LOCATING THE NEW PROPERTY CASES IN HISTORY’S 
STREAM
In this respect, if we place Banks in its time frame -  if, to paraphrase the 
American historian Carl Schorske,84 we locate the case in history’s stream -  we 
can see that it represents a reconfirmation of the basic liberal premises of our 
society. The theory of the state that underlay its holding was one in which the 
interests of the individual were not to be readily sacrificed to the interests of 
collective efficiency. It was in this sense that it was suggested at the beginning 
of this chapter that the decision in Banks represented a constitutional moment. 
The case was also one which preserved within the unwritten terms of the 
constitution a significant role for the judicial branch as protector of the 
(comparatively) powerless citizen against the state as Leviathan. In both of these 
respects, the judgment represents an explicit rejection of the underlying 
philosophy of the Anglo-Canadian scholarship, which tended to place a heavy 
premium upon the importance of “expertise”, and which favoured the vesting in 
the Executive of extensive, non-judicially reviewable, discretion.
It is no surprise that it was not until the relative economic prosperity of 
the 1960s that the courts felt confident to assertively restate liberalism as a basic 
social principle as was done in Banks and Ridge v Baldwin. For the reasons 
discussed in the last chapter, conditions after the Second World War gave rise, 
especially in England, to a pessimism about the future of the judicial role in
s4 In Thinking With History>: Explorations in the Passage to Modernism (1998), Schorske wrote: 
“[I]f we locate ourselves in history’s stream, we can begin to look at ourselves ... as conditioned 
by the historical present as it defines itself out of -  or against -  the past.”
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administrative law. There had been some important and (as time would show) 
far-reaching decisions in administrative law cases, to be sure -  notably 
Wednesbwy88 and Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal86 -  but the 
accepted doctrine remained such that Lord Hewart could have just as happily 
railed against the state of the law in 1959 as he had in 1929. It was for that 
reason that de Smith could write at the end of the 1950s of the “decisive victory” 
of “judicial self-restraint”.87
Consider, though, what was to come within the next few years. Here in 
Australia, Sir Own Dixon -  the steadfast proponent of “strict legalism” -  was to 
retire in 1964. In his place as Chief Justice was appointed Sir Garfield Barwick -  a 
conservative, but (to use his own style88) a radical conservative; an unrepentant 
judicial activist. Similarly, in England, Lord Denning was to be appointed Master 
of the Rolls in 1962. In the House of Lords, the passing of the old guard was 
characterised by the retirement of the arch-formalist Lord Simonds in 1962.8g To 
the de facto chair of the Appellate Committee came Lord Reid, a Scottish judge 
without the same deferential instinct towards precedent as an English judged0
85 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesburv Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (defining 
the concept of “unreasonableness” in administrative law).
86 R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 KB 338 
(reviving certiorari as a remedy to quash decisions which reveal an error of law on the face of 
the record).
87 See supra 176.
88 Sir Garfield’s autobiography was entitled A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and 
Recollections (1995).
89 In fact, there was a significant turn-over of membership of the Appellate Committee in this 
period. Apart from Lord Simonds, retiring Law Lords included Lords Morton (1959), Cohen 
(1960), Somervell (1960), Tucker (1961), Keith (1961), Jenkins (1963), Radcliffe (1964) and 
Devlin (1964).
90 See, eg, his speech “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972) 12 JSPTL 22, at 23 -  25.
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Consider, too, the line of decisions that was to follow: Ridge v Baldwin,91 Paclfield 
v Minister o f  Agriculture ,92 Anis minie f '  and Conway v Rimmer94 were all decided 
within a few years of one another. In administrative law terms, the 1960s really 
were, as Bernard Schwartz claimed, tantamount to a “judicial revolution”.9''
LORD DENNING AND THE BROADENING OF PROTECTED 
RIGHTS
In this respect, no discussion of natural justice in the 1960s and 70s could 
be complete without some discussion of the work of Lord Denning. For, as with 
so many of our present-day “balance-seeking” legal doctrines, Lord Denning 
played a significant role in actually spreading the reach of the newly-revived 
doctrine of procedural fairness.
For present purposes, Lord Denning’s contribution to the evolution of 
natural justice came in two complementary forms. First, through cases like 
Nagle v Fielden)h and R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte 
H o o k f  he drew an overt link between natural justice and the private rights to 
“personhood.”98 Secondly, it was Lord Denning who was responsible for
91 [1964] AC 40.
92 [1968] AC 997.
93 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
94 [1968] AC 910.
95 B Schwartz, Lions Over the Throne: The Judicial Revolution in English Administrative Law 
(1987), at 11.
96 [1966] 2 QB 633.
97 [1976] 1 WLR 1052.
98 See also Lee v The Showmen’s Guild [1952] 2 QB 329, at 343 and Enderby Town Football 
Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591. See further Faramus v Film Artistes’ 
Association [1964] AC 925, at 947 (per Lord Pearce), and the remarks of Megarry V-C in
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introducing the notion of “legitimate expectations” into our law. Through a 
series of three cases, which formed an integral part of his general project to 
reform the law to protect the interests of the weak from the predations of the 
strong, Lord Denning developed a new means of implying the existence of a 
duty on the part of a decision-maker to accord natural justice. In his view, when 
the state acted in such a way as to create an expectation that it would behave in a 
certain fashion, and it purported to (as Lord Denning was to put it) go back on its 
word, he felt that the courts had the power to require the state to accord 
procedural fairness, even if a legal right in the strict sense was not being affected 
by the state’s capriciousness.
In Schmidt v Secretary o f State for Home Affairs," the first of these 
“legitimate expectation” cases, his Lordship made it plain that he viewed Lord 
Reid’s speech in Ridge v Baldwin as the signal for his new departure:
The speeches in Ridge v Baldwin show that an administrative 
body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is 
affected by their decision an opportunity of making 
representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or 
interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it 
would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to
Schmidt v Secretary o f State for Home Affairs involved a group of non- 
British students at a Church of Scientology college near Brighton, whose student 
visas in Great Britain were not renewed. The decision not to renew the visas
Mclnnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520, at 1528 -  1529. Also see R Baldwin and D 
Home, “Expectations in a Joyless Landscape” (1986) 49 ModL Rev 685.
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came after the Minister of Health announced that the British government viewed 
Scientology as a harmful “pseudo-philosophical cult”, and that the government 
no longer recognised the college as a valid educational institution for the purpose 
of granting student visas. The Scientologists claimed that the decision not to re­
new the visas was ultra vires. But a subsidiary argument made by them was that 
they had a right to a hearing before the renewal could be refused. 101
The Scientologists lost on both counts, but Lord Denning made it clear 
that if, instead of refusing a renewal, the Home Secretary had attempted to 
revoke a valid visa, a legally-cognisable legitimate expectation would have 
existed: “If his permit is revoked before the time limit expires, he ought, I think, 
to be given an opportunity of making representations: for he would have a 
legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time” . 102
99 [1969] 2 Ch 149.
100 [1969] 2 Ch, at 170 (emphasis added).
I(l! They were represented by Quintin Hogg QC, later Lord Hailsham LC. He framed his 
argument in the following way:
Things must not go on which offend that general sense of fairness of ordinary 
men. Here the defendant applied a general rule, which he had made up his 
mind about before announcing his decision in the case. The same general 
principle applies to seeking permission to enter, refusing to extend the period 
of conditional entry and deportation. The administrative officer must not act 
capriciously ([1969] 2 Ch, at 163).
It is interesting to compare this with his political position on immigration laws. See, in this 
respect, his memoirs, A Sparrow’s Flight (1990), at 367 - 372.
102 [1969] 2 Ch, at 171 (original emphasis). It should be noted that while neither of the other 
members of the Court, Russell and Widgery LJJ, concurred on this point, Widgery LJ said, after 
referring to the licencing cases,
1 fully accept that [there may be natural justice issues] in cases where renewal 
is something which can reasonably be expected by the possessor of a licence 
and where the facts are such that a refusal of renewal is tantamount to the 
withdrawal of a right which the applicant legitimately expected to hold ([1969]
2 Ch, at 173).
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Lord Denning subsequently used this same principle as the foundation of 
his dissenting judgment in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union,m a case in 
which an elected union steward’s formal appointment had been blocked by the 
Union executive on the basis of reasons that were demonstrably false (and prima 
facie defamatory). Holding that in the circumstances, Breen had a right to a 
hearing, he said:
Seeing that he had been elected to this office by a democratic 
process, he had, I think, a legitimate expectation that he would be 
approved by the district committee, unless there were good 
reasons against him. If they had something against him, they 
ought to tell him and to give him a chance of answering it before 
turning him down ... Who are [the union executive] to say nay to 
him and his fellow workers without good reason and without 
hearing what he has to say? 104
The “gut instinct” view of legitimate expectations seen in these two 
judgments, based on elementary notions of common fairness, came shortly 
thereafter to be intertwined with another view, based more closely on the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. This modified form of legitimate expectation 
emerged from Lord Denning’s judgment in the third case, R v Liverpool 
Corporation, Ex parte Taxi Fleet (“the Liverpool Taxis Case” ) . 105 Liverpool 
Taxis involved a concern by Liverpool taxi drivers that unlicensed private hire 
cars were unfairly stealing their business. In response to this, the Corporation of 
Liverpool decided to sponsor a Bill, which would have regulated the private cars 
in the same way that the public taxicab fleet was regulated. As a quid pro quo, 
however, the Corporation proposed to increase the number of available taxi
103 [1971] 2 QB 175.
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licences. It assured the taxi drivers, though, that this would not take place until 
the sponsored legislation came into force. But the Corporation came to break its 
word. As Lord Denning put it so tellingly, “without a word to the taxicab 
owners or their association” , 106 the assurance was rescinded and a decision was 
taken to increase the number of taxi licences forthwith.
Predictably, Lord Denning reacted to this in a negative way. He held that 
while it was not open to the Corporation to fetter its discretion, nor was it open 
to it to go back on its undertaking:
That principle [ie, the principle concerning fettering] does not 
mean that a corporation can give an undertaking and break it as 
they please. So long as the performance of the undertaking is 
compatible with their public duty, they must honour it ... At any 
rate they ought not to depart from it except after the most serious 
consideration and hearing what the other party has to say: and 
then only if they are satisfied that the overriding public interest 
requires it. The public interest may be better served by honouring 
their undertaking than by breaking it. 107
Now, it is easy to criticise these cases. For example, insofar as Liverpool 
Taxis was intended to draw an analogy with equitable estoppel (though, to be 
fair, Lord Denning did not draw such an analogy himself), the major flaw is that 
the Liverpool taxi drivers had not worsened their situation in reliance upon the 
Corporation’s undertaking. The critical element of detrimental reliance, upon
1114 [1971] 2 QB, at 191. See also R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Hook 
[1976] 1 WLR 1052, at 1058.
105 [1972] 2 QB 299.
106 [1972] 2 QB, at 307.
11 [1972] 2 QB, at 308 (applying his own previous decisions in Robertson v Minister o f Pensions 
[1949] 1 KB 227 and Lever Finance Ltd v Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 
QB 222).
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which estoppel has always been founded, ",s was missing. And for their part, the 
legitimate expectation portions of Lord Denning's judgments in both Schmidt 
and Breen are open to charges of simple result-orientedness. In neither case did 
his Lordship offer any authority for his holding. Nevertheless, these three cases 
have together come to be taken as the foundation-stones of the modem doctrine 
of natural justice. Their legacy in Australia will be the subject of chapter five.
THE LEGISLATIVE ENSHRINEMENT OF COMMON LAW 
VALUES
It should not be thought, though, that the revival of interest in procedural 
fairness was accomplished solely as a result of a collective change of spirit among 
the judiciary. In the last chapter, it was noted that Geoffrey Sawer argued that in 
the 1920s and 30s in Australia, there was a “curious dissociation” between politics 
and public law.l(W This was no longer the case in the 1960s. In fact, there were 
indications that governments throughout the British Commonwealth had begun to 
realise that the interests of the public would have to be paid greater attention if 
there were not to be serious political repercussions. In this respect, an important, if 
today often-overlooked, episode in the debate over reform of administrative law 
was the third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, held in Sydney in 
August 1965.'10 The conference drew together many of the important people in the 
law from around the Commonwealth, and from our vantage-point, the papers
1()S See, eg, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, and the authorities 
discussed therein.
109 Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901 -  1929 (1956), at 329 (see supra chapter 3, at 143).
110 For some other thoughts on the significance of the conference, see L Curtis, “The Vision 
Splendid: A Time for Re-appraisal”, in R Creyke and J McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision o f
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delivered offer a fascinating insight into the state of conventional thinking about 
administrative law in the mid-1960s.
There were four sessions of the Conference which were devoted to public 
law topics, two of which have a special interest for present purposes: “The Place of 
the Administrative Tribunal in 1965” and “The Proper Scope of Judicial Review”. 
On the first topic, it is interesting to note that all of the speakers -  including a 
judge, a solicitor-general, a practising QC and a legal academic -  were agreed not 
only that administrative adjudication had become a permanent feature of 
government, but that it was a desirable thing. The gloomy spectre of “Hewart- 
ism” was gone. Mr Justice Else-Mitchell of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, for example, said that “modem government requires many matters to be 
entrusted to some form of administrative determination by bodies other than the 
established courts”, and that this was not to be deplored.111
Similarly, Donald Cormie QC, the dean of the Alberta Bar, said that 
Canada “manages to obtain remarkably good government through a great 
proliferation of tribunals ...”112 But at the same time, it was apparent that for the 
most part, the lawyers continued to think about the work of tribunals in common 
law terms. The Solicitor-General of New Zealand, for instance, said that the 
administrative tribunal “undoubtedly has its place in the judicial system.”113 
Cormie QC expressed the view that not only was the bulk of adjudication taking
Australian Administrative Law -  At the Twenty-Five Year Mark (1998) 36, at 37 -  39. See also 
the Administrative Review Council, First Annual Report (1977), at 1.
'11 Proceedings, at 65.
U2Id, at 83.
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place in the tribunals, but so was most “judicial experimentation.”114 Implicit in 
this way of speaking about tribunals, of course, was the assumption that the 
common law values, and common law rules of fairness ought presumptively to 
govern tribunal proceedings. Mr Justice Else-Mitchell said that “[f]rom a 
procedural point of view it is difficult to envisage any other special requirement 
which should be imposed on administrative tribunals ... which would not be 
equally ensured by an observance of the rules of natural justice ...”115 The 
legislative initiatives that were to follow from the (re)association of law and 
politics were to embody these same implicit assumptions.
The Franks Committee
The first government to move to reform administrative law by statutory 
means was the Eden government in Britain. As noted, the Crichel Down affair had 
led to the resignation of the Minister of Agriculture in 1954. It also led the next 
year to the appointment of a Committee on Administrative Tribunals and 
Enquiries, chaired by Sir Oliver Franks. The Franks Committee's brief was to 
consider the constitution and operation of tribunals and governmental enquiries, 
and to make recommendations concerning, inter alia, “the constitution and 
working of tribunals other than the ordinary courts of law.”116
113 H R C  Wild QC, id, at 76.
114 M a t  88.
115 M a t  71.
116 See, 1957 Cmd 218, paragraph 59.
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Interestingly, the Franks Committee's membership was not monopolised by 
legal profession. Consequently, as Professor Wade once noted, it was “not 
concerned with the law ... It was really a mobilisation of opinion among all sorts of 
people concerned with public affairs to see what were the real causes of the 
undercurrent of complaint about tribunals.” 117 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Committee’s recommendations tended away from the doctrinal or abstract. 
Nevertheless, they for the most part embodied traditional common law 
assumptions and values. The Committee noted that the system of tribunals had 
become an integral -  and essential -  part of the British administrative state. 1 18 But 
it felt that the pedantic, yet ad hoc, way in which some tribunals had carried out 
their business had given rise to a reasonable feeling of discontent. 119 As a general 
proposition, the Committee recommended that tribunal and enquiry proceedings 
ought to be governed by three principles: openness, fairness and impartiality.
Importantly, the Franks Committee also recommended that some sort of 
appeal ought to lay from every administrative decision on the basis that it would 
both improve the quality of administrative decision-making and increase public 
confidence in the administrative system:
The existence of a right of appeal is salutary and makes for right 
adjudication. Provision for appeal is also important if decisions are 
to show reasonable consistency. Finally, the system of adjudication 
can hardly fail to appear fair to the applicant if he knows that he
11 H W R  Wade, Towards Administrative Justice (1963), at 70.
IIS See generally B Schwartz and H W R  Wade, Legal Control o f Government: Administrative 
Law in Britain and the United States (1972), at 151 - 153.
119 See Wade, Towards Administrative Justice, supra n 117, at 70 - 71.
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will normally be allowed two attempts to convince independent 
bodies of the soundness of his case. 120
The New Zealand Reforms
In New Zealand, similar pressures led to the commissioning of G S Orr to 
report on the state of administrative justice in the Dominion. 121 Many of the 
concerns which had driven the recommendations of the Franks Committee were 
found to exist in New Zealand, including the feeling that public confidence in the 
administrative system suffered by reason of its sense of “closedness”. As is well- 
known, the New Zealand reforms involved the creation of an Ombudsman122 (the 
first such officer in the British Commonwealth, and actually created before the On- 
Report) and an Administrative Division of the Supreme Court. 122 Of special 
interest are the comments of the New Zealand Minister for Justice when the Bill to 
create the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court was being introduced. 
For, like the speakers at the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, they 
reflected very much a common lawyer’s view of administration. He said that the 
goal of the legislation was the “restoration” of the Court to its proper position at 
the apex of the system of adjudication. Under the new arrangements, he said,
120 Supra n 116, paragraphs 104 -  105. The Franks Committee’s report eventually gave rise to 
the Tribunals and Enquiries Act 1958. On the Franks Committee and its aftermath, see Wade 
and Forsyth, supra n 73, chapter 23.
121 See Orr, Report on Administrative Justice in New Zealand (1964).
122 Parliamentary> Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962.
122 Judicature Amendment Act 1968.
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decisions would be given by “judges of high status who can command a degree of
confidence in the parties and in the community generally.”124
The McRuer Commission in Ontario and the Final Blast From the 
Anglo-Canadian Scholars
In Canada, in 1967 the government of Ontario appointed a Royal 
Commission into Civil Rights. Known popularly as the McRuer Commission, it 
was named after its chairman, the Hon J C McRuer, a former Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Ontario. Unlike the Reports of the Franks Committee and the On- 
Commission in New Zealand, the McRuer Report12" did not lead directly to any 
substantial legislative initiatives. But what makes it interesting is that it led to 
what was probably the final blast from the Anglo-Canadian scholars of the 1930s. 
In 1968, John Willis published a short article in the University o f  Toronto Law 
Journal, in which he attacked not only the report, but also the premises on which 
the McRuer Commission was based.126 In fact, Willis did find some things to 
praise about the Commission's work (notably, its research127). But for the most 
part, the piece was classic 1930s hyperbole. He said that he wrote his piece “in a 
mood of irritated dissent”. His aim was to
show cause against treating the report as if it were the Ten 
Commandments, engraved on tablets of stone and brought down by 
Moses himself from Mount Sinai -  which is how the Toronto 
Globe and Mail, opposition members in the Ontario legislature and, 
to my own personal knowledge, many lawyers are treating it.128
124 Quoted in the Report o f the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (the Ken- 
Committee Report), 1971 Pari Paper No 144, para 159.
125 Report o f the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968).
126 “The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values”, 18 UTLJ 351.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
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Willis went on to express great concern over the Report's legalistic 
orientation. McRuer and his fellow commissioners had, in Willis’s view, 
completely missed the lessons of the past thirty or forty years. As for the 
Commission’s recommendations concerning procedural safeguards, Willis said 
that this would
inevitably reintroduce into ‘non-court’ deciding authorities the 
‘court’ atmosphere that they were created to avoid -  where 
following the prescribed ritual is more important than getting at 
the merits, and strings of procedural objections are regularly made 
for no other purpose than to give the lawyer who loses on the 
merits a second string to his bow in the court of review.124
The “New” Australian Administrative Law
Here in Australia, of course, a massive-scale project of statutory reform 
of Commonwealth administrative law began with the appointment of the 
Administrative Review Committee -  the Kerr Committee, after its chairman, Mr 
Justice (later, Sir John) Kerr -  in 1968. The Kerr Committee’s brief was in some 
respects broader than that of the Franks Committee. Roughly stated, it was 
given authority to make recommendations concerning both judicial and merit 
review of all Commonwealth administrative decision-making.120 The Committee 
recommended both the creation of an administrative review tribunal (which was
129 Id, at 358.
10 For essays commenting on the statutory reforms as a whole, see R Creyke and J McMillan, 
The Kerr Vision o f Administrative Law, supra n 110. For actual detail of the reform process, 
including the work of the subsequent Bland and Ellicott Committees, see R Creyke and J 
McMillan, The Making o f Commonwealth Administrative Law (1996).
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eventually to come to fruition as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal1'1) and the 
introduction of a legislative code to simplify judicial review.132 In light of what 
was to develop in the case law in the 1970s and 80s (which will be discussed in 
chapters five to seven), it is interesting to note that apart from Kerr, the 
Committee also included A F Mason QC -  then the Commonwealth Solicitor- 
General.133
For immediate purposes, however, there are two aspects of the Ken- 
Committee Report which deserve special attention. The first is that, like the 
recommendations of the Franks Committee and the McRuer Committee (and of 
the Donoughmore Committee before them), the K en Committee’s 
recommendations were largely premised on common lawyers’ values. As the 
K en Committee itself said, “although administrative efficiency is a dominant 
objective of the administrative process, nevertheless that achievement of that 
objective should be consistent with the attainment of justice to the individual.”134
The second thing of interest is the place the Committee accorded to 
natural justice in the administrative scheme of things. The Committee noted that 
the right to a fair hearing was centuries-old,1 ° and it placed the denial of natural
131 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Which eventually became enshrined as the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
1977 (Cth). The Kerr Committee’s Report is reproduced in R Creyke and J McMillan, The 
Making o f Commonwealth Administrative Law, supra n 130.
133 Other members of the Committee were Professor Harry Whitmore, the Dean of Law at the 
Australian National University, and R J Ellicott QC, who became Commonwealth Solicitor- 
General and joined the Committee after Sir Anthony Mason’s appointment to the bench.
134 Supra n 124, para 12.
1 ° Para 39.
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justice first among the proposed grounds of judicial review.136 But what the Ken- 
Committee did not do -  and this distinguished it from the Franks Committee -  
was to offer a doctrinal justification for natural justice. The Franks Committee 
(like the Orr Report) said that procedural fairness was essential to the 
maintenance of public confidence in the administrative system. The Ken- 
Committee merely referred to the doctrine’s anciency. The section of the Report 
dealing with natural justice only described the elements of the duty, and made 
the point of its antiquity. The failure of Australian law to theorise the duty of 
procedural fairness has already been adverted to. As will be discussed in more 
depth in chapter seven, this has perhaps been the chief continuing deficiency in 
the Australian approach to natural justice.
THE EMERGENCE OF AN AUSTRALIAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
For today’s Australian administrative lawyers, one of the most happy 
offshoots of all of this activity in the 1960s (apart, that is, from making provision 
for more litigation) was that it begat an indigenous administrative law 
scholarship. In chapter two, the comparative dearth of Australian writing on 
administrative law in the inter-War period -  at least as contrasted with England 
and Canada -  was discussed. As disappointing as it may have been in result, the 
one positive thing that the decision in Testro Bros v Tait did was to engender an 
outpouring of writing, both on natural justice, and on other topics related to 
administrative law. Much of this, not surprisingly, was critical of the High
136 Para 258.
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Court. In the 1966 edition of Principles o f Australian Administrative Law, for 
example, Benjafield and Whitmore wrote of Testro Bros v Tait that it was 
“difficult to avoid the impression that the court is treating each case on an ad hoc 
basis without attempting to develop a coherent body of law as to the 
circumstances in which the rules of natural justice will be implied, and as to the 
content to those rules.”1 '7
This was a real turning point. There had always been writings about 
specific aspects of administrative law -  most notably, of course, the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration1^  -  but as for matters of 
general jurisprudential theory, one of the very few pieces written prior to the 
early 1960s was an article published in the Australian Law Journal in 1930 
entitled “Administrative Legislation in the Commonwealth” by Professor 
Kenneth Bailey (as he then was).139 Another was Mr Justice Evatt’s “The 
Judiciary and Administrative Law in Australia”,140 which was discussed in 
chapter three.141 Apart from these two pieces, one sees in the Index to Legal 
Periodicals only a very occasional reference to administrative law in Australia 
until 1963 or so.142 But then, the publication rate underwent a dramatic
137 At 154.
138 See, eg, H Moore, “Living Wage in the Australian Arbitration Court” (1912) 12 7 Comp Leg 
(2nd ser) 202, J Brown, “Judicial Regulation of Wages for Women” (1919) 28 Yale LJ 236, J 
Brown, “Judicial Settlement of Industrial Disputes” (1924) 2 Camb L J  51, F A A Russell, “The 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1928" (1928) 2 ALJ 147, F A A Russell, “The 
Clash of Commonwealth Arbitration and State Courts” (1930) 4 A U  110, G W C Ross, 
“Constitutional History of Industrial Arbitration in Australia” (1945) 30 Minn L Rev 1, L L 
Jones, “Industrial Arbitration in Australia” (1945) 8 Mod L Rev 63.
139 4 ALJ 7.
140 (1937) 15 Can Bar Rev 247.
141 See supra, 143.
142 Eg, T P Fry, “Australian Disregard of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers” (1933) 5 
Rocky Mtn L Rev 221. Others were discussed in chapter 3.
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acceleration.143 As for treatises, it was not until 1962 that the first Australian 
work of any substance was published144 -  and even then, the book was criticised 
on the basis that its content was excessively En g l i s h . Bu t  by the mid-1960s, 
there was a veritable explosion of academic commentary on the field as a whole. 
This new Australian literature was to provide the intellectual infrastructure for 
the developments to come.
THE NEW PROPERTY AND NATURAL JUSTICE
The pragmatically-founded judgment of Barwick CJ in Banks v 
Transport Regulation Board (Victoria) meshed very well both with the theory 
underlying Charles Reich’s “new property” analysis, and the holding in Ridge v 
Baldwin. By indicating a willingness to accord some form of procedural 
protection to interests created by what I have been describing as the “new” 
legislation, the courts saw themselves as filling a gap. In this respect, they were 
reflecting a general shift in public opinion about the relative values of collective 
efficiency and individual autonomy which was, among other things, reflecting 
itself both in scholarship and legislative initiative. At the risk of
oversimplification, the gloss had begun to come off the move to greater
143 See, eg, H Whitmore, “Australian Administrative Law -  a study in inertia” (1963)) 36 A U  
255, D G Benjafield and H Whitmore, “The House of Lords and Natural Justice” (1963) 37 A U  
140, G Nash, “Judicial Function and Inspectors Appointed Under the Companies Act” (1964) 38 
A U  111, Anon, “Case Comment ” (1964) 2 Adel L Rev 252, R A Sunbey, “Case Comment: 
Testro Bros v Tait” (1964) 4 MULR 413 and K I Seggie, “Jurisdictional Error in Administrative 
Law” (1965) 5 Syd L Rev 89.
144 Friedmann and Benjafield, Principles o f Australian Administrative Law, and Brett, Cases and 
Materials in Constitutional and Administrative Law. The first edition of Principles o f Australian 
Administrative Law, written by Friedmann alone, was published in 1950, but it was a mere 
hundred and twelve pages in length and there are very few Australian cases mentioned.
145 L Zines, “Book Review” (1964) 1 Fed L Rev 172.
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bureaucracy. The new property cases were, in this sense, part of a continuum. 
In all of the periods considered thus far, developments in administrative law had 
centred on trying to find for the courts an appropriate supervisory role amidst the 
changed environment of governance. The hands-off dicta in Board o f Education 
v Rice and Local Government Board v Arlidge; the confusing construction of 
“superaddition” in R v Electricity Commissioners; the fear of a new despotism; 
the tussle between the courts and the Anglo-Canadian scholars over the Housing 
Act cases; the seeming capitulation of the courts during the “twilight” phase of 
natural justice -  all of these reflected stages in the evolving political debate over 
the appropriate limits of judicial involvement in the control of the bureaucracy.
The decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v Baldwin represented a 
significant breakthrough in broadening natural justice's penumbra. While the 
case can actually be parsed (and, if Lord Reid is to be taken on his face, should 
be parsed146) quite narrowly, the decision came to symbolise a willingness upon 
the part of the courts finally to accept the existence of the administrative state, 
but yet to open their minds to new ways of thinking about the control of abuse of 
governmental power. In subjecting a plethora of new types of decision-making 
processes to the requirements of natural justice, their Lordships threw the 
doctrine of natural justice a lifeline, rescuing it from Professor Wade’s 
pessimistically termed “twilight” phase. This lifeline was picked up by the High 
Court in Banks, and as the following chapters will show, to date the High Court 
has not let it go.
146 See [1964] AC, at 64 -  65, 79.
216
FIVE
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
■ io r much of its life, natural justice’s bounds were relatively certain. As
r
.A. was discussed in chapter one, in the days before significant involvement of 
central authority in day-to-day local government, natural justice was in the main 
an obligation that attached to the work of inferior judicial officers. Then, 
through much of this century, it was thought that natural justice was only 
required where, in establishing a decision-making framework, the legislature had 
indicated in some way that the decision-maker was to conduct him or herself in a 
judge-like fashion.
What linked the olden days with the first decades of this century was the 
implicit belief that the obligation to observe natural justice depended upon the 
decision-maker’s functional identity. But Ridge v Baldwin and Banks again 
raised the explicit question of public law principle. Both of these were cases cast 
very much in the common law tradition of pragmatism, in which theoretical 
niceties are left for ex post facto rationalisation. 1 When Barwick CJ held in 
Banks that a licence could be viewed as “property” for natural justice purposes, 
he cast open the Pandora’s box of other non-proprietary interests. Charles Reich 
had convincingly argued that it was wrong to consider what might generically be
1 In his 1987 Hamlyn Lectures (published under the title, Pragmatism and Theory in English 
Law), Professor Atiyah offered as his premise what he termed a “fairly uncontroversial
referred to as welfare benefits as mere “largesse” which could be withdrawn by 
the state at will.* 2 But simply to try to lump all aspects of the welfare state 
together under the rubric of common law property rights would plainly be both 
overinclusive and underspecific.3 Furthermore, only by risking a new form of 
sematicism could many of the types of choses created by the new legislation be 
treated as property.
Moreover, the thrust of the welfare state was in significant part precisely 
to move away from a model of society in which the exclusionary rights 
associated with proprietary dominion were the chief determinant of wealth, and 
hence personality. So the question of legal principle remained: if natural justice 
was not to attach to all interests enjoyed of the state, to which ones was it to 
attach? Ridge v Baldwin and Banks bequeathed to administrative law a valuable 
new spirit of openness, but they provided only a very limited assistance in 
dealing with the underlying question of public law principle that the new 
legislation raised.
THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
In the main, the courts’ chosen vehicle for fleshing out the project begun 
in Ridge v Baldwin and Banks has been the so-called “legitimate expectation”
suggestion”, namely that “English lawyers are not only more inclined to be pragmatic and 
somewhat hostile to the theoretical approach, but positively glory in this preference” (at 3).
2 See supra chapter 4, at 171 -  176.
? On this point, see also P Craig, “Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis” (1992) 108 
LQR 79, at 97 - 98.
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that Lord Denning had introduced into the legal vocabulary in Schmidt v 
Secretary o f State for Home Affairs,4 and its partner cases that were discussed in 
the last chapter. The aim of this chapter is to explore the way in which the High 
Court has made use of the legitimate expectation in its development of the 
contemporary doctrine of natural justice. As suggested in the Introduction, this 
chapter marks the broad shift from an historical consideration of natural justice 
to a contemporary one.
When considering the legitimate expectation cases, it is important to note 
at the outset that it is impossible to define the idea of legitimate expectations in 
anything but rough terms, for it is at base a rough, reactionary concept. As 
Dawson J once put it, “[t]he phrase was never a term of art and was meant 
merely to indicate that to deal administratively with something not amounting to 
an actual right might nevertheless require the adoption of a fair procedure. ” 5 The 
essence of the idea was once described by McHugh J in the following way:
Just as the common law has traditionally given a person a right to 
be heard ... so the common law now gives a person the right to be 
heard before the exercise of a statutory power prejudices some 
right, interest, privilege or benefit which that person can 
legitimately expect to obtain or enjoy in the future. 6
Stated like this -  at its most simple level of formulation -  the concept 
seems merely to represent another form of the notion of “fairness writ large and
4 [1969] 2 Ch 149. See supra chapter 4, at 200 -  205.
? Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, at 54.
6 Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648, at 680. In 
Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396, at 438, Stephen J said that the legitimate 
expectation “stems ... from the same fertile source as has nourished the concept that those who
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juridically”, again to borrow the words of Lord Morris.7 It is, moreover, exactly 
the same sort of sentiment which underlies the whole of the doctrine of natural 
justice: the state has the power to extinguish proprietary interests, but the courts 
have said that the interests of common fairness require a prior hearing before this 
can take place. The basis of legitimate expectations is the same -  an instinctive 
and intuitive judicial revulsion against an assertion of overweening power by the 
state. As to judicial instinct being its theoretical root, Lord Denning, who is 
credited with having coined the expression, has admitted as much. He has said 
that he is “sure it came out of my own head and not from any continental or 
other source”.8 But lack of theoretical sophistication notwithstanding, since the 
mid-1970s, the concept of legitimate expectations has come to be the hook on 
which the High Court has sought to hang a general duty of fairness on 
government.
THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN 
AUSTRALIA
The doctrine of legitimate expectations emerged in Australia in much the 
same way that it did in England -  as a manifestation of judicial instinct in the 
face of obvious unfairness. Appropriately enough, in light of the prominence 
that migration cases were to come to occupy in the development of the doctrine, 
the first discussion of legitimate expectations in the High Court was in a
possess rights and interests shall not ... be deprived of them by the exercise of an arbitrary 
discretion.”
In Furnell v Whangerei High Schools Board [1973] AC 660, at 679.
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deportation case. Salemi v MacKellar (No 2 f  dealt with a question which was to 
become quite familiar to anyone interested in natural justice in Australia, viz the 
rights of illegal aliens vis a vis the issuance of deportation orders.
First Discussion: Salemi v MacKellar (No 2)
Salemi was an Italian citizen who had entered Australia on a temporary 
entry permit. The permit was once renewed, but thereafter, upon its expiry, he 
became a “prohibited immigrant” under the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth), and formally liable to be deported. What complicated matters, however, 
was that the Minister for Immigration had issued several press releases regarding 
an “amnesty”, by which prohibited immigrants who came forward within a 
certain time frame, and who satisfied certain health and character criteria, would 
be permitted lawfully to remain in Australia. Salemi fit within the criteria, but 
when he presented himself in accordance with the instructions set out in the 
press releases, a deportation order was nonetheless made against him. Not 
surprisingly, he sought an injunction to prevent the deportation, and a declaration 
that in the circumstances, he had been denied natural justice.
In Salemi v MacKellar (No 2), Stephen J emerged as the advocate for the 
legal recognition of expectations -  and to take up the rhetorical role played by 
Lord Denning in the English cases discussed in the last chapter. He would have
s In a letter to Christopher Forsyth, quoted in C Forsyth, “The Provenance and Protection of 
Legitimate Expectations” (1988) 47 Camb U  238, at 241.
9 (1977) 137 CLR396.
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held that in the circumstances, there was an expectation created by the amnesty 
announcement, which should have given rise to an obligation on the part of the 
Minister to observe natural justice before making the deportation order. After 
discussing Lord Denning’s judgments, he said:
When the discretionary grant of a licence, permit or the like 
carries with it a reasonable expectation of, although no legal right 
to, renewal or non-revocation, summarily to disappoint that 
expectation is unfair; hence the requirement that the expectant 
person should first be heard ...10
Stephen J was of the view that the amnesty announcement amounted to 
the very same sort of express assurance that had existed in Liverpool Taxis 
(though in point of fact Salemi v MacKellar was more akin to a conventional 
case of estoppel, in that there was a real detrimental reliance). As he put it:
Any fair reading of the news releases leads to the inference that 
that assurance was given so as to induce this very expectation in 
the minds of prohibited immigrants such as the plaintiff, so that 
they might come forward and reveal to the authorities their 
whereabouts and the details of their continued presence in 
Australia ... They were invited to rely upon the Minister’s 
statement..."
Accordingly,
If the Minister is now to depart from the terms of the assurance 
which he gave he will be free to do so, as was the Council [in the 
Liverpool Taxis Case]. But, as Roskill LJ there observed, while it 
was there for the council to make up its own mind as to what 
policy it wished to follow, it was not at liberty, having given an 
undertaking as to policy intentions, to depart therefrom except
10 137 CLR, at 439. See also Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629, 
at 636, where “reasonable expectation” was the preferred expression.
11 Ibid.
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‘after due and proper consideration of the representations of all 
those interested’ . 12
In contrast to Stephen J, Barwick CJ and Gibbs and Aikin JJ did not find 
on the facts that a legitimate expectation could exist. Rather, they held that the 
proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Migration Act was such 
that the Minister was to have an unfettered discretion in determining whether or 
not to deport prohibited immigrants. A policy statement such as the amnesty 
announcement in question could not as a matter of law affect the breadth of the 
Minister’s discretion. In his judgment, though, Barwick CJ also expressed his 
views on the English legitimate expectation cases. After referring to Lord 
Denning’s use of the expression in Schmidt, he said:
I am bound to say that I appreciate its literary quality better than I 
perceive its precise meaning and the perimeter of application. 
But, no matter how far the phrase may have been intended to 
reach, at its centre is the concept of legality, that is to say, it is a 
lawful expectation which is in mind. I cannot attribute any other 
meaning in the language of a lawyer to the word ‘legitimate’ than 
a meaning which expresses the concept of entitlement or 
recognition by law. So understood, the expression probably adds 
little, if anything, to the concept of a ‘right’ . 13
First Application: Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming 
Commission
The first case in which the doctrine was actually applied in the High 
Court was Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission, 14 decided two
12 137 CLR, at 440.
13 137 CLR, at 404.
14 (1977) 137 CLR 487.
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months after Salemi v MacKellar (No 2). This case involved a so-called 
“warning off notice” given by the Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission 
to Heatley, a punter, which forbad him from entering any racecourse in 
Tasmania. The Commission could issue such notices by virtue of sub-section 
39(3) of the Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Act 1952. Sub-section 39(8) of the 
Act made it an offence to violate a warning off notice. No prior warning was 
given of the notice, and Heatley was not given a chance to address the assertions 
upon which the notice was based.
The High Court1'' held that in the circumstances, Heatley had had a 
legitimate expectation, which entitled him to a hearing prior to the issuance of 
the notice. He had not shown any interest in the doctrine in Salemi v MacKellar 
(No 2), but it was Aickin J who offered the first authoritative exposition of the 
Australian version of the legitimate expectation. He noted that while an ordinary 
member of the public has no right to enter a race meeting, he almost certainly 
has an expectation that upon payment of the requisite admission charge, he will 
be able to do so.16 Moreover, once a member of the public had been granted 
permission to enter the racecourse, he had a right “as against all the world other 
than the owner [of the course] to continue upon the premises and remain there in 
accordance with whatever the terms may be of the licence originally granted to 
him”.17 This was, he said, a case in which considerations of fairness demanded 
that a hearing be given. Since the Act gave the Commission the right to destroy
15 Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Aickin JJ, Barwick CJ dissenting.
16 137 CLR, at 507.
17 Ibid.
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both the right to remain in a racecourse, “as well as to destroy the expectation 
that they will on future occasions be granted the like right, ” 18
[f]aimess requires that the person affected should, save in an 
emergency, be given notice by the Commission of its intention to 
issue a warning-off notice and of the grounds for that proposed 
action and should be afforded an opportunity to make 
representations to the Commission on his own behalf, which it 
must consider before taking action. 14
What is significant here is that what gave rise in Aickin J’s mind to the 
expectation was simple social custom. What the Court was concerned with, he 
said, was “an expectation on the part of members of the public that they will 
continue to receive the customary permission to go on to racecourses upon 
payment of a stated fee to a racecourse owner” .20 In Stephen J’s opinion in 
Salemi v MacKellar, the legitimising factor of the expectation had been its 
reasonableness. In Aickin J’s view in Heatley, it was simple commonness. This 
is interesting in that (as will be seen) it became an issue in later cases whether 
the test for the existence of a legitimate expectation was a subjective or an 
objective one. On the facts in Heatley, the Court was easily able -  almost on the 
basis of taking judicial notice -  to impute a subjective expectation to the entire 
public.21
18 137 CLR, at 509.
|l) 137 CLR, at 516. In a similar vein, Murphy J said:
The exercise of the power will probably have an adverse effect on the person 
and his reputation and possibly his livelihood. It will seriously alter his legal 
position ... The strong presumption is that the legislature did not intend to 
authorise the Commission (in exercising its power of warning-off) to depart 
from the standards of official behaviour towards individuals which are basic to 
every civilised society (137 CLR, at 495).
20 137 CLR, at 509.
21 See also Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242.
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Aickin J’s judgment was criticised at the time as representing an 
inappropriate extension of the principle expounded in the English cases. 
Vivienne Bath, for example, argued that in the English cases, the affected party 
had had an actual relationship with an organ of government which gave rise to 
the expectation that the government would act in a certain way.22 In Heatley, 
there was no such relationship. Similarly, Peter Cane criticised the judgment 
because it seemed to mistake the source of the expectations. He noted that the 
real effect of the decision in Heatley was to enforce as against the state rights 
created by private contract between two parties.2'
When thought of this way, the holding does seem a little surprising. It is 
one thing to say that if the state creates an expectation, it should be estopped 
from destroying it without notice. But it is quite another to say that the state can 
as a matter of law be required to accord natural justice because two private 
individuals had inter se engaged in a particular course of conduct which allowed 
expectations to develop in their minds. Moreover, Aickin J’s reasoning had left 
a potential gap in coverage. His view could not cover the case of someone who 
had not yet been permitted entry to the racecourse. As Cane went on to argue, 
on Aickin J’s analysis “[t]he absurd result would be that the Commission could 
prohibit the plaintiff from entering without complying with natural justice, but 
not from remaining” .24
22 “Case Note: Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission” (1978) 9 Fed L Rev 504, 
at 508.
22 “Natural Justice and Legitimate Expectations” (1980) 54 A U  546, at 547.
24 Ibid.
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FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke
Yet these sorts of issues did not directly arise in the next judgment of the 
High Court to consider the place of expectations in Australian administrative 
law, FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke, decided in 1982.2'' The case involved an 
application by FAI Insurances Ltd for a renewal of its licence to provide 
workers’ compensation insurance in Victoria, which had been turned down by 
the Victorian Governor in Council. The High Court held that in the 
circumstances, the State had an obligation to provide FAI with a summary of the 
points on which the refusal was based, and an opportunity to respond to them.26
FAI had carried on the business of providing workers’ compensation 
insurance in Victoria for twenty years. Provision of workers’ compensation 
benefits was not its main line but, in the words of Mason J, it was “nevertheless 
important in enabling the company to offer a comprehensive insurance 
service”.27 In 1979, the state Minister of Labour had advised all workers’ 
compensation insurers that henceforth, renewal of licences would be dependent 
upon them being able to demonstrate compliance with various criteria which 
were intended to reveal the companies’ financial health. With respect to FAI in 
particular, the Minister had noted that he felt that its level of investment in 
related companies was higher than desirable.
25 151 CLR 342.
26 The fact that the decision not to renew was made by the Governor in Council raised the 
complicating questions of whether the decision was unreviewable per se, and if not, how exactly 
natural justice could be applied to the proceedings of the Executive Council. These will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
27 151 CLR, at 357.
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When FAI applied for the renewal of its licence for the calendar year 
1981, it specifically addressed the criteria noted in the Minister’s 1979 letter, 
though it disputed the lawfulness of the Minister making use of some of them as 
a basis for determining fitness for renewal. The company also explicitly 
requested that if the Minister considered that the renewal of the licence was in 
danger, it be given the opportunity to make further submissions on the points of 
concern. Despite this, the Minister recommended to the Governor in Council, 
without notice to FAI, that FAI’s licence not be renewed, on the basis of what 
might broadly be characterised as concerns about undercapitalisation. FAI again 
requested particulars of the Minister’s concerns and the opportunity to respond 
to them, but no response to this was forthcoming. Instead, the decision was 
taken by the Governor in Council not to renew the licence.
The full bench of the High Court found that in the circumstances, FAI 
had been treated unfairly, and was entitled to a declaration that the decision not 
to renew was void.2x It was open to the Court to decide the case on the basis of 
the so-called “club” or “licensing” cases, in which the courts had held that a right 
to natural justice attached to any move to deprive a person of their livelihood.24 
But instead, their Honours chose to expand on the themes expounded by Aickin J 
in Heatley, and to formulate the holding in broad, inclusive terms. The Court’s
:s Murphy J dissenting. Murphy J’s distinctive approach to administrative law issues will be 
discussed below, in chapter 6.
29 On these generally, see D C Hodgson, “The Current Status of the Legitimate Expectation in 
Administrative Law” (1984) 14 MULR 686. See also Lord Reid’s speech in Ridge v Baldwin 
[ 1964] AC 40, at 66 -  71 (discussed supra chapter 4, at 186 -  189).
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aim was clearly to unify divergent strands of thought on the basis of the common
thread of expectations.30
Aickin J reiterated his views in Heatley: while noting that stricto sensu, 
licence renewal amounts at law to the issuance of a new licence, 31 the fact that 
FAI reasonably expected to be able to carry on created an obligation on the part 
of the State government to accord natural justice. Similarly, Wilson J said that 
the nature of FAI’s investment in the insurance business gave rise to a legitimate 
expectation that a renewal of its licence would not be withheld. 32 Mason J spoke 
of the “starting point”, being “that an applicant for renewal of a licence generally 
has a legitimate expectation that his licence will be renewed when the statutory 
power is entrusted to a statutory authority” .33 And Gibbs CJ said that
[i]t would not be fair to deprive a company of the ability to carry 
on its business without revealing the reason for doing so, and, if 
the reason is one related to some alleged misconduct or deficiency 
in the conduct of the company’s affairs, without allowing the 
company a full and fair opportunity of placing before the
30 This was also the situation in Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shin [1983] 2 AC 
629. Ng Yuen Shin stands as the English equivalent (though in fact, it was a Hong Kong case) of 
FAI Insurances, to the extent that it signified that the concept of legitimate expectations had been 
accepted in English public law. There, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that a 
representation made by a Hong Kong government official about the manner in which illegal 
migrants from Macau were to be treated created a right to natural justice if the government 
intended not to comply with the statement. To get a complete picture on the contemporary 
English law, however, Ng Yuen Shiu ought to be read with O ’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 
237, in which Lord Diplock referred (albeit in obiter) to legitimate expectations. In Ng Yuen 
Shiu, the Privy Council quoted Lord Diplock’s speech in O ’Reilly v Mackman, and wove it 
together with Schmidt and Lord Denning’s other legitimate expectation cases. For a summary 
view of the place of legitimate expectations in English law, see Council o f Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service (“the GCHQ case”) [1985] AC 374, and Re Westminster County 
Council [1986] AC 668, at 692 (per Lord Bridge).
31 151 CLR, at 378 (citing Gerratv v McGavin (1914) 18 CLR 152, at 163 - 164).
32 151 CLR, at 395.
33 151 CLR, at 362. On this reasoning, Mason J would presumably not have found a legitimate 
expectation to have existed in Breen.
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authority making the decision its case against the existence of the 
alleged misconduct or deficiency.^4
The Entrenchment of Legitimate Expectations in Australian Law: Kioa 
v West
The case which, more than any other, signalled that the concept of 
legitimate expectations had “arrived” in Australia was the High Court’s decision 
in 1985 in Kioa v West*5 -  even though the discussion of the concept was only 
in obiter. Indeed, Kioa v West has come to emblemise the present-day approach 
to procedural fairness in Australia in a broad sense, and it is probably now the 
most frequently-cited natural justice authority in the Australian courts.
Kioa v West concerned the plight of a Tongan family which did not wish 
to return to Tonga after the expiration of their temporary visas. Mr Kioa had 
come to Australia initially on a student visa, to undertake a short course. His 
wife and child joined him shortly afterwards. Following completion of his 
studies, Kioa decided to take some leave here, and he applied for an extension of 
his visa. For reasons which are not clear from the record, the application for 
extension did not end up being dealt with by the Immigration Department. But
4 151 CLR, at 348. See also Stephen J, 151 CLR, at 351, and Brennan J, 151 CLR, at 412 - 413. 
35 159 CLR 550. For some of the early Australian writing on legitimate expectations, see M 
Somarajah, “Natural Justice, Fairness and Administrative Functions” (1977) 5 U Tas L Rev 268, 
Bath, supra n 22, Cane, supra n 23, Hodgson, supra 29, G Johnson, “Natural Justice and 
Legitimate Expectations in Australia” (1984) 15 Fed L Rev 39, M Allars, “Fairness: Writ Large 
or Small” (1987) 11 Syd L Rev 306, and P Tate, “The Coherence of ‘Legitimate Expectations’ 
and the Foundations of Natural Justice” (1988) 14 Mon U L Rev 15. See also J Hlophe, 
“Legitimate Expectations and Natural Justice: English, Australian and South African Law”
(1987) 104 SA U  165.
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in the meantime, Kioa formed the intention to remain in Australia permanently,
and he took up employment.
In July of 1983, Kioa was apprehended at his place of work, and a 
deportation order was made against him. As part of the process leading up to the 
making of the deportation order, the submission of the Immigration Department 
spoke of Kioa’s “active involvement with other persons who are seeking to 
circumvent Australia’s immigration laws.”36 While this was not referred to as 
one of the reasons for the deportation order, Kioa alleged (inter alia) that the 
principles of natural justice entitled him to be given the opportunity to rebut this 
allegation. The question for the High Court on this point, therefore, was whether 
natural justice applied to decisions to deport -  the very same thing that had been 
in issue in Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) and which had been reiterated in a 
subsequent case/'
In holding in Kioa v West that natural justice was required,3* the Court 
noted that since the earlier decisions, significant legislative amendments had
36 See 159 CLR, at 557.
1 R v MacKellar, Ex parte Ratu (1977) 137 CLR 461.
Also of interest in this case is that at least two of the majority found that the reputational 
interest was the trigger for the duty to accord natural justice. Mason J, for example, was clearly 
impressed by the fact that it had been alleged that Mr Kioa had been involved with other illegal 
migrants. His Honour said: “As [this allegation] was extremely prejudicial, the appellants should 
have had the opportunity of replying to it” (159 CLR, at 582). On the question of reputation as a 
“protectable” interest, he said that the reference to “right or interest” in the context of his 
formulation of the trigger for natural justice “must be understood as relating to personal liability, 
status, preservation of livelihood and reputation, as well as to proprietary rights and interests” 
(159 CLR, at 588). See, also, Wilson J, 159 CLR, at 602 -  603. For a contrast in terminology, 
see Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund 
Ptv Limited (1998) 155 ALR 684, n 146, where Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ used “legal 
right” to include legitimate expectations. Reputation, it may be worthwhile to note, was 
recognised by the High Court as an interest deserving of legal protection from its foundation: 
see Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139, at 157.
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taken place, which no longer supported a conclusion that the Minister was to 
have an unfettered discretion in the making of decisions to deport. But in the 
course of reaching this conclusion, several of the judges proffered things in dicta 
which indicate that by 1985, the concept of legitimate expectations had become 
firmly entrenched in Australian public law.
Mason J, for example, described it as “a fundamental rule of the common 
law doctrine of natural justice”.39 He said that “generally speaking, when an 
order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the 
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to be 
made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it.”40 For his 
part, Gibbs CJ said that he preferred the expression “reasonable expectation”, 
which had also been used by Stephen J in Salemi v MacKellarf While he 
concluded that natural justice was not required in the circumstances, he, too, 
found that the existence of created expectations could in principle give rise to an 
obligation to observe natural justice.
The only contrary voice on this point was Brennan J’s. He 
acknowledged that the law had evolved to the point where it protected, in a
39 159 CLR, at 582.
40 Ibid (emphasis added). He also said:
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a 
common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in 
the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and 
legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary 
statutory intention (159 CLR, at 584).
41 See supra, at 222. In Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 
CLR 648, at 653, Deane J also said that this was a better expression. Lord Diplock, too, 
suggested that “reasonable expectation” was a preferred term (see the GCHQ Case [1985] AC, at 
408) and the Privy Council used it in Ng Yuen Shiu (see [1983] 2 AC, at 636).
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procedural sense, matters which did not correspond with traditional common law 
property rights.42 Indeed, in this respect, Brennan J seemed to be willing to go 
further than any of the other judges. In his estimation, natural justice was 
presumed to be required in any situation where the exercise of “a power is apt to 
affect the interests of an individual in a way that is substantially different from 
the way in which it is apt to affect the interests of the public at large” .42 But he 
also thought that the existence or not of a subjective expectation as to a benefit 
ought to be irrelevant in detennining whether the rules of natural justice should 
govern the exercise of a power.
This is because in his Honour’s view, the obligation to accord natural 
justice arose as a matter of presumed legislative intent. He felt that the 
obligation for a decision-maker to be procedurally fair was to be determined 
through the process of statutory interpretation, not psychological introspection:
[T]he expectation of an individual whose interests may be 
affected by an exercise of a power is not relevant to the 
construction of the statute which creates the power. The 
construction to be placed on the statute cannot depend on whether 
an individual has an expectation that the power will be exercised 
in his favour or that he will be consulted and given an opportunity 
to put a case before the power will be exercised against him. It is 
not the state of mind of an individual but the interest which an 
exercise of power is apt to affect that is relevant to the 
construction of a statute.44
As will be discussed in chapter seven, Brennan J’s approach makes sense 
when it is read with his assertion of the doctrinal basis for the application of
42 159 CLR, at 616.
43 159 CLR, at 619.
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natural justice. For the moment, it is sufficient to observe that of the various 
members of the High Court since Banks, it is Brennan J who has been most 
consistent in holding that the obligation to accord natural justice arises as a result 
of presumed parliamentary intent. To foreshadow for a moment the focus of 
chapter seven, other justices -  notably Mason CJ and Deane J in the recent cases 
-  have expressed the view that the source of natural justice obligations is the 
common law, rather than legislation.
Expectations v “Mere HopesSouth Australia v O ’Shea
The question adverted to by Brennan J in obiter in Kioa -  the extent to 
which the individual’s actual expectations matter -  was raised four-square in the 
High Court’s next encounter with a legitimate expectation case, South Australia 
v O ’Shea. 45 Unfortunately, the Court did nothing to clear up the confusion on 
the issue. In O ’Shea, the Court held that a legitimate expectation, which will 
attract natural justice, must be distinguished from a “mere hope”, which does 
not. But their Honours did not offer a principled basis on which to make the 
distinction between expectations that are legitimate, and hopes which lack 
legitimacy. Moreover, in holding that O’Shea did not have a “legitimate” 
expectation, it imputed to him understandings and appreciations that almost 
certainly he did not have.
44 159 CLR, at 617-618 . See also Wilson J, 159 CLR, at 602 -  603.
45 (1987) 163 CLR 378.
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O’Shea was a sexual offender, who had in 1977 been convicted of certain
paedophilic offences. As he had been convicted of similar offences in 1962 and 
1967, he was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure, by virtue of sub­
section 77a(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). Nevertheless, 
in 1980, the Governor in Council, acting on a recommendation of the Parole 
Board, released O’Shea on licence. O’Shea subsequently breached one of the 
conditions of his licence and he was reincarcerated. In 1983, he was again 
released on licence, but in 1985, when it was found out that he was planning to 
operate a camp for young children under a false name, he was once more taken 
into custody. Despite this, the Parole Board again recommended that O’Shea be 
released on licence. The recommendation was made after a hearing, which 
O’Shea was permitted to attend, with counsel, and at which he had been 
permitted to make representations. This time, however, the Governor46 refused 
to act on the recommendation. O’Shea sought judicial review of the Governor’s 
decision, claiming that he had a legitimate expectation that the Parole Board’s 
recommendation would be acted upon, and that he was therefore entitled to a 
hearing before the Governor in Council.
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act vested in 
the Governor a discretion to release a preventative detainee if he was satisfied 
“on the recommendation of the Parole Board, that [the detainee] is fit to be at 
liberty”.47 Deane J dissenting, the Court4* held that this was not sufficient to
46 Which, in South Australia, means the Governor in Council: Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), 
s 23.
47 Clause 77(c)(3)(b)(i).
4X Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ.
235
give rise to an expectation of release in O'Shea that would trigger the obligation 
to provide him with the opportunity to make representations to the Governor in 
Council. In the view of Mason CJ (as he had become in 1987), the crucial factor 
was that O’Shea had been given a full opportunity to make submissions before 
the Parole Board: “The hearing before the recommending body provides a 
sufficient opportunity for a party to present his case so that the decision-making 
process, viewed in its entirety, entails procedural fairness”.49 It was only if the 
Governor had based his decision on something new -  something on which 
O’Shea had not had the chance to comment -  that natural justice might have 
been required.M) In this case, the thing which turned the tide against O’Shea’s 
third release on licence was a consideration of the public interest, which, in the 
Chief Justice’s view, was the Governor in Council’s special province. But, he 
said, O’Shea had not been inhibited in any way from making submissions with 
respect to it before the Parole Board.
In a joint judgment, Wilson and Toohey JJ arrived at the same result. In 
their opinion, the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
evidenced a “strong concern to protect the community” from sexual offenders.''1 
But Wilson and Toohey JJ differed from the Chief Justice in characterising the 
proceedings before the Parole Board. In Mason CJ’s view, as has been noted, 
the hearing before the Board had given O’Shea a chance to make representations 
on all matters in issue, including questions of the public interest. That was why
49 163 CLR, at 389.
50 Ibid. See also on this point, Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 547 (PC, NSW).
51 163 CLR, at 396.
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“viewed in its entirety”, the decision-making process could be said to have been 
in accordance with the requirements of natural justice. In the eyes of Wilson and 
Toohey JJ, though, the two stages of the process were quite distinct and served 
different purposes. The object of the proceedings before the Parole Board was to 
make an assessment of individual fact -  whether O’Shea was fit to be released -  
based, inter alia, on expert evidence. But this alone was not enough to settle the 
issue: “Clearly, the legislature believes that, without more, the recommendations 
of the Board may not offer sufficient protection to the community” .52
The Governor in Council’s involvement was intended to address this. He 
was to make an assessment based, not on O’Shea’s individual characteristics, but 
on the collective good. Accordingly, the decision-making criteria used by the 
Governor were quite different. This being so, having received natural justice 
before the Parole Board, all that O’Shea had was a “hope” of release, which, “of 
itself, is not sufficient to ground an expectation that will attract legal 
consequences” . 55 Their Honours continued:
So far as the concept of legitimate expectation is concerned, Mr 
O’Shea must be taken to know that the Act committed to the 
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, 
the responsibility for determining where the public interest lay. 
He would also know that the reservations expressed in the 
medical reports and implied in the stringent conditions 
recommended by the Board would be likely to give the Governor 
and the members of the Executive Council cause for anxious 
consideration as to whether to release Mr O’Shea. The nature of 
the decision that they were required to make was such that 
participation by Mr O’Shea was inappropriate."4
52 163 CLR, at 401.
53 163 CLR, at 402.
54 Ibid.
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Brennan J, in contrast, reiterated the line he had taken in Kioa v West;
that O ’Shea’s subjectively held expectations were irrelevant to the question of 
whether a hearing before the Governor in Council was required. In his view, the 
broad discretion conferred upon the Governor by the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act was sufficient to counter any claim that natural justice was 
required."" For his part, Deane J would have found that in the circumstances, a 
legitimate expectation did exist."6 However one defines the concept of 
expectations, Deane J said,
a person who has been deprived of his liberty on medical grounds 
has a “legitimate expectation” of being released on licence once 
the stage is reached where the appropriate specialist statutory 
tribunal, acting on independent medical advice and after full 
enquiry, has concluded and recommended that he be so released."7
This was consistent with the view he had taken in Kioa v West/*
Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
The High Court’s next significant discussion o f legitimate expectations 
came in two judgments which were delivered on the same day in June of 1990. 
The first of the pair was Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs, 59 It dealt with the question of deportation, and the facts in issue were 
reminiscent of Salemi v MacKellar (No 2), in that the case turned upon the
55 163 CLR, at 410-411.
56 163 CLR, at 417.
57 Ibid.
58 For the story of O’Shea’s subsequent dealings with the legal system (including a summary 
history of his many encounters with the law), see O 'Shea v DPP (1998) 71 SASR 109. See also 
R v O'Shea (unreported., Sup Ct South Australia, 13 November 1996).
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impact of a statement of Ministerial policy upon the right to deport. The second 
was Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin,60 which involved the question 
of the justiciability of an expectation of appointment to judicial office. In the 
former, the Court found that a legitimate expectation existed. In the latter it did 
not. What connects the two, apart from their date, is the relationship drawn by 
the judges between expectations of substantive outcome, and resultant rights to 
procedure.
Haoucher arose because of a provision in the Migration Act, which 
allowed one to seek merit review of deportation orders in the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal. Section 66E of the Act gave the AAT the power either to 
affirm a decision to deport, or to remit the matter to the Minister for 
reconsideration “in accordance with any recommendations of the Tribunal”. 
Haoucher was a citizen of Lebanon, who, in 1985, was convicted of being in 
possession of cannabis resin with an intent to sell or supply it to others, for 
which he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of three years.61 Prior to 
this, in 1980, he had been convicted of assault on one of his brothers, and 
sentenced to imprisonment for three months. At the same time, he had also been 
convicted of disorderly conduct. At the time, he was warned by the Department 
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs that a failure to maintain good behaviour 
could result in deportation. Nevertheless, in 1982, he was again convicted of
59 169 CLR 648.
60 170 CLR 1.
61 The facts are summarised in the judgment of Dawson J, 169 CLR, at 656 - 657.
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disorderly conduct and of using a false name. In 1983, he was convicted of 
causing damage to property.
Pursuant to the then s 12 of the Migration Act, the Minister was 
empowered to order the deportation of non-citizens who had been in Australia 
for less than ten years, and who had been sentenced to periods of imprisonment 
for more than one year. The Minister had, however, adopted a Criminal 
Deportation Policy which provided, inter alia, that ordinarily the Government 
would only order the deportation of non-citizens who had committed “serious 
offences”. With respect to drug-connected matters, the Policy offered as 
examples of serious offences: “[t]he production, importation, distribution, 
trafficking or commercial dealing in heroin or other ‘hard’ addictive drugs”. As 
for non-‘hard’ drugs (such as the possession of cannabis resin), the policy said 
that “involvement in other illicit drugs on a significantly large scale” would also 
be considered a serious offence. The policy also stated that in normal cases, the 
Minister would defer to decisions made by the AAT on review.62
In this case, the AAT had recommended that the Minister’s deportation 
order against Haoucher be revoked, on the basis that Haoucher’s involvement in
62 The relevant portion of the policy stated:
It is the policy of the Australian Government that recommendations of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal should be overturned by the Minister only in 
exceptional circumstances and only when strong evidence can be produced to 
justify its decision. Furthermore, it is the policy of the Government that, when 
the Minister decides to deport a person contrary to a recommendation of the 
Tribunal, the Minister will table in the parliament at the first opportunity a 
statement of his/her reasons for doing so (see 169 CLR, at 657).
240
the trafficking of the cannabis was not “on a significantly large scale”.6' It also 
concluded that in the circumstances, the risk of recidivism was low, that 
Haoucher’s ties with Lebanon were not especially strong, and that the benefit to 
Australia from his deportation would be outweighed by the harm caused to his 
family -  most of whom lived in Australia -  were he to be forcibly removed. 64 
Despite this, the Minister rejected the AAT’s recommendation and affirmed the 
deportation order. In his statement of reasons, he said that while he accepted the 
findings of fact made by the AAT, he did not accept the AAT’s 
“characterisation” of them, or “the weight to be given to them in the exercise of 
my discretion”. In particular, the Minister said that he thought the offence was a 
serious one, and that in light of Haoucher’s past criminal record, the risk of 
recidivism was serious. He also thought that the AAT had overstated the burden 
that would be placed upon Haoucher’s family were he to be deported. Therefore, 
said the Minister, “exceptional circumstances existed which justified departing 
from the recommendation of [the AAT] ” . 6'1
In his application for judicial review, Haoucher argued that the terms of 
the Criminal Deportation Policy had created a legitimate expectation that the 
Minister would comply with the AAT’s recommendation, and that if he proposed 
to depart from the recommendation, the Minister was first obliged to provide 
him with a hearing. By a three to two majority, 66 the High Court agreed with 
Haoucher. But what is most interesting is to compare the different approaches
63 169 CLR, at 657.
64 Ibid.
65 169 CLR, at 658.
66 Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, dissenting.
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taken by the judges to the legitimacy of Haoucher’s expectation that he be able 
to remain in Australia. For what the judgments show is that among the judges, 
there seem to have been really very different notions of the idea of “legitimate” 
expectations.
In her dissent, Gaudron J for the most part adopted the sort of approach 
taken by Mason CJ in O 'Shea, namely that the question was whether “viewed in 
its entirety” the decision-making process could be said to be fair.67 In her 
opinion, all that had happened here was that the Minister had taken a different 
view of the evidence placed before the AAT. Haoucher could not be said to have 
been denied the opportunity fairly to present his case, when all that happened at 
the Ministerial stage was a different weighing up of facts found in a process in 
which he had been fully involved. In her view, she said,
a decision which results from a difference between the final 
decision-maker and the recommending body as to the evaluation 
of precisely the same body of facts is not one which will 
ordinarily be viewed as involving a breach of the rules of natural 
justice merely because no opportunity was given to put a case that 
the facts should be evaluated in the same way as they were by the 
recommending body. That is because, at least ordinarily, it may 
be said that ‘the decision-making process, viewed in its entirety, 
entails procedural fairness’ .68
Her Honour arrived at this conclusion after having considered the fact 
that the Migration Act provided for a two-step decision-making process, in
6 In fact, credit for this approach perhaps should go to Barwick CJ. Though it was not referred 
to by Mason CJ in O ’Shea, in Brettingham-Moore v St Leonards Municipality (1969) 121 CLR 
509, at 521, Barwick CJ said it was “in relation to the carrying out of the whole process 
prescribed by the statute that the question as to the requirements of natural justice is to be 
considered”.
68 169 CLR, at 674 (quoting South Australia v O ’Shea, per Mason CJ).
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which the first step was merely recommendatory. This fact -  that the first step 
was a recommendation, rather than a decision per se -  “contemplates that the 
final decision may differ from the recommendation” .64 It also “necessarily 
imports a degree of freedom of choice or discretion in the evaluation of the facts 
as found by the recommending body” .70
Dawson J approached the matter in a similar way. Stated crudely, 
Haoucher had in his view had the chance to say all before the AAT, and a further 
hearing before the Minister could serve no constructive purpose: “In this case, it 
is not suggested that there is any new material which could be placed before the 
Minister to lead him to a contrary conclusion ... Any further hearing would result 
only in the repetition of those matters before the Minister” .71 This was not, he 
said, a case like FAI v Winneke, where there had been no hearing in the first 
place. “ Dawson J also said that it was misleading to speak of a legitimate 
expectation of procedural protection: “To speak, as the cases often do, of the 
legitimate expectation of procedural fairness generally is ... to confuse the 
interest which is the basis of the requirement with the requirement itself. ” 73 “It 
adds nothing”, he concluded, “to say that there was a legitimate expectation, 
engendered by the promise or practice that a certain procedure would be 
followed. ” 74
69 169 CLR, at 673.
70 Ibid.
71 169 CLR, at 663.
72 Ibid.
73 169 CLR, at 659.
74 169 CLR, at 660.
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For his part, Deane J predictably found that in the circumstances a 
legitimate expectation did exist. Intriguingly, though, he seemed to be of the 
opinion that what gave rise to the legitimate expectation was the fact that 
Haoucher had gone to the trouble of seeking review before the A AT, and that 
there, he had carried the day. The Deportation Policy, in his view, had little to 
do with it. “[Tjhere is much to be said for the view”, he said,
that where a person has made the effort and incurred the expense 
involved in persuading the Tribunal to make findings and 
recommendations in his or her favour, after a full hearing on the 
merits in proceedings in which the Minister has been fully heard 
as an active opposing party, there will arise a new and distinct 
legitimate or reasonable expectation that the Minister will accept 
the findings and abide by the recommendations of that Tribunal.
If that be so, then quite apart from the context provided by 
published government policy, the Minister was under an 
obligation to observe procedural fairness in determining whether 
the deportation order ... should stand.7:1
Toohey J’s contribution to the debate came in the form of an assertion, 
which, significantly, was later on to be picked up by some of his colleagues in 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teohf that in order for a 
legitimate expectation to be founded, there need not actually have been any 
subjective expectation at all. Drawing upon Brennan J’s view that whether 
natural justice is required is a matter of statutory construction, he said that while 
a pattern of governmental conduct could give rise to a legitimate expectation that 
the pattern would continue, this was not the only type of legitimate expectation 
case. In other cases, the “[legitimate expectation does not depend upon the
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knowledge and state of mind of the individual concerned”.77 What Toohey J had 
in mind in this regard were cases in which the duty to observe natural justice 
arose as a result of legislative intent, whether express or implied, but the passage 
is of tremendous interest, for as will be seen, his views on the place of actual 
expectations came to assume some prominence. s
Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin
Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin stemmed from the 
reorganisation of the New South Wales inferior courts in the mid-1980s.79 At the 
time, all but one of the one hundred and one stipendiary magistrates sought 
appointment to the new Local Court, which had succeeded the old Court of Petty 
Sessions. Of the hundred would-be reappointees, ninety five were successful. 
What led to the litigation was the fact that in 1983, after the Local Courts Act 
was passed, but before it came into force, the stipendiary magistrates were given 
to expect by the Chairman of the Bench of Stipendiary Magistrates that they 
would be automatically appointed to the new court.80 But before the new 
appointments were made, the Attorney-General formed the view, arrived at
75 169 CLR, at 654 (emphasis added). Deane J also said in this case that he thought that natural 
justice applied presumptively to all government decision-making (169 CLR, at 653). This 
extraordinary assertion will be discussed in chapter 7).
76 (1995) 183 CLR 273. See infra, at 259.
77 169 CLR, at 670.
,s For his part, McHugh J held, as he had in O ’Shea, that a legitimate expectation had to be 
distinguished from a “mere hope” (169 CLR, at 682), but he found that in these circumstances, a 
legitimate expectation had in fact been engendered by the Deportation policy (169 CLR, at 683).
7 Whereby the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) was repealed and replaced by the Local Courts Act 
1982 (NSW). The scheme for the reorganisation was such that the stipendiary magistracies 
ceased to exist when the Local Courts Act came into force, on January 1, 1985. The Local 
Courts Act contained a saving provision, however, whereby former magistrates who were not 
reappointed were to be given appointments in the state Public Service, at a protected rate of pay.
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following substantial consultation, that five out of the hundred (including Quin) 
were not fit for reappointment.
In a proceeding in the New South Wales courts, Macrae v Attorney- 
General (NSW)^] it was held that Quin and the other non-reappointed 
stipendiary magistrates had been denied natural justice, as during the course of 
the reappointment process, the Attorney-General had taken into account adverse 
comments on Quin and his colleagues, on which they had not had the 
opportunity to comment. A declaration was issued, remitting the matter back to 
the Attorney-General for reconsideration according to law. Significantly, in light 
of what Dawson J was later to say in Haoucher about it being misleading to 
speak of a legitimate expectation of procedure,s2 the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal had found that Quin and the others had had a legitimate expectation, not 
of appointment to the new Court, but of procedural fairness in the appointments 
process.
The problem, however, was that by the time the Macrae case had wended 
its way through the superior courts, the new Local Court was in operation. By 
the time Macrae had ended, all of the initial appointments to the Local Court had 
been made, and some additional vacancies had already been filled. The 
Attorney-General therefore proposed to treat Quin’s application (for by this time, 
he was the only one of the five non-reappointees left who was still pursuing his
80 See 170 CLR, at 8.
81 (1987) 9 NSWLR 268.
82 See supra, at 243.
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claim to reappointment to the magistracy) along with other applications for 
appointment as Magistrates. In other words, rather than succeeding to the new 
Court virtually automatically, as had most of his colleagues in the old stipendiary 
magistracy, he would have to compete for a position with other candidates, and 
be judged according to merit. It sounds odd to say that the basis of a lawsuit is 
that a person was complaining of having to be judged according to his or her 
merits, but from Quin’s perspective, had it not been for the Attorney-General’s 
initial denial of natural justice, he would have had a de facto claim upon a 
judicial appointment. The complication was that in the Macrae case, the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal had described Quin’s legitimate expectation as one 
to procedure, not as to substantive outcome.
In the New South Wales courts, Quin succeeded in obtaining a 
declaration to the effect that in order to comply with the Court of Appeal’s 
original declaration in Macrae, the Attorney-General was to treat Quin’s 
application on its own merits, and not in comparison with any others.83 But the 
High Court84 took a different view. In Mason CJ’s opinion, Quin’s claim was 
defeated on two bases. First, he noted that in fact, Quin’s expectation was of an 
appointment to the new Court, and that this was on the basis of the 
representation made by the Chairman of the Bench of Stipendiary Magistrates. 
But a representation could not, said the Chief Justice, act so as to fetter the 
lawfully-conferred discretion upon the Crown: “The Executive cannot by 
representation or promise disable itself from, or hinder itself in, performing a
83 Unreported, 23 December 1988.
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statutory duty or exercising a statutory discretion to be performed or exercised in 
the public interest ...”85
In this case, Mason CJ interpreted section 12 of the Local Courts Act, 
which provided that the Governor may “appoint any qualified person to be a 
Magistrate”, as conferring upon the Crown such a discretion. It was therefore 
free, he said, for the Attorney-General to adopt and change policies for the 
appointment of judges to the Local Courts. Whatever expectation Quin may 
have had, it could not operate to frustrate the discretion given by Parliament to 
the Crown with respect to the judicial appointments process.
In addition, Mason CJ thought that Quin was barred from the relief he 
sought on the basis that a legitimate expectation could not confer a right to 
substantive outcome. As his Honour noted, while the expectation which grounds 
the authority of the court to intervene may be substantively-oriented, the right 
conferred by the expectation is to procedural fairness.86 In contrast to Dawson J 
in Haoucher, he said that legitimate expectations may be of procedural 
entitlement (as the New South Wales Court of Appeal had concluded in 
Macrae), but this cannot be dispositive of the content of the resulting entitlement 
to natural justice: “The procedural right which forms the subject-matter of the 
legitimate expectation will not necessarily be the same as the procedure which 
procedural fairness ... will demand.”87
84 Mason CJ, Brennan and Dawson JJ, Deane and Toohey JJ dissenting.
85 170 CLR, at 17.
86 170 CLR, at 21.
87 Ibid.
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It was with this latter aspect of Mason CJ’s analysis that Dawson J had 
trouble in Quin. While he concurred with the Chief Justice in the result (and in 
particular, on the question of Quin effectively urging the High Court to 
countenance a fettering of discretion), he returned to his theme in Haoucher that 
an expectation as to procedure could not be deemed “legitimate”, in the sense of 
conferring an entitlement to natural justice. He reiterated his view that the whole 
notion of legitimate expectations was to provide some means of protection of 
interests which fall short of rights.8S Whether fair procedure is required depends 
not on whether the party in question expects that it will be provided, but on 
whether “the circumstances call for fair procedure” . 89 In Dawson J’s view, it was 
almost trite -  and possibly tantamount to opening the floodgates -  to speak of a 
“legitimate expectation” of procedure.90
Brennan J was ad idem with Mason CJ and Dawson J on the fettering 
question. In his view, the power to appoint to public office must, in the absence 
of statutory provisions to the contrary, “be at large if its exercise is to answer the 
purpose for which it is conferred, namely, to advance the interests of the 
public” .91 But he also took the opportunity to offer his views, which by now
88 170 CLR, at 54.
89 170 CLR, at 55. He also asserted that insofar as it recognised the possibility of a legitimate 
expectation of procedure, which in turn was the source of a right to procedure, the judgment of 
the Privy Council in Ng Yuen Shin was wrong. See 170 CLR, at 56 -  57.
90 He said:
No doubt people expect fairness in their dealings with those who make 
decisions affecting their interests, but it is to my mind quite artificial to say 
that this is the reason why, if the expectation is legitimate in the sense of well- 
founded, the law imposes a duty to observe procedural fairness. Such a duty 
arises, if at all, because the circumstances call for a fair procedure and it adds 
nothing to say that they also are such as to lead to a legitimate expectation that 
a fair procedure will be adopted (170 CLR, at 55).
91 170 CLR, at 33.
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were becoming familiar, on the subject of legitimate expectations generally. To 
answer the question posed to the Court by Quin’s argument, he said:
The question can be put quite starkly: when an administrative 
power is conferred by the legislature on the executive and its 
lawful exercise is apt to disappoint the expectations of an 
individual, what is the jurisdiction of the courts to protect that 
individual’s legitimate expectations against adverse exercises of 
the power? I have no doubt that that answer is: none. 42
Deane and Toohey JJ, dissenting, would have found that the nature of 
Quin’s expectation did entitle him to the relief he sought, viz to have his 
application for appointment considered on its own, and not as against other 
applications. In Deane J’s opinion, this case was like FAI v Winneke, where an 
expectation as to an entitlement -  there, the renewal of a licence, here, the 
reappointment to curial office -  gave rise to procedural rights.92 Toohey J was 
slightly differently focussed in his reasoning. He thought the case raised issues 
of judicial independence. The initial procedure adopted by the Attorney- 
General, of allowing a de facto claim upon reappointments by the Stipendiary 
Magistrates, reflected recognition of “the security of tenure that is essential to 
the independence of the judiciary” .94 Moreover, it created a legitimate 
expectation that Quin and the others would be reappointed, provided they were 
not found to be unfit for office. Since the assertion of Quin’s unfitness had
92 170 CLR, at 35. This was because, in his Honour’s view, to hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to substituting merit review for judicial review:
Judicial review provides no remedies to protect interests, falling short of 
enforceable rights, which are apt to be affected by the lawful exercise of 
executive or administrative power. If it were otherwise, the courts would be 
asserting a jurisdiction, in protection of individual interests, to override the law 
by which a power to affect those interests is conferred upon the repository 
(ibid) (C/Torsyth, supra n 8, at 240 -  241).
93 170 CLR, at 46-47.
94 170 CLR, at 67.
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flowed from unfair procedures, it followed logically that Quin had the right to 
have his fitness assessed according to fair procedures.
Annetts v McCann
The next case in which the High Court visited the question of individual 
expectations giving rise to procedural rights was Annetts v McCann?' decided 
later in the same year as Haoucher and Quin. Annetts v McCann arose out of the 
tragic (and, at the time, newsworthy) death of two young jackaroos in the desert 
of Western Australia. After news of the deaths came to light, rumours began to 
circulate, alleging possible wrongdoing. The two youths had died of thirst, but 
one of the two had also been shot in the head, and it was uncertain whether he 
had taken his own life, or whether his friend had shot him.96 McCann was a 
Coroner, conducting an inquest into the deaths. Pursuant to section 24 of the 
Western Australian Coroners Act 1920, McCann gave the parents of the 
deceased youths standing to appear at the Inquiry.
The rights conferred by section 24 upon people who had been given 
standing included the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Apart from 
that, the Coroner had exclusive discretion to determine the circumstances under 
which people would be heard.97 Nevertheless, the Annetts claimed that natural 
justice required that they be given the right also to make submissions to
95 (1990) 170 CLR596.
96 See the judgment of Toohey J, 170 CLR, at 619.
97 Section 7 of the Act vested the Coroner with “all the power, authority and jurisdiction which 
belong to the office of a Coroner in England”, except to the extent to which the Act varied this.
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McCann, which he refused. The Annetts thereupon applied to the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia for a writ of mandamus, to direct McCann to allow 
them to appear. The Full Court refused the application, holding that under the 
Coroners Act, the Coroner had a discretion whether or not to hear submissions, 
and that the Annetts could not, therefore, claim a denial of natural justice." The 
High Court" allowed an appeal from this decision, holding that in the 
circumstances, the Annetts had a legitimate expectation, which gave them the 
right to make submissions concerning possible findings as to their son’s 
involvement in the shooting of his mate.
While the Court split in the end result, all of the justices agreed that a 
right to make submissions of one form or another existed on the facts at hand. In 
a joint judgment, Mason CJ and Deane and McHugh JJ said that the case was an 
easy one. It could, they said,
now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a 
public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person’s rights, 
interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice 
regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by 
plain words of necessary intendment.100
Here, it was obvious that the work of McCann could affect the interests 
of the Annetts. This was so for two reasons. In light of the wording of sub­
section 24(1) of the Coroners Act -  “any person who, in the opinion of the 
coroner, has a sufficient interest in the subject or result of the inquest ...” -  the
The position in England apparently is that no person may address a Coroner except with the 
Coroner’s leave. See [1990] WAR, at 163 -  165.
9S Annetts v McCann [ 1990] WAR 161.
99 Mason CJ, Deane, and McHugh JJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ dissenting.
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fact that McCann had given the Annetts standing served as evidence of the fact 
that they had an interest in the proceedings.101 The interest they represented, the 
majority concluded, was “the protection of the reputation of their deceased 
son”.102 But the conferral of standing also, in the eyes of the majority, gave rise 
to a legitimate expectation: it created “a legitimate expectation that the Coroner 
would not make any finding adverse to the interests which they represent without 
giving them the opportunity to be heard in opposition to that finding”.102
This latter conclusion is significant. The Coroners Act did not itself give 
rise to the legitimate expectation. It merely gave the Coroner the right to give 
standing to “any person who, in the opinion of the coroner, has a sufficient 
interest”. The factor which legitimised the Annetts' desire to be heard was the 
action of Coroner McCann. This is interesting, for it is difficult to discern any 
pattern in the High Court's holdings on this point. In some of the cases: Salemi v 
MacKellar (No 2), O'Shea and Quin, it was held that actions of governmental 
officials could not counter a decision by parliament to confer a discretion upon 
the decision-maker. But in others: FAI v Winneke, Haoucher and, now, Annetts 
v McCann, it was held that it could.
The only contentious question in the eyes of the Chief Justice and Deane 
and McHugh JJ was whether the Coroners Act made plain an intention to 
exclude the rules of natural justice. Of course, their conclusion was that it did
100 170 CLR, at 598 (internal citations omitted).
101 170 CLR, at 599.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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not. But the way in which they reasoned to their conclusion cannot help but 
raise eyebrows. The majority noted that in 1920, when the Act was passed, it 
“simply would not have occurred to anyone in the legal profession that the 
common law rules of natural justice applied to an inquiry whose findings could 
not alter legal rights or obligations”.104 Accordingly, there was nothing which 
would suggest that the West Australian parliament would have intended to 
exclude them! As a matter of simple logical deduction, this is, of course, 
compelling enough. But as a matter of legal reasoning, it rings quite 
disingenuous.
In his judgment, Toohey J approached the case in more or less the same 
way as the majority. While he was in favour of dismissing the appeal, he 
expressed the view that McCann ought to have been required to provide the 
parents with the opportunity to make submissions on any proposed finding 
which would reflect adversely on the character of the younger Annetts. In 
Toohey J’s view, any finding by the Coroner which suggested criminality in the 
young Annetts’ conduct would have affected the interests of the parents: “The 
relationship of parent and child and the emotional consequences for the family of 
such a finding demand that such an opportunity [ie. to make submissions] be 
afforded”.105 This, too, seems compelling when viewed in one way. But when 
viewed in another way, one wonders about the legitimising factor of the 
expectation in Toohey J’s opinion. Could it have been the emotion that
104 170 CLR, at 600.
105 170 CLR, at 620.
254
generally attends coronial proceedings? Or the emotional effect of any finding 
by Coroner McCann which would have cast their son's character in a bad light?
Whatever the case, Brennan J took a similar view. If and when McCann 
arrived at the stage of making adverse findings against the character or 
reputation of young Annetts, then he should afford the elder Annetts the right to 
make submissions. 106 But he reached this view by a very different route from the 
other judges. In keeping with the approach to legitimate expectations he 
enunciated in Kioa, Haoucher and Quin, he said that the views or expectations of 
the Annetts themselves were irrelevant to the issue of whether natural justice was 
required. The only key to answering that question was an examination of the 
provisions of the Coroners Act: “The only sound foundation for judicial review 
is, in my opinion, the statute which creates and confers the power, construed to 
include any terms supplied by the common law. ” 107
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission,i()S the next case in the line, 
involved a report made by the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission 
(“CJC”) into areas of potential difficulty which could follow from a proposal by 
the Queensland government to introduce poker machines into the state. The 
statutory scheme provided that the CJC’s report would be filed with the state
106 170 CLR, at 612.
107 170 CLR, at 606.
108 (1992) 175 CLR 564.
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Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee,11" and the government’s stated 
intention was to conduct a series of public hearings after receiving the report. In 
the report, which received wide publicity, the CJC made disparaging comments 
about both a Mr Leonard Hastings Ainsworth, and Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd, 
a manufacturer and distributor of poker machines of which Mr Ainsworth was 
the managing director and principal. The CJC also recommended that Ainsworth 
Nominees not be permitted to participate in the poker machine industry in 
Queensland. In reaching this view, however, the CJC at no time made enquiries 
of either Ainsworth or Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd, or put to them the 
substance of the allegations which had been made against them and which 
formed the basis for the disparaging comments as well as the recommendation.
Ainsworth and Ainsworth Nominees (together, “the Ainsworths”) sought 
a declaration from the Supreme Court of Queensland that they had been denied 
natural justice. The Supreme Court denied the application, on the basis of the 
High Court’s holding in Testro Brothers v TaitlU) that investigations which did 
not have the effect of prejudicing legal rights did not attract natural justice.1" In 
the High Court, the Ainsworths argued both that the legislation in question -  the 
Queensland Criminal Justice Act 1989 -  did require the observance of natural 
justice, and that the common law had moved on since Testro Brothers v Tait was 
decided in 1963.
109 Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld), para 2.18(1 )(a).
110 (1963) 109 CLR 353. For more on this case, see supra 163 -  168. 
1,1 See 175 CLR, at 572.
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The High Court" 2 agreed with the Ainsworths. On the first argument, the 
majority held in a joint judgment that a provision of the Criminal Justice Act 
which required the CJC to “act independently, impartially, fairly and in the 
public interest” in “all proceedings”" ' was sufficient to attract a requirement to 
observe natural justice. " 4 On the second argument, the majority was of the view 
that the law had moved on since Testro Bros v Tait:
As the law has progressed since that case, the only question which 
now arises is whether the report adversely affected a legal right or 
interest, including an interest falling within the category of 
legitimate expectation, such that the [CJC] was required to 
proceed in a manner that was fair to the appellants."''
As said, Brennan J raised his voice in protest at this. He reiterated his by 
now commonplace view that the obligation to observe natural justice arose as a 
consequence of parliamentary intent.1"' But he then proceeded to engage in the 
same stretch of imputed legislative intent that he had in Annetts v McCann. In 
Ainsworth he said that there was an interpretive presumption that an obligation
112 Mason CJ, Brennan Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.
113 Para 3.2l(2)(a).
114 Taken in context, the majority said, the provision provided evidence of a parliamentary intent 
that the work of the CJC be consistent with the requirements of procedural fairness:
[A] body established for the purposes and with powers and functions of the 
kind conferred on the Commission [ie the CJC] and its organisational units is 
one whose powers would ordinarily be construed as subject to an implied 
general requirement of procedural fairness, save to the extent of clear contrary 
provision. That is because it is improbable that, though it did not say so, the 
legislature would intend that a body of that kind should act unfairly (175 CLR, 
at 574-575).
See, also 175 CLR, at 576:
[T]he nature of the Commission and its functions and responsibilities are such 
that a supplementary duty of fairness is necessarily to be implied in those areas 
involving its functions and responsibilities which are not covered by the 
[statutory] duty of fairness.
115 175 CLR, at 577.
116 175 CLR, at 584- 585.
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to observe natural justice accompanied “a statutory function the exercise of 
which is apt to affect the reputation of an individual” . 117
Both Brennan J and the majority agreed that reputation was a protected 
interest in the circumstances. 118 Where they differed was the starting point for 
the enquiry. Brennan J began by asking whether the Criminal Justice Act ought 
properly to be interpreted so that natural justice applied. The other judges, in 
contrast, said that natural justice would apply here as an “implied general 
requirement” of the common law. The starting point was that natural justice 
applied because the common law dictated that this was the case. The interpretive 
question for them was whether the Criminal Justice Act should be interpreted so 
as to exclude natural justice. Their analytical approach, in other words, was the 
inverse of Brennan J's. As will be argued in chapter seven, this difference masks 
an abstruse clash in view, not only about the legal foundation for judicial review 
in Australian administrative law, but also about the relative positions of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government within the Australian 
constitutional framework.
" 175 CLR, at 591. For more on Brennan J’s view on reputation as a protected interest, see 
NCSC v News Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 296, at 326. See also Johns v Australian Securities 
Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408.
Ils It is interesting to contrast the judgments in Ainsworth with that of Stephen J in R v Collins, 
Ex parte ACTU-Solo Enterprises Ptv Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 691. There he held -  ä la Testro Bros v 
Tait -  that a writ of certiorari would not issue against a report of a Royal Commission, where the 
report did not affect the rights of the report's subject, or “subject [them] to a new hazard” (8 
ALR, at 699). One wonders why reputation was not considered a “new hazard” in R v Collins.
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THE TEOH CASE
The High Court’s most controversial discussion of the notion of 
legitimate expectations was in its 1995 judgment in Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Teohf9 Few, if any, of the High Court’s administrative 
law pronouncements have attracted as much attention as Teohf0 For the most 
part, reflection on the Court’s administrative law work remains the province of 
the academic lawyer, rather than the journalist. But Teoh was different. It 
attracted a notice that stretched far beyond the compass of those ordinarily 
interested in the doctrine of natural justice. In part, one supposes, this reflects 
the fact that today, the work of the High Court generally attracts greater attention 
than it did in years past. Another reason for Teoh ’s high profile, undoubtedly, is 
the fact that the case concerned children’s rights. Yet a third reason surely must 
be the essence of the holding itself. For the essence of the holding was that the 
simple ratification of a treaty could give rise to enforceable legal interests. 
Despite its protestations to the contrary, the Court was clearly introducing a
119 Minister o f State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh 183 CLR 273.
120 A small sample of the torrent -  and breadth -  of commentary which followed the judgment in 
Teoh includes: the Hon A Nicholson, “Address to the Children First! Forum”, Melbourne 1995, 
National Children’s Youth Law Centre, “High Court Breathes New Life into CROC” (1995) 3 
Rights NOW! 2, M Allars, “One Small Step for Legal Doctrine, One Giant Leap Towards 
Integrity in Government: Teoh ’s Case and the Internationalisation of Administrative Law” 
(1995) 17 Syd L Rev 204, R Snell, “Kioa to Teoh" (1995) 20 Alternative L J  136, A Twomey, 
“Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh” (1995) 23 Fed L Rev 348, H Burmester, 
“The Teoh Decision -  A Perspective From the Government Service” (1995) 5 AIAL Forum 6, J 
McMillan, “Teoh and Invalidity in Administrative Law” (1995) 5 AIAL Forum 10, K Walker, 
“Treaties and the Internationalisation of Administrative Law”, in C Saunders (ed) Courts o f 
Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996), N Williams, “Legitimate Expectations 
-  Beyond Teoh", in L Pearson (ed) Administrative Law: Setting the Pace or Being Left Behind? 
(1997), S Sheridan, “Legitimate Expectation: Where Does the Law Now Lie?”, in J McMillan 
(ed), Administrative Law Under the Coalition Government (1997). See also J McMillan and N 
Williams, “Administrative Law and Human Rights”, in D Kinley (ed) Human Rights in 
Australian Law (1998), at 83 -  88.
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significant change to the law. And in doing this, the Court was clearly altering 
the way in which the rule of law had traditionally been understood to operate in 
Australia.
In Teoh, the High Court held that the ratification by the executive of a 
treaty gave rise to a legitimate expectation that executive decision-making 
processes would be in conformity with it, and that if the executive intended to 
deviate from the terms of a ratified treaty, it first had to provide an affected 
person with an opportunity to argue against the deviation. Specifically, the 
Court held that Article 3(1) of the International Convention on the Rights o f the 
Child (to which Australia is a party), which provides that “[i]n all actions 
concerning children ... the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration”, created a legitimate expectation that the Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs would take the best interests of any affected children into 
account as a primary consideration when deciding whether to issue a deportation 
order against a parent. If the Minister proposed not to take the best interests of 
the children into account as a primary consideration, he or she first had to 
provide the prospective deportee parent with a hearing regarding the departure 
from the Convention’s provisions.
As Mason CJ and Deane J acknowledged in their joint judgment,121 until 
Teoh it was well established that the provisions of an international treaty to 
which Australia is a party did not form part of Australian law until they had been
121 183 CLR, at 286 - 287.
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incorporated into municipal law by a valid act of parliament.122 That was as a 
consequence of our constitutional system of separation of powers. It is trite that 
for us, the principle of separation of powers lies at the heart of the rule of law. In 
Teoh, however, the High Court held that the ratification could give rise to 
domestic legal consequences, quite independently of parliamentary inaction. 
This was rather different from the position it had taken in 1982, in Simsek v 
MacPhee. There, the Court had held that a claim that natural justice was 
required as a result of Australia's accession to treaties had to fail. Since the 
treaties did not form part of domestic law, they could not give rise to a legitimate 
expectation.12 ' In Teoh, however, a majority of the High Court took a different 
view.
The facts in Teoh were straight-forward. In May of 1988, Ah Hin Teoh, 
a Malaysian national, arrived in Australia. He came to care for the three children 
of his dead brother, all of whom were Australian citizens. He married his 
brother’s widow -  who was the mother of the children -  and he became the de 
facto parent for them. In addition, Mr Teoh and the new Mrs Teoh had three 
children of their own. The problem was that Mrs Teoh was a heroin addict, and 
Mr Teoh was caught trying to import heroin into Australia for her use. He was
122 In A-G Canada v A-G Ontario [1937] AC 326 at 347, the principle was stated in the 
following way:
Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a 
treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they 
entail alteration of the existing domestic law, required legislative action.
Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not 
within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law.
See also Chow Hung Ching v R (1948) 77 CLR 449, Bradley v The Commonwealth (1973) 128 
CLR 557, Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636, Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 
CLR 168, Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292, and J  H Rayner 
(Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department o f Trade and Industry> [1990] 2 AC 418.
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sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. As a result of this, Mr Teoh’s application 
for permanent residency was refused on the basis that he was not of good 
character. Teoh appealed this to the Immigration Review Panel (“IRP” -  a fore­
runner to the current Immigration Review Tribunal), but his appeal was 
dismissed. His visitor’s permit having expired, a Deportation Order was then 
made against Teoh -  even though the IRP recognised that the deportation of 
Teoh would cause extreme hardship to Mrs Teoh and the children. Teoh sought 
review of the deportation order in the Federal Court under the AD(JR) Act. His 
claim was that he had been denied procedural fairness in the deportation 
decision-making process. At the initial stage, however, the claim was a vague 
one -  there was no reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 124
At first instance in the Federal Court, he was unsuccessful. French J 
denied his application. But on appeal, the Full Court found in his favour.12"' The 
Minister then appealed to the High Court. In the High Court, four separate 
judgments were delivered: a joint judgment by Mason CJ and Deane J, a 
concurrence by Toohey J, a judgment concurring in result (but for quite different 
reasons) by Gaudron J, and a dissent by McHugh J.
123 148 CLR, at 644.
124 See the judgment of Toohey J, 183 CLR, at 295, 298. Counsel for Teoh has told me that the 
argument about the Convention was only formulated on the morning of the appeal to the Full 
Court of the Federal Court. Up to that point, the intention was to base the case upon the parens 
patriae jurisdiction of the courts. The Convention only came into counsel’s ken when it was 
mentioned in passing to him on the morning of the appeal by (ironically) a friend who was 
employed in the Government Solicitor’s office.
125 (1994) 49 FCR 409, per Black CJ, Lee and Carr JJ.
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Mason CJ and Deane J said that they accepted the basic legal tenet that 
the mere ratification of treaties did not transform them into enforceable domestic 
law. 12(1 But, they held, ratification did mean something. They were unwilling to 
think of ratification “as a merely platitudinous or ineffectual act” . 127 Instead, 
they held that ratification ought to be characterised as “a positive statement by 
the executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian 
people that the executive government and its agencies will act in accordance 
with the convention.”12s In light of this, they held that in the absence of any 
move by the government to displace the expectation, the act of ratification was 
sufficient to found a legitimate expectation that administrative decision-makers 
will act in conformity with the provisions of the treaties to which the 
Government has bound us.
Applying that principle to the facts at hand, the majority found that even 
though the IRP had commented on the problems that the children would face as a 
result of the deportation of Mr Teoh, the majority found that the good character 
requirement had not been regarded as the primary consideration. But what was 
most interesting about this holding was that the Chief Justice and Deane and 
Toohey JJ were prepared to find the legitimate expectation to exist even though 
Mr Teoh had no knowledge whatsoever of the Convention or its contents. As
126 183 CLR, at 286-287 .
127 1 83 CLR, at 291. See, also, 183 CLR, at 302 {per Toohey J).
128 183 CLR, at 291.
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Toohey J put it:
the matter is to be assessed ... in terms of what expectation might 
reasonably be engendered ... A subjective test is particularly 
inappropriate when the legitimate expectation is said to derive 
from something as general as the ratification of the Convention. 129
The approach taken by Gaudron J is interesting in a different respect. 
Unlike her other colleagues who found for Mr Teoh, Gaudron J did not base her 
reasons on natural justice rights stemming from the Convention or its terms. In 
her Honour’s view, this was not so much a case involving rights stemming from 
treaties, as it was a case of rights stemming from the common law. As she said,
citizenship carries with it a common law right ... to have a child’s 
best interests taken into account, at least as a primary 
consideration, in all discretionary decisions ... which directly 
affect the child’s individual welfare. 130
In other words, Gaudron J looked at the significance of the treaty’s 
contents in reverse to the way in which the majority had looked at it: she said 
that the treaty merely gave written expression to this “fundamental human right”. 
She left open, though, the question of what would happen in a case where the 
contents of the convention were “not in harmony with community values and 
expectations” . 131
McHugh J -  who, as will have been noted, had thus far been one of the
129 183 CLR, at 301 (emphasis added). Cf R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Khan [1984] 1 WLR 
1337. There, the Court of Appeal held that natural justice was required only where the British 
government was purporting to rely on a policy which had not been explained to the applicant.
130 183 CLR, at 304.
131 183 CLR, at 305.
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active proponents of the idea of legitimate expectations -  dissented strenuously 
from the reasoning of his colleagues, and in places, his judgment came close to 
displaying that sarcastic testiness which one usually associates with dissents in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Simply put, McHugh J was of the view 
that ratification of the treaty did not give rise to any legitimate expectation at all. 
Accordingly, it was not a document that the decision-maker was bound to 
consider in deciding whether or not Mr Teoh should be deported. He thought 
that since Mr Teoh had no knowledge of the treaty, and had not been given any 
undertakings that it would apply, it would be “strange, almost comic”, to have to 
tell him that the Convention would not be applied. 132 As for the characterisation 
of the act of ratification, in contrast to the majority McHugh J said that it 
amounted solely to a statement to the international community -  a statement, 
moreover, that Australia intends to fulfil its obligations. It was not a
representation that Australia would be in compliance with the treaty’s provisions 
forthwith upon signature. 133
His Honour also said that even if he were wrong, and that ratification 
could in the abstract give rise to a legitimate expectation, there were in this case 
clear policy guidelines which would have displaced the expectation. Finally, he 
said that apart from anything else, this was not an action concerning children.
132 183 CLR, at 314.
133 As an aside, in Simsek v MacPhee, Stephen J referred to a different impact upon our relations 
with other nations that emphasis on treaties by the courts could have:
It may be observed in passing that to seek to apply anything like the full 
content of the maxim audi alteram partem to cases before the Committee, 
which may have to consider a wide range of confidential information about 
conditions overseas and whose conclusions might, if made public, affect good 
relations with other countries, might well stultify its operations and would not
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Even if it did have some sort of status in Australian law, the Convention would
not be applicable on these facts. The decision to deport Teoh would have 
consequences for the children, to be sure, but it was an action concerning 
deportation of an undesirable alien. He said that if the majority’s interpretation 
were to hold, then anything which touched upon children -  sentencing of 
criminals, a decision to put someone in bankruptcy -  would have to comply with 
the treaty.134
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND THE NEW HIGH 
COURT
The High Court's most recent judgment involving the question of 
legitimate expectations came in October of 1998, in Sanders v Snell.135 What 
makes this case especially interesting is that it was the first of the cases heard by 
the “new” Court. Only Gaudron J was left of the judges who heard the major 
legitimate expectation cases of the 1980s and early 90s. Sanders v Snell did not 
involve the question of a lack of expectation, so the status of Teoh itself cannot 
be commented on, but the judgments did indicate a sensitivity to the criticism 
about the legitimate expectation cases that McHugh J had offered in Teoh. 
Nevertheless, the case suggests that the law as established in the 1980s and 90s
serve the best interests of applicants whose cases come before it (148 CLR, at 
644).
134 Though despite McHugh J’s pessimistic prognosis, McMillan and Williams have noted that 
there has been “a limited appearance of Teoh in litigation” (supra n 120, at 88, n 133). Cases in 
which Teoh has been considered by the Federal Court include Browne v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 566 (29 May 1998), Lam v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 154 (4 March 1998), Vaitaiki v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 150 ALD 608, and Department o f Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Ram (1996) 41 ALD 517.
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cases will continue to be the yardstick against which the obligation to accord 
natural justice will be determined.
Sanders v Snell involved the question of the lawfulness of the termination 
of the employment of the Executive Officer of the Norfolk Island Tourist Bureau 
by one of the Ministers in the Norfolk Island Government. In fact, for the most 
part the judgment concerns the torts of inducing breach of contract and 
misfeasance in public office. The facts were that the Executive Officer had a 
contract of employment with the Norfolk Island Tourist Bureau which provided 
that the contract could be tenninated either on the misconduct of the Executive 
Officer, or with two months’ notice. Section 15 of the Norfolk Island 
Government Tourist Bureau Act 1980 (NI), however, provided that the Minister 
could give the Tourist Bureau binding directions “as to the conduct of the 
business or affairs of the Bureau”.
For reasons which were not exactly clear from the record (but which 
clearly involved some personal mistrust), the Minister gave directions to the 
Bureau to sack the Executive Officer. When the Bureau refused, the Minister 
dissolved the Bureau and appointed a new one which proceeded to carry out the 
directions. Significantly, one of the reasons that the original Bureau refused to 
act was that the chairman was of the view that the Minister should first have 
given the Executive Officer a hearing. The Bureau’s letter of refusal said that “it 
would seem contrary to natural justice to do such a thing without giving the
135 (1998) 157 ALR491.
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Executive Officer an opportunity to hear what he is accused of, and to give his 
side of the story” . 13(1 The evidence was that another member of the government 
had also advised the Minister that natural justice was required, but the Minister 
was steadfast in his desire to get rid of the Executive Officer.
The Full Court of the Federal Court held that in the circumstances, the 
Minister was among other things liable to the Executive Officer for the tort of 
misfeasance in public office. 137 The High Court held that no evidence had been 
led which would have supported this conclusion and it remitted the matter back 
to the trial judge. But for present purposes, what is of interest is what the Court 
had to say about the natural justice aspects of the case.
The majority138 accepted that the tort of misfeasance in public office 
could extend to acts that are invalid for want of procedural fairness. 139 The 
question, therefore, was whether natural justice extended to the Minister's 
making of the direction to the Tourist Bureau. The majority said that it did. 
This was, they said, a “livelihood” case -  just like Banks v Transport Regulation 
Board and FAI Insurances v Winneke. In a small place like Norfolk Island, there 
were, moreover, reputational aspects which would accompany a sacking. But 
their Honours said that in the circumstances, the Executive Officer also had a
136 See 157 ALR, at 499.
137 (1997) 73 FCR 569 (rev’g in part Beaumont J, at first instance).
I3S Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ, Callinan J dissenting.
139 157 ALR, at 502. Though c/Brennan J in Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 
at 356 -  357, holding that not all actions that breach the requirements of natural justice constitute 
misfeasance in public office (referred to, 157 ALR, at 505 -  506).
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legitimate expectation:
In this case [the Executive Officer] had an expectation that his 
contract of employment would continue until the members of the 
Bureau resolved (for whatever reason) to give notice of its 
termination or [misconduct had been established]. The direction 
that [the Minister] sought to give to the Bureau would defeat that 
expectation.140
Therefore, the Court held, the power to give directions under the Norfolk 
Island Government Tourist Bureau Act was “a power that should be read as 
requiring the giving of procedural fairness to those whose rights or legitimate
expectations are affected by its exercise”.141
THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION AND AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC LAW
So what is one to make of these cases -  of the line now stretching more 
than twenty years, from Heatley in 1976, to Sanders v Snell in 1998? The 
picture that emerges from them is a mixed one; one of tremendous dynamism 
and change, yet of constancy at the same time. The change is obvious enough: 
the obligation to observe natural justice now extends far further than it ever has 
before -  possibly even, as Deane and McHugh JJ have suggested, presumptively 
to all governmental decision-making.142 So insofar as we are contrasting the 
formulation of the doctrine of natural justice as it is understood in Australia
140 157 ALR, at 504.
141 157 ALR, at 505. Callinan J took quite a different view. He did not think that there was 
anything in the Minister's conduct to give rise to an expectation on the part of the Executive 
Officer that he would receive a hearing (157 ALR, at 508).
142 See Haoucher 169 CLR, at 653 {per Deane J) and Teoh 183 CLR, at 311 (per McHugh J).
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today with that as it was understood up until the 1970s, it is clear that the 
landscape has been completely re-cast. No longer is the obligation to observe 
natural justice focussed on the identity or the function of the decision-maker. 
The question is now one of effect: whether a governmental decision has the 
effect of interfering with “rights, interests or legitimate expectations”.143
A Reactionary Doctrine
But, perhaps paradoxically, the constancy lies in the same thing which 
has been responsible for the doctrine’s broadening: its formulation. The sort of 
effect-based trigger for natural justice that came to be enunciated by the High 
Court in the legitimate expectation cases is the same as the trigger in the older 
cases, when it was said that a decision which affected property rights was 
deemed to be judicial in character. In chapter four, the extent to which in the 
1950s natural justice in this country remained in an un-theorised state was 
discussed. The picture that emerges from the 1970s, 80s and 90s cases is, in a 
theoretical sense, much the same -  one of a doctrine that is in many respects 
essentially reactionary in form. The High Court has come to phrase the trigger 
for natural justice so broadly that, without some limitation, it is dramatically 
overinclusive. The problem is that the limitation: legitimate expectations v “mere 
hopes”, has been phrased in a way that is incapable of precision in application.
I4? This formulation is an often-used one. It was first cast by Mason J in Kioa (see 159 CLR, at 
584).
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Inconsistency in Application
In fact, the legitimate expectation cases throw up a series of theoretical 
issues. One is the seeming inconsistency in application of the enunciated test. 
Consider, for instance, the decision in O ’Shea. To apply the criteria used in 
previous cases, the Governor of South Australia had by his past conduct -  having 
granted release in all the previous instances upon receiving a recommendation 
from the Parole Board -  engendered an expectation of release that was no less 
solid in its foundation that that which was found to have existed in FAI 
Insurances v Winneke. And unlike in Haoucher, the asserted basis for the 
legitimacy of the expectation in O ’Shea was not merely a government policy but 
an Act of Parliament.
Now, common sense would suggest, as the majority said, that the 
ultimate decision to release in cases of this nature must of course also depend 
upon an assessment of the public interest. The public interest would always, one 
would intuitively assume, be deemed to be a relevant consideration concerning 
decisions to release. This was the knowledge imputed to O’Shea by Wilson and 
Toohey JJ. As they said, a person in O’Shea’s shoes “must be taken to know 
that the Act committed to the Governor, with the advice and consent of the 
Executive Council, the responsibility for determining where the public interest 
lay.”144 But the critical point is that the Act did not say this. The statutory 
provision in question, sub-section 77a(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act,
144 163 CLR, at 402.
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made no reference whatever to the Governor’s decision being based on the 
public interest. On the contrary, the expressed criterion was purely 
individualistic: an offender’s fitness to be at liberty. And as for an imputation of 
legislative intent, the past practice within the government in these instances 
would seem to militate against it.
Similar criticisms can be made of Mason CJ’s assertion that “viewed in 
its entirety” one could conclude that O’Shea had been accorded natural justice. 
Essential to this claim was the observation that he had had the chance before the 
Parole Board to make representations regarding the public interest. The record 
was unclear on this (which, presumably, ought to have raised an evidentiary 
concern), but if Wilson and Toohey JJ were right in saying that the activities of 
the Governor in Council fulfilled a different role from those of the Parole Board, 
then the Chief Justice's claim loses much of its persuasiveness. The point is that 
if it is read according to the Court’s previously stated terms of the notion of 
legitimate expectations, one cannot help but be left with the feeling that the 
concept is one of extreme malleability according to the judicial view of the 
relative equities of the case at bar.
In a like way, one has difficulties squaring Mason CJ’s approach in Quin 
with his approach in FAI Insurances v Winneke, a case which, as Deane J 
noted,14" bore much similarity. There is no reason of principle, for instance, why 
the Victorian Governor's discretion to issue licences to sell insurance ought to
145 See his judgment in Quin, 170 CLR, at 46 -  47.
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have been any more limited than the discretion of the Governor of New South 
Wales to appoint magistrates. Moreover, in FAI Insurances v Winneke there had 
been at best been an expectation engendered by conduct. In Quin, the 
expectation had been engendered by an actual representation by someone in a 
position of authority.
The only way to reconcile the two judgments is to distinguish them either 
on the basis of subject-matter, or on the basis of relative deservedness of the two 
claimants. As to the former, one could alternatively say that licencing cases 
were different (which would have been correct in law146) or that judicial 
appointments cases were different (or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, 
exceptional). As to the latter, one could without raising many eyebrows say that 
Quin -  like O'Shea before him -  was not someone whose plight reeked of 
injustice. A claim like Quin’s -  that he had a right to judicial office without his 
fitness being considered on the merits -  would strike many people as absurd. 
Nor (because of its sheer novelty) was it the sort of claim that raised the spectre 
of rampant bureaucratic malevolence. 147
146 See supra n 29, and accompanying text.
14 There is also much to be critical of in the judgments in Haoucher. The analysis of Gaudron 
and Dawson JJ, in particular, seems curious when one considers it in a broader systemic light. 
Both judges were of the view that in the circumstances, the requirements of natural justice had 
been satisfied by the hearing before the AAT. But to arrive at this conclusion, they had to 
discount the value per se of an opportunity to speak. Yet, on any reading of the basis for natural 
justice, the opportunity provided by a hearing must have some intrinsic value: to ensure that the 
decision-maker has had the advantage of the fullest possible argument on the pros and cons of 
the proposed decision and to make the affected person feel that he or she has had their day in 
court. And while one understands the corresponding systemic value in decisional closure at 
some point, it reads jarringly to hear judges trained in the common law tradition of oral 
advocacy suggest that hearings can only serve a fact-finding purpose, and that the opportunity to 
convince a decision-maker through argument is of no real value.
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Brennan J ’s Inconsistency in Reasoning
At the same time, and notwithstanding his constancy in theme, Brennan 
J’s reasoning in these cases also revealed some inconsistency. In both Kioa v 
West and Quin, Brennan J held that legitimate expectations could be relevant 
insofar as the content of natural justice was concerned, but not so as to act as a 
trigger for the duty. But then, confusingly, he suggested that the trigger for 
natural justice ought to be allied with standing.I4N This approach contains within 
it two problems: first, it surely has the equation backwards. To say that if one 
has standing to challenge a decision, then natural justice is presumed to have 
been required in the course of making that decision, is to place the remedy before 
the right. Standing ought to follow natural justice, not the other way ’round.
Secondly, the law of standing is a creature of the common law, not the 
parliament.149 So, insofar as Brennan J was of the view that the obligation to 
observe natural justice stems from a judicial assessment of parliamentary intent, 
then it is puzzling that the yardstick could be the common law of standing. 
Locus standi is very much related to effect. So, too, is the matter of the content 
of natural justice. If one says that the content of natural justice is variable, one is 
making a statement about the relative deservedness of entitlements. When we 
say that the context of one decision is such that natural justice demands a formal 
hearing, but that the context of another only requires some sort of an opportunity
148 170 CLR, at 40 - 41. See, also, on this O ’Reilly v Macbnan [1983] 2 AC 237, at 275 (per 
Lord Diplock) and Forsyth, supra n 8, at 258 -  259.
149 For more on the law of standing as it was understood at the time of these cases, see M Allars, 
“Standing: The Role and Evolution of the Test” (1991) 20 Fed L Rev 83, especially at 97 - 101.
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to make written submissions, we are acknowledging a hierarchy of interests 
measured according to effect.
But this cuts undercuts Brennan J’s doctrinal premise, namely that the 
obligation to accord natural justice is determined by reference to parliament’s 
wishes rather than a citizen’s individual predicament. What is important, 
according to Brennan J’s conception, is what parliament either explicitly or 
impliedly had to say about the decision-making process. As he was to say, “the 
law governing the extent and exercise of a power exists independently of the 
circumstances which evoke its exercise” . 150
This was, he said, a matter of simple practical necessity: “a repository of 
power must know what the law requires for the valid exercise of the power 
before attempting its exercise” . 1" 1 But when, as in Kioa and Quin, he also said 
that the content of natural justice is variable, or that legitimate expectations 
could have a bearing on the doctrine’s content, he was acknowledging that the 
impact on the individual is important. And integral to an assessment of the 
impact of a decision on an individual must be some view as to the individual’s 
subjective feelings about the decision. By allowing that standing ought to drive 
the determination of what decision-making procedures were required (which was 
effectively what he was saying), Brennan J was laying his thesis on a shaky 
foundation.
150 Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596, at 604.
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The Lack of a Need for Actual Expectations
The decision in Teoh raises its own set of theoretical concerns. The most 
obvious, of course, is that which attracted most of McHugh J’s ire -  the holding 
that one need not have any real expectation at all to be deemed to have had a 
legitimate expectation in law. As a matter of simple linguistics, the suggestion 
seems a non sequitur. Moreover, it also seems contrary to the position that 
Mason CJ had taken in Quin. There, Mason CJ referred to the suggestion by the 
Privy Council in Ng Yuen Shiu that legitimate expectations are intended to 
further a governmental duty of good administration. 152 True as this might be, he 
said, “the content of [the duty of good administration] is still defined by 
reference to the claimant’s legitimate expectation. In the absence of such an 
expectation, there is no corresponding duty to accord fairness. ” 153
Yet, having said all of this, the significance of the holdings in these cases 
cannot be denied. They make it clear that the doctrine of natural justice is a 
vibrant one in Australia today. The focus of the next chapter will be to examine 
another aspect of this vibrancy: the means by which the doctrine’s compass has 
been extended to cover the activities of governmental actors who for much of our 
legal history, were assumed to be not amenable either to the imposition of 
natural justice requirements, or to judicial review more generally.
151 Ibid.
152 See [1983] 2 AC, at 638.
153 170 CLR, at 2 0 -2 1 .
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SIX
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CROWN
A longside the expansion of the scope of natural justice through the use of 
A ahe legitimate expectation, one of the most interesting developments in 
Australian public law in the 1980s was the assertion by the High Court of a 
general right to engage in review of decisions made by the Crown itself, as 
distinct from decisions made by the Crown’s servants. But this was not an 
Australian development alone. In a series of cases decided within a few years of 
one another, the High Court of Australia, the House of Lords and the Supreme 
Court of Canada were all driven to the same conclusion: that as a matter of logic, 
the Queen as Sovereign should be no more immune from judicial review than 
should be those who administer the state on her behalf.
Yet what makes this development so especially striking in the Australian 
context is not so much the coincidence of logic, as the boldness with which the 
assertion came to be made. For the fact is that the way in which the scope of 
reviewability is now stated makes it clear that in this country, there are now few, 
if any, governmental decisions which can be said to be non-reviewable per se.] 
It also makes it clear that the courts will also reserve the right to impose general
1 Emphasis here is placed on “per se". Statutory codes for review often exclude categories of 
cases. The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), for example, formally 
excludes from statutory review decisions of the Governor-General (sub-s 3(1)).
Standards of fairness upon the Crown as it goes about its business.2 * The aim of 
this chapter is to explore these cases, and to place them alongside the legitimate 
expectation cases discussed in the last chapter. What emerges is a picture of a 
judiciary which is sceptical about the ability of the political process to exercise 
any self-control over abuse of procedure and which, as a consequence, has been 
continuing to expand its own role in imposing procedural obligations on the 
government.
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY
At the outset, it is worthwhile to acknowledge that it is incorrect to think 
that the idea of a real Crown immunity, broadly construed, has ever been a 
feature of public law in the common law system. “’The King can do no wrong”, 
Blackstone famously wrote.2 The simple fact is that as a statement of law -  even 
taken historically -  this is highly misleading. It was, and remains, the law that 
the Sovereign may not be sued in her personal capacity.4 But implicit in the very 
expression “public law” is the notion that the courts have the right to pronounce
2 It should be stated that defining “the Crown” is something not without difficulty -  especially in 
the case of what were once termed the Dominions. For the purposes of this thesis, the Crown is 
taken to include the Queen herself, together with her Privy Counsellors, as well as her 
representatives, together with their Executive or Privy Counsellors. For more on the question of 
the definition of the Crown in this context, see H V Evatt, The King and His Dominion 
Governors (1936), A B Keith, The King and the Imperial Crown (1936), E Forsey, The Royal 
Power o f Dissolution o f Parliament in the British Commonwealth (1943), J B Harper, “The 
Crown as the Source of Legal Powers in Australia” (1938) 1 Res Jud 310, and 8(2) Halsbury’s 
Laws o f England (4th ed), “Constitutional Law and Human Rights”, paragraphs 351 -  354.
1 Comm 245.
4 Warders and Commonality> o f Sadlers’ Case (1588) 4 Co Rep 54b, 76 ER 1012. See also 12(1) 
Halsbury’s Laws o f England (4th ed), paragraph 101.
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upon the lawfulness of action taken in the Crown’s name." As early as the 
thirteenth century Bracton said that the king had to be under the law for “it is the 
law that makes the king” .6 And, of course, central to Dicey’s vision of the rule 
of law, from which so much of our present-day public law doctrine is assumed to 
stem, is the notion that qua government, the Crown should be subject to the law 
just as much as any individual citizen. 7
Moreover, throughout history there have been several celebrated 
instances in which the courts have adjudicated upon matters going to the heart of 
the Crown’s authority. Importantly, a number of these date from the seventeenth 
century, during the period leading up to the Constitutional settlement, so can be 
considered “foundational” in terms of modem constitutional assumptions. The 
Case o f Prohibitions del Roy8 and the Case o f Proclamations’ are two of the 
better known of these."’ In the former case, the King’s Bench held (or, perhaps 
to put it more accurately, persuaded the King") that the Crown no longer had a
5 See Raleigh v Goschen [1898] 1 Ch 73.
6 Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem (“The 
king must not be under man but under God and the law, because it is the law that makes the 
king”) (De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (S Thome, ed 1968, vol 2, at 32). See also 
http://bracton.law.comell.edu/bracton/Common/index.html
7 The Law o f the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), at 189. On the question of Cabinet members being 
personally liable for their activities, see Wilkes v Lord Halifax (1769) 14 St Tr 1406 and Re M 
[1994] 1 AC 377.
8 (1608) 12 Co Rep 63, 77 ER 1342.
9 (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 1352.
10 Others, lesser-known, include the Case of Dispensing Power (1607) 12 Co Rep 18, 77 ER 
1300, the Case o f Customs, Subsidies, and Impositions (1608) 12 Co Rep 33, 77 ER 1314, the 
Case o f Pardons (1610) 12 Co Rep 30, 77 ER 1311, and the Case o f Commendams (Colt & 
Glover v Bishop o f Coventry) (1616) Hob 140, 80 ER 290.
11 In his report of the case, Coke merely said that the King was “greatly offended” at Coke’s 
position (77 ER, at 1343), but another witness offered a rather fuller narration of the event. Sir 
Roger Boswell said that after Coke’s statement that the King had no right to involve himself in 
the proceedings, “His Majestie fell into that high indignation as the like was never knowne in 
him, looking and speaking fiercely with bended fist, offering to strike him, etc, which the lord
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prerogative right to take an active part in the business of curial adjudication. 
And in the latter, it held that the Crown no longer had the right to create crimes 
through the prerogative. The right to do so lay solely with parliament. In the 
course of this holding, Coke CJ said that “the king hath no prerogative, but that 
which the law of the land allows him” . 12
But equally, it is a fact that this royal impleadability was never an open- 
ended one. The hyperbole and boldness of cases like the Case o f Prohibitions 
and the Case o f Proclamations can in large measure be attributed to the tumult of 
the times in which they were decided. The courts throughout history have 
generally displayed a decided reluctance to intrude upon what one might crudely 
term “affairs of state”. In his Commentaries, Blackstone described the position 
of the Crown exercising its prerogatives as “irresistible and absolute” . 12 After 
the constitutional settlement, and particularly after the idea of cabinet 
government began to take shape, Blackstone’s formulation came to represent a 
common law code for saying that the courts ought not to question the 
government of the day on matters of policy or political judgment.
In the Australian setting, Blackstone’s admonition was accepted as a 
constitutional principle from the beginning. In no less than four instances in the 
first fifty years of the Commonwealth’s existence, the High Court indicated an 
unwillingness to probe into what might broadly be described as “counsels of the
Cooke [s/c] perceiving fell flatt on all fower” (quoted in Sir W Holdsworth, A History o f English 
Law Vol 5 (2nd ed, 1937), at 430-431).
12 12 Co Rep, at 76, 77 ER, at 1354.
13 1 Comm 251.
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Crown. ” 14 As Isaacs and Powers JJ put it in one of these cases, the accepted 
legal position was that it was “not open to impute malafides with respect to the 
issue of a royal proclamation, which is the act of the King himself or his 
representatives.” 15
The reasons for this reluctance are ones not difficult to appreciate. The 
courts suffer from a number of distinct instrumental disadvantages when it 
comes to assessing affairs of state. For one thing, even though it happens 
frequently that former politicians are appointed to judicial office (though this 
today is not as common in the High Court as it once was), in institutional terms, 
the courts lack political expertise. Their decisions often have political 
ramifications -  of that there can be no doubt -  but in arriving at their decisions 
judges employ legal rather than political reasoning. Of course, to put it this way 
is to invite criticism about attempting to draw a line between “law” and “policy”. 
It is conceded that no such line can be drawn -  most public law cases do have 
political ramifications. But it must equally be conceded that at a basic level, 
judges and politicians employ different evaluative criteria in their work.
Related to this is the fact that almost always, judges will be at a 
significant disadvantage when it comes to having enough information at hand to 
properly evaluate decisions involving governmental policy. Rules of evidence, it
14 Duncan v Theodore (1917) 25 CLR 510, James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386, Victoria 
Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Ptv Ltd v Dignan (“Dignan’s Case") (1931) 46 CLR 
73, and Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. The expression 
“counsels of the Crown” is taken from the judgment of Dixon J in the latter case (83 CLR, at 
179).
15 Duncan v Theodore 25 CLR, at 525 - 526.
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will be remembered, are designed to keep information away from courts. So the 
practical ability of judges to grapple with policy-laden affairs of state is doubly- 
hampered by their institutional isolation from other parts of government. 
Though this isolation has been viewed as a principle of foundational law only 
since the constitutional settlement, it in fact has its roots in the very beginning of 
the common law system, when a corps of full-time professional judges, 
functionally separate from the King’s other advisors, came to exist. 16 In modem 
Australian terms, of course, this structural disability has been formally 
entrenched in Chapter III of the Constitution, and given life by various decisions 
of the High Court. 17
A third disadvantage suffered by the courts with respect to passing 
judgment on affairs of state is of rather more recent origin. That is a systemic 
concern -  the concern that the courts do not enjoy any sort of popular mandate 
for their work. To put it in contemporary terms, the courts suffer from a 
“democratic deficit”. This has only been real a consideration since the reform 
movements of the nineteenth century. But since then, the notion of popular 
sovereignty has emerged as another foundational element of the political order. 18
16 On the foundation of the judiciary, see, generally, J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History (3rd ed, 1990), chapters 2 and 3, S F C Milsom, The Historical Foundations o f the 
Common Law (2nd ed, 1981), chapter 1, T F T Plucknett, A Concise History o f the Common Law 
(5th ed, 1956), chapter 2, Sir V Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed, rev, 1957), and Sir 
W Holdsworth, A History o f English Law, Vol 1, chapter 3 (7th ed, 1956).
17 Especially, the Boilermakers’ Case (A-G Commonwealth v R [1957] AC 288, aff g R v Kirby, 
Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society o f Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254) and Brandy v Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245. See also R v Spicer, Ex parte 
Australian Builders Labourers’ Federation (1957) 100 CLR 227, at 289, 310. For a scholarly 
discussion of the separation of powers in Australia, see F Wheeler, “The Separation of Federal 
Judicial Power: A Purposive Analysis” (unpublished PhD thesis, ANU, 1999).
18 This view -  that government in Australia represents an act of agency on behalf of the 
sovereign people -  is one that was enunciated several times by the High Court in the 1980s and
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Indeed, in the eyes of many nowadays, the notion of an electoral mandate has 
become perhaps the most critical determinative of political authority of all.'1' 
Most of the criticism that one hears of the courts today in Australia has at base 
this view. In particular, the claims that one often heard in the early 1990s, after 
judgments like Mabo20 and WUc1 and the Political Free Speech22 cases -  that the 
High Court was overstepping its bounds by “making law”23 -  only make sense if 
one subscribes to the view that the authority to effect social change must stem 
from prior approval by the electorate.
Even in the eyes of those who may not subscribe to the vulgar sort of 
criticism of the judiciary that one heard sometimes voiced in Australia in the 
early 1990s, the relationship between electoral mandate and policy formation is 
now so unconsciously entrenched that today, the expression “rule of law” has 
unconsciously become a de facto synonym for populist democracy. The older
90s. In Australian Capital Television v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, at 137, for 
example, Mason CJ said:
The very concept of representative government and representative democracy 
signifies government by the people through their representatives. Translated 
into constitutional terms, it denotes that the sovereign power which resides in 
the people is exercised on their behalf by their representatives.
See also R v Duncan, Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Ptv Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 535, at 589 
(per Deane J), University o f Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, at 477 {per Deane J), 
Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, at 484 (per Deane and Toohey JJ), Nationwide 
News Ptv Ltd Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, at 72 {per Deane and Toohey JJ) and Theophonous v 
Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, at 180 {per Deane J). Also see J Williams, 
“The Protection of Rights Under the Australian Constitution: A Republican Analysis” 
(unpublished ANU PhD thesis, 1997), chapter 10.
10 Witness, for example, the terms of the current debate over the republic in Australia and reform 
of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. In both cases, there is a sizeable view that 
whatever may take the place of the current institution, it must enjoy some form of electoral 
sanction.
20 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
21 Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.
22 Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, Nationwide News Pty 
Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 
520.
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notion of the rule of law equating with the systemisation or regularisation of 
state power is now often forgotten.24 Indeed, many people would undoubtedly 
be horrified to learn that when Bagehot wrote the first edition of The English 
Constitution,2' the franchise was held by only about a third of the adult 
population in England!26
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE TENSION IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Taken together, these structural disabilities constitute a substantive basis 
for the doctrine of the separation of powers. Just as politicians are not thought to 
have the opportunity for deliberative repose that judges do, or their freedom from 
the tyranny of the ballot box, and hence are not deemed institutionally 
appropriate to sit in judgment in courts of law, so are courts thought in principle 
to be institutionally incompetent to sit in day-to-day government. As Sir 
Anthony Mason once put it, “courts are ill-equipped to review policy.”21 In this 
respect, the expression “separation of powers” need not be merely a theoretical 
formula for safeguarding liberty through checks and balances. It can also 
represent a practical formulation for the division of governmental labour.
23 See, eg, the references of Sir Anthony Mason in “The Importance of Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual Rights” (1994) 1 AJHR 1, at 10.
24 On this older meaning in the Australian context, see I Holloway, “Sir Francis Forbes and the 
Earliest Australian Public Law Cases” (unpublished, 1998).
25 (1867).
26 W R Cornish and G de N Clark, Law and Society in England 1750 -  1950 (1989), at 82.
27 “The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual 
Rights”, supra n 23, at 10.
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But juxtaposed against this statement of constitutional principle cum 
formula for task allocation, is the deeply-felt sense of duty held by most judges -  
which in fact long pre-dates both Dicey and the constitutional settlement -  to do 
justice in individual cases. It is fashionable in some circles to attribute to the 
judiciary an ignorance of the concerns of the non-white, non-middle class world. 
Yet, however apt this may or may not be with respect to particular judges, there 
is within the judiciary as an entity an institutional sensitivity to individual 
injustice which is rooted in a common law tradition stretching back several 
centuries. It is this, more than anything, which gives rise to tension in the field 
of administrative law. On one hand, governments today are organised in such a 
way that the frequent exercise of discretion is not only a good thing, but a 
necessary thing. On the other, the common law courts hold a deep institutional 
suspicion of arbitrariness -  and arbitrariness is but a small, subjectively-viewed, 
step from the exercise of broad discretion.
The theory of administrative law, of course, is that judges are not 
concerned with the justness of individual decisions. As Lord Brightman once 
put it, “[jjudicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the 
decision-making process” .28 But to state it this way is to take a view of judicial 
office that is blinded from reality. Lord Denning once captured the reality (in 
characteristically colourful terms) when he said that “the judgments of Her 
Majesty’s judges are the judgements of the Queen herself’. Speaking of the 
coronation oath, in which the Sovereign vows that she will “cause law and
28 Chief Constable o f  North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155, at 1173.
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justice, in mercy, to be executed,” he said that judges must accordingly, 
“execute, not law alone, but ‘law and justice’: and they must do so ‘in mercy’” .29
Now, Lord Denning may have been given to a rhetorical flourish which 
few judges today would feel comfortable emulating, but he encapsulated well the 
sense of social responsibility that many members of the judiciary feel attaches to 
their office. The point is that when an individual comes before a court and can 
show that he or she has suffered some sort of ill-treatment at the hands of 
another, there are few judges who will not feel some compulsion to try to 
provide some redress. As T R S Allan has reminded us, equity is as important an 
element of the common law system as formal legality.30 The question, therefore, 
is where the political process should end and the legal process should begin. At 
what stage ought the judges -  with their built-in institutional naievite and their 
democratic deficit -  to feel justified in engaging in critical oversight of the 
development and implementation of value choices by the political branches of 
government.
This is, of course, the basic question of administrative law realpolitik. In 
principle, of course, judges should never feel comfortable in this task. At least 
no judge who subscribes to the theory of supremacy of parliament should feel 
comfortable in this task. Lord Greene, for example, was being faithful to a 
Diceyan view of the constitution when he said that “[t]he judiciary is not 
concerned with policy. It is not for the judiciary to decide what is in the public
29 Gems in Ermine (1964), at 14.
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interest. These are the tasks of the legislature which is put there for the 
purpose. ” 31 But the first lesson of administrative law must be that, the 
constitutional principle of supremacy of parliament is at best honoured in the 
breach. Given the modem style of legislative drafting, in which the tendency is 
to vest administrative decision-makers with broad discretion, administrative law 
would be a niche field -  much like admiralty or ecclesiastical law, perhaps -  if 
the courts really did acknowledge parliamentary commands as being statements 
of paramount law. That it is not -  that, as the Law Institute of Victoria once put 
it, administrative law has been the Australian legal profession’s “sunrise 
industry” 32 -  is proof positive of the fact that the courts are not always loyal to 
legislative text.
Natural justice cases provide us with a better vantage point than most 
with which to view the tensions at play in administrative law. That is because 
even though judgments in them are phrased, as all administrative law cases, in 
terms of lawfulness and vires and lack of authority to dictate substantive 
outcome, the doctrine of natural justice is, as we have seen in the preceding 
chapters, concerned by its very essence with judicial perceptions of fairness, 
equity and substantive deservedness. It is, in other words, concerned with 
exactly the same sorts of things of which Lord Denning spoke so romantically in 
his description of the judicial function. So the critical question is, where does
30 See Law, Liberty and Justice (1993), at 28 -  32.
31 “Law and Progress”, 13th Haldane Memorial Lecture (1944), at 11.
32 “Seminar in Print, Administrative Law: The Profession’s Sunrise Industry?” (1984) 58 Law 
7/W/7784.
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politics end and law begin? At what point in the decisional spectrum do the 
courts assume a right to dictate procedural obligations to administrators?
FUNCTIONAL IDENTITY, DICEYISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW
As has been discussed, it seemed at one time that the dividing line 
between justiciable and non-justiciable cases could be drawn by reference to the 
functional identity of the actor. If the decision-maker in question was chosen by 
parliament to be a Minister, or a public servant, or a tribunal, then judicial 
review was available.33 This was in keeping with the Diceyist views both that no 
person was above the law, and that the Queen in Parliament was supreme in 
stating the law. Judicial review in these cases would be carried out under the 
guise of an (unstated) direction by parliament to the courts to police the bounds 
of jurisdiction, so as to ensure that no member of the executive usurped authority 
that had not been given to him. On this view, judicial review -  and, 
consequently, the supervising judiciary -  had a modest role in the constitutional 
scheme of things. Judicial review was not itself a free-standing principle of 
public law, but was rather a corollary of other free-standing principles:
33 See, eg, Arthur Yates & Co Pty Ltd v Vegetable Seeds Committee (1945) 72 CLR 37, 
Television Corporation v The Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 59 and Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1. See also Padfield v Minister for Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries [1968] AC 997, Secretary; of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan 
Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain 
[1967] 2 QB 864, Congreve v Home Office [1976] 1 QB 629, Laker Airways v Department o f 
Transport [1977] 1 QB 643.
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parliamentary supremacy and the separation of powers. The trigger for judicial
intervention was the violation of one of these. 34
On the other hand, if decision-making authority was vested in the 
Sovereign herself, or in the Governor-General or in the Cabinet, it was taken as 
an indication that the subject-matter of the decision-making process was not 
appropriate for review in non-political fora. If parliament had chosen to vest 
decision-making authority in the Sovereign or the Cabinet, this could be taken as 
a parliamentary signal that the decisions were truly “political” and should be 
immune from judicial review. As John Willis succinctly put it, “the form is the 
Minister, the substance is the civil service; the form is the Governor in Council, 
the substance is the cabinet.”3'’ Murphy J was making the same point when he 
said that “[wjhen parliament authorises the [Governor in Council] to make a 
decision it is because parliament considers the decision warrants a political 
determination. ” 36 A Canadian judge once put it similarly: the vesting of 
decision-making authority in the Crown itself shows “the judgment of 
parliament that this is an area inordinately sensitive to changing public policies 
and hence it has been reserved for the final application of such a policy by the 
executive branch of government” .37
34 In Australia, this of course has a formal constitutional dimension. See Bank o f New South 
Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, at 363 {per Dixon J). See, also, R v Coldham, Ex 
parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 and O ’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd 
(1991) 171 CLR 232.
35 “Case Comment” (1951) 29 Can Bar Rev 296, at 301.
36 FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, at 374. See also Namatjira v Raabe 
(1959) 100 CLR 664, at 669.
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At the same time, if the decision-making authority in issue derived not 
from legislation but from the royal prerogative then (Sir Edward Coke’s views in 
the Case o f Proclamations notwithstanding) the jurisdictional basis for judicial 
review was not thought to be secure. In part, this was because in the limited 
form in which it has existed since the constitutional settlement, the prerogative 
reeks of policy judgment, something which the courts have seldom felt 
comfortable openly to question. It was in this latter sense that Isaacs and Powers 
JJ said in Duncan v Theodore that it was not open to impute mala fides with 
respect to the issue of royal proclamations, which they described as “the act of 
the King himself or his representatives” .78 And it was in the same vein that the 
Privy Council once said that “[tjhose who are responsible for the national 
security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires. ” 79
THE LIMITATIONS ON IDENTITY AS AN INSULATING 
CLOAK
But there always were limitations to this “determination by 
identification” rule. It was clear, for instance, that it did not apply to insulate 
governmental action before it actually reached the Crown.40 Similarly, it has 
been long-held that the courts have the right to review subordinate legislation for
37 Attornev-General o f Canada v Inuit Tapirisat o f Canada [1980] 2 SCR 735, at 756 (per Estey 
J).
38 23 CLR, at 525 - 526. See also R vArndel (1906) 3 CLR 557, at 572 (per Griffiths CJ).
39 The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, at 107.
30 In Brettingham-Moore v St Leonards Municipality (1969) 121 CLR 509, the High Court held 
that in principle, a hearing could be compelled in the process of gathering information for the 
purpose of preparing a report for the Governor, which he would use as the basis of an exercise of 
discretion.
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vires, notwithstanding that it had been made by the Governor in Council.41 
Judicial review could also take place, the Privy Council once said, if bad faith 
could be shown on the part of the Crown in making a regulation.42 And in 
Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, the House of Lords held that the 
courts could properly enquire whether a prerogative, in fact, existed.42 In New 
Zealand, the courts have phrased the right of review of Crown action very 
broadly. Not only do they have the right to examine the correctness of any legal 
determination made by the Governor-General of New Zealand, but they can 
“always inquire, in any case, whether the Governor-General (or the Minister as 
the case may be) could reasonably have formed any opinion, on law or on fact, 
which is set up as the foundation of [a] regulation. ” 44 Likewise, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal once held that when the Governor in Council was exercising a 
statutory power, “such a statutory power can be validly exercised only by 
complying with statutory provisions which are, by law, conditions precedent to 
the exercise of the power” .45
This sort of scepticism about mere identity as an insulating cloak was 
also apparent in cases like Sankey v Whitlam46 and Conway v Rimmer.41 As
41 See, eg, Young v Tockassie (1905) 2 CLR 470, Bishop v MacFarlane (1909) 9 CLR 370, 
Commonwealth v Progress Advertising and Press Agency Co (1910) 10 CLR 457, Broadcasting 
Company o f Australia v Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 52 and Shanahan v Scott (1957) 96 
CLR 245.
42 Attorney-General (Canada) v Hallett and Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427, at 444.
43 [1920] AC 508 (though their Lordships then said that if the prerogative were shown to exist, 
that would be the end of the matter).
44 Reade v Smith [1959] NZLR 996, at 1000.
45 Border Cities Press Club v Attorney-General for Ontario [1953] 1 DLR 404, at 412 (per 
Pickup CJO). See, also, Re Davisville Investment Co Ltd and City o f Toronto (1977) 15 OR (2d) 
553 (CA) and Re Doctors Hospital and Minister o f Health (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 220 (Ont HC). 
See also Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries [1968] AC 997.
46 (1978) 142 CLR 1.
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Gibbs CJ said in Sankey v Whitlam, “[i]t is in all cases the duty of the court, and 
not the privilege of the executive government to decide whether a document will 
be produced or may be withheld”.48 But when the courts indicated a willingness 
to reserve their right to judge claims of secrecy made by the Crown,44 it was but 
a small step to an assertion of a more general right of review. For that matter, 
Banks v Transport Regulation Board50 was itself a case in which the interests of 
the Governor came into play. It was only with some curial footwork that 
Barwick CJ was able to characterise the case as a reviewable one. There, the 
decision to revoke Banks’s taxi licence had been affirmed by the Governor in 
Council. The Chief Justice’s approach was to say that since the initial decision 
to revoke was void for being ultra vires, the affirmation by the Crown could 
have had no legal effect."1
In fact, though, the real change came in the 1980s, as the High Court was 
working its way through the legitimate expectation cases that were discussed in 
the last chapter, many of which involved decision-making at the highest levels of 
government."2 In the legitimate expectation cases, the High Court came to the 
view that it did not matter who the decision-maker was in determining whether 
natural justice applied to the decision-making process. What mattered was that
47 [1968] AC 910. Though see also the earlier case of Robinson v South Australia (No 2) [1931] 
AC 704, in which the Privy Council indicated willingness to look behind a claim of public 
interest privilege.
48 142 CLR, at 38.
49 Cf Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co [1942] AC 624. More generally on the question of Crown 
privilege, see Sir W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994), at 846 - 851.
50 (1968) 1 19 CLR 222. For a discussion of this case, see supra chapter 4, at 195 -  197.
51 See 119 CLR, at 240-242.
52 Eg, FAI Insurances v Winneke (Victorian Governor in Council), O ’Shea v South Australia 
(South Australian Governor in Council), Quin v A-G (NSW) (Attorney-General of New South
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the decision-maker was acting to affect the “rights, interests or legitimate 
expectations” of an individual, as an individual. If that was the case, then the 
courts would ordinarily impose an obligation to observe natural justice. Ex 
necessitate, the Court found itself compelled to broaden the reach of natural 
justice to cover decision-making processes by governmental actors who hitherto 
had been presumptively immune from judicial review. But this, of course, 
immediately gave rise to a further question: on what the basis, in lieu of identity, 
were law and politics to be distinguished?
NATURAL JUSTICE OR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?
In considering the developments of the late 1970s and 1980s, it is 
worthwhile to dwell for the moment on the more general observation that there 
has in recent years been a shift in not just the scope of natural justice, but also in 
its focus. As will be seen, this has been an essential part of its expansion to 
encompass the Crown.
Before the 1960s, the concern of natural justice was almost exclusively 
with the protection of formal legal or proprietary rights. But since Ridge v 
Baldwin and Banks, the courts have steadily worked to extend natural justice to 
attach to a whole range of non-proprietary interests. In chapter four, these were 
referred to as the “new property”, but many of them were really quite different in 
kind from property rights as these are understood in the common law. This
Wales), Kioa v West, Hcioucher v Minister for Immigration, Teoh v Minister for Immigration and
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could not help but have had a significant effect on the way in which judges 
viewed natural justice cases. Peter Cane once argued that the real effect of the 
recognition of expectations as a source of procedural obligations was that natural 
justice would come to be concerned more with human rights than with legal 
rights.''3 This is an intriguing point, and it will be returned to in the Conclusion. 
For now, though, it is perhaps more accurate to say that before the 1960s, natural 
justice cases were in many respects akin to disputes over rights in rem. But with 
the “new property” cases, and even more so with the legitimate expectation 
cases, the focal point of disputes over natural justice was increasingly no longer 
things tangible. Rather, the focus became the status of the individual affected by 
the governmental action. Natural justice cases became actions more fully in 
personam. It was this shift -  from a concern about the deprivation of property to 
a concern about relative status of citizen v state -  that had the consequence of 
acting as a liberating influence on the courts.
One of the ways in which this shift in focus became apparent was in an 
alteration in the terminology used by the courts to describe these cases. Instead 
of speaking about natural justice, with all of the accumulated historical nuances 
that that carried with it,54 judges began to speak instead of “procedural fairness”, 
and of a simple “duty to act fairly”. Thus far in this thesis, I have been using the 
expressions natural justice and procedural fairness more-or-less interchangeably.
Ethnic Affairs (Commonwealth Cabinet Minister).
53 “Natural Justice and Legitimate Expectations” (1980) 54 A U  546, at 547 -  548.
54 See supra Introduction, at 13 -  14.
294
But it is appropriate at this stage to look at them more closely, to see whether in
fact they mean the same thing.
Re H I f ' is the case which is generally considered to have introduced the 
notion of simple administrative “fairness” in this sense. The case dealt with the 
question of whether someone who was being refused entry into the United 
Kingdom had any right to natural justice. Lord Parker CJ said that
even if an immigration officer is not [acting] in a judicial or 
quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an 
opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the [legislation] 
and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate 
impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, 
as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, 
but of being required to act fairly.56
His Lordship then continued:
Good administration and an honest bona fide decision, as it seems 
to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one’s 
mind to bear on the problem, but of acting fairly; and to the 
limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, 
and within the legislative framework under which the 
administrator is working, only to that extent do the so-called rules 
of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a 
duty to act fairly. 57
Two things strike one about Lord Parker’s judgment in this case. First, 
he made specific reference to the link between fairness and the principles of 
good administration. This echoed the point that had made by Hamilton LJ in the
55 [1967] 2 QB 617.
56 [1967] 2 QB, at 630.
57 Ibid.
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Court of Appeal in Local Government Board v ArlidgeF Secondly, Lord Parker 
was ambiguous in his use of the two expressions “the so-called rules of natural 
justice” and “being required to act fairly”. Taken grammatically, these passages 
seem to say that the two were synonyms, and that the right to disabuse the 
immigration officer was what natural justice required in the circumstances. This 
was the view later taken by Lord Morris in Furnell v Whangerei Schools Board, 
when he said that “[njatural justice is but fairness writ large and juridically. It 
has been described as fair play in action.” '’9
Yet other judges seemed to feel that Lord Parker was suggesting 
something different; that natural justice was something which applied to a 
judicial or quasi-judicial actor, whereas procedural fairness was something 
which applied to everyone else.60 In Bates v Lord Hailsham, for example, 
Megarry J said: “in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural 
justice run, and ... in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty 
of fairness. ” 61 Similarly, Lord Pearson once said that while the obligation to 
observe natural justice only applied to judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, as 
regards entities entrusted with administrative or executive functions, “Parliament 
is not to be presumed to act unfairly”, and “the courts may in suitable cases 
(perhaps always) imply an obligation to act with fairness” .62
58 [1914] 1 KB 160, at 203 - 204. See supra chapter 2, at 8 4 -8 5 .
59 [1973] AC 660, at 679. See also Bushell v Environment Secretary [1981] AC 75, at 95 (per 
Lord Diplock).
60 See P Craig, Administrative Law (3rd ed, 1994), at 289 - 292.
61 [1972] 1 WLR 1373, at 1378 (though c f  his seeming views to the contrary in Mclnnes v 
Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520).
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In Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council, 63 Wooten J of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales indicated agreement with Lord Pearson’s view, 64 and 
said that natural justice should be preserved “with its traditional content”, as “a 
concept applicable to a certain class of function -  the traditional class containing 
virtually all judicial functions and many administrative functions to which it is 
appropriate.”6'' Other governmental functions, in contrast, should be “treated as 
subject to an implied condition that [they] be fairly exercised. ” 66 Laskin CJ, in 
the Supreme Court of Canada, once expressed much the same opinion.67 
Moreover, the oft-quoted statement of Lord Lorebum LC in Board o f Education 
v Rice -  that “everybody who decides anything” has a duty to “fairly listen to 
both sides” 68 -  was thought to support such a position.
For a time, there was a flurry of academic writing on the supposed 
differences between natural justice and procedural fairness. 66 In an important 
piece which came towards the tail end of it, Margaret Allars argued that the idea 
of a simple duty of procedural fairness -  which she saw in the High Court’s 
judgment in Kioa v West -  held the key to breathing real life back into the notion
62 Pearlberg v Vartv [1972] 1 WLR 534, at 547.
63 [1975] 2 NSWLR 446.
64 [1975] 2 NSWLR, at 472.
65 [1975] 2 NSWLR, at 470-471.
66 [1975] 2 NSWLR, at 471.
67 Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board o f Commissioners o f Police [1979] 1 SCR 
311, at 324-328.
68 [1911] AC 179, at 182. This case is discussed in depth supra chapter 2, at 83 -  88.
64 See, eg, J F Northey, “Pedantic or Semantic” [1974] N ZU  133, J F Northey, “The Aftermath 
of the Furnell Decision” (1974) 6 NZU L Rev 59, D J Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural 
Justice” (1975) 25 UTU  281, G D S Taylor, “Natural Justice -  the Modem Synthesis” (1975) 1 
Mon U L Rev 258, G D S Taylor, “Fairness and Natural Justice” (1977) 3 Mon U L Rev 191, M 
Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory” (1978) 28 
UTU  215, D J Mullan, “Natural Justice and Fairness -  Substantive as well as Procedural 
Standards for the Review of Administrative Decision-Making?” (1982) 27 McGill U  250.
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of procedural protection. She noted that in the United Kingdom, “the fluidity of 
the fairness principle [had] provided an opportunity for judges to recognise that 
in some circumstances practices followed and obligations incurred by 
administrators have a normative effect with legal consequences” . 70 Allars was 
quite correct to draw the link between the low-threshold idea of procedural 
fairness and the legitimate expectation cases. But the fluidity of which she 
wrote, and which was discussed in the last chapter, has been responsible as well 
for a general blurring of the demarcation between judicial (or quasi-judicial) and 
non-judicial decision-making that the distinction between natural justice and 
procedural fairness was thought to indicate.
In fact, what has happened in Australia is that procedural fairness and 
natural justice have become synonyms. In Forbes v New South Wales Trotting 
Club Ltd, for example, Murphy J drew on American terminology and said that 
“[njatural justice and fairness are different ways of expressing the concept or 
facets of the concept of due process” .71 In Twist v Randwick Municipal Council, 
Mason J also used the two as synonyms, 72 and in Salemi v MacKellar (No 2), 
Gibbs J denied that the two expressions represented different concepts. “Some 
judgments”, he said, “suggest that the duty to act fairly arises from a principle 
separate from, although analogous to, the principles of natural justice, but I 
would prefer to regard the duty to act fairly as simply flowing from the duty to
70 “Fairness: Writ Large or Small?” (1987) 11 Syd L Rev 306, at 309.
71 (1979) 143 CLR 242, at 276.
72 (1976) 136 CLR 106, at 112.
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observe the principles of natural justice.”' ' The point is that with the trigger for 
the duty now being expressed so broadly -  to include any infringement of an
“interest or legitimate expectation” -  there is no longer a need for a separate duty 
to attach to non-judicial actors. This, of course, was a critical element in 
extending the reach of natural justice to include the Crown.74
THE NEW RESPONDENTS
In 1969, Peter Hogg published in the Australian Law Journal an 
influential article entitled “Judicial Review of Action by the Crown 
Representative”.7" In it, he argued that to cast Crown immunity broadly to cover 
decisions made by the Governor in Council was antithetical to the rule of law. 
He said that it was
inconsistent with that fundamental characteristic of our 
constitution which Dicey described as the second element of the 
rule of law. This is the notion that no official, however eminent, 
has any powers other than those conferred upon him by statute or 
the prerogative; and no official act, however formal, is valid 
unless it is authorised by statute or the prerogative.76
73 (1977) 137 CLR 396, at 418 (internal citations omitted). On Gibbs J’s statements in this case, 
see Allars, “Fairness: Writ Large or Small?”, supra n 70, at 310.
74 Though there were some who pressed for the distinction to be maintained. See, eg, J F 
Northey, The Basis o f Judicial Review in Administrative Law (1981), at 7.
75 43 A U  215.
76 Id, at 220.
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Attorney-General (Canada) v Inuit Tapirisat of Canada
Hogg’s argument eventually came to be cited with approval by Sir Harry 
Gibbs,7 but the first of what one might perhaps call the “new respondent” cases 
which applied Hogg’s reasoning (though without citation) was actually a 
Canadian one (which also came later to be relied on by the High Court). This 
was the 1980 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Attorney-General 
(Canada) v Inuit Tapirisat of Canada,78 The case involved the question of 
whether natural justice applied to the process of setting long-distance telephone 
rates. The Inuit Tapirisat was a group which represented certain aboriginal 
Canadians. It claimed that it had been denied natural justice when the Governor- 
General of Canada in Council denied its request for a hearing to argue that a 
telephone rate increase was not warranted.
Inuit Tapirisat dealt only with the exercise of statutory power by the 
Crown, but on that point, the Canadian judges had no doubt that Dicey’s 
prescription about legal equality between the citizen and the government was 
applicable: “[T]he essence of the principle of law here operating”, said Estey J 
for the majority, “is simply that in the exercise of a statutory power the Governor 
in Council, like any other person or group of persons, must keep within the law 
as laid down by parliament or the legislature. Failure to do so will call into 
action the supervising function of the superior court ...”.79
1 R v Toohey, Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170, at 192.
78 [1980] 2 SCR 735.
79 [1980] 2 SCR, at 752.
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R v Toohey, Ex parte Northern Land Council
This same question was visited in Australia a year later in R v Toohey, Ex 
parte Northern Land Council.80 Though not a natural justice case, R v Toohey laid 
the jurisdictional groundwork for FAI Insurances v Winneke, and thus occupies 
an important place in the natural justice story. R v Toohey involved the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1975 (Cth), which gave the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs the power to establish land trusts, and to 
recommend to the Governor-General that Crown lands should be conveyed to 
these trusts to be held for the benefit of Aboriginal groups which could establish 
traditional ownership rights over the lands.81 Recognising the potential 
complexity of such issues, the scheme provided for by the Act was that a Land 
Commissioner was first to investigate claims made by Aboriginal groups, and 
then to file a report with the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in which he was to 
outline his findings of fact, and to indicate whether or not he recommended that 
a land grant be made.82
The starting point for R v Toohey was a claim made under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act for a large tract of wasteland on the Cox Peninsula, in the 
Northern Territory. The Cox Peninsula is separated from the city of Darwin by 
only about three and a half miles by sea but, as Gibbs CJ noted in his judgment, by
80 (1981) 151 CLR 170.
81 Sub-s 11(1).
82 Para 50(1 )(a).
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road the peninsula was really quite remote.83 Nevertheless, after it was learned that 
a land claim was to be made, Town Planning Regulations were made by the 
Northern Territory Government which effectively annexed to Darwin parcels of 
land in and around the Cox Peninsula. This, of course, would have made the land 
no longer “unalienated” and, hence, non-grantable to Aborigines. The annexed 
tracts amounted to approximately 1,680 square miles.84 This was extraordinary 
(and clearly suspicious) since Darwin’s population was only 50,000, and its pre- 
annexure size was 55 square miles.85 By the annexation, Darwin’s size would have 
increased by approximately three thousand per cent! The clear inference drawn 
from the circumstances, of course, was that the Northern Territory Government 
was simply attempting to forestall the vesting of title to any land near Darwin in 
Aboriginal hands.86
The litigation in the High Court actually involved a mandamus application 
-  to compel the Honourable John Toohey, later Toohey J of the High Court, but 
then a judge of the Federal Court and the Northern Land Commissioner, to issue a 
discovery order against the Northern Territory government. Toohey J thought that 
he did not have the right to compel discovery, in light of the fact that the decision
83 See 151 CLR, at 175.
84 4,350 square kilometres.
85 142 square kilometres.
86 When reading this case, it is interesting to look at the Darwin Regional Land Use Structure 
Plan 1990, drawn up when the litigation over the land claim on the Cox Peninsula was still on­
going. The Plan suggests that the reason that the Cox Peninsula needed to be annexed to Darwin 
was to cope with land demands when the population of Darwin reached one million (p 40), an 
extraordinary thing when one considers that at the time, the population was less than 75,000. As 
to the urgency of defeating the aboriginal land claim, the Plan said:
If granted, the effect of the claim would be transform this large publicly owned 
land asset into private (Aboriginal Freehold) land, the availability of which for 
urban use would be doubtful at best, as the unique title established by
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in question -  the decision to make the annexing regulation -  was one of the 
Territorial Administrator (who, for the purposes of the litigation, was assumed to 
be “the Crown”87). The precise legal issue to be decided by the High Court was set 
out by Stephen J: “does it make any difference in law that the relevant power was 
one exercised not by a Minister of the Crown but by the representative of the 
Crown on the advice of his Ministers? ” 88 In a word, the Court held that it did not.
In the view of Gibbs CJ, the case was one involving power conferred by 
statute, not one of Crown authority generally. In light of this, he concluded in 
much the same terms as had Estey J in Inuit Tapirisat and Hogg in his article: “It 
seems fundamental to the rule of law that the Crown has no more power than any 
subordinate official to enlarge by its own act the scope of a power that has been 
conferred on it by the Parliament . . . ” 89 In his approach, the question was one of the 
vires o f the regulations: “[I]f the Crown in Council makes a regulation which 
appears on its face to be made for a purpose that was not authorised by the statute 
under which it purports to be made, the regulation will be invalid.” 90
Mason J took a somewhat broader view. Unlike the Chief Justice, he did 
not restrict his comments to the exercise of discretion under statute, though he 
noted that it is generally much easier to review statutory discretions than
Commonwealth law denies even the Territory Government any powers of 
acquisition. (Ibid)
s On this, see also Namatjira v Raabe (1959) 100 CLR 664, at 669 (discussed, supra chapter 3, 
at 156 -  158), where the High Court described the Administrator as “the head of the 
government” of the Northern Territory.
88 151 CLR, at 204.
89 151 CLR, at 187.
90 151 CLR, at 192.
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discretions exercised under the prerogative.91 But after reviewing the authorities, 
he concluded that the old rule, stated in terms like those used by Blackstone, or by 
Isaacs and Powers JJ in Duncan v Theodore, could no longer be sustained: “[I]t is 
at least arguable,” he said, “whether [Crown immunity] should now apply to acts 
affecting the rights of the citizen which, though undertaken in the name of the 
Sovereign, are in reality decisions of the executive government. ” 92
Instead of a blanket immunity determined by reference to the identity of the 
decision-maker, Mason J proposed that the test for reviewability should be one 
based on judicial competence to undertake the review. Though offered in obiter, 
this was in many ways the most significant part of the judgment. He explicitly 
acknowledged the concerns about the appropriateness of curial second-guessing of 
policy-based governmental action, but he said that “[t]he purpose of preventing 
unnecessary judicial interference is better achieved, and achieved with greater 
fairness to the citizen, by denying review in those cases in which the particular 
exercise of power is not susceptible of the review sought” .93 Mason J 
acknowledged that a power being “not susceptible of review” was more often 
likely to be the case if it was based on the prerogative than on statute. That was for 
a variety of reasons. Statutory discretion, he said,
very often affects the right of citizens; there may be a duty to 
exercise the discretion in one way or another; the discretion may be 
precisely limited in scope; it may be conferred for a specific or 
ascertainable purpose; and it will be exercisable by reference to 
criteria or considerations express or implied.94
91 151 CLR, at 219.
92 151 CLR, at 220.
93 151 CLR, at 222.
94 151 CLR, at 219.
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“The prerogative powers”, he continued, “lack some or all of these 
characteristics. Moreover, they are in some instances by reason of their very 
nature not susceptible of judicial review”.9'
In another part of his judgment, Mason J said that the sorts of cases in 
which the courts had refused to review the exercise of the prerogative were ones in 
which “the prerogative power in question was not, owing to its nature and subject 
matter, open to challenge for the reason put forward”.96 Presumably what his 
Honour was referring to in these passages were cases involving what were referred 
to earlier as “affairs of state” -  cases involving the exercise of pure political 
judgment or the formulation of governmental policy. In this respect, most people 
would have an intuitive sense of the sorts of instances which Mason J had in mind. 
Speaking extrajudicially, he once said:
although [decisions] are no longer immune from review simply 
because they are decisions made in the exercise of prerogative 
power, their nature may be such that they are not susceptible of 
review. Decisions affecting national security, foreign affairs, to 
prosecute or not to prosecute and the grant of pardons to convicted 
people come to mind.97
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine, for instance, a court reviewing Prime 
Minister Menzies’ declaration in September 1939 that Australia was at war with 
Germany, even though the fact that he did not seek the prior approval of the 
Australian parliament has since given rise to some controversy about the
95 Ibid.
96 151 CLR, at 220.
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constitutional appropriateness of Menzies’ action.4* Likewise, it is difficult to 
imagine a court ever reviewing a decision, say, to award or not to award the Order 
of Australia. But having said this, the fact is that apart from the “obvious” cases, 
the Mason test is really quite difficult to articulate. How does one determine 
whether an exercise of a power is “susceptible of judicial review”? To refer to 
Mason J’s list of factors which tend to make it easier to review statutory discretion 
than prerogative discretion, it is often the case -  regardless of the source of the 
power -  that an exercise of governmental discretion will affect the rights of 
citizens. And if we use the new trigger for natural justice, the exercise of 
discretion will almost always affect someone’s “interests and legitimate 
expectations”. Furthermore, it is seldom, if ever, that a discretion is completely 
untrammelled or its exercise unconnected with criteria or “considerations express 
or implied” .99
Moreover, one frankly wonders just how obvious the “obvious” cases will 
always be. In both England and New Zealand, for example, the courts have 
reviewed refusals to grant pardons. 100 And in Coutts v The Commonwealth, 
Mason ACJ and Deane J would have applied the rules of natural justice to a 
decision by the Governor-General to dismiss an officer from the RAAF on the 
basis of medical unfitness. In Mason AC J ’s view, there were on the facts
97 “The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual 
Rights”, supra n 23, at 8. See also Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 (holding that the decision of 
the Attorney-General to exercise the prerogative power to lay an indictment was not reviewable).
98 Mason J actually spoke to this example. He said that “the refusal of the courts to review the 
exercise of the royal prerogatives relating to war and the armed services is based on the view that 
they are not, by reason of their character and their subject matter, susceptible of judicial review” 
(151 CLR, at 219 - 220). See also Chandler v DPP [1962] 3 All ER 142.
99 See, eg, the comments of Kitto J, infra at 336.
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sufficient decisional criteria to make the decision justiciable . 101 Similarly, in 
Heddon v Evans, McCardie J suggested that it was open to the courts to allow an 
action for malicious abuse of military authority. 102
More dramatically, in Operation Dismantle v The Queen, the Supreme 
Court of Canada indicated that it was even willing to review a decision by the 
Canadian Cabinet to permit the United States to carry out tests of cruise missiles in 
the Canadian north. 103 In response to an assertion by the Government of Canada 
that such a decision was not (to use Mason J’s language) by reason of its character 
and subject matter susceptible of judicial review, Wilson J, speaking for the entire 
Court on this point, said that she was not moved by an argument that certain issues 
“involve moral and political considerations which it is not within the province of 
courts to assess” . 104 She said that “however unsuited courts may be for the task, 
they are called upon all the time to decide questions of principle and policy”.10"'
Now, in Operation Dismantle the Supreme Court was in fact dealing with a 
constitutional issue, which to an extent placed it in a different position from a court 
sitting in administrative judicial review in Australia. But the fact remains that the 
Canadian judges did feel that the issue before them was “susceptible of review.”
100 R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Bentley (“the Bentley Case") [1994] QB 349 and Burt v 
Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672.
101 (1985) 157 CLR 91. The majority reached the opposite conclusion, and Mason ACJ said that 
in his view, natural justice would not be applicable in the case of a decision to dismiss taken 
solely on a discretionary basis. For a critical commentary on the case, see A O’Neil, “Case 
Comment” (1986) 10 Fed L Rev 212.
102 (1919) 35 TLR 642.
103 [1985] 1 SCR 441. As an aside, the reason that the Canadian north was an attractive testing- 
ground was that it resembled the terrain of the northern Soviet Union, over which the missiles 
would have to travel in the event of hostilities.
104 [1985] 1 SCR, at 465.
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The courts may in the end choose to defer to the political judgment of the 
government (as, indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada did). But as to the basic 
question, a case like Operation Dismantle shows that there can be no automatic 
immunity from review, no matter what the issue.106 That is because, as Mason J 
phrased the test, the question is one of judicial competence to undertake the 
review, which can only be determined by the judges themselves.
NATURAL JUSTICE AND THE CROWN
FAI Insurances v Winneke
The next step -  the imposition of an actual duty to observe natural justice 
on the Crown and its advisors -  was accomplished by a series of cases decided 
between 1982 and 1986. The first of the series was FAI Insurances Ltd v 
Winneke,107 which was discussed at length in the last chapter. As will be
remembered, the case involved an application by FAI Insurances Ltd for a 
renewal o f its licence to provide workers’ compensation insurance in Victoria. 
The application was turned down by the Victorian Governor in Council, and the 
High Court held that in the circumstances, the State had an obligation to provide 
FAI with a summary of the points on which the refusal was based, and an 
opportunity to respond to them.
105 [1985] 1 SCR, at 465 -  466.
106 See, also, Allars, supra n 73, at 322.
107 (1982) 151 CLR 342.
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The point, though, that the decision not to renew was made not by a 
bureaucrat, but by the Governor in Council raised the complicating questions of 
whether the decision was unreviewable per se and, if not, exactly how natural 
justice could be applied to the proceedings of the Executive Council. In fact, the 
evidence in the case was that it was a practice of long-standing in Victoria (and 
other Australian jurisdictions) to assign responsibility for ordinary administrative 
decisions to the Governor in Council. Moreover, there was old colonial-era 
precedent to the effect that when he was exercising statutory authority, as he was 
in this case, the Governor was obliged to grant hearings. 108 But the High Court 
was not content to let the matter rest on localised nineteenth century 
jurisprudence. Instead, it preferred to offer a modem basis for its conclusion. As 
Sir Anthony has said, “[t]he decision broke new ground in that the Court decided 
for the first time that the fact that a statutory power is vested in the Governor in 
Council does not mean that it is beyond review. ” 109
Murphy J -  who was the only former cabinet member among the Court, it 
is interesting to note -  dissented. In R v Toohey, Murphy J had found himself in 
an awkward position. On one hand, his plain instinct was to defer to the 
executive -  a view he made plain in his administrative law judgments. 110 But on 
the other, his anti-monarchical prejudices led him to shy away from expressing 
his views as to justiciability in terms of the immunity of the Crown. His solution 
in R v Toohey was to say that it was simply not open for the courts to question
108 See Roebuck v Borough o f Geelong West (1876) 2 VLR(L) 189, Shire o f Kowree v Shire o f 
Lowan (1897) 19 ALT 153. See also Smith v R (1878) 3 App Cas 614 (PC, Qld).
109 The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual 
Rights”, supra n 23, at 8
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the purpose for which legislative power was being used.111 In FAI Insurances, he 
reiterated this position. In his view, judicial review should not have been 
available in the circumstances, for what was at issue was a political decision. 
There was no jurisprudential basis for review in this case except R v Toohey, 
whose premises he continued to reject. But this, he said, did not mean that 
natural justice or a duty of fairness did not attach to the decision-making process. 
It did. But in the context fairness involved “political standards enforceable by 
the political process”.112
Gibbs CJ, in contrast, based his judgment on the presumption that natural 
justice would obviously normally apply to a licensing case, and that there was no 
evidence of a parliamentary intention to exclude it: “It would not be right to 
impute to the legislature an intention to confer an arbitrary or unfettered power to 
refuse to renew an approval, having regard to the consequences that such a 
refusal might entail”.m In other words, the Chief Justice began by taking an 
effects-based approach to the issue. Only then did he consider the matter of the 
decision-maker’s identity. In this regard, he noted that the Governor here was 
neither acting personally nor exercising the royal prerogative. Rather, he was 
acting on ministerial advice. In the circumstances, therefore, “[i]t would be to 
confuse form with substance to hold that the rules of natural justice are excluded 
simply because the power is technically confided in the Governor in Council”.114
110 See infra 332.
1,1 151 CLR, at 228-231 .
112 151 CLR, at 374.
113 151 CLR, at 349.
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Of the other judges, Stephen J was closest in approach to Gibbs CJ. His 
judgment is especially useful in that he reviewed the history of executive 
decision-making arrangements in Victoria1" He made the point that in colonial 
Australia, when legislative drafting habits were being formed, Governors really 
did govern. 116 The legislative convention which had grown up here was one of 
vesting formal decision-making power in the Crown. In the United Kingdom, 
the actual day-to-day involvement of the Sovereign in the business of 
government had been steadily decreasing since the rise of cabinet government in 
the late eighteenth century. So when the British administrative state came to 
appear, the idea of a departmental minister, in theory responsible to parliament, 
was implanted in the consciousness of the legislative draftsman. In Australia, 
the history was different. The legislative pattern here was to devolve 
administrative decision-making power to the Crown. But drafting conventions 
aside, in the modem era in both countries the real decision-maker was the 
responsible minister. So, like the Chief Justice, Stephen J based his opinion on 
the importance of not mistaking form for substance.
114 Ibid.
115 151 CLR, at 353 - 355.
116 See 151 CLR, at 353, where Stephen J discussed the historical reasons for this. He quoted 
Geoffrey Sawer as saying that in colonial Australia, the Executive Councils “resembled the 
Tudor rather than the Victorian Privy Council” (“Councils, Ministers and Cabinets in Australia” 
[1956] Pub Law 110, at 111). The different practice in England and other of the self-governing 
colonies was described in C K Allen, Law and Orders (1945), at 45, and A B Keith, The King 
and the Imperial Crown (1936), at 60 - 61. See also supra chapter 1, at 48 -  51.
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“The Fundamental Issue ”
Mason J’s conclusion proceeded from the same premisses as the Chief 
Justice’s and Stephen J’s, viz, that the effective decision-maker here was not Sir 
Henry Winneke, the Governor, but rather J H Ramsey MLA, the Minister for 
Labour and Industry. But, as had been the case in R v Toohey, it was Mason J 
who took the broadest sweep in his statement of the law. In his view, “the 
fundamental issue” was whether the Governor in Council could as a matter of 
legal principle be bound to observe the rules of natural justice.117 He noted that 
the Victorian legislature had not directed its mind to the question. Possibly, he 
said, this was “because it thought that [natural justice] had no application to the 
Governor in Council”.1 ls One would have thought that this ought to have ended 
the matter, but in Mason J’s view, it did not. On the contrary, the legislature’s 
silence left the question still open. This was, it will be remembered, much the 
same view he was later to take in Annetts v McCann, the case involving the 
question of whether natural justice applied under the Western Australian 
Coroners Act 1920C9
In FAI Insurances v Winneke, as in Annetts v McCann, Mason J’s answer 
to the fundamental issue was in the affirmative. The statute in question, the 
Victorian Workers’ Compensation Act, purported to confer a completely 
unfettered discretion upon the Governor to decide whether or not licences should
117 151 CLR, at 359.
118 151 CLR, at 362.
119 See, supra chapter 5, at 251 -  255.
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be issued. Mason J noted that cases in the past had regarded this as an indication 
that natural justice was not to apply. 120 But, he said, there was a convention that 
in exercising his discretion, the Governor was obliged to follow advice. This 
was, indeed, only a convention and not a principle of judicially-enforceable law, 
but it was enough in Mason J’s opinion to give the Minister a close enough link 
with the Governor’s action to make natural justice applicable to the decision­
making process as a whole:
[T]he nature of the relationship between the Governor and the 
Executive Council supplies no reason for denying the availability 
of judicial review for ultra vires ... once as a matter of 
construction of a statute the conclusion is reached that the 
discretion given to the Governor in Council is limited, whether in 
scope or purpose or by reference to criteria or otherwise. 121
“Once the true relationship between the Governor and the Executive 
Council is understood”, he continued,
it becomes apparent that the doctrines of ministerial and 
collective responsibility provide no objection to the application of 
the rules of natural justice to the exercise of a discretion by the 
Governor in Council. As the Governor ultimately acts in 
accordance with advice tendered to him, the final decision is not a 
decision for which he has to account. The effective decision is 
that of the Executive Council and the Ministers who are 
responsible for that decision to the parliament and to the 
electorate. 122
So this was the holding on the threshold issue. Natural justice could in 
principle apply to the exercise of discretion by the Crown, according to the very
120 He referred, inter alia, to Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396, at 420, R v 
MacKel/ar, Ex parte Ratu (1977) 137 CLR 461, Testro Brothers Ltd v Tait (1963) 109 CLR 222, 
and Franklin v Minister o f Town and Country’ Planning [1947] AC 87.
121 151 CLR, at 365.
122 151 CLR, at 365 - 366.
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same principles by which it applied to the exercise of discretion by Ministers. 
What that meant as a practical matter was that the obligation to accord natural 
justice would ordinarily apply to the fonnulation of the recommendation which 
was to be put to the Governor in Council. 123 The question that then remained to 
be answered according to the specific circumstances of the case was whether 
there was anything which would have indicated that the obligation to observe 
natural justice should be excluded.
The Non-relevance of Parliament’s Assumptions
Taking the approach that he had urged in R v Toohey, Mason J asked 
whether decisions made by the Governor in Council were “intrinsically 
unsuited” for justiciability. He acknowledged that given the nature of the 
method by which Governor and Executive Council carried out their proceedings, 
it was “less, perhaps much less, likely” that parliament intended that natural 
justice generally apply. 124 Indeed, as noted, he had earlier suggested that 
parliament had probably thought that it would not apply. But, as he was to 
restate in Annetts v McCann, parliament’s intention or lack thereof was not 
determinative. Given the nature of the particular decision in issue -  including its 
possible ramifications -  it was possible in the circumstances, notwithstanding his 
assessment of parliament’s likely actual beliefs, to impute to the legislature an 
intention that the Governor in Council would act in conformity with the
123 It was on this basis that Aickin J gave his judgment. See 151 CLR, at 383. For Wilson J’s 
views on the point, see 151 CLR, at 396, 398 - 399.
124 151 CLR, at 369.
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principles of natural justice, by giving the applicant an adequate opportunity to 
present its case before a decision was made not to renew the workers’ 
compensation insurance licence.12' As to the actual logistics of the duty, he 
thought that the obligation to receive whatever submissions were made by FAI 
could have been delegated to a departmental employee.
Tellingly, Mason J said that his conclusion
offers some protection to the citizen against the legislative 
practice of conferring statutory discretions on a Governor in 
Council instead of the Minister or a statutory officer in the hope 
of thereby avoiding judicial review, particularly for want of 
compliance with the rules of natural justice, in circumstances 
where the legislature does not directly dispense with the duty to 
accord natural justice. 126
One would be hard-pressed to imagine a statement that sounds more like 
an enunciation of a principle of constitutionalism than this. Yet, notwithstanding 
the general looseness of their language (particularly that of Mason J), the 
majority judgments in FAI Insurances v Winneke reveal a very precise technical 
problem which stood in the way of a complete opening up of the field. That was 
that the ordinary public law prerogative remedies do not lie against the Crown. 
Ordinarily, the writ of certiorari is available to quash a decision that is made 
contrary to the requirements of natural justice. 127 But by definition, writs of 
certiorari and mandamus could not be issued against the Sovereign128 and, as
125 151 CLR, at 370.
126 151 CLR, at 372.
127 Stolleiy v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509. See also Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (“the GCHQ Case") [1985] AC 374.
128 Chabot v Lord Morpeth (1844) 15 QB 446. See also Aronson and Dyer, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (1996), at 732 -  733 (on certiorari), 770 (on mandamus).
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Gibbs CJ said, “in the absence of express statutory provision, there is no power 
to make a declaration against the Governor in Council”.12g The solution in the 
circumstances was to issue a declaration against the Attorney-General, who 
could be expected to advise the Governor to act accordingly. Maitland was 
clearly correct when he suggested that the old thinking about the law of actions 
could continue to dog us from the grave!10
But technical finesse aside, the remedial point highlights a deeper 
concern with principle. Gibbs CJ said that an express statutory authorisation 
would be necessary before a declaration could be made against the Crown. It is 
interesting to juxtapose this against Mason J’s inquiry as to whether there was 
evidence of a parliamentary intention to exclude natural justice -  for otherwise it 
would apply. To cast back to his judgment in R v Toohey, one wonders why it 
was not possible to read a lack of direct legal remedy as an indication of non­
justiciability. If there is no power to compel the party in question to do anything, 
could that not be evidence that the actor is inherently unsuited for judicial 
review?
This question is made even more intriguing when one remembers that in 
1978, the Victorian state parliament passed the Administrative Law Act. Its 
stated intention was to clarify the law respecting the prerogative writs. At 
second reading, the Attorney-General was quite specific in saying that the
129 151 CLR, at 351.
130 The famous statement, of course, was: “The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule 
us from their graves.” {The Fonns o f Action at Common Law {1909), at 2).
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legislation did not intend to extend the scope of judicial review beyond what 
existed at the time.1'1 Given the pre-existing state of the law, could this not be 
taken as a tacit indication of legislative wishes that it did not wish the law (on 
this point, at least) not to be altered? The position at the Commonwealth level is 
even more stark. The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
specifically excludes decisions of the Governor-General from its coverage. 
Moreover, the evidence is clear that the legislative view was that it was not 
desirable to have decisions of the Governor-General subject to judicial review.132 
Taking Mason J ’s point, one wonders why both Acts, but the Commonwealth 
one in particular, could not be said to provide evidence of legislative signals that 
decisions of the Crown were not to be reviewable. Now that reference to 
Hansard may freely be made in the process of interpretation,133 one wonders 
whether the signals ought not to be seen as even stronger.
131 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 25 October 1978, at 5092 (the Hon H 
Storey).
132 See H Whitmore, “Administrative Law in the Commonwealth: Some Proposals for Reform” 
(1972) 5 Fed L Rev 7, at 14. Whitmore, who was a member of the Kerr Committee, wrote:
[The Committee] recognised that technical difficulties prevent effective review 
of decisions by the Governor-General. It considered that the present law could 
operate as a ‘safety valve’ for the Government, and foresaw that Members of 
Parliament would carefully scrutinise powers conferred on the Governor- 
General knowing that they would be placed substantially outside the system of 
review.
See also P Bayne, “The Court, the Parliament and the Government -  Reflections on the Scope of 
Judicial Review” (1991) 20 Fed L Rev 1, at 4.
1 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB, Interpretation o f Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35.
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NATURAL JUSTICE AND THE EXERCISE OF 
PREROGATIVE POWER
The GCHQ Case
The first definite step in extending natural justice obligations to cover the 
exercise of prerogative, rather than statutory, power was in the House of Lords’ 
decision three years after FAI, in the GCHQ Case.''4 Significantly, in GCHQ, 
the House of Lords adopted the very same approach to the question of 
reviewability of Crown decisions as was taken by the High Court in FAI.
GCHQ involved a decision by the Minister for the Civil Service (who 
happened also to be the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher) to forbid employees at 
the British government’s secret communication facilities (the Government 
Communications Headquarters -  “GCHQ”) from belonging to trade unions. 
Between 1979 and 1981, there had been a series of smallish-scale industrial 
disruptions at the facilities. Most of these had not been to protest working 
conditions within the GCHQ, but were carried out at the behest of the trade 
union movement, in demonstration against the Thatcher government’s moves to 
reform industrial relations law.
It became a matter of record in the proceedings that some of the trade 
union literature expressed particular satisfaction at the success in causing 
disruption to Britain’s defence preparedness through the industrial action taken
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at GCHQ. 1 35 The government attempted to obtain a “no-strike” promise from the 
union representing GCHQ employees. When it was not forthcoming, the 
Minister issued her instruction forbidding union membership. While, being 
Crown servants, the GCHQ employees did not have a contract of employment, 
the evidence was that prior to this instruction, the government had always 
negotiated with their union before introducing changes to employment 
conditions. Accordingly, after the “no union membership” instruction, the union 
commenced action, claiming that the Minister had denied it natural justice by not 
consulting with it prior to issuing her instruction. The union’s argument was that 
in the circumstances, it had a legitimate expectation of prior consultation.
The Minister’s decision to forbid union membership was made pursuant 
to an Order in Council, which gave her the authority to make regulations for 
“controlling the conduct of the service” . 136 The Order in Council had itself been 
issued not pursuant to any statutory authority, but rather by virtue of the royal 
prerogative, exercised on advice. This led the Crown to argue that the 
instruction, as a delegated decision made under the prerogative, was 
unreviewable per se.
In the end, all of their Lordships found that in light of the fact that 
national security was involved, the obligation to observe natural justice was 
displaced. Lord Roskill stated the rationale in language much like that used by
134 Council o f Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
135 See the speech of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton [1985] AC, at 395.
136 Art 4(a)(ii).
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Mason J in FAI Insurances v Winneke, when he said that things like “the making 
of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of 
honours, the dissolution of parliament and the appointment of ministers as well 
as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their nature and 
subject matter are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process” . 13 But -  
also like the High Court in FAI -  all of the speeches in GCHQ indicated a feeling 
that since natural justice would ordinarily apply in circumstances of this nature, 
there was no reason that it ought not to apply as a matter of principle, even 
though the source of the Minister’s power was the royal prerogative.
Lord Scarman said that he thought it could be “said with confidence” that 
if the subject matter of the dispute was justiciable, then it should not matter that 
the governmental power in question was rooted in the prerogative, rather than 
legislation. 138 The old limitation was gone, he said, “overwhelmed by the 
developing modem law of judicial review. ” 134 Similarly, Lord Roskill said that 
he could not see “any logical reason” why the source of the governmental power 
should matter if the effect of the exercise of the power was to harm rights or 
legitimate expectations. 140 Only Lord Fraser expressed some doubt on this point, 
because “to permit such review would run counter to the great weight of 
authority. ” 141 But even he acknowledged that he could see no reason of logic
137 [1985] AC, at 418. It is interesting to note that while counsel for both parties referred to 
Australian authority in argument, none was cited in judgment by their Lordships. See [1985] 
AC, at 355 (L Blom-Cooper QC for the unions) and [1985] AC, at 385 (R Alexander QC for 
Mrs Thatcher).
138 [1985] AC, at 407.
139 Ibid.
140 [1985] AC, at 417.
141 [1985] AC, at 348.
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why prerogative power should be treated differently from statutory power for 
judicial review purposes. 142
Most sweeping of all, though, was Lord Diplock’s pronouncement that he 
thought that any discussion of the legal nature of the prerogative was “of little 
practical assistance” 142 His view was instead firmly rooted in contemporary 
pragmatism. 144 Lord Diplock said that he saw “no reason why simply because a 
decision-making power is derived from the common law [which is how he 
described the source of the prerogative] and not a statutory source, it shall for 
that reason only be immune from judicial review. ” 145
The Peko-WallsendLitigation
This approach was followed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in 
Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd.Ub This was 
one of a series of Peko-Wallsend cases, involving mining rights in the Northern
142 Ibid.
143 [1985] AC, at 409.
144 He was not, though, as sweeping as had been Lord Denning. In Laker Airways v Department 
o f Trade [1977] 2 WLR 234, at 250, Lord Denning had said that the exercise of a power under 
the prerogative “can be examined by the courts just as any other discretionary power which is 
vested in the executive.”” In GCHQ, Lord Roskill said that stated this way, the principle was “far 
too wide” ([1985] AC, at 416). But c /D  G T Williams, “The Prerogative and Preventative 
Justice” (1977) 36 Camb L J  201.
145 [1985] AC, at 410 (original emphasis). Lord Diplock continued with his now-famous 
summary of the bases for judicial review:
Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating 
any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can 
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative 
action is subject to control by judicial review [his Lordship then set out his 
description of the three heads of review as being ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’ and 
‘procedural impropriety’].
146 (1987) 15 FCR274.
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Territory. 147 In this instance, Peko-Wallsend and other mining interests were 
concerned at a government decision to include part of the Kakadu National Park 
on the World Heritage List. The mining interests had licences to explore and 
mine on the lands in question, but the listing of the property would have had the 
effect of rendering mining operations unlawful. The legal question which arose 
in this case was whether the Commonwealth Cabinet was obliged to provide a 
hearing of some sort to Peko-Wallsend before making the listing. The Full 
Court concluded that the decision to seek listing was not justiciable, 148 but 
Wilcox and Sheppard JJ both found that there was no reason of principle why 
natural justice could not attach to the exercise prerogative power, including 
cabinet proceedings. 144 Only Bowen CJ -  who was a former member of the 
Commonwealth Cabinet -  took a different view. He said that “[t]he prospect of 
Cabinet itself, even by delegation, having to accord a hearing to individuals who 
may be adversely affected by its decisions, is a daunting one. It could bring the 
proceedings of Cabinet to a grinding halt.” 150
South Australia v O'Shea
The High Court picked up on the question of natural justice attaching to 
cabinet proceedings in South Australia v O ’Shea.'5I This was the case, also
147 See also Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24. The history of 
the litigation was summarised in the judgment of Wilcox J in the Federal Court, 15 FCR, at 274.
148 See 15 FCR, at 279 (Bowen CJ), 280 (Sheppard J), 308 (Wilcox J).
149 15 FCR, at 281 (Sheppard J), 304 -  308 (Wilcox J). An interesting discussion of this case, 
written by a fellow Justice of the Federal Court, is in the Hon R S French, “The Rise and Rise of 
Judicial Review” (1993) 23 UWA L Rev 120, at 135 -  137.
150 15 FCR, at 279.
151 (1987) 163 CLR 378.
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discussed in the last chapter, involving the decision by the South Australian 
Cabinet to deny the convicted paedophile O’Shea release from an indefinite term 
of preventative detention. In the end, the Court held that O’Shea had not been 
denied natural justice, on the basis that he did not have any legitimate 
expectation which was deserving of protection. But Mason CJ and Deane J 
made it clear that in their opinion, the fact that the decision to not release had 
been made by the Cabinet would not otherwise have been a bar to a finding that 
natural justice was required. This was the closest that the High Court had come 
to the boldness of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Operation Dismantle 
case.
Reiterating his view in FAI Insurances v Winneke, Mason CJ said that 
where the decision in question is “of a kind usually made by a Minister or 
statutory officer”, “it is not to be supposed that parliament intended to exclude a 
duty to act fairly by vesting authority to make the decision in the Governor in 
Council” . 1''2 Furthermore, in the Chief Justice’s view, there was nothing in the 
nature of the decision which should have signalled to the Court that it ought to 
have backed off: “the nature of the decision to be made, the release of the 
offender or the continuation of his preventative detention, concerned 
considerations personal to Mr O’Shea rather than issues of general policy” . 153
As had been the case in FAI Insurances v Winneke, there was at play here 
a local quirk of constitutional law. In South Australia there is a jurisdictionally
152 163 CLR, at 386.
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curious -  but for the purposes of the present discussion doctrinally important -  
feature that all actions taken by the Governor are specifically required by statute 
to be exercised on advice. 1"'4 And, as was discussed in chapter five, the High 
Court characterised the Governor in Council/Cabinet stage as one where the 
focus was on “the public interest” . 155 In Mason CJ’s view, though, as a systemic 
feature this was not fatal to a claim based on natural justice. Even though the 
Cabinet ordinarily was concerned with affairs of state, this did not preclude it 
from deliberating on issues of individual autonomy. And when it did, natural 
justice would apply. As his Honour put it:
There is a common law duty to act fairly in the making of 
administrative decisions which affect the rights, interests and 
legitimate expectations of an individual, subject only to the clear 
manifestation of a contrary statutory intention. This common law 
duty is capable of applying to the Governor in Council, there 
being nothing in the relationship between the Governor and the 
Executive which inhibits the existence of such a duty. 156
So much for principle. What of practicality? How could a court 
effectively police a natural justice requirement in an entity like the Cabinet, 
whose proceedings were, by plain convention, both secret and informal. 1"’7 The 
normal obligations which flow from an obligation to observe natural justice -  
what the Americans would call “notice and comment” obligations -  are alien to 
the workings of the Anglo-Australian idea of Cabinet secrecy. But neither was 
this necessarily fatal in the Chief Justice’s eyes. In his opinion, it was not an
153 163 CLR, at 387.
154 Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s 23.
155 See, supra, at 234 -  238.
156 163 CLR, at 386.
15 See Whitlam v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1985) 73 FLR 414, at 421 -  422. See also 
Muiphy J’s judgment in FAI Insurances v Winneke, 151 CLR, at 373 -  375.
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intrusion into Cabinet’s control of its own proceedings for the courts to insist 
that Cabinet adopt a certain decision-making procedure. There was “no 
persuasive reason”, he said, “why the courts should not, in an appropriate case, 
require as an incident of natural justice ... that there be placed before Cabinet by 
the responsible Minister the written submissions of the individual affected by 
the decision to be made or an accurate summary of such submissions” . 1''8 In 
what sounded almost like a veiled threat, he continued:
If at some later stage it were to appear that the parliament was 
entrusting the Governor in Council with the making of decisions 
affecting individuals so as to avoid the need to act fairly the court 
might be compelled to go further, but at this stage such a course is 
not warranted. 159
It was with equal candour that Mason CJ spoke of the relationship 
between matters of policy and fairness of decision-making processes. He 
rejected the argument that because the factor to be decided by the Cabinet here 
was the public interest, this rendered the decision-making process non- 
justiciable. Matters of public policy and individual fairness could operate hand- 
in-hand, in his opinion:
True it is that the courts do not substitute their view of policy for 
that prescribed by the Executive, but this does not mean that 
policy issues stand apart from procedural fairness. Although it is 
unrealistic and impractical to insist upon a person having the 
opportunity to present submissions on matters of high level 
general policy, the same considerations do not apply to the impact 
of policy on the individual and to those aspects of policy which 
are closely related to the circumstances of the particular case.lo°
158 1 63 CLR, at 387 - 388. He went on to say that this “would in all probability conform to 
existing practice” (at 388). See also Wilson and Toohey JJ, 163 CLR at 402 - 403.
159 163 CLR, at 388.
160 163 CLR, at 389. See generally on this issue F Wheeler, “Judicial Review of Prerogative 
Power in Australia: Issues and Prospects” (1992) 14 Syd L Rev 432.
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Typically of Sir William Deane, in his judgment in O ’Shea, he cut a wide 
swathe in his assessment of the range of actors to whom a duty to observe 
natural justice could attach. “There was a time”, he said, when the identity of the 
decision-maker would both have excluded an obligation to observe natural 
justice and have precluded judicial review. But “that time has now gone in this 
country”:
If those common law requirements would otherwise apply to 
require that a person affected by a decision made in the exercise 
of a statutory power or authority be given an opportunity of being 
heard, the fact that the decision-making power or authority is 
entrusted to the Governor in Council will neither automatically 
deprive the person affected of the right to insist upon that 
opportunity nor render the decision in question immune from 
challenge in the courts of the land. 161
THE “FICTION” OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
Implicit in these sorts of statements is the view that the courts represent 
the only real means of control of the executive; that responsible government is 
no longer an effective means of controlling abuse of power. There is a paradox 
in this, of course, insofar as the justification for engaging in judicial review of 
the Crown involved reference to the Diceyist principle of the legal sovereignty of 
parliament -  the notion, as Gibbs CJ put it in R v Toohey, that it is “fundamental 
to the rule of law that the Crown has no more power than any subordinate
161 Ibid, though it should be noted that in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 
CLR 604, the High Court held that courts ought to respect the confidentiality of cabinet 
workings.
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official to enlarge by its own act the scope of a power.”162 But this 
notwithstanding, it is apparent that the authority of parliament as a source of 
control did not command respect amongst the High Court.
This was not always the case. Board o f Education v Rice, which was 
discussed in chapter two,162 represented an overt expression of faith in the 
principle o f responsible government as a means of exerting control over 
administrative wrong-doing. It so happened that the appeal in Rice fitted nicely 
with the Liberal government’s line in the battle that it had been waging with the 
House o f Lords (in its political capacity) over the Lords’ right to veto 
legislation,164 but such views could be seen here, too. In Randall v Northcote 
Corporation, decided in 1910, for instance, Higgins J said, “If the ratepayers do 
not like the mode in which the affairs of the town are administered, their remedy 
is generally to be sought in the pressure of public opinion at the polling 
booth.”165
It was sometimes said that responsibility for checking executive excess 
was a task shared by parliament and the courts. In Johnson and Co v Minister o f  
Health, for example, Lord Greene MR spoke of the intersection of the concepts of 
executive responsibility to parliament and judicial review. He said: “Every 
Minister has a duty to the King to act fairly, the breach of which is punishable by
162 151 CLR, at 187.
163 Supra, at 79-83 .
164 Which, of course, the Lords lost. The Parliament Act 1911 removed the Lords’ absolute veto. 
For a wonderfully written account of this whole episode, and of the changes to the working 
constitution that it wrought, see G Dangerfield, The Strange Death o f Liberal England (1935).
165 11 CLR 100, at 120.
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parliament. But he also has a duty to the law ...”166 This was quoted with 
approval by Williams J in the Communist Party Dissolution Case}bl More 
recently, in the Fleet Street Casuals Case, Lord Diplock said much the same thing. 
Speaking of the Executive in the plural, he said: “They are accountable to 
parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that 
parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the 
lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge”.168 Of the two 
duties, the former -  the duty to the legislature -  was thought in principle to provide 
the more effective avenue for control. That is because the power of the legislative 
assembly to check executive overzealousness was thought to be unlimited. As a 
British cabinet member once put it: “I am the servant of the House of Commons; 
every action I take, every decision I come to ... can be brought up and discussed 
here.”169 It was for this same reason that as recently as 1966, Prime Minister Holt 
was expressing doubt about the need for an Ombudsman in Australia -  it was 
Holt’s view that parliament could exercise sufficient scrutiny over the government 
and government officials.170
Yet, concerns about the weakness of responsible government are not 
new. As long ago as 1915, Dicey was bemoaning the decline of parliament as a
166 [1947] 2 All ER 395, at 399.
16 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, at 221 -  222.
I6S Inland Revenue Commissioner v National Federation o f Self-Employed and Small Businesses 
Ltd [1982] AC 617, at 644.
169 Quoted in Sir C T Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (1941), at 13.
170 Noted in “Administrative Tribunals”, Current Affairs Bulletin, 24 April 1967, at 171. This 
was also a view which was apparently held by Prime Minister McMahon. See R Creyke and J 
McMillan, “Administrative Law Assumptions ... Then and Now”, in Creyke and McMillan (eds), 
The Kerr Vision o f Administrative Law (1998) 1, at 3.
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means of control over the Cabinet.171 In 1903, Harrison Moore was moved to 
write of “a change in the working of our constitutional forces”,172 which meant that 
legislation was “no longer devised by a body distinct from and jealous of the 
Executive, but [rather] expresses to a very great extent the views of the Executive 
as to the public needs.”177 In the 1950s, Devlin J expressed some concern 
extrajudicially that “while members can still make themselves felt on questions 
of principle, the detail o f the legislation -  and it is the detail that the citizen finds 
most worrying -  is almost entirely the work of the ministries.”174 Likewise, at the 
Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference in Sydney in 1965, Billy Sneddon, 
as Commonwealth Attorney-General, expressed some doubt about the 
effectiveness of ministerial responsibility, especially in light of the strength of the 
modem party system.177 This point was also made by Sir William Wade in his 
Hamlyn Lectures. He said that ministerial responsibility perhaps at one time did 
act as a working mechanism of restraint, “[b]ut this comforting proposition 
became less and less tenable as the party system grew in efficiency and in
171 In “Development of Administrative Law in England” (1915) 31 LQR 148, at 152, he wrote 
that the reference by Lord Lorebum LC to responsible government in Local Government Board 
v Arlidge was “somewhat unfortunate”:
It is calculated to promote the belief that such ministerial responsibility is a 
real check upon the action of a Minister or a Cabinet... But any man who will 
look plain facts in the face will see in a moment that ministerial censure not in 
fact by parliament nor even by the House of Commons, but by the party 
majority who keep the Government in office is a very feeble guarantee indeed 
against action which evades the authority of the law courts.
172 “The Enforcement of Administrative Law”(1903) 1 Comm L Rev 13, at 14.
I7_' Ibid.
174 “Public Policy and the Executive” [1956] Cur Leg Prob 1, at 14.
175 “Ministerial Responsibility in Modem Parliamentary Government”, in Proceedings o f the 
Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference (1966) 1, at 6, 8 -  10. See also the Report o f 
the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (“the Kerr Committee Report”), 1971 Pari 
Paper No 144, chapter 15.
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rigidity and as it became obvious that parliament had become the obedient 
instrument of the government of the day.” 17'1
More recently, though, there have been statements from the High Court 
which suggest that there is an active judicial perception in Australia that the 
parliamentary horse has gone lame. In R v Toohey, both Gibbs CJ and Mason J 
indicated that they were less than convinced that responsible government provides 
much protection against anything in Australia today. Gibbs CJ said that “under 
modem conditions of responsible government parliament could not always be 
relied on to check excesses of power by the Crown or its ministers.” 177 Mason J 
said that he wanted to add to his reasons for judgment “the comment that the 
doctrine o f ministerial responsibility is not in itself an adequate safeguard for the 
citizen whose rights are affected.”17' He said that this was “now generally accepted 
and its acceptance underlies the comprehensive system of judicial review of 
administrative action which prevails in Australia.” 170 Even Sir Gerard Brennan, 
who, as noted, has been steadfast in linking judicial review to legislative intent, 
was once moved to say that “as the wind of political expediency now chills 
parliament’s willingness to impose checks on the Executive and the Executive now 
has a large measure of control over legislation, the courts alone retain their original 
function o f standing between government and the governed.” 180
176 Constitutional Fundamentals (1980), at 41.
177 151 CLR, at 192.
178 151 CLR, at 222. His Honour quoted this passage in his piece, “The Importance of Judicial 
Review”, supra n 23, at 1.
179 Ibid.
180 “Courts, Democracy and the Law” (1991) 65 A U  32, at 35. There was even an element of 
this view in Sanders v Snell (1998) 157 ALR 491, the High Court’s most recent encounter with 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations, which was discussed supra, at 266 -  269. The Court did
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LIONEL MURPHY, SIR GERARD BRENNAN AND THE 
POLICY OF DEFERENCE TO POLITICS
These views aside, of the members of the Court in the late 1970s and 
1980s, it was only Sir Gerard Brennan who, with Mr Justice Murphy, prominently 
expressed any willingness to defer to parliament’s prerogative to control the 
executive. In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend, for example, 
Brennan J said that a Ministerial action could only be deemed justiciable if the 
Minister was alleged to have failed to comply with a statutory obligation that 
attended the decision-making process. It was then that a question o f lawfulness 
arose. Otherwise, the matter was one of political responsibility:
[If] the Minister’s decision may be founded on policy for which 
the Minister is responsible to the parliament, the court does not 
review decisions affecting the interests of contending parties on 
the ground that no weight or insufficient weight has been given to 
evidence or information favouring one party.IS!
This was, of course, the point made by Murphy J in FAI Insurances v 
Winneke. Brennan J was not suggesting that the Minister had the right to be 
unfair in his proceedings. Rather, he was saying that the avenue of enforcement
not touch upon the question of responsible government directly, but the reasoning of the 
judgments implicitly indicates a lack of faith in the ability of political processes to act as any sort 
of a brake upon unlawfulness. The reason that the majority in the case held that the matter had to 
be remitted back to the trial judge is that they found that there was no evidence of knowledge on 
the Minister’s part of the unlawfulness of his conduct. The majority concluded that the warning 
by another cabinet Minister that natural justice was required before the direction to sack the 
Executive Officer of the Bureau could be implemented was to be taken in a lay sense, and not to 
amount to actual advice of the Minister’s legal position. They did not say so, but it was surely 
implicit in the majority view that political advice could not be presumed to amount to legal 
control.
181 (1986) 162 CLR 24, at 64. See also his comments in A-G (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR, at 
35 - 36.
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of whatever duty of fairness that existed was not the courts but the political 
process. In FAI Insurances, it will be remembered, Murphy J said the same 
thing. He would have held that the decision not to renew the insurance licence 
was not justiciable, but he thought that a duty to observe the principles of natural 
justice could still exist. His view of the non-justiciability of the issue “did not 
mean that standards of good faith, fair dealing, natural justice and propriety are 
not applicable.” 182 They were, he said, “but they are political standards 
enforceable by the political process, sometimes very effectively and sometimes 
ineffectively.”183
In a similar vein, in R v Toohey, Murphy J had said that “whether or not 
parliament provides a regular procedure for its control of delegated legislation, it 
retains control.”184 This point was picked up by Sheppard J of the Federal Court 
in Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend. He said that 
he wanted to “emphasise that the question is not whether the Cabinet is bound to 
act according to law; it is whether its decisions are amenable to the jurisdiction 
of the Court.”18" This notion -  of a duty of procedural fairness existing, but 
being enforceable through non-judicial means -  had actually been enunciated in 
the High Court as early as 1926,186 but apart from the lone voices of Lionel
182 151 CLR, at 374.
183 Ibid.
184 151 CLR, at 229.
185 15 FCR, at 281.
186 See Moreau v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 39 CLR 65, at 68 (per Isaacs J). See also 
Isaacs J’s judgment in Boucaut Bay Co Ltd v The Commonwealth (1927) 40 CLR 98, at 105.
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Murphy and Sir Gerard Brennan (and Mr Justice Sheppard), it has been lost in
the modem era. 187
Lionel Murphy in fact had one of the more eclectic approaches to natural 
justice among High Court judges in recent times. In cases like R v Toohey and 
FAI Insurances v Winneke, he was prepared to urge that the courts adopt a very 
deferential view of what constituted a fair decision-making process vis ä vis the 
Executive. Yet, in other contexts, he was prepared to go much further than any 
of his colleagues in extending the compass of procedural fairness. In Forbes v 
New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd, for instance, he suggested that any attempt 
to exclude natural justice through contract would be invalid as being contrary to 
public policy. 188 In Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission, he 
said that there was a presumption of statutory interpretation against a 
government “departing] from the standards of official behaviour towards 
individuals which are basic to every civil society. ” 189 He also once said that any 
broad-based assertion of private power (which he saw as including the operation 
of “public halls, restaurants, theatres [and] racecourses”190) which “affects
18' The extent to which the notion of the executive’s chief responsibility as being to parliament 
has similarly been eroded in England is typified by R v Secretary o f State for the Environment, 
Ex parte Brent LBC [1982] QB 593, in which a minister was held to have failed to observe 
natural justice in refusing to meet with a local government delegation which wanted to protest 
against a policy decision to reduce a grant, even though the policy had been both fully debated in 
parliament and fully explained to the local authorities. See also R v Secretary o f State for 
Transport, Ex parte Greater London Council [1986] QB 556. More generally, see Wade and 
Forsyth, supra n 49, at 551 -  553.
188 (1987) 143 CLR 242, at 274.
189 (1977) 137 CLR 487, at 495.
190 Forbes, 143 CLR, at 274. Historically, Murphy J may not have been that far off the mark in 
his assessment of the way in which law regulated power. Paul Craig has written of the means by 
which the old common law imposed a general duty of reasonableness on those who wielded 
monopolistic power. See, “Constitutions, Property and Regulation” [1991] Pub Law 538. As to 
Murphy’s views on individual rights generally, see the essays in M Coper and G Williams (eds), 
Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or Merely Prescient? (1997).
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members o f the public to a significant degree” should be deemed to amount to an
exercise o f public power. He continued:
Such public power must be exercised bona fide, for the purposes 
for which it is conferred and with due regard to the persons 
affected by its exercise. This generally requires that where such 
power is exercised against an individual, due process or natural 
justice must be observed.191
THE LIMITS OF DISCRETION AND THE WIDENING OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW
When they are contrasted with sentiments like those expressed by 
Justices Brennan, Murphy and Sheppard, and the general tenor of the deferential 
judgments of the 1950s and before, the reach of the majority judgments in the 
1980s cases seems striking. If Sir Anthony Mason was accurate in delimiting the 
range of subjects which are not “susceptible of review”, when he said that they 
included “decisions affecting national security, foreign affairs, to prosecute or not 
to prosecute and the grant of pardons to convicted people”,192 this represents a 
profound extension of the reach of natural justice. Yet, considered in an 
historical light, the widening was only to be expected. All of the ingredients for 
the breaking down of the barriers to curial scrutiny of political decision-making 
processes had been in existence for some time.
191 143 CLR, at 275.
192 “The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual 
Rights”, supra n 23, at 8. See also Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 (holding that the decision of 
the Attorney-General to exercise the prerogative power to lay an indictment was not reviewable).
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Most critically in this respect, it is one of the basic truths of public law 
that the courts have seldom if ever taken discretion-conferring or state of mind 
provisions at face value.193 The courts have always been willing to read limits 
into legislative enactments which on their surface contain no limits at all. As 
long ago as 1599, the Common Pleas said that a statutory provision which 
allowed royal servants to “do according to their discretions” had to be interpreted 
in such a way that the actions “be limited and bound with the rule of reason and 
law.”194 Even in the case that most administrative lawyers would now prefer to 
forget, Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne, the Privy Council said that a “state of mind” 
provision “must be intended to serve in some sense as a condition limiting the 
exercise of an otherwise absolute power”.19''
It followed from this that some means of external control was necessary. 
If we accept that there can be no such thing under the rule of law as completely 
unfettered discretion (for such a thing could not amount to “law”), then some 
form of external arbiter is required. Otherwise, their Lordships said in Nakkuda 
Ali, the universally imputed legislative intent that the discretion be limited would 
be frustrated: “if the question whether the [condition precedent for the exercise 
of power] is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the power, the
193 Cases of wartime exigency being a possible exception. See, eg, Liversidge v Anderson [1942] 
AC 206 and R v Hallidav, Ex parte Zadig [1917] AC 260. Even then, there have been instances 
of the courts refusing to allow the Executive a free rein in the exercise of discretionary power. 
See, eg, R v Connell, Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries (1944) 69 CLR 407.
194 Rooke’s Case 5 Co Rep 99b, at 100a, 77 ER 209, at 210. The Court continued: “For 
discretion is a science or understanding to discern between shadows and substance, between 
equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private 
affections ...” (ibid).
195 [1951] AC 66, at 77.
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value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing” . 196 In the Australian setting, 
this point was perhaps best summed up by Kitto J, when he said:
It is a general principle of law ... that a discretion allowed by 
statute to the holder of an office is intended to be exercised 
according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to 
private opinion; according to law, and not humour, and within 
those limits within which an honest man, competent to discharge 
the duties of his office, ought to confine himself. The courts, 
while claiming no authority in themselves to dictate the decisions 
that ought to be made in the exercise of such a discretion in a 
given case, are yet in duty bound to declare invalid a purported 
exercise of the discretion when the proper limits have not been 
observed. 197
The way in which Kitto J phrased the judicial responsibility in cases 
involving executive discretion is significant. In many respects it was reminiscent 
of the way in which Lord Denning described the judicial role generally, as 
quoted at the outset of this chapter. 198 To return to first principles, in judicial 
review cases the courts are supposed only to be concerned with the lawfulness of 
administrative decisions, and not their propriety. Yet it is the logical 
consequence of the application of one of the fundamental tenets of our 
constitutional system -  that it falls to the judicial branch to determine questions 
of legality -  that has been responsible for the expansion of natural justice to 
include in the appropriate circumstances the work of the Crown. If we accept the 
premise that the principle of legality is a feature of the constitution, then it 
follows that the courts must have the right to determine whether the government
196 [1951] AC, at 77.
I9/ R v Anderson, Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177, at 189. 
198 See supra 285 -  286.
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-  whether it is acting through the Sovereign or one of her ministers, or whether it 
is proceeding under statute or by virtue of the prerogative -  is obeying the law. 199 
But, as with any other case involving the exercise of discretion, lawfulness will 
depend upon the reasonableness of the outcome and the fairness of the process.
It is for this reason that it has proven largely impossible to draw a firm 
dividing line between the bounds of judicial review and the province of merit 
review. Even under the older position, as set out in cases like Attorney-General 
v De Keyser's Royal Hotel, 200 whereby the courts claimed to reserve only the 
right to determine whether a prerogative existed, the seeds had been sewn for 
what amounted to substantive review of the Crown’s actions. “The power to 
interpret is the power to destroy”, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund said. 201 It is no less true 
that implicit in the power to determine whether a prerogative exists is the power 
to determine its scope, including whether, for it to be lawfully exercised, legal 
notions of procedural fairness are required.
So to speak of “non-justiciability” in this area is plainly nonsensical. The 
potential justiciability of all government action follows from the very first 
principles of our constitutional structure. This was nicely illustrated by the
199 It was in this context, for example, that in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex 
parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864, at 881, Lord Parker CJ said that if the decisions of a tribunal 
created under the prerogative were to have any lawful effect, then they themselves had to 
comply with the law.
200 Supra n 43.
201 “The Impact of Constitutions on Labour Law” (1976) 35 Camb U  240, at 244 (paraphrasing 
Marshall CJ in McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316).
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judgment of the House of Lords in the Fleet Street Casuals Case.202 This 
involved an attempt by a federation representing a group of small businesses to 
challenge a decision by the taxation authorities to “cut a deal” with a group of 
people employed casually in the newspaper industry -  in the days when the Fleet 
Street print unions were still strong. A group of small businesspeople was 
outraged at what it perceived to be special treatment afforded to trade union 
interests, and it sought to challenge the action. The House of Lords held that the 
federation was not sufficiently connected to the matters to have standing. But it 
also held that standing was not something that should be decided at the outset. 
In certain cases, the Lords held, whether or not there is the necessary sufficiency 
of interest in the matters complained of can only be determined after an 
evidentiary hearing.203
The significant point in this for present purposes was their Lordships’ 
implicit acknowledgment of the contingent nature of our legal system. For us, 
law is circumstance-dependent. Any statement of law must have a factual sub­
stratum. A judge invited to review a decision by the executive must engage in a 
fact-finding exercise at one level or another before deciding whether he or she 
has the authority to overturn it. In some cases, this fact-finding exercise may 
consist simply of statements on affidavit, but the truth is that one simply cannot 
say that the actions of the Crown are not reviewable per se.
202 Inland Revenue Commissioner v National Federation o f Self-Employed and Small Businesses 
Ltd [1982] AC 617.
203 See Lord Wilberforce [1982] AC, at 630, Lord Diplock [1982] AC, at 643 - 644.
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JUDICIAL ATTITUDE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The real question, therefore, is what stance the courts will take with 
respect to actions of the government -  whether by the Crown itself or by a 
Crown servant or agent -  which strike the court as being unfair or unjust. To 
restate the trite principle, the correctness or preferability of an administrative 
decision is meant to be no concern of the courts. This was the point made so 
forcefully by Murphy J in FAI Insurances v Winneke and R v Toohey, but it is 
also something that the whole High Court has felt need to reiterate in recent 
years. In Wu Shan Liang, for example, the majority quoted with approval a 
statement by Brennan J that “[t]he duty and jurisdiction of the court to review 
administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law 
which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s 
power. ” 204
Yet the recent natural justice cases stand in testament to the High Court’s 
willingness to ignore its own admonition when faced with cases of patent 
unfairness. This is where there has been a real change in judicial attitude. In 
older cases -  of which Duncan v Theodore was an example -  the courts were 
prepared to assume a deferential stance, not only to the ultimate value judgments 
made by political actors, but also to the political dynamics by which the value 
judgments were made. Even where the Privy Council acknowledged that if bad
204 Minister fo r Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, at 272 
(quoting A-G (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, at 35 - 36). See also GCHQ [1985] AC, at 414 -  
415.
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faith could be shown the making of a regulation could in principle be challenged, 
it was clear that their Lordships were inclined to take a deferential stance both to 
the necessity of the regulation and to the political process by which it came 
about.20" The attitude shown in cases like R v Toohey, FAI Insurances v Winneke 
and O ’Shea v South Australia was really quite different. And to return to the 
subject of the last chapter, to speak of the legal protection of expectations is 
necessarily to place substance at the forefront of the judicial review process.
That reflects the difference between cases involving legal rights and ones 
involving expectations. In the former, the law has made a prior determination of 
entitlement. But in the latter, the court must evaluate the worthiness of the 
expected outcome, so as to determine whether it amounts to a legitimate 
expectation or a to “mere hope”. So even if the courts do not see themselves as 
substituting their own preferred outcomes for those of the executive, the fact that 
they are weighing the substantive determinations made by the executive against 
what the citizenry expected the government to do, means that almost always, the 
reasons for judgment will have a substantive impact on any subsequently-made 
decision. This is most apparent in the workings of the courts at the metaphorical 
coal-face; the ones faced with real substantive injustice on a daily basis.
This, then, takes us back to the base question: at what stage will a 
representative of government -  whether the Queen herself or one of her servants -
205 Attorney-General (Canada) v Hallett and Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427. The case concerned the 
issuance of an Order in Council which had the effect of expropriating a stock of barley grain 
owned by Hallett and Carey Ltd. See supra n 42.
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be said to have gone from acting irresponsible to acting unlawfully? A review of 
the cases suggests that the answer to this is becoming less certain. At one time, the 
answer was predicated on identity -  just as was the duty to observe natural justice 
generally. But in the 1980s, the High Court (together with the House of Lords and 
the Supreme Court of Canada) abolished identity as the criterion for justiciability. 
In its stead came the more pragmatic, yet more malleable, question of whether a 
given power is not “susceptible of review”.
In chapters four and five, the question was raised in different contexts as to 
the jurisprudential basis by which the High Court had extended the reach of natural 
justice in the way it had. In chapters two and three, it was suggested that the 
doctrine of natural justice had suffered in Australia by not having been exposed to 
the sort of close academic scrutiny that it had in England and Canada in the first 
half of the century. The way in which the High Court has approached the issue of 
the reviewability of the Crown places both of these things in the scholar’s eye. 
The cases examined in this chapter make clear that the High Court’s approach to 
the question of procedural fairness is a pragmatic one; a “rolling up of shirtsleeves 
and getting down to business” sort of fairness.206 But given the questions of 
legitimacy, competency and constitutional propriety that go along with judicial 
review, they make more pressing than ever the question of the juridical basis by
206 In Bushell v Environment Secretary [1981] AC 75, at 95, Lord Diplock said :
What is fair procedure is to be judged not in light of constitutional functions as 
to the relationship between the minister and the other servants of the Crown 
who serve in the government department of which he is the head, but in light 
of the practical realities as to the way in which administrative decisions 
involving forming judgments based on technical considerations are reached ...
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which the duty to observe natural justice is said to arise in the first place. That 
question will be the focus of the next chapter.
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SEVEN
THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR THE 
DUTY OF FAIRNESS
t will have become apparent by now that in recent times, the High Court has 
.A. been comparatively unrestrained in its imposition of procedural requirements 
on governmental decision-makers. Since its judgment of thirty years ago in 
Banks v Transport Regulation Board,1 the Court has spread the obligation to 
treat individuals fairly to a range of governmental activity that would have been 
quite inconceivable to earlier generations. As noted earlier, Aronson and Dyer 
have described administrative law as a project of the “civilising” of government 
discretion.2 * In a lecture given in 1989, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of 
the statutory reforms to Commonwealth administrative law,2 Sir Gerard Brennan 
used similar language. He said:
After ten years it may not be possible to say that this society is 
fairer, or more egalitarian, or more compassionate than it was 
before. But it is possible to say that this society is one which now 
accords to the individual an opportunity to meet on more equal 
terms with the institutions of the state ... The interests of 
individuals are more fully acknowledged, and the repositories of 
power are constrained to treat the individual both fairly and 
according to law.4
1 (1968) 119 CLR222.
: M Aronson and B Dyer, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (1996), at 124.
See, supra chapter 4, at 211 -  214.
4 “Reflections” (1989) 58 Canberra Bulletin Pub Admin 32, at 33 (quoted in J McMillan and N 
Williams, “Administrative Law and Human Rights”, in D Kinley (ed) Human Rights in 
Australian Law {1988) 63, at 70).
COMPASSION AS A PUBLIC LAW VIRTUE?
As a point of judicial disposition, many people would be inclined to 
approve of Sir Gerard’s sentiments. As statements of positive law, the High 
Court’s decisions on natural justice in the 1980s and 90s can, one supposes, 
commend themselves to the reasonable compassionate observer. To state it in 
the terms used by Aronson and Dyer, the exercise of governmental discretion in 
Australia has become civilised -  at least to a much greater degree than formerly 
was the case. It is no longer imaginable, for example, that a taxi driver could 
have his licence withdrawn, only to be told by a stem looking judge (like, say, 
Lord Goddard) that he had no rights in his livelihood at all, or that parents whose 
child dies in tragic circumstances (like Mr and Mrs Annetts) would be denied the 
full opportunity to speak at a coronial inquest.
In terms of an ideal of public service conduct, this might all be to 
society’s ultimate good. As the Federal Court once admonished us, it is in our 
national interest to be seen as a civilised and compassionate nation." But to the 
legal scholar, consideration of the doctrine of natural justice cannot stop at 
compassion. The scholar must also be concerned with the means by which
5 Chaudhury v Minister for Immigration (1994) 49 FCR 84, at 87 -  88. This has been a repeated 
theme in the Federal Court. See, eg, Smithers J in Ates v Minister o f State for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (1983) 67 FLR 449, at 455 -  456 (decisions need to be taken “by reference to a 
liberal and even compassionate outlook appropriate to a free and confident nation and conscious 
of its reputation as such”) and Burchett J in Fuduche v Minister for Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR 515, at 527 (the Immigration Act requires “a 
broad and generous construction ... in furtherance of the good name of Australia that its 
humanity demands”). See also J McMillan and N Williams, “Administrative Law and Human 
Rights”, in D Kinley (ed) Human Rights in Australian Law (1998), supra n 4 , at 75 -  76.
344
changes to public law are carried out, and the extent to which this conforms to 
accepted bases for legal change.
It is basic to our constitutional system, though often overlooked, that the 
rule of law applies to the courts as much as to the political branches. As the 
editors of de Smith have said, “the standards applied by the courts in judicial 
review must ultimately be justified by constitutional principles, which govern the 
proper exercise of public power in any democracy. ” 6 The judiciary, like the 
legislature and the executive, must be able to demonstrate the lawful basis for its 
actions. Curial arbitrariness or faithlessness to principle should be just as 
offensive as executive arbitrariness. Indeed, it is salutary to remember that the 
length of the Chancellor’s foot was a public concern long before any fear of a 
“headless fourth branch of government” .7 It was in precisely that spirit that Sir 
Owen Dixon sought to warn of the conscious judicial innovator, who “is bound 
under the doctrine of precedents by no authority except the error he committed 
yesterday. ” 8
6 S A de Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (5th ed, 1995), at 
14.
An expression used by the American Bar Association’s Committee on Administrative 
Management. It described administrative agencies as a “headless ‘fourth branch’ of the 
government containing a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated 
powers.” (Report o f the Committee with Studies o f Administrative Management in the Federal 
Government (1937), at 39). See also FTC v Ruberoid Co (1952) 343 US 470, at 487, where 
Jackson J spoke of a “veritable fourth branch.” See further P Strauss, “The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch” (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 573.
8 “Concerning Judicial Method”, in Jesting Pilate (1965) 152, at 159.
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THE LEGITIMATE BASES FOR LEGAL CHANGE
Judicial positivism is, without reference to any supporting basis for its 
legitimacy, little more than an expression of individual curial prejudice. To use 
Sir Owen Dixon’s words once more, an activist judge who grounds legal change 
in his or her own view of the need for change, “wrests the law to his authority” , 9 
which is antithetical to any principled notion of the rule of law. As Lord Devlin 
once cautioned, mere enthusiasm for change is not a judicial virtue. 10 In the 
common law system, there are only three bases for establishing lawfulness. 
Judicial innovation, therefore, must be grounded in one of the three: legislative 
enactment, common law principle, or successful revolution." Accordingly, since 
genuine legal revolution is so rare, in almost all cases it will fall for a judge- 
made innovation in the law to legitimise itself by reference to a legislative 
command (including formal constitutional amendment), or the yardstick of 
common law principle.
For the reasons touched upon in chapter six, 12 the concern about 
legitimacy is particularly acute in matters of political and social controversy, as 
is the case with so many administrative law disputes. Jeremy Waldron once 
wrote that although “[i]t is said that hard cases make bad law one of our tasks in
9 Id, at 158.
10 “Judges and Lawmakers” (1976) 36 Mod L Rev 1, at 5.
11 See State (Pakistan) v Dosso PLD [1958] SC 533, Uganda v Commissioners o f Prisons [1966] 
EA 540. See also D W Greig, International Law (1976), at 149 —151,1 Brownlie and Principles 
of International Law (4th ed, 1990), at 9 2 -9 5 .
12 See supra 281 -  284.
346
jurisprudence is to consider the justification of legal institutions. ” 13 “If this 
enterprise is to be conducted in a spirit of argument rather than ideology,” he 
continued, “then hard cases -  indeed the hardest cases -  must be our primary 
point of reference. ” 14 Taking this observation in the present context, for the 
modem High Court approach to natural justice to amount to a satisfactory part of 
the body of administrative law, the cases must accord with something more than 
mere populist approval.
The decision of the High Court in Teohl~ provides an illustration in point 
of the pertinence of Waldron’s admonition. It becomes immediately clear from 
any reading of the majority judgments what the desired outcome was. But much 
less clear is the legal justification for this outcome. In their analysis of the 
legitimate expectation cases, of which Teoh represents the high water mark, 
Aronson and Dyer grouped the holdings into three categories. First, they said, 
were the cases where there had been an actual expectation which had arisen out 
of positive government statement -  cases such as Haoucher16 and Liverpool 
Taxis. 17 Secondly were the cases where, despite the non-existence of a positive 
statement by the government, circumstance had given rise to what they termed a 
“likely” expectation. Cases in this group included FAI Insurances v Winnekels
13 “Property, Justification and Need” (1993) 6 Can JLaw and Jurisp 185.
14 Ibid (original emphasis).
15 (1995) 183 CLR 273. For a discussion of the case, see supra chapter 5, at 259 -  266.
16 Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648. See supra 
chapter 5, at 238 -  245.
]1 R v Liverpool Corporation, Ex parte Taxi Fleet [1972] 2 QB 299. See supra chapter 4, at 203 
-205.
18 (1982) 151 CLR 342.
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and Annetts v McCann. ' 9 Thirdly, though, were cases like Teoh and Ainsworth v 
Criminal Justice Commission, 2U where there was neither a real expectation nor a 
likelihood of one. Aronson and Dyer described these as cases of prescriptive 
expectation. 21
In Teoh, as will be remembered, the High Court held that regardless of 
Mr Teoh’s ignorance of Australia’s treaty obligations, and quite apart from the 
fact that the treaty in question was debarred by constitutional principle from 
having force in domestic law, a legitimate expectation could be said to have 
existed that the Immigration officials would take the interests of the Teoh 
children into account as a “primary consideration” before deciding whether or 
not to deport Teoh. It is possible to mount a legal justification for the result, by 
imputing the requisite expectation to parliament rather than to Teoh. But this the 
majority did not do. Instead, they simply asserted that people in Mr Teoh’s 
shoes ought to be able to hold such expectations. That was implicit in the 
holding that the test for legitimate expectations was to be an objective rather than 
a subjective one. 22 Yet, their Honours did not ground this assertion in any theory 
of the constitution. On this basis, the judgments in Teoh must surely fail the 
challenges proffered by Waldron and Sir Owen Dixon. No disrespect is meant to 
the High Court if one says that Teoh smacks of result-oriented jurisprudence, or 
that their Honours sought in Teoh to (in Sir Owen Dixon’s words) wrest the law 
to their authority.
19 (1990) 170 CLR 596.
:o (1992) 175 CLR 564. This case is discussed at length supra chapter 5, at 255 -  258.
21 Supra n 2, at 417 (relying in part on the classifications used in P Finn and K Smith, “The 
Citizen, the Government and ‘Reasonable Expectations’ “ (1992) 66 ALJ 139, at 141 -  142).
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The point is that underlying our feelings as lawyers about individual 
outcomes must be the serious questions of the legitimacy of the High Court’s 
recent changes to the law. The result in Teoh may indeed have been the best one 
in the circumstances (at least looked at from the standpoints of Teoh and his 
family, or those who are in favour of children’s rights, or international lawyers). 
But the legal precedent which was the result of the High Court’s holding insists 
upon the jurisprudential question. By what right can the courts prescribe to the 
government that they must accord domestic legal status to documents which do 
not form part of domestic law? In a similar way, the Crown cases discussed in 
the last chapter clearly invite the observer to ask by what right a court can 
impose procedural obligations upon the workings of the Cabinet. In both cases, 
the question is: by reference to what principle of legal legitimacy can the High 
Court show that its extension of the law has a legal foundation?
PRAGMATISM, LEGITIMACY AND THE CHANGING 
CONSTITUTION
In fact, questions of the legitimacy of judicial review have been at the 
forefront of administrative law since at least the seventeenth century. In 1616, 
for example, King James I issued an order forbidding judicial interference with 
the work of the Sewer Commissioners. In terms which have a modem ring (if a 
quaint cast), the order spoke of, among other things, the need for “speedy and 
sudden execution” of the Commissioners’ orders, and the inappropriateness of
22 See also Aronson and Dyer, id, at 418 -  419.
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the “direct frustration and overthrow of the authority of the Commissioners” by 
the judges. 23
The answer to the legitimacy question in the early days was, in keeping 
with common law tradition, a pragmatic one: the courts engaged in review, and 
first the King, and later Parliament, acceded to it. It was thus that Lord Reid felt 
that he could justify the doctrine of natural justice on the basis that “for a long 
time the courts have, without objection from parliament supplemented procedure 
laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this 
purpose. ” 24 The various battles over privative clauses, which have been carried 
on right to the present day, also make the point. In chapter three, Billy Hughes’s 
description of the interplay between parliament and the High Court as a 
“miserable battledore and shuttlecock business” was noted.2' At some stage in 
the badminton game, parliament will simply give up, and acknowledge (however 
begrudgingly) that the courts can effectively never be completely excluded from 
review. But this alone does not answer the question of juridical principle. 
However much we might admire the spirit inherent in such interchanges, unless 
it is accompanied by a statement of justifying constitutional principle, judicial 
doggedness in circumventing privative clauses lends itself to a charge of 
wresting the law to the judges’ authority.
23 Quoted in L L Jaffe and E G Henderson, “Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical 
Origins” (1956) 72 LQR 345, at 353 -  354.
24 Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297, at 308. As an aside, it is interesting to note that even 
eight years after Ridge v Baldwin, Lord Reid continued to use the old language of functional 
classification.
25 Supra chapter 3, at 145.
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For the most part, however, the lack of a juridical certainty associated 
with natural justice has not really been much of a problem until this century. 
This was so for three reasons. First, before the advent of what I have been 
calling the “new” legislation, natural justice had a relatively limited scope. 
There were cases involving the protection of the quasi-proprietary rights we have 
in our reputations.26 And it was of course accepted all along that natural justice 
applied to the workings of the actual courts of law.27 Apart from that, however, 
natural justice was concerned in the main with the protection of legal proprietary 
rights against encroachment by the government.
On this, the notion of private property was so sacrosanct in the English 
legal tradition that in reality, the right to sit in judicial review of property- 
encroaching cases could be said to have been a principle of constitutional law. 
Of course it was seen to be a “rule of universal application”, “founded upon the 
plainest principles of justice”, as Willes J put it in Cooper v Wandsworth Board 
o f Works,2* that a man had to be heard before his rights in property could be 
destroyed. One would be hard-pressed to imagine the Common Pleas having 
said anything else. It was in a similar way that in Local Government Board v 
Arlidge, Lord Parmoor could say that in his view, it did not matter whether the 
proceedings before the Board were classified as judicial or not in order for
26 Eg, Wood V Wood (1874) LR 9 Ex 190.
27 See, eg, Cameron v Cole (1943) 68 CLR 571, at 589, in which Rich J said:
It is a fundamental principle of natural justice, applicable to all courts whether 
superior or inferior, that a person against whom a claim or charge is made 
must be given a reasonable opportunity of appearing and presenting his case.
If this principle be not observed, the person affected is entitled ex debito 
justiciae, to have any determination which affects him set aside.
28 (1863) 14 CB(NS) 180 at 190, 143 ER 414, at 418.
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natural justice to apply. The mere fact that the order was one which affected 
Arlidge’s property rights was enough to oblige the Board to act “in a judicial 
spirit, in accordance with the principles of substantial justice” .29 The important 
thing, though, is that however broadly the doctrine of natural justice may have 
been described in the old cases, the actual penumbra of the law was limited by 
the limited range of disputes that were seen to raise justiciable issues.
Secondly, it is a fact that for the greater part of its history, the common 
law has eschewed matters of fine constitutional principle. The common law 
tradition, possibly in contrast to the continental tradition, is one of stolid 
pragmatism. 20 But with the onset of the “new” legislation, unstated assumptions 
about the appropriateness of curial muscle-flexing came first under strain and 
then under direct challenge. As discussed in chapter six, once the universal 
franchise came to be a feature of our parliamentary system, the imperative to 
justify the overt exercise of political power by reference to a democratic mandate 
became a pressing one. In the seventeenth century, it was possible to have a 
series of constitutional clashes amongst Crown, judiciary and parliament in 
which the opinions of ordinary Englishmen and women were for the most part 
irrelevant. This simply could not be the case today. Cynicism about media 
manipulation aside, every political office-holder today -  including the judge -  is 
acutely aware of the authority of the opinion-poll.
29 [1915] AC 120, at 142.
30 See, supra, at 217, n 1.
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Thirdly, by the mid-nineteenth century, it could no longer be assumed 
with confidence that parliaments actually wished to respect individual property 
rights. To return to Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works and Municipal 
Council o f Sydney v Harris f  both cases arose in the context of a pretty clearly- 
stated parliamentary intent to interfere with the traditional rights of private land- 
owners. Furthermore, many of the new cases dealt with things other than 
property rights in the strict sense. And even those cases which did involve land 
oftentimes could not be pigeon-holed into the category of “state encroachment 
on holder in fee” case. New types of rights and interests -  often previously 
unknown to the common law -  were at issue. Gillen v Laffer(2 provides an 
illustration of this.
The point is that judges may have conservative inclinations, but they are 
generally not conscious saboteurs. During the period in which the new 
legislation was still new, judges on the whole were aware of the bureaucratic 
revolution going on all around them -  of that, the controversy over The New 
Despotism and the Housing Act cases can leave no doubt. They may not have 
liked it but they were all, at least by the early part of this century, schooled in 
Dicey and the Whiggish rhetoric of the Glorious Revolution. Unlike the judges 
of Coke’s day, parliamentary supremacy was as integral a provision of their 
constitution as the sanctity of property rights. As a former Chief Justice of
?1 See, supra chapter 2, at 74 -  79.
'2 (1925) 37 CLR 210. See supra chapter 2, at 91 -  94.
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Canada once said:
We may well feel that judicial supremacy is the highest of all 
values under a democratic regime of law, and a value to which 
even the legislature should pay tribute. But we have not 
enshrined it in any fundamental constitutional law or in our 
political system. On the contrary, the cardinal principle of our 
system of representative government, inherited from Great 
Britain, has been the supremacy of the legislature.”
So in searching for ways in which to respond to these sorts of new cases 
-  cases in which parliament was exercising its supreme power in ways 
unfamiliar to the common law -  the courts came to seek refuge in the Diceyan 
formulation of the rule of law. Dicey’s rule of law has as its central creed that 
the executive government is subject to the ordinary law as much as any 
individual. 34 Judicial review of executive action, therefore, came to be styled as 
an act of implied agency. Being no longer able to rely solely upon the authority 
of common law antiquity to justify review (even though it was an antiquity 
which in fact pre-dated the constitutional settlement), as the legal issues with 
which they were now dealing were not ones rooted in antiquity, the courts 
resorted to the other doctrinal justification for legal action -  the legislative 
command. The courts were to be parliament’s policemen, ensuring that the 
executive did not overstep its lawful boundaries. The understood foundation for 
judicial review, in other words, was the notion of ultra vires.
33 B Laskin, “Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses” (1952) 30 
Can Bar Rev 986, at 990 (quoted by Sir Gerard Brennan, in “The Purpose and Scope of Judicial 
Review”, in M Taggart (ed), Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems 
and Prospects (1986) 18, at 26).
'4 The Law o f the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), at 189.
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THE ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth have been probably the two 
most staunch defenders in recent times of the ultra vires principle. They have 
described it as the “central principle” of administrative law/" Without it, they 
argue, judicial review loses its legitimacy: “Every administrative act is either 
intra vires or ultra vires; and the court can condemn it only if it is ultra vires” .36 
From a Diceyist perspective, this is entirely proper. As Christopher Forsyth has 
written, “the prime role of [the ultra vires principle] is to provide the necessary 
constitutional underpinning for the greater part ... of judicial review. ” 37 He said 
that “[n]o one is so innocent as to suppose that judicial creativity does not form 
the grounds of judicial review; but by adhering to the doctrine of ultra vires the 
judiciary shows that it adheres to its proper constitutional position . . . ” 38 
Spigelman CJ recently put it similarly: in justifying judicial review by reference 
to the ultra vires principle, “the sovereignty of parliament, understood in the 
sense of a parliamentary monopoly of public power, is affirmed.” 39
Administrative law, under this view, can largely be characterised as an 
exercise in statutory interpretation. Taking this in the context of natural justice, 
such a characterisation does not pose a problem when a statute lays down
35 Sir W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994), at 41.
36 Id, at 44. For an Australian comment on this point of view, see Aronson and Dyer, supra n 2, 
at 110- 115.
37 “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Principle, the Sovereignty of Parliament and 
Judicial Review” (1996) 55 Camb U  122.
38 M a t 136.
39 The Hon J J Spigelman, “Foundations of Administrative Law: Toward General Principles of 
Institutional Law” (1999) 58 A J  Pub Admin 3, at 4.
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express conditions for the exercise of power. But what of the case where an Act 
is siler.t on an issue which nonetheless offends common law values? The 
solution is a trick of judicial legerdemain. As Wade and Forsyth put it:
It is presumed that Parliament did not intend to authorise abuses, 
and that certain safeguards against abuse must be implied in the 
Act. These are matters of general principle, embodied in the rules 
of law which govern the interpretation of statutes. Parliament is 
not expected to incorporate them expressly in every Act that is 
passed. They may be taken for granted as part of the implied 
conditions to which every Act is subject and which the courts 
extract by reading between the lines, or (it may be truer to say) 
insert by writing between the lines. These implied conditions are 
to be taken as part and parcel of the Act, just as much as express 
conditions. Any violation of them, therefore, renders the 
offending action ultra vires.40
de Smith, the other of the classic English texts on judicial review, 
expresses a similar view. After describing the sovereignty of parliament and the 
rule of law as twin constitutional principles which govern the exercise of public 
power in a democracy, 41 the editors say:
The apparent inconsistency between the rule of law and 
Parliamentary supremacy may be resolved by the courts making 
the presumption that Parliament intended its legislation to 
conform to the rule of law as a constitutional principle ... 
Parliament, when enacting legislation, is presumed to intend that 
the future implementation and enforcement of its legislation 
should conform with the fundamental principles of the 
constitution as elucidated in standards set by the common law.42
40 Swra n 35, at 42.
41 Swra n 6.
42 Id at 16.
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For present purposes, Lord Guest once described this process of 
presumption in the context of inferring the existence of a duty to observe natural 
justice:
[T]he courts will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the 
principles of natural justice should be applied. The implication 
will be made on the basis that parliament is not to be presumed to 
take away parties’ rights without giving them an opportunity of 
being heard in their interest. In other words, parliament is not to 
be presumed to act unfairly.4'
It is clear that approaches such as these can require the courts regularly to 
turn a Nelsonian eye to what would seem to be perfectly clear statements of 
legislative intent. While not a natural justice ease, the decision of the House of 
Lords in Anisminic44 provides a wonderful illustration of this technique -  which 
Wade and Forsyth describe as a “necessary artificiality” 45 -  in action. There, the 
British Parliament had made it quite clear that it wished the determinations of the 
Foreign Compensation Commission to be immune from judicial review. 
Nothing could be plainer from a statutory provision which said that “[t]he 
determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this 
Act shall not be called in question in any court of law” .46 Nevertheless, their
43 Wiseman v Borneman, [1971] AC 297, at 310. See also Jacobs J in Salemi v MacKellar (No 
2) (1977) 136CLR396, at 451.
44 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
45 Supra n 35, at 43.
46 Foreign Compensation Act 1950, sub-s 4(4). Though it would have been improper for their 
Lordships (in their judicial capacity) to refer to it at the time, a review of Hansard makes it clear 
that the government’s intention was to insulate the Foreign Compensation Commission from all 
legal challenge. In second reading in the Lords, Lord Jowitt LC said that the intention was to 
allow the FCC to “decide, and decide finally” how the money in the foreign compensation pot 
was to be divided up (Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 27 June 1950).
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Lordships were able to read this provision as still permitting review for legal
47error.
Anisminic is an important case not only for the legal rule that it 
established, but also for the fact that it illustrated one of the basic truths of public 
law in the Anglo-Commonwealth tradition. That is that many judges will, if 
moved to do so by what they perceive to be circumstances of individual 
hardship, proceed contrary to the actual wishes of parliament. But the method 
used by the House of Lords in Anisminic was not to deny the constitutional 
stricture of the supremacy of parliament. Rather, it was to impute to parliament 
an intention not to deny the citizen access to the courts -  though on the actual 
facts of the case, the contrary view, if anything, was the warranted one. As Sir 
William Wade himself acknowledged in an analysis of Anisminic: “The intention 
of Parliament was clear ... In refusing to enforce it, the court was applying a 
presumption which may override even their constitutional obedience ... This is 
tantamount to saying that judicial review is a constitutional fundamental which 
even the sovereign Parliament cannot abolish.” 48
Professor Wade’s frankness illustrates the great weakness of the ultra 
v/res/statutory interpretation conception of judicial review. It leaves itself open 
to charges of intellectual dishonesty -  which, for a doctrine of law, is a serious 
enough charge. But, as Christopher Forsyth has reminded us, its countervailing
47 On Anisminic, see Wade and Forsyth, supra n 35, at 734 -  740.
48 At 737. See also H W R Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (1980), at 66. For an example 
of a most strident (and generally extraordinary) criticism of Professor Wade for taking the view
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saving is that it does not do violence to constitutional principle. In the same way 
that the general introduction of legal fictions saved English land law from 
collapse, so, too, can “necessary artificialities” preserve judicial review from 
necessarily fatal charges of constitutional illegitimacy.
THE DUTY TO OBSERVE NATURAL JUSTICE AS AN 
IMPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
In fact, the statutory interpretation approach was the basis adopted for the 
imposition of natural justice requirements in new legislation cases for some time. 
In some of the earlier “new legislation” cases in the High Court, the ultra vires 
principle was clearly conceived of as the foundation for the imposition of the 
doctrine of natural justice. In Municipal Council o f Sydney v Harris, for 
example, Isaacs J was of this opinion. In his view, it will be remembered, 
natural justice was applicable because in cases involving interference with 
property rights, it was “plain on ordinary principles of construction that the 
persons affected must have some opportunity to be heard in their own defence.” 49 
Similarly, in Gillen v Laffer, Higgins J said that the question was whether audi 
alteram partem was “tacitly implied” in the provision in issue.50 This, he said, 
“depend[ed] on the construction of the particular Act” .51 He quoted the passage 
in Maxwell on Statutes which said that in “giving judicial powers to affect 
prejudicially the rights of person or property, a statute is understood as silently
that he does on this point, see H M Seervai, Constitutional Law o f India -  A Critical 
Commentary (4th ed, 1993), at x -  xiv, and Postscript to chapter XVI.
49 (1912) 14 CLR 1, at 14. See supra chapter 2, at 77.
50 (1925) 37 CLR 210, at 225.
51 37 CLR, at 227.
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implying, when it does not expressly provide [the audi alteram partem 
principle] . ” ''2 Two years later, in Boucaut Bay Co Ltd v The Commonwealth, 
Starke J said that whether a Minister had to provide a hearing to someone whose 
contract to provide a coastal shipping service in the Northern Territory was to be 
cancelled turned upon the “true meaning” of the agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the contractor.52
Even in some old-fashioned property cases from the period, there were 
hints of the courts using the interpretive approach to determine whether natural 
justice was required. De Verteuil v Knaggs54 was an example of this. The case 
involved a property right that most people today would find abhorrent -  the 
rights to property in indentured labourers. The Governor of Trinidad had made 
an order that a plantation owner have his indentured servants removed from him, 
on the basis that they were suffering ill-treatment. The Governor made his order 
pursuant to a local Ordinance, which allowed him to act if he thought it 
necessary “on sufficient ground shown to his satisfaction”.5'' In deciding that a 
hearing was required before such an order could be validly made, the Privy 
Council found that it was an “obvious implication” in the legislative scheme.56
52 37 CLR, at 225 (quoting Maxwell (6th ed, 1920), at 638).
53 (1927) 40 CLR 98, at 102.
54 [1918] AC 557 (PC).
55 Immigration Ordinance No 161, s 203.
56 [1918] AC, at 560.
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THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE AND NATURAL JUSTICE 
IN THE MODERN HIGH COURT
The Barwick View
The references to ultra vires in the judgments of Isaacs and Higgins JJ in 
the 1920s have already been discussed. But the ultra vires approach to natural 
justice continued to receive a forceful espousal in the High Court into the 
1970s.87 In 1976, in Twist v Randwick Municipal Council, Barwick CJ spoke of 
the duty to observe natural justice in somewhat open-ended terms.58 Similarly, 
in Banks v Transport Regulation Board, his judgment had been equivocal on the 
issue of the precise jurisdictional basis for judicial review. But in Salemi v 
MacKellar (No 2), in 1977, Barwick CJ made clear his view as to the proper 
source of an obligation to accord procedural fairness. His was a decidedly 
“Wade-isfC view of the issue:
The relevant principles [concerning the duty to observe natural 
justice] are both fundamental and, in my opinion, fairly well 
settled. The courts have no power of amendment of an Act of 
Parliament. They may interpret its language and, perhaps, in 
doing so, at times reach a result which the Parliament may not 
have contemplated but which, by the terms it has employed, the 
Parliament has effected ...
The courts in construing a statute may make express what is 
implicit in it. Thus they may decide that the statute requires those 
whom it vests with a power of decision affecting the rights and 
property of others to adopt procedures which, in the opinion of 
the courts, are necessary to ensure natural justice. Those 
procedures are various and stem from the particular statutory
57 This was also the position in Canada. See Attorney-General o f Canada v Inuit Tapirisat o f 
Canada [1980] 2 SCR 735, at 755 (discussed supra chapter 6, at 300). See also Alliance des 
Professeurs Catholiques de Montreal v Labour Relations Board [1953] 2 SCR 140.
58 136 CLR 106, at 109- 110.
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situations with which the courts have to deal ... [Fairness] is what 
is required of a repository of power when on the proper 
construction of the statute that power is qualified by the need to 
accord natural justice. But the basic question is whether the 
statutory power is so qualified. Whether it is to be so qualified 
is a matter for the Parliament... [I]t is fundamental that what 
the courts do in qualifying the powers is no more than to 
construe the statute.
To conceive of the issue otherwise, in the Chief Justice’s view, could 
lead to negative constitutional -  and social -  consequences. He echoed the 
views of Sir Owen Dixon, his predecessor as Chief Justice, when he said that 
“[i]t is most important ... that the courts do not transgress the line dividing the 
judicial from the legislative function. To do so is to weaken both functions 
which ought for the health of society to retain their mutual independence. ” 60 In 
the same case, Jacobs J made a slightly different observation: “The legislature”, 
he said, “is assumed by the courts to be aware of the principles of natural justice 
which are a part of the common law. The application of those principles depends 
on the circumstances of the case” .61 As noted, Wade and Forsyth, de Smith and 
Lord Reid have also made the same point. But Jacobs J acknowledged the 
Quixotic reality of the courts’ quest for parliamentary intent in natural justice 
cases:
I recognise that the search for legislative intention can be 
described as somewhat artificial. What the courts do in the 
absence of express legislative intention is to ensure that power, 
whether it be judicial or quasi-judicial or executive, be exercised 
fairly, weighing the interests of the individual and the interests of 
society as a whole.62
59 (1977) 137 CLR 396, at 400 - 401 (emphasis added).
60 137 CLR, at 401 -402.
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The Brennan View
The view taken by Sir Garfield Barwick leads one to think of he and 
Lionel Murphy as substantively ill-matched bedfellows on the question of 
parliamentary sovereignty, but by far the most continuingly vocal advocate in the 
High Court for the ultra vires approach to natural justice has been Sir Gerard 
Brennan. As was foreshadowed in chapter five, in the legitimate expectation 
cases in particular Brennan J indicated concern with the way in which his 
colleagues were expounding the basis of the doctrine of natural justice. Yet, his 
preoccupation went to the basis for judicial review generally. As Sir Anthony 
Mason has put it, Sir Gerard’s “perception of the limitation of the judicial role 
stemmed, in part, from his view of the relationship between the three arms of 
government.”63
Sir Anthony attributed this to Brennan’s shared view of the nature of 
judicial power with Sir Owen Dixon: “It could be said that the separation of 
powers, at least the separation of the judicial power, was central to his thinking, 
as indeed was Sir Owen Dixon’s notion of judicial method.”64 Perhaps the most 
overt indication of Brennan J’s views in this respect was seen in his judgment in 
1993, in Walton v Gardiner. Referring to the sixth edition of Wade66 (curiously,
61 137 CLR, at 451.
62 Ibid.
63 “Judicial Review: The Contribution of Sir Gerard Brennan”, paper presented at the Public Law 
Conference, Canberra, 6 November 1998.
64 Ibid.
65 (1988), at 42.
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one of the few instances in which Professor Wade’s work has actually been cited
on this point in the High Court), Brennan J said:
Where a statute confers a jurisdiction or power, [the court] must 
construe the statute in order to exercise its supervisory 
jurisdiction. If the statute, either expressly or by implication, 
limits the power or prescribes rules governing its exercise, the 
Court enforces the limitation or the observance of the rules in 
obedience to the intention of the legislature. That legislative 
supremacy is the justification for judicial supervision is clear 
enough when the limitation or the rules are expressed; it is no less 
the justification for judicial supervision when a limitation or 
governing rule is implied.66
On the doctrine of natural justice more narrowly, it is interesting to 
examine the changing tone of Brennan J’s assertions about jurisdictional basis in 
the legitimate expectation cases of the 1980s. In FAI Insurances v Winneke, for 
example, he was relatively gentle:
[T]he rules of natural justice describe collectively the kinds of 
procedural conditions implied by the common law in statutes 
which confer powers but which do not express, or do not express 
exhaustively, the procedures to be observed in exercising the 
powers conferred.67
And:
The construing of a statute with a view to determining whether 
the principles of natural justice are to be applied requires more 
than mere exegesis of the statutory text; the common law 
attributes to the statute an operation which accords as closely as 
may be with the requirements of justice.68
66 177 CLR 378, at 408.
67 (1982) 151 CLR 342, at 407.
68 151 CLR, at 409.
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Three years later, in Kioa v West, the chiding became just a little bit more
pointed:
The supremacy of Parliament, a doctrine deeply embedded in our 
constitutional law and congruent with our democratic conditions, 
requires the courts to declare the validity or invalidity of 
executive action ... in accordance with criteria expressed or 
implied by statute. There is no jurisdiction to declare a purported 
exercise of statutory power invalid for failure to comply with 
procedural requirements other than those expressly or impliedly 
prescribed by statute. 69
By the end of the decade, in Annetts v McCann, he was downright 
insistent:
The relevant law must be found in the statutory provisions which 
create the power and confer it on the repository, though the terms 
of the statute may be expanded by the implication of conditions 
supplied by the common law ... This is the foundation and scope 
of the principles of natural justice. The common law confers no 
jurisdiction to review the exercise of power by a repository when 
the power has been exercised or is to be exercised in conformity 
with the statute which creates and confers the power. 70
The Flaws in the Brennan Approach
A series of problems come to mind with Brennan J’s enunciation of the 
statutory interpretation/w/rra vires basis for natural justice. First, he left 
unanswered the question of natural justice applying to the royal prerogative, 
something which he actually acknowledged himself. 71 Wade and Forsyth, the
69 (1985) 159 CLR 550, at 611.
70 (1990) 170 CLR 596, at 604.
71 See Kioa, 159 CLR, at 611. See also his piece “The Purpose and Scope of Judicial Review”, 
supra n 33. On the question of review of the prerogative in Australia generally, see F Wheeler,
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two leading academic proponents of the ultra vires approach, recognised this as 
well, saying that “prerogative power is as capable of abuse as is any other power, 
and that the law can sometimes find means of controlling it. ” 72 The point is that 
the Brennan analysis leaves a gap in coverage.
Secondly, and perhaps more critically, there is a gap of logic in Brennan 
J’s reasoning with respect to the scope of natural justice. This was an issue 
adverted to earlier, in chapter five.73 As will be recalled, Brennan J held that 
legitimate expectations could be relevant insofar as the content of natural justice 
was concerned, but not so as to act as a trigger for the duty. But he also 
suggested that the trigger for natural justice ought to be allied with the test for 
standing -  which is a creature of the common law, and which is determined 
according to standards measured according to subjective effect. As suggested in 
chapter five, to apply Brennan’s proffered test is to undercut his thesis about the 
constitutional foundation of judicial review.
The feeling of perplexion with Brennan J’s reasoning on this point 
increases when one considers his judgment in Annetts v McCann. On one hand, 
he continued to display a greater overt faithfulness to the constitutional premise 
of parliamentary sovereignty than his colleagues. But his reference in Annetts v
“Judicial Review of Prerogative Power in Australia: Issues and Prospects” (1992) 14 Syd L Rev 
432.
72 Supra n 35, at 384 (referring, inter alia, to GCHQ). In Constitutional Fundamentals (1980), 
Professor Wade said that he thought the expression “prerogative” was often used too widely, and 
that if it was properly understood, there would be less controversy over the scope of 
reviewability of non-statutory power. See especially at 41 -  48.
73 See supra 274 -  275.
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McCann to “terms supplied by the common law” 74 sits ill with this view of the 
constitution. It of course bears a conspicuous resemblance to the suggestion by 
Byles J in Cooper v Wandsworth Board o f Works that the common law could 
“supply the omission of the legislature”.7" Indeed, in Annetts v McCann, as in 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin, the magisterial appointment case, when it came 
to actual result, Brennan J based his conclusion on the way in which the 
common law acts to protect reputational interests.76 Yet, when, in the next 
legitimate expectation case, Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission, 77 the 
High Court reiterated that the common law could give rise to an independent 
obligation to be “fair” quite apart from any statutory requirements to the same 
effect, Brennan’s was a voice once more heard in protest. 78
Thirdly, the ultra vires approach is, as noted earlier, arguably 
intellectually dishonest. Though the curial slight of hand involved in cases like 
Anisminic has in recent years been reiterated by the House of Lords as the source 
of judicial review power, 79 the ultra vires principle as enunciated by Wade and 
Forsyth has been subjected to strident criticism, both from the academy and from
4 (1990) 170 CLR 596, at 606. See supra chapter 5, at 255.
3 (1863) 14 CB(NS) 180, at 194, 143 ER 414, at 420. For more on this case, see supra chapter 
1, at 31 -32 .
76 170 CLR, at 608 - 609 (referring to NCSC v News Corporation Limited (1984) 156 CLR 296, 
Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808, and In re Pergamon Press [1971] Ch 388). Brennan 
J described the idea that natural justice applies to protect reputational interests as a “general 
principle”, which is applicable “unless the statute relating to the performance of the Coroner’s 
functions excludes its application” (170 CLR, at 609).
77 (1992) 175 CLR 564.
78 (1992) 175 CLR 564, at 584 -  585.
77 Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 WLR 639 and R v Lord President o f the Privy 
Council, Ex parte Page [1993] AC 682. See also C Forsyth, “Collateral Challenge and the 
Foundations of Judicial Review: Orthodoxy Vindicated and Procedural Exclusivity Rejected” 
[1998] PubL 364.
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members of the judiciary.80 Lord Justice Laws, for example, has said that it is a 
pure fiction to ascribe modern-day principles of judicial review like the 
protection of legitimate expectations to the intention of the legislature. He said 
that concepts like these,
[wjhich represent much of the bedrock of modem administrative 
law, were suddenly interwoven into the legislature’s intentions in 
the 1960s and 70s and onward, in which period they have been 
articulated and enforced by the courts. They owe neither their 
existence nor their acceptance to the will of the legislature. They 
have nothing to do with the intention of Parliament, save as a fig 
leaf to cover their true origins. We do not need the fig leaf any
o 1more.
Fourthly, and perhaps most critically of all, is the fact that in the right 
sort of case, Brennan J could be moved to ignore his own admonitions. He could 
find himself drawn away from principle by the press of individual circumstances. 
Such was the case in J  v Lieschkef The case involved a proceeding under the 
Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW), to have five infant children removed from the 
custody of their mother, on the basis that they were suffering from neglect. It 
was apparently the practice in these sorts of proceedings in New South Wales 
that parents were ordinarily not given full standing.83 This naturally offended 
Brennan J’s sense of justice. But in arriving at his conclusion that the children’s 
mother ought to have had the right to standing in the proceedings, he made 
statements which had a most w«Brennan-like mien to them.
80 See, eg, P Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review” (1998) 57 Camb LJ 63, 
Sir J Laws, “Law and Democracy” [1995] Pub L 72, Lord Woolf, “Droit Public -  English Style” 
[1995] Pub L 57, P Craig, Administrative Law (3rd ed, 1994), at 12 -  17, Sir J Laws, “Illegality: 
The Problem of Jurisdiction”, in M Supperstone and J Goudie (eds), Judicial Review (1992), at 
67, D Oliver, “Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?” [1987] Pub L 543.
81 “Law and Democracy”, supra n 80, at 79.
82 (1987) 162 CLR447.
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Rather than referring to Wade, or to one of his own previous decisions, or 
even to the principled exposition of the basis for the doctrine of natural justice by 
Barwick CJ in Salemi v MacKellar, Brennan J instead relied on Barwick CJ’s 
much more open-ended view in Twist v Randwick Municipal Council, and on 
Dixon CJ’s judgment in Commissioner o f Police v Tanos, 84 Indeed, there was no 
mention whatever in his judgment in Lieschke of the necessity of engaging in 
statutory interpretation in order to find ultra vires action on the part of the 
governmental actor. Instead, he seemed to suggest that natural justice applied to 
the facts at hand as a matter of common law. “The general principle which 
governs this case”, he said,
is clearly established. It is stated by Barwick CJ in Twist v 
Randwick Municipal Council in these terms:
The common law rule that a statutory authority having 
power to affect the rights of a person is bound to hear him 
before exercising the power is both fundamental and 
universal ... But the legislature may displace the rule and 
provide for the exercise of such a power without any 
opportunity being afforded the affected person to oppose its 
exercise. However, if that is the legislative intention it must 
be made unambiguously clear.
The principle governs the proceedings of administrative agencies 
and, a fortiori, the proceedings of the established courts: see per 
Dixon CJ and Webb J in Commissioner o f Police v Tanosf
Given the doggedness of his position on natural justice in the legitimate 
expectation cases, this seems an extraordinary passage to read.86
83 See 162 CLR, at 454-455 .
84 (1958) 98 CLR 383. See supra chapter 3, at 153 -  155.
162 CLR, at 456 (quoting Twist, 136 CLR, at 109 - 110, and Tanos, 98 CLR, at 396).
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THE COMMON LAW AS THE PREFERRED SOURCE OF 
NATURAL JUSTICE OBLIGATIONS
Of the judges who have eschewed a need to base the right to natural 
justice on legislative intent, Sir Anthony Mason has probably been the most 
forthright, though he found consistently good company in Sir Harry Gibbs, Sir 
William Deane and Sir Daryl Dawson. The first of Sir Anthony’s judgments to 
be considered for present purposes was that in Twist. In fact, Twist was in many 
ways an easy case, for it involved an old-fashioned, “power to demolish 
unsightly building” statute. 87 The only issue was whether a right to a de novo 
appeal of a demolition order obviated the necessity of according natural justice at 
first instance. Not surprisingly given the context, Mason J (as he then was) said 
that normally, “it could not be doubted that an intended exercise of the power 
would attract the rules of natural justice or the duty of fairness” . 88
In a similar vein, Gibbs J denied that in the circumstances it was 
necessary to find a statutory “hook” on which to base an obligation to impose 
natural justice requirements: “when the power which is being exercised is a
86 Though see also his judgment in NCSC v News Corp Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296, at 326,where 
he said:
If a statute were enacted to authorise an administrative agency to publish 
matter reflecting adversely upon the reputation of a person after an inquiry into 
that person’s conduct, the statute might be expected to specify the procedural 
protection which the agency would be required to accord to that person. When 
the limits of a statutory function are ascertained the interests which are apt to 
be affected by the performance of the function can be identified. Then it is 
possible for a court to say -  in the absence of express statutory provision -  
what has to be done to be fair to those whose interests are apt to be affected by 
the performance of the function.
87 The Local Government Act 1919 (NSW).
88 136 CLR, at 112.
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statutory one, it is not necessary to be able to find in the words of the statute 
itself a duty to hear the party affected or otherwise to act judicially”.89 Rather, 
the right to procedural fairness depended on the particular situation: “[t]he 
question whether the principles of natural justice must be applied, and if so what 
those principles require, depends on the circumstances of each case”.90 This, of 
course, stood in marked contrast to the view of Barwick CJ, who, as noted, 
thought that whether natural justice applied depended on the intent of the 
legislature, and hence demanded a “universal” opinion.91
The Mason View
But the real exposition of a doctrine of natural justice free from 
dependence on interpretive presumptions was to come through Sir Anthony 
Mason’s judgments in the major legitimate expectation cases of the 1980s and 
90s. Indeed, for the most part, Brennan J’s reiteration of the Wade/Forsyth view 
must be read in the context of a reaction against the judgments of his brother 
Mason in these cases. In FAI Insurances v Winneke, for example, Mason J said:
The fundamental rule is that a statutory authority having power 
to affect the rights of a person is bound to hear him before 
exercising the power. The application of the rule is not limited 
to cases where the exercise of the power affects rights in the 
strict sense. It extends to the exercise of a power which affects 
an interest or a privilege or which deprives a person of a
89 137 CLR, at 419.
90 Ibid. See, also, Bread Manufacturers o f New South Wales v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404, at 
415. Gibbs CJ’s view was reminiscent of that once expressed by Lord Wilberforce. In Wiseman 
v Borneman [1971] AC 297, at 317, he said he was “not satisfied” with an approach that relied 
upon legislative intent: “It is necessary to look at the procedure in its setting and ask the question 
whether it operates unfairly ... to a point where the courts must supply the legislative omission.”
91 137 CLR, at 401.
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‘legitimate expectation’, to borrow the expression of Lord 
Denning MR ... in circumstances where it would not be fair to 
deprive him of that expectation without a hearing.
Natural justice in its application to decisions affecting the grant, 
refusal, renewal and revocation of licences has been beset with 
complexities. Some of these abstract complexities have been 
banished from the stage or at least relegated to the wings ... It is 
now authoritatively established that the exercise of a power 
revoking a licence will attract the rules of natural justice, 
certainly when the revocation results in the loss of a right to 
earn a livelihood or to carry on a financially rewarding 
activity.
This passage is interesting for its sheer sweep -  it represents an 
illustration of one of Sir Anthony Mason’s attempts to codify the common law.93
The majority judgments three years later, in Kioa v West, show 
something of the curious non-collegiate way in which the High Court of 
Australia tends to conduct its business. In his judgment, Gibbs CJ relied upon 
Mason J’s judgment in FAI Insurances v Winneke as the basis for applying the 
doctrine of natural justice.94 Mason J, in contrast, referred only in passing to 
FAI. Instead, he reiterated (and refined) his views:
It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural 
justice expressed in traditional terms that, generally speaking, 
when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some 
right or interest or the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is 
entitled to know the case sought to be made against him and to be 
given an opportunity of replying to it. The reference to ‘right or 
interest’ in this formulation must be understood as relating to 
personal liberty, status, preservation of livelihood and reputation, 
as well as to proprietary rights and interests. 95
92 151 CLR, at 360 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93 See also in this respect his judgment in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 
162 CLR 24.
94 See 159 CLR, at 563.
95 1 59 CLR, at 582.
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He said that the law had
now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a 
common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according 
procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions 
which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject 
only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.96
In Annetts v McCann, Mason CJ (as he now was) joined with Deane J 
and McHugh J in offering the following view of the doctrine’s scope:
It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power 
upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person’s 
rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural 
justice regulate the exercise of that power unless they are 
excluded by plain words of necessary intendment.97
Relying on the judgment of Dixon CJ and Webb J in Tanos, the three 
judges continued:
[A]n intention on the part of the legislature to exclude the rules of 
natural justice was not to be assumed nor spelled out from 
‘indirect references, uncertain references or equivocal 
considerations’. Nor is such an intention to be inferred from the 
presence in the statute of rights which are commensurate with 
some of the rules of natural justice.98
Annetts v McCann, it will be remembered, was the case in which the 
High Court bizarrely found that there was no legislative intent to exclude natural 
justice on the basis that West Australian parliament in 1920 would not have 
thought that natural justice would apply to coronial proceedings. Quod voluit
96 159 CLR, at 584.
97 170 CLR, at 598.
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non dixit: parliament could not be said to have intended that it be excluded. 
More importantly from a doctrinal point of view, though, this case made it clear 
just how far Australian law had shifted from the ultra vires position. Rather than 
requiring a legislative indication that natural justice was to apply (even if the 
indication was implied by the common law), what instead was required was a 
legislative indication -  and not by implication, but by “clear manifestation” -  
that it was not to apply.w
Deane and McHugh JJ and the Presumptive Application of Natural 
Justice to ALL Decision-making
In Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,100 Deane J 
went even further, and suggested that natural justice ought, as a legal 
presumption, to apply to all government decision-making. He said that the law 
seemed to him
to be moving towards a conceptually more satisfying position 
where common law requirements of procedural fairness will, in 
the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent, be recognised as 
applying generally to governmental executive decision-making. 101
In Teoh, McHugh J indicated his agreement with and said that “the 
rational development of this branch of the law requires acceptance of the view 
that the rules of procedural fairness are presumptively applicable to
98 Ibid.
99 Similarly, in Municipal Council o f Sydney v Harris, 14 CLR, at 11, Barton J held that the 
obligation to observe natural justice was one which was presumptively implied in “interference 
with property” cases. Where a statute is silent on the matter of a hearing right, he said “the 
courts will not assume that the legislature intended to prohibit it, unless such intention can be 
gathered from the statute by clear implication.”
100 169 CLR 648.
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administrative and similar decisions made by public tribunals and officials. ” 102 It 
is doubtful that expressed in such direct terms, these statements accurately reflect 
the state of the law in Australia. 102 But their usefulness lies in the fact that they 
throw down the gauntlet with respect to the legitimacy issue. Indeed, the issue is 
almost neat in its symmetry. In Banks, the High Court began the liberalisation of 
the doctrine of natural justice, but, as discussed in chapter six, 104 Barwick CJ 
glossed over the jurisprudential issues. In Teoh, the Court carried the project 
through to its ultimate point -  a natural justice-triggering legitimate expectation 
being found to exist when there was no expectation at all. But (as discussed in 
chapter five) in doing so, it made plain just how shaky the project’s doctrinal 
underpinnings had become. In Haoucher, Sir William Deane said that he 
thought that this shift was much more “conceptually satisfying”, but with respect 
to his Honour, he did not attempt to explain why this was the case.
One might well agree that in terms of outcome, a presumptive application 
of the rules of natural justice to all government decision-making (though 
presumably Deane and Toohey JJ must only have had in mind government 
decision-making which affects people on an individual basis) is more satisfying 
than one which allows bureaucrats a shield to be unfair. But according to what 
principles of constitutional law can this approach be more satisfying? On what
101 169 CLR, at 653.
102 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, at 311.
102 For John McMillan’s criticisms of this view, see “Developments Under the ADJR Act: The 
Grounds of Review” (1991) 20 Fed L Rev 50, at 70 -  74. See also Wilcox J in Minister for Arts, 
Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274, at 306: “the law has not yet 
reached the stage of applying the obligation of natural justice to every decision which 
disadvantages individuals.”
104 See supra 292.
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juridical basis is an approach like this legitimate? To be sure, it has the 
pragmatic advantage that it does not suffer from the gap in coverage that 
Brennan J’s did. As has been seen, all of the other High Court judges from this 
period except Murphy J, and perhaps Gibbs CJ, considered power exercised 
under the prerogative as reviewable in principle as power exercised under 
statute.10" But for Justices Deane and McHugh (and, implicitly, Mason CJ) to 
have left their claim unexplained in terms of underlying principle is to leave it as 
little more than a vulgar, if compassionate, assertion of legal positivism. 106
LEGISLATED DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES AND 
COMMON LAW NATURAL JUSTICE
One possible means of justifying this approach in accordance with 
commonly accepted constitutional principles is to read a legislative non-reaction 
to the cases as amounting to a tacit approval of the extension of the reach of 
natural justice -  in effect, to make use of Wade’s and Forsyth’s (and Jacob J’s107) 
point that parliament is presumed to legislate in light of the common law. As 
has been noted, in Wiseman v Borneman, Lord Reid made comments which 
could arguably lend themselves to such a view:
Natural justice requires that the procedure before any tribunal
which is acting judicially shall be fair in all the circumstances ...
For a long time the courts have, without objection from
105 In R v Toohey, Gibbs CJ made a special point of noting that his views only dealt with the 
exercise of a statutory power. See 151 CLR, at 186.
106 Though in fairness to their Honours, it should be pointed out that the Privy Council has 
indicated similar views. See Huntley v Attorney-General for Jamaica [1995] 2 AC 1.
107 In Salemi v MacKellar (No 2). See supra 362.
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parliament supplemented procedure laid down in legislation 
where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose. 108
But this, then, raises the question of how the High Court has reacted to 
legislative statements as to procedure. " 10 This, as will be remembered, had lain 
at the base of the judgment of the Lord Thank ertön’s speech in Franklin v 
Minister o f Town and Country Planning f °  He found the inclusion of a statutory 
decision-making procedure to have had the effect of excluding the common law 
rules of natural justice. But if the common law, rather than statute, is to be the 
source of the duty to observe natural justice, then it remained to be determined 
what the relationship of legislative statement as to decision-making procedures 
and natural justice is to be. A related question is as to the effect of a right of 
appeal on natural justice obligations at first instance.
In Twist, Barwick CJ discussed this. He said that the obligation to 
observe natural justice can be displaced by legislation -  either by formally 
excluding it or by including statutory procedures in lieu. This was a point that 
the High Court had made earlier, in Namatjira v Raabe, when it said that the 
existence of a right of appeal de novo suggested a legislative intent to displace 
hearing requirements at first instance. * 111 In Twist, Barwick CJ said that if 
parliament has “addressed itself’ to the question of decision-making procedures, 
a court is not entitled to impose additional procedural requirements as a matter of
108 [1971] AC 297, at 308 (emphasis added).
10y See generally Aronson and Dyer, supra n 2, at 457 -  465.
110 [1948] AC 87. See supra chapter 3, 129 -  131.
111 (1959) 100 CLR 664, at 668 -  669. See supra chapter 3, at 157.
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common law: “the court, being bound by the legislation as much as the citizen,
has no warrant to vary the legislative scheme”.112
In Brettingham-Moore v St Leonards Municipality, he made much the 
same point. Ordinarily, he said, natural justice would apply to a decision to 
dissolve a municipal entity. But since the legislation in question (the Tasmanian 
Local Government Act 1962 - 1966) contained a provision whereby notice of any 
proposed change to municipal organisation was to be published, and that 
aggrieved persons had the right to petition the Governor not to accept the 
proposal,113 any requirements the common law would attach to the decision­
making process were displaced. He said:
[Section] 15 is a clear indication by the legislature of the nature of 
the opportunity which it will afford the aggrieved persons to make 
known their views ... The case is not one in which the legislature 
is silent as to the right to be heard, so that the common law can 
fill the void. The legislature has addressed itself to the very 
question and it is not for the Court to amend the statute by 
engrafting upon it some provision which the Court might think 
more consonant with a complete opportunity for an aggrieved 
person to present his views and to support them by evidentiary 
material.114
It was to this point that Mason CJ and Deane and McHugh JJ were 
replying in Annetts v McCann, when they said that an intention to exclude 
natural justice was not to be “inferred from the presence in the statute of rights 
which are commensurate with some of the rules of natural justice.”115 Yet, there
112 136 CLR, at 110.
Il? Section 15.
114 (1969) 121 CLR 509, at 524. See, also, 522 - 523.
115 170 CLR, at 598. Curiously, though, their Honours did not actually refer to Barwick CJ’s 
judgment in Twist. Instead, they referred to a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
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were in the early 1970s a series of cases in which the House of Lords and Privy 
Council seemed to offer support for the Barwick view."6 In Wiseman v 
Borneman itself, for example, the House of Lords held that the inclusion of a 
disputation procedure in taxation legislation" displaced the common law 
requirements of natural justice. As Lord Morris put it, “it is, I think, a positive 
consideration that parliament has indicated what it is that the tribunal must do 
and has set out [what] the tribunal must take into account ...”."8
Similarly, in Pearlberg v Varty (which also dealt with taxation 
legislation), Lord Hailsham LC said that the courts “have no power to amend or 
supplement the language of a statute merely because on one view of the matter, a 
subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision 
than the statute accords him.”"9 In the same case, Viscount Dilhome said that 
the decision-making procedure ought not to be “regarded as anything other than 
deliberate and, if deliberate, it should be assumed that parliament did not think 
that the requirements of fairness made it advisable to provide [any additional 
hearing rights].”120 In Furnell v Whangerei High Schools Board, the Privy 
Council cited with approval the passage from Barwick CJ’s judgment in
{Baba v Parole Board o f New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 338, at 344 - 345, 347, 349) as 
authority for their proposition that a decision by parliament to impose some procedural 
requirements on the decision-making process was not to be taken as a sign that the legislature 
was intending to occupy the field, to borrow the expression from constitutional law. See also J  v 
Lieschke 162 CLR, at 460 -461.
116 Though, as Aronson and Dyer note (at 476), the argument has been rejected in a number of 
cases in Australia. See, eg, Baba v Parole Board of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 338, R v 
Chairman o f Parole Board, Ex parte Patterson (1986) 43 NTR 13 and Queensland v Litz [1993] 
1 Qd R 343.
117 The Finance Act 1960, ss 28, 29.
118 [1971] AC, at 310.
119 [1972] 1 WLR534, at 540.
120 [1972] 1 WLR, at 545.
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Brettingham-Moore quoted above, and found that the absence of a provision 
giving rights to early notice of complaint, in a statute dealing with the 
employment of teachers, 121 “must have been deliberate since the regulations 
proceed with great particularity to specify when and how communication should 
be made to him and when and how he should make response” . 122
More recently, in Rees v Crane, the Privy Council read the decision to 
enshrine a decision-making procedure in legislation (actually, the Trinidadian 
Constitution) as being of special significance. 122 Rees v Crane involved an 
attempt by the Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago to have a puisne justice -  
Crane J -  of the Supreme Court dismissed. The circumstances of the attempted 
dismissal reeked of substantive unfairness (Mr Justice Crane had, for instance, 
been given formal notice of his suspension from judicial duties by a policeman 
in a public street). Their Lordships said:
It is clear that [the Trinidadian Constitution] provides a procedure 
and an exclusive procedure for such suspension and termination 
and, if judicial independence, mean anything, a judge cannot be 
suspended nor can his appointment be terminated by others or in 
other ways. 124
But it should be observed that this view -  at least, as it was expressed by 
Barwick CJ in Brettingham-Moore and Salemi v MacKellar -  suffers from a
121 The Secondary and Technical Institute Teachers Disciplinary Regulations 1969, made under 
the Education Act 1964 (NZ).
122 [1973] AC 660, at 681. Barwick CJ’s judgment in Brettingham-Moore was quoted with 
approval at 679.
123 [1994] 2 AC 173.
124 [1994] 2 AC, at 187 - 188. See also the recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court 
in Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 145 ALR 621, in which 
Davies and Burchett JJ (Whitlam J dissenting) held that the Migration Act grounds for reviewing
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significant logical flaw. In Salemi v MacKellar, Barwick CJ had nailed his 
colours to the Wade-ist mast. Yet, in light of his judgments in cases like Twist 
and Banks, he must be taken to have had the view that parliament is presumed to 
intend that natural justice be required when property rights or matters of personal 
livelihood are in issue. But if parliament actually indicated a concern for 
procedural protection, then he would have said that natural justice is excluded! 
When the Barwick propositions are set out this way, they seem an odd 
formulation.12''
Moreover, Barwick CJ’s point stands in contradiction of the way in 
which the superaddition question was treated during the R v Electricity 
Commissioners period. 126 Then, it was taken that the Court of Appeal had said 
that a parliamentary indication of decision-making procedures could serve as 
evidence of a duty to act judicially. In other words, it was thought that the 
inclusion of formal decision-making procedures could be taken as a signal that 
natural justice was to apply. Further, in many contexts to apply the Barwick 
approach would lead to an absurd result. As Aronson and Dyer have said, for 
instance, it would be silly to argue that the existence of a right of appeal to the
decisions were intended to substitute for common law grounds, including natural justice. See 
145 ALR, at 625 (Davies J), 145 ALR, at 636 (Burchett J).
125 As an aside, in the second edition (1968), de Smith made the point that it was the inclusion of 
hearing requirements in statutes that contributed to the decline in natural justice:
Paradoxically, the decline of the audi alteram partem principle as an implied 
common-law requirement of administrative procedure was hastened by its 
embodiment in statutory forms. Twentieth century statute law has indirectly 
reflected the disfavour with which the common law viewed administrative 
claims to be entitled to take direct action against private property without 
giving notice or the opportunity to be heard (at 146 -  147).
126 See, supra chapter 2, at 96 -  101.
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal ought to be taken as evidence of a legislative 
intent to exclude natural justice at the initial decision-making stage. 127
Yet, in the abstract, each of the expressed standpoints have some appeal. 
If natural justice is a right which enjoys some sort of paramount status (the 
Mason/Deane/McHugh view), then the courts should view any attempt to oust it 
with the same suspicion that they have traditionally brought to the interpretation 
of statutes which purport to interfere with common law rights. 128 But if natural 
justice is merely a requirement of ordinary common law, then it should be open 
for parliament to signify that it has “occupied the field”, to borrow an expression 
from constitutional law (the Barwick view). But if it is neither of these things, 
and is instead merely a right which arises in non-traditional contexts when 
parliament says that it should, then it is fair to look for some sort of signal that 
natural justice should be observed, in the form of statutorily-enshrined decision­
making procedures (the Electricity Commissioners view).
Lord Diplock once attempted to reconcile the various views by drawing a 
distinction between the doctrinal places of statutory and common law decision­
making procedures -  the former, he thought, went to the question of voidness of 
the decision on the basis of ultra vires, the latter went to fairness of the decision-
127 At 477. See also Courtney v Peters (1990) 98 ALR 645, at 654.
128 See Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, at 463 (general words in legislation are “insufficient to 
authorise interference with basic immunities which are the foundation of our freedom; to 
constitute such authorisation express words are required” (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ, quoting Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 
1054, at 1065). See also R v Bolton, Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, at 523, Bropho v 
Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1, at 18, Balog v ICAC (1990) 169 CLR 625.
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making process.121' The simple fact, however, is that the Gibbs and Mason-era 
High Courts have simply ignored either of the latter two views. Annetts v 
McCann is a prime illustration of a case where the Court felt completely free to 
use the common law to supplement the decision-making procedures determined 
by the parliament in question. And all of the cases considered thus far show that 
the superaddition test of the Electricity Commissioners period is long-dead in 
Australia.
In fact, the only area in which the question of legislative intent might 
now be thought to be relevant to the doctrine of natural justice in Australia is 
with respect to content. In Kioa v West, Mason J said that in the case of a 
decision made under statute, “the application and content of the doctrine of 
natural justice or the duty to act fairly depends to a large extent on the 
construction of the statute” . 120 Similarly, in Bread Manufacturers o f New South 
Wales v Evans, Mason and Wilson JJ said in their joint judgment that the 
“application of the rules [of natural justice] is flexible, varying in extent from 
case to case, and falls to be determined in the case of a statutory body exercising
129 In O'Reilly vMackmcm [1983] 2 AC 237, at 276:
Where the legislation which confers upon a statutory tribunal its decision­
making powers also provides expressly for the procedure it shall follow in the 
course of reaching its decision, it is a question of construction of the relevant 
legislation ... whether a particular procedural provision is mandatory, so that its 
non-observance in the process of reaching the decision makes the decision 
itself a nullity ... But the requirement that a person who is charged with having 
done something which, if proved to the satisfaction of a statutory tribunal, has 
consequences that will, or may, affect him adversely, should be given a fair 
opportunity of hearing what is alleged against him and of presenting its own 
case, is so fundamental to any civilised legal system that it should be presumed 
that Parliament intended that a failure to observe it should render null and void 
any decision reached in breach of this requirement
130 159 CLR, at 584.
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statutory powers by reference to the proper construction of the statute. ” 1 31 Taken 
with the acknowledgment of a legislative power to exclude natural justice 
(provided, of course, this is done with words of “necessary intendment”), these 
passages could be understood as an admission of parliamentary supremacy after 
all. But this is not, in fact, how they ought to be understood.
The notion of natural justice having a variable, circumstance-dependent, 
content is an old one. Tucker LJ’s statement in Russell v Duke o f Norfolk, that 
“[t]he requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the 
case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the 
subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth” , 132 has been cited with 
approval several times by the High Court. 133 It is a point of common sense, for 
“fairness” is an adjectival noun, and it must be rooted in circumstance if it is to 
have any meaning. That is why the statements about the “proper construction of 
the statute” in Bread Manufacturers v Evans and Kioa cannot in fact be seen as 
requiring paramount importance to be paid to parliamentary intent in 
determining the content of the duty of procedural fairness. Indeed, if we say that 
the duty to observe natural justice arises by operation of the common law, then it 
logically cannot follow that its content may be determined by reference to
131 180 CLR, at 432 -433.
132 [1949] 1 A11ER 109, at 118.
133 See, eg, South Australia v O ’Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, at 400, R v Ludeke, Ex parte Customs 
Officers’ Association o f Australia (1985) 155 CLR 513, at 530, Kioa v West, 159 CLR, at 584 -  
585, NCSC v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296, at 311 -  312, Salemi v MacKel/ar 137 
CLR at 444, R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, Ex parte Angliss 
Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, at 552 -  553, Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
o f Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475, at 504. See, also, R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex 
parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417 (CA), Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297, Furnell 
v Whangerei High Schools Board [1973] AC 660 (PC, NZ), University o f Ceylon v Fernando 
[1960] 1 WLR223 (PC).
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parliamentary intent. Moreover, as we have seen, in those cases in which 
parliament actually does express an intention with respect to decision-making 
procedures, the courts will, where deemed necessary, supplement them (as 
happened, for instance, in Bread Manufacturers v Evans).
A LEGITIMISING BASIS FOR NATURAL JUSTICE?
In fact, the reference to the proper construction of the statute can only 
mean a reference to the sorts of procedures which can be accommodated within 
the statutory framework. The courts will of course do their best to avoid 
frustrating the parliamentary' objects in enacting the statute. 134 But the required 
procedures themselves are, just as is the initial duty to observe natural justice 
itself, determined by the common law. The point -  and it is a political point, 
really -  is that in considering the doctrine of natural justice, the High Court 
considers the interests of the individual before the interests of the state. To return 
again to the words of Sir Gerard Brennan quoted at the beginning of the chapter: 
“The interests of individuals are more fully acknowledged, and the repositories 
of power are constrained to treat the individual both fairly and according to 
law.” 135
134 See, eg, Lord Reid in Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297, at 308: “But before this unusual 
kind of power is exercised it must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve 
justice and that to require additional steps will not frustrate the apparent purpose of the 
legislation”.
135 “Reflections”, supra n 4.
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This leads us back to the basic question of legitimacy. However we may 
regard the desirability of this approach as a political matter, by what legitimising 
basis has the High Court adopted it? A study of the cases can lead only to one 
conclusion: that the jurisdictional basis for the doctrine of natural justice in 
Australia today is an over-arching common law. The cases since the 1980s have 
all but rejected Diceyan premisses as the foundation for judicial review. As Sir 
Anthony Mason has suggested, the view which is supported by the holdings is 
that “the law of judicial review is the creation of the common law and that the 
courts exercise a jurisdiction to ensure that administrative decision-making 
conforms to the requirements of the law.”136 In Sir Anthony’s opinion, this view 
is a rather more satisfactory one than a Wade-Forsyth/Brennan view, being both 
more realistic in terms of explaining present-day cases, and more in accord with 
legal hi story A7
In both of these respects, Sir Anthony is undoubtedly correct. The fact is 
that courts do regularly rule with an agnosticism to the evidence of parliament’s 
wishes. Moreover, as discussed in chapter one, the law of natural justice (and of 
judicial review generally) is much older than the law of parliamentary 
supremacy. But does the latter justify the former? The problem is that in a 
judicial context, the High Court has not given an express answer to this; it has 
not enunciated a juridical basis for the present-day approach in natural justice 
cases that has been examined in these past three chapters. If the points made in 
this chapter are taken together with the expansion of the compass of natural
136 Supra, at 386.
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justice that was discussed in chapters five and six, the picture which emerges is 
one of a vastly-expanded doctrine of natural justice, but one which is largely 
bereft of principled underpinnings; a doctrine whose scope and content are to be 
determined according to the prejudices and assumptions of the individual 
members of the judiciary. In a country which prides itself on being governed by 
the rule of law, one wonders whether this can be a satisfying basis for the 
exercise of judicial power.
137 Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
A STUDY IN COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM
/ ^ V n e  of the things that this study has shown is that considered in terms of 
coverage or ambit, the doctrine of natural justice in Australia today is in 
an exceedingly hale, vigorous state. To be sure, there are problems with the 
doctrine’s application -  the inconsistency in judicial approach regarding 
legitimate expectations v “mere hopes”, which was discussed in chapter five,1 2is 
one such problem -  but the fact remains that the range of decision-making 
processes subject to a duty of procedural fairness is much, much wider than it 
was just thirty or forty years ago. Sir Gerard Brennan was perfectly accurate 
when he said that society “now accords to the individual an opportunity to meet 
on more equal terms with the institutions of the state”, and that individual 
interests “are more fully acknowledged, and the repositories of power are 
constrained to treat the individual both fairly and according to law.” Sir Gerard 
was, it is true, actually speaking in commemoration of the anniversary of the 
statutory reforms to Commonwealth administrative law, but it is no less the case 
that the process by which “repositories of power” have been “constrained to treat 
the individual both fairly and according to law” is attributable to the growth of 
the common law -  and to the shift in attitude towards natural justice in the High 
Court since the decision in Banks v Transport Regulation Board in 1968.3
1 See supra 234 -  237, 271 -  272.
2 “Reflections” (1989) 58 Canberra Bulletin Pub Admin 32, at 33 (see supra 343).
Indeed, this is perhaps the chief observation to be drawn from this study: 
the extent to which the civilising mission of administrative law has, in recent 
times, taken place without direct reference to the authority of parliament. The 
conventional understanding of natural justice as being rooted in the ultra vires 
principle has been discarded by the High Court. As chapter seven has shown, 
the existence or not of a duty to accord procedural fairness is determined at first 
instance in Australia today by the common law, rather than by statute. Judicial 
review legislation may make specific reference to a denial of natural justice as a 
ground of review,3 4 567but the tenor of the judgments of the High Court in cases like 
South Australia v O ’Shea, Haoucher, Annetts v McCann and Teoh can leave 
no doubt that the source of procedural rights against the Australian Executive is 
not parliamentary command, but common law sanction.
NATURAL JUSTICE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
It is in this sense that the story of natural justice in Australia can be 
described as a study in common law constitutionalism. Whether we define a 
constitution as a paramount source of limitation of state power, or as a set of 
base norms according to which a society is constituted, in the way it has come to 
be enunciated by the High Court, the doctrine of procedural fairness amounts to 
a doctrine of constitutional law.
3 119 CLR222.
4 See, eg, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), para 5(1 )(a).
5 (1987) 163 CLR378. See supra chapter 5, at 234 -  238.
6 Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648. See supra 
chapter 5, at 238 -  245.
7 (1990) 170 CLR 596. See supra chapter 5, at 251 -  255.
s Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. See supra chapter 5, 
at 259-266.
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Indeed, various judges of the Court have said as much. When, for 
example, Mason J spoke in FAI Insurances v Winneke of “offering] some 
protection to the citizen against the legislative practice of conferring statutory 
discretion”,9 he was speaking in constitutional terms. When, in O'Shea, he 
suggested that if it were to appear that parliament was attempting to structure 
decision-making procedures so as to avoid triggering natural justice obligations, 
“the Court might be compelled to go further” in expanding the scope of 
procedural fairness,10 he was issuing a constitutional warning to the political 
branches. Deane J was even more pointed in his description of the common law 
as a constitutional bulwark. In O'Shea, he said that the rules of natural justice 
“reflect the minimum standards of basic fairness which the common law requires 
to be observed in the exercise of governmental ... authority or power.”* 11 And 
when Deane and McHugh JJ suggested in Haoucher and Teoh that it would be 
“conceptually more satisfying” if procedural fairness were to attach “generally to 
government executive decision-making”, they were both enunciating a vision 
of constitutional control of the Executive.
It is undoubtedly the existence of our entrenched Constitution that leads 
us in Australia sometimes to overlook the continuing relevance of the common 
law constitution. But the fact is that even though we have a written
9 (1982) 151 CLR 342, at 372. See supra 315.
10 South Australia v O ’Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, at 386. See also Sir Anthony’s recent paper, 
“Reflections on the Development of Australian Administrative Law”, in R Creyke and J 
McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision o f Australian Administrative Law at the Twenty-Five Year 
Mark{ 1998) 122, at 124.
11 163 CLR, at 416.
12 Deane J in Haoucher, 169 CLR, at 653, McHugh J in Teoh, 183 CLR, at 311. See also supra 
chapter 7, at 374 -  376.
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constitutional document, and even though the common law constitution can in 
principle be amended by ordinary legislation, 13 Dicey’s reference to the law of 
the constitution stemming from the accumulation of judicial decisions in 
ordinary litigation14 remains pertinent in Australia. Sir Owen Dixon once 
offered a salutary reminder of this when he said that Australia’s federal structure 
sometimes led people to mistake the federation’s constitutional foundation:
Federalism means a rigid constitution and a rigid constitution 
means a written instrument. It is easy to treat the written 
instrument as the paramount consideration, unmindful of the part 
played by the general law, notwithstanding that it is the source of 
the legal conceptions that govern us in determining the effect of 
the written instrument. 15
His work is not often cited today, but the influence of W E Hearn, the 
first Dean of Law in the University of Melbourne, 16 is apparent in the writing of 
both Dixon and Dicey. 17 In particular, it was Hearn’s work which underlay 
Dicey’s encapsulation of the essence of English constitutionalism as being the 
rule of law. Indeed, Dicey was later to describe Hearn as the person who, more 
than anyone else, taught him “of the way in which the labours of lawyers
13 Though as to the practical difficulty of this, witness the story of the privative clause. See M 
Aronson and B Dyer, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (1996), chapter 18.
14 See The Law o f the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), at 191. See also supra Introduction, at 2.
15 “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation” (1957) 31 ALJ 240, at 241. 
Spigelman CJ recently made a similar observation:
Because we have a written Constitution, the area of constitutional law is 
generally identified with exegesis of the terminology of the written document.
I believe, however, that we have a broader constitution, of which the 
Constitution Act 1900 is simply one, perhaps the most significant, component. 
“Foundations of Administrative Law: Toward General Principles of Institutional Law” (1999) 59 
A JP ub Admin 3, at 8.
16 Hearn (1826 -  1888) was a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin. He was appointed Professor 
of History, Literature, Political Economy and Logic at Melbourne in 1854, and in 1874 became 
Dean of Law. He also sat as a member of the Victorian Legislative Council from 1878 until his 
death. On the importance of Hearn’s legal work, see also H W Arndt, “The Origins of Dicey’s 
Concept of the ‘Rule of Law’ “ (1957) 31 A U  117, at 121 -  123 and Spigelman, supra n 15, at 3 
-  4. On his work as an economist, see J A La Nauze, Political Economy in Australia: Historical 
Studies (1949).
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established in early times the elementary principles which form the basis of the 
constitution” . 18
In his book, The Government o f England, Hearn began by writing that 
“the English constitution forms part of the common law.” 19 It was this 
understanding of the essence of constitutionalism that Toohey J was drawing on 
when he said that what underlies the expression “rule of law”, “is that there are 
known principles according to which decisions should be made affecting the 
relationship between State and citizen on the one hand and citizen and citizen on 
the other,” and that “[t]he rule of law demands that these principles should be 
applied, not as a matter of discretion but by their own force.” It was in the 
same vein that Isaacs J spoke, nearly seventy-five years ago, of a source of 
judicial authority being “certain fundamental principles which form the base of
99the social structure of every British community.” And when, in South 
Australia v O 'Shea, Mason CJ made his statement about the Court reserving the 
right to go further in expanding the compass of natural justice, he was speaking 
in terms of a similar understanding of the part played by the common law 
judiciary in setting the bounds of constitutional control.
17 For Dixon’s discussion of Hearn’s thought, see “The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 
LQR 590, at 593 -  596.
18 Preface to The Law o f the Constitution (1st ed, 1885), at vi. Dicey was also to say of Hearn:
He was to be universally recognised among us as one of the most distinguished 
and ingenious exponents of the mysteries of the English Constitution had it not 
been for the fact that he made his fame as a professor not in any of the seats of 
learning in the United Kingdom but in the University of Melbourne (ibid).
19 (1st ed, 1867), at 1.
20 “A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?” (1993) 4 Pub L Rev 158, at 159.
21 Ibid.
22 Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, at 79.
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THE CONSTITUTONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A COMMON 
LAW BASIS FOR NATURAL JUSTICE
But it is precisely this understanding of constitutionalism which gives 
rise to a concern stemming from the High Court’s recent natural justice holdings. 
That is the significance of the assertion that natural justice rights are grounded in 
the common law, rather than statute. As has been discussed in earlier chapters 
(particularly chapter seven23), the conventional understanding of the basis of 
natural justice was that it was related to the ultra vires principle; that it stemmed 
from a presumption about parliament’s intentions. To take this in Harlow’s and 
Rawlings’s terms,24 the conventional approach to natural justice embodied a 
theory of the state which has the constitutional principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty at its heart.
There are — as was discussed in chapter seven -  allegations of intellectual 
dishonesty that can be levelled at the sort of interpretive stretching that must take 
place to keep faith with the ultra vires doctrine. But, as Christopher Forsyth has 
retorted, such an approach at least does not do overt violence to the 
constitutional arrangements which emerged after the settlement of 1688. Yet, 
the recent cases in Australia have involved -  Barwick CJ and Murphy and 
Brennan JJ partially excepted in this respect -  an explicit rejection of the 
statutory interpretation approach to natural justice. So what of a doctrine which 
stems not from presumptions about legislative entitlement, but from the common 
law? What constitutional theory is involved in this?
23 See supra 355 -  265.
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In fact, such a view fits nicely with Professor Hearn’s theory of the 
constitution -  that it forms part of the common law. This was a point made by 
Sir Owen Dixon in a paper delivered in 1957. The thesis of Dixon’s paper was
that in Australia, the common law amounted to “an anterior law providing the
26source of juristic authority for our institutions when they came into being.”“ 
What Sir Owen meant by this was that all of our constitutional principles derive 
their status as constitutional principles from recognition as such by the common 
law. The condition precedent for the enjoyment of constitutional authority is the 
recognition by the common law of the constitution as an instrument of 
paramount status. Without such recognition, the constitution would amount to 
nothing more than a written text.
In other words, Dixon argued that the common law’s existence was 
anterior to the constitution not only in a temporal sense, but also in a juridical or 
juristic sense. If the written constitution has paramount status, the common law 
has an ^ -paramount, or sw/?ra-paramount, status. The rules of the common law 
were the source of the authority of parliament, and amount to the constitutional 
antecedent. The notion of parliamentary supremacy could only operate as a 
constitutional principle because it was recognised as such by the common law. 
The common law was the constitutional grundnorm. As Dixon put it in another 
piece:
It is of the essence of Parliamentary supremacy that the Courts of 
law, once there is put before them an authentic expression of the 
legislative will, shall give unquestioned effect to it according to 
what appears its true scope and intent. But it is of the essence of
24 See supra Introduction, at 2.
25 “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation”, supra n 15.
26 Id, at 240.
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the supremacy of the law that the Courts shall disregard as 
unauthorised and void the acts of any organ of Government, 
whether legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits of
27the power that organ derives from the law.
It is in this way that the old “paradigm” English natural justice cases that 
were discussed in chapter one can properly be said to have amounted to an 
exercise in constitutional adjudications If the constitution is understood in the 
way described by Dixon, then it is perfectly in keeping with juristic principle to 
speak of the common law as the source of natural justice rights, which the law 
will employ to delimit the authority of the executive. But in considering Dixon’s 
point, it is critical to realise that the Australian constitutional antecedent was not 
an Australian common law, but rather the common law of England.
The expression “common law” can of course be understood in a number 
of senses. For present purposes, it can on one hand refer to the pragmatically- 
disposed adversarial system of dispute resolution that is employed in most 
jurisdictions which formerly enjoyed the status of British colony. In this sense, 
the Australian common law began to differ from the English common law 
almost as soon as it was deemed to have been received. But when Sir Owen 
Dixon wrote of the common law as the constitutional antecedent, he was using
27 “The Law and the Constitution”, supra n 17, at 596.
28 See T R S Allan, “The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First 
Principles”, in C Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia 
(1996) 146, at 148. On the paradigm cases, see supra chapter 1, at 29 -  33.
29 While no study has yet been done of this aspect of his work in New South Wales, when he was 
Chief Justice of Newfoundland, Sir Francis Forbes regularly used local custom as a source of 
Newfoundland common law, and it is almost certain that he regularly did it here as well. On his 
use of local custom in Newfoundland, see Coleman v Kennedy (1817) 1 NLR 8, Broom v 
Williams (1817) 1 NLR 15, Ryan v Simms (1817) 1 NLR 34, and Heath v Kean (1820) 1 NLR 
193. In Hayes v Nave (1821) 1 NLR 259, however, he said that a “bad custom” would not be 
applied. On Forbes’s influence on the received law in New South Wales, see generally, I 
Holloway, “A Fragment on Reception” (1998) 4 AustJ Leg Hist 79 and I Holloway, “Sir Francis 
Forbes and the Earliest Australian Public Law Cases” (unpublished, 1998).
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the expression in a different sense. He used it to refer to what Salmond 
described as the “ultimate legal principle.” By this, Salmond was speaking not 
of a principle of substantive law, but rather of the historical foundation for the 
legal order:
All rules of law have historical sources. As a matter of fact and 
history they have their origin somewhere, though we may not 
know where it is. But not all of them have legal sources. Were 
this so, it would be necessary for the law to proceed ad infinitum 
in tracing the descent of its principles ... In other word there must 
be found in every legal system certain ultimate principles, from 
which all others are derived, but which are themselves self- 
existent. Before there can be any talk of legal sources, there must 
be already in existence some law which establishes them and 
gives them their authority.
It is used in this second sense that “the common law” can be said to enjoy 
ante-constitutional status in Australia. But the common law in question was the 
English common law. It was the English common law which was the source of 
the authority of the parliament at Westminster which, in turn, was the source of 
the authority of the parliament at Canberra. The significance of this point in the 
Australian constitutional context was alluded to by Dixon:
Wherever the common law has gone the theory of the supremacy 
of the law has necessarily gone with it. But the theory of 
legislative sovereignty stands in a different position. Its transfer 
to lands outside Britain was less easy. For the common law, 
being English law, and not ius gentium, did not recognise the 
sovereignty of a Legislature as an abstract idea, as a quality 
belonging to a Legislature inherently ... The King in Parliament 
was established by the English common law as the English 
Legislature and that and that alone was endowed by the common 
law with supreme and unlimited legislative power. ’ 1
30 See Jurisprudence (8th ed, 1930), at 169. For a variation on this construction, see also his First 
Principles o f Jurisprudence (1893), at 220 -  221. See further A Frame, Salmond: Southern 
Jurist (1995), at 64 -  68, and R T E Latham, The Law and the Commonwealth (1949), at 522 -  
523.
“The Law and the Constitution”, supra n 17, at 595.
396
In his (at the time, controversial) article, “A Government of Laws, and 
Not of Men?”, Mr Justice Toohey made a reasoned argument for common law 
constitutionalism. He said that some principles in society are fundamental, and 
that “it is the role of an independent judiciary to give effect to those principles, 
within the rule of law, as best it can.” He continued: “although the relationship 
in our society between the authority of the legislature and the rule of law 
fluctuates over the course of time, the rule of law is the dominant factor in the 
relationship.”33 In the course of his argument, his Honour quoted with evident 
approval a reference by Harrison Moore to “the real subordination of 
government to law.”34
There is, however, a problem with this claim in the present-day 
Australian setting. When Moore was writing in the early part of this century, he 
was doing so in the context of the same understanding about the roots of 
constitutionalism as Dixon CJ. But now, the High Court has come to deny the 
continued existence of the constitutional antecedent. The Court has on several 
occasions insisted that the source of legal authority in Australia is no longer the 
statute law of the Imperial parliament (viz, the Commonwealth o f Australia 
Constitution Act 1900), but rather the licence of the Australian people. In 
Australian Capital Television v The Commonwealth, for example, Mason CJ 
said:
The very concept of representative government and representative 
democracy signifies government by the people through their
32 Supra n 20, at 174.
33 Ibid.
24 Id, at 164 (quoting Moore, “Foreword”, to R G Menzies, The Rule o f Law During the War 
(1917), at 3).
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representatives. Translated into constitutional terms, it denotes 
that the sovereign power which resides in the people is exercised 
on their behalf by their representatives.3^
In other words, the sovereign source of governmental power is no longer 
the law (acting as it formerly did through the conduit of Imperial legislation) but 
“the Australian people”. Implicit in this sort of assertion must be a denial of the 
antecedent constitutional status of the common law and, therefore, also the 
common law’s sovereignty and status as an ultimate legal principle. But when 
read against the backdrop of the natural justice cases, in which the Court has said 
that the source of natural justice rights is not legislation but the common law, 
this demands the question: in light of what the High Court asserts to be the new 
Australian constitutional reality, on what constitutional basis do we ascribe to 
the common law a power, independent of legislation, to regulate the decision­
making processes determined by the peoples’ agents? Surely, in any 
constitutional setting where the people are the sovereign source of governmental 
power, the doctrine of sovereignty must be grounded in a practice of according 
primacy to decision-making procedures set out in parliamentarily-enacted 
legislation. But this runs very counter to the holdings discussed in the last three 
chapters.
35 (1992) 177 CLR 106, at 137. See also the authorities cited in chapter 6 (supra 282, n 18) and 
G J Lindell, “Why Is Australia’s Constitution Binding? The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the 
Effect of Independence” (1986) 16 Fed L Rev 29. It is interesting to see how similar Chief 
Justice Mason’s vision of government was to that of Pember Reeves, the progressive, whose 
work was discussed in chapter 2. See supra 70.
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NATURAL JUSTICE, THE COMMON LAW AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISSONANCE
The point is that the recent natural justice cases reveal a contradiction in 
the High Court’s public law discourse. It is inconsistent to speak both of popular 
sovereignty, and of the common law as the source of procedural rights against 
the government. This is because it is antithetical to our conception of the rule of 
law that the courts can be seen as the agents of the people. McHugh J may or 
may not have been correct when he asserted that “[t]he courts, as much as the 
legislatures, are in continuous contact with the concrete needs of the 
community” ,36 but the constitutional principle of judicial independence operates 
vis ä vis the people as well. The courts can have no constituency, save the 
common law -  using the expression here in the first sense, described earlier.37 
Moreover, unlike the case of parliament and the ballot box, there is no line of 
formal constitutional connection between the people and the courts through 
which a principle-agent relationship could be consummated.
Moreover, while the Australian common law may amount to a reflection 
of community values (provided, to paraphrase Archibald Cox, that the courts
o o
know us better than we know ourselves ), it cannot amount to an ultimate legal 
principle, for the deep historical rootedness of ultimate legal principles is 
inconsistent with the generationally shifting nature of popular sovereignty. The 
common law, er.forced by unelected judges, can amount to an ultimate legal 
principle in the English setting because of its anciency -  because the English
36 “The Law-making Function of the Judicial Process -  Part II” (1988) 62 A U  116. Many
a different view from his Honour.people, of course, would take 
37 See supra 395.
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Constitution has its roots in the pre-democratic era. Under the old understanding 
of the Australian constitution, this could be held to be the case here, as well. But 
if now in Australia, representative democracy is to be the basis for government 
(as the High Court says it is), then any sort of claim to common law antecedency 
must, ipso facto, be constitutionally offensive. In a state whose constitutional 
foundation is not based on an ultimate legal principle but upon popular 
sovereignty, it surely must be constitutionally impermissible to speak of the 
common law as the source of natural justice rights.
But this leads us back to the juridical point: according to our 
constitutional design, a fundamental precept of which is the notion of judicial 
independence, popular sovereignty can only express itself though legislation. 
Tiis being the case, the existence of natural justice rights can, if juristic principle 
is not to be violated, only be determined by reference to the ultra vires principle. 
Yet, the High Court has explicitly rejected this as the basis for the modem 
Australian doctrine of procedural fairness. In chapter six, it was noted that the 
editors of de Smith have said that “the standards applied by the courts in judicial 
review must ultimately be justified by constitutional principles, which govern
I Q
the proper exercise of public power in any democracy.” The conclusion to be 
d~awn from a study of the recent natural justice cases in the High Court is that 
there is a significant dissonance in the Court’s thinking about constitutionalism 
aid the rule of law in Australia.
3! The Role o f the Supreme Court in American Government (1976), at 117.
3t S A de Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, Judicial Review o f Administrative Action (5,h ed, 1995), 
a 14.
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THE PURPOSIVE CONSTITUTION
There is a second juristic concern stemming from the recent natural 
justice cases -  which, from a pragmatic perspective, is possibly more a pressing 
one. That is the Court’s failure to offer any real purposive justification for the 
imposition of procedural fairness requirements.
There is a school of thought -  typified by the writing of Michael 
Oakeshott40 -  which holds that the existence of legal authority need not have any 
explicit social purpose in order to justify itself. In his now well-known scheme, 
Martin Loughlin classified people who conceive of law (and government) in this 
way as “normativists.” 41 According to Loughlin’s definition, W E Hearn and Sir 
Owen Dixon offered normative visions of the constitutional order:
The normativist style in public law is rooted in a belief in the 
ideal of the separation of powers and in the need to subordinate 
government to law. This style [of thought] highlights law’s 
adjudicative and control functions and therefore its rule 
orientation and its conceptual nature. Nonnativism essentially 
reflects an ideal of the autonomy of law.42
In Loughlin’s taxonomy, nonnativism is contrasted with what he termed 
“functionalism”. In contradistinction to the normativist, who believes that the 
law begets government, the functionalist “views law as part of the apparatus of 
government.” 43 The functionalist’s focus “is upon law’s regulatory and 
facilitative functions and therefore is oriented to aims and objectives and adopts
40 For more on Oakeshott see supra chapter 177 -  178.
41 M Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (1992), at 60.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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an instrumentalist social policy approach. Functionalism reflects an ideal of 
progressive evolutionary change.”44 To classify them in Loughlin’s terms, the 
Anglo-Canadian scholars of the 1930s and the Australian progressives discussed 
in chapter two were ideal type functionalists.
The usefulness of Loughlin’s labels for present purposes lies not in their 
precision (for, as Loughlin himself acknowledged, most public law thought 
represent an amalgam of functionalism and normativism45), but in the fact that 
they highlight the range of possible difference in constitutional premisses. In the 
1920s natural justice cases discussed in chapter two, for example, some judges -  
notably Isaacs and Higgins JJ -  showed functionalist sympathies. In the 1940s 
and 50s, Sir Owen Dixon showed both functionalist and normativist strains of 
thought: his judgments in cases like Browning,46 Hickman,47 and Namatjira v 
Raabe, are functionalist in stance, while his academic writing on the 
constitution stands in illustration of the applicability of normativism to the 
Australian setting.
Moving to the present-day, it is clear that some of the more recent 
members of the Court have come to express a vision of the constitution in terms 
akin to functionalism. They have suggested that the function of the constitution 
is not simply to place value-neutral limits on state power. Instead, they have 
said that they view the allocation of power within the constitutional framework
44 Ibid.
45 Id, at 61.
46 Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492. On 
these cases, see supra chapter 3, at 150 -  155.
47 R v Hickman, Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598.
48 Namatjira v Raabe (1959) 100 CLR 664.
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in “purposive” terms. Michael Detmold has spoken of this as the “new 
constitutional law” .49 John Doyle (as he then was) described it as the “grand 
design” vision of the Australian constitution.50 In fact, it would be wrong to 
claim that, as yet, the shift in judicial thought amounts to a comprehensive (or 
coherent) theory of constitutionalism,M but there is no doubt that the High Court 
has shifted away from the simple approach of textualism in constitutional 
interpretation that endured for so long after the decision in the Engineers’ 
Case. In Davis v The Commonwealth, for example, Brennan J said that the 
“end and purpose of the constitution is to sustain the nation”. More 
specifically, Mason CJ has spoken of at least certain provisions of the 
constitution as being “designed to enhance national unity and a real sense of 
national identity.” 54
Equally importantly for present purposes, some members of the High 
Court have indicated a view that “purposivism” applies also to the common law 
constitution -  and, consequently, that the judicial role in defining and applying 
public law principle is a purposive one. Sir Anthony Mason once described this 
as the “dynamic rule” of constitutional evolution.55 This was, he said in a 
different setting, part of the High Court’s project of bringing into existence “a
49 “The New Constitutional Law” (1994) 16 Syd L Rev 229.
50 “Constitutional Law: ‘At the Eye of the Storm’” (1993) 23 UWA L Rev 15, at 20.
51 See J M Williams, “The Protection of Rights Under the Australian Constitution: A Republican 
Analysis” (unpublished PhD thesis, ANU, 1997), at 373 -  376.
52 Amalgamated Society o f Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Company Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
On the case and its import, see M Coper and G Williams (eds), How Many Cheers for 
Engineers? (1997).
53 (1988) 166 CLR 79, at 110.
54 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, at 485. See also Leeth v The 
Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455.
55 “The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation” (1986) 16 Fed L Rev 1, at 23.
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distinctive body of Australian law” .56 An integral part of this project involved 
judicial innovation, independent of the action or inaction of the legislature. Sir 
Anthony said that it was “no longer feasible for courts to decide cases by 
reference to obsolete or unsound rules which result in injustice and await future
c n
reform at the hands of the legislature.” Likewise, McHugh J has said:
In certain situations, invoking democratic rhetoric to legitimise 
the refusal to deliver justice is itself undemocratic, particularly 
when democratic reform is unlikely. When a legislature fails to 
recognise and address a problem of law reform, the use of 
democratic rhetoric to deprive the courts of the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of the law and the doing of justice
r o
is highly questionable.
Paul Finn has argued that we must subject judge-made law, and the 
judicial law-making process, to the same sort of scrutiny as we do statute law 
and the legislative process.59 This, then, is the frame of mind in which we ought 
to evaluate the High Court’s treatment of natural justice: as a doctrine of 
constitutionalism, employed in functionalist, purposive terms.
NATURAL JUSTICE AS A PURPOSIVE DOCTRINE
In the past, speaking of procedural fairness in “natural” terms itself acted 
as a signal of the doctrine’s purpose. The terminology of natural rights was a 
sufficient link with the Enlightenment as to make plain the law’s liberal,
56 “Changing the Law in a Changing Society” (1993) 67 ALJ 568.
’7 “The Australian Judiciary in the 1990s” (unpublished address to the Sydney Institute, 15 
March 1994). Cf his comments on judicial law reform in State Government Insurance 
Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, at 633.
38 Supra n 36, See also G Craven, “The Crisis of Constitutional Literalism in Australia” (1992) 
30 Alta L Rev 492.
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humanistic goals in imposing a duty of fairness in decision-making procedures. 
If government tended to view administration (and administrative law) in 
functional terms, the function of natural justice was to act as a normativistic 
check -  as a reminder of the normativistic limits that our constitutional system, 
with the English common law as its antecedent, imposed upon popularly-elected 
governments.
To a certain extent, there has been a paradox at play in the tension that 
has been felt to exist in natural justice cases between the judiciary and the 
executive. That is that the curial aspiration for individual fairness, and the 
competing administrative desire for governmental professionalism and 
efficiency, stem from the very same values. As was discussed in chapter one, 
natural justice as we understand the doctrine today was a creature of the 
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment may have been concerned with progress, but 
it was what one might call “mission-oriented” progress. It was all about 
progress as a means of liberating humanity; of improving the human condition. 
To paraphrase Harold Laski, it was about recognising that the liberty of the 
ordinary person was an end in itself.60
The paradox lies in the perception of a tension between individual 
fairness and collective efficiency. The humanistic goals which have driven both 
the executive and the judiciary have been one and the same. The problem -  and 
this is a legacy of the peculiarly English version of the Enlightenment, which
59 “Of Power and the People: Ends and Methods in Australian Judge-Made Law” (1994) 1 The 
JudRev 255, at 263.
405
included the constitutional revolution of 1688 -  is that the competing players are 
driven by constitutional design to view human interest from a comparatively 
narrowly confined perspective. To return to a point made in the Introduction,61 
at the moment that disputes transform themselves from political to legal ones, 
formal constitutional strictures impose themselves on the decision-making 
processes -  both administrative and legal. The rub in this -  as seen from the 
perspective of the executive -  is in the fact that according to our conception of 
the rule of law, the courts must have the final word. Because of this, the factor 
which will ultimately determine the scope and reach of natural justice is the legal 
or social purpose that the High Court sees it fulfilling.
The Instrumental Purpose
There are at least five different (though substantially overlapping)
contemporary-sounding purposive justifications that might be offered for a legal
62attentiveness to the fairness of administrative decision-making procedures. 
One such justification is what Paul Craig and others have described as an 
“instrumental” purpose: “helping to attain an accurate decision on the substance 
of the case”.63 O’Connor J once said that the notion underlying natural justice is 
that “by ensuring that the process is fair, the chances that an unbiased decision-
60 “Liberty in the modem sense is founded on the principle that the ordinary man is recognised as 
an end in himself and not as a means to the end of the state” (quoted by Sir W Monckton, in 
“Liberty and the Common Law” (1942) 20 Can Bar Rev 670, at 674).
61 See, supra 1-2.
62 For slightly different characterisations of the justifications, see P P Craig, Public Law and 
Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States o f America (1990), at 176 -  179, and 
the Hon J W von Doussa, “Natural Justice in Federal Administrative Law” (1998) 17 AIAL 
Forum 1, at 2 -  3.
63 Administrative Law (3rd ed, 1994), at 282.
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maker will make the best decision in the circumstances is [s/c] maximised.’'’64 
Lon Fuller described it in slightly different terms, but he was making essentially 
the same point when he said that “[t]he procedural limitations that surround the 
adjudicative function are designed to ensure as rational a decision as possible.” 65 
Professor Wade explained this notion in terms which are readily comprehensible 
to the administrative lawyer:
The whole theory o f ‘natural justice’ is that ministers, though free 
to decide as they like, will in practice decide properly and 
responsibly once the facts have been fairly laid before them ... 
Arbitrary exercise of an administrative power the courts cannot 
control, for policy is in the last resort arbitrary. But much can be 
done to prevent an appearance of arbitrariness, and since in 
practice it is far more likely to be accidental than intentional, a 
procedure which satisfies ‘natural justice’ is the best insurance 
against such accidents.66
One of the most compelling arguments for the instrumentalist view in 
recent years was offered by D J Galligan, in his book Due Process and Fair 
Procedures.67 Central to Galligan’s argument was that one cannot divorce 
consideration of decision-making procedures from the decisions they are 
intended to result in. On the very first page, he indicated his broad agreement 
with Fuller’s point:
In a modem legal system, the range of legal decisions is 
considerable, but one common feature is that each tries to 
advance certain ends and goals. Legal decisions are in that sense 
purposive, and so the main point of procedures is to serve those 
purposes.
64 “Is There Too Much Natural Justice?” (1994) 1 AIAL Forum 82, at 84.
65 “Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator” [1963] Wise LJ3,  at 29.
66 H R W Wade, “Quasi-Judicial and its Background” (1949) 10 Camb U  216, at 229.
67 (1996).
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That is why, in the instrumentalist view, it is impossible to define a given 
set of decision-making procedures as being fair or unfair in the abstract. The 
indicium of fairness is, to an instrumentalist, a relative one, measured according 
to the degree to which the urged decision-making process promotes the 
decision’s underlying purpose. In this sense, the instrumentalist view is well- 
suited to Loughlin’s school of functionalism. As Jeffery Jowell once put it, the 
rules of natural justice attempt “to promote fidelity to organisational purpose”. 
This is accomplished, “both by permitting the persons affected to argue their 
case and, where a reasoned decision is required, giving, through the process of 
justification, what Fuller has described as ‘formal and institutional expression to 
the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs’” .69 In other words, the 
instrumentalist view is premised on the very same thing as the adversary system: 
that hearing both sides of a dispute leads to “better” decision-making.
This was part of what Lord Parker CJ had in mind when he asserted that 
good administration and natural justice were intertwined ends.70 And it was in 
this sense that in Brettingham-Moore v St Leonards Municipality, 11 the High 
Court held that in principle, a hearing could be compelled in the process of 
gathering information for the purpose of preparing a report for the Governor, 
which he would use as the basis of an exercise of discretion. The High Court did 
not say so explicitly, but this holding plainly reflected an instrumentalist concern 
about the Governor’s decision-making process. Instrumentalism was also 
behind Deane J’s articulation of the so-called “probative evidence rule”,
68 “The Rule of Law Today”, in The Changing Constitution (3rd ed, 1994), at 68.
69 Ibid.
70 Re H K  [1967] 2 QB 617, at 630. See supra chapter 6, at 293 -  299.
71 (1969) 121 CLR509.
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whereby he held that decision must be based on “some probative material or 
logical ground,” otherwise it would be deemed tainted for unfairness.72
Yet, the instrumentalist should not be thought to be claiming that the 
observance of natural justice will always lead to the correct decision, in a bi­
valent sense. For instrumentalists acknowledge that in many cases, there will be 
no single correct decision. Rather, they argue, “correctness” is a function of 
perspective, and the observance of fair decision-making procedures ensures that 
the perspective of the decision-maker is as broad as is legally permissible. To 
borrow Lord Parker’s characterisation again, the object is to ensure that an 
“honest bona f id e  decision” is made.
Nevertheless, the instrumentalist justification for natural justice contains 
some significant limitations. Most troublingly of all, it views the question of 
fairness from the perspective of the executive government rather than the 
individual. Considered in light of the High Court’s statements about 
constitutional purpose referred to earlier, this seems a profound defect. On a 
pure instrumental view, if the Executive can prove that it does not need any 
additional information to make the sort of decision it intended to make (ie, to 
make the “correct” decision in the circumstances), then natural justice can be 
dispensed with, regardless of the degree of unfairness that might be suffered by 
the individual(s) affected.
72 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, at 366. See also Aronson and 
Dyer, supra n 13, at 388 -  391.
73 Ibid.
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There are also some significant practical complications associated with 
an instrumental view of natural justice. For example, while the instrumentalist 
view may be borne out in an adversarial hearing before an administrative 
adjudicator in which matters of fact are in controversy, for many of the types of 
decision-making processes that present-day members of the executive must 
engage in, an instrumental claim would not seem to advance the analysis very 
far. Most critically, it remains generally the case that natural justice does not 
attach to the making of regulations, or to other governmental activity which can 
be described as “legislative” in character.74 There are compelling logistical 
reasons for this rule, but if instrumentalism were the justification for the doctrine 
of natural justice, then one could not unreasonably expect the law to be 
otherwise -  or at least that it should be permissive on the question of rights to 
involvement in the making of subordinate legislation.
In the case of non-legislative decision-making, instrumentalism presents 
other problems. In the case of a policy-laden decision which reflects the long- 
held political views of a governing party, for example, can one say that the 
existence of the policy amounts to a violation of the bias rule? An 
instrumentalist would surely be inclined as a matter of logic to hold that it does, 
at least insofar as the policy could be argued to represent a mind closed to other 
avenues of action without first having had the benefit of argument from all 
interested parties. What of what Lon Fuller described as a “polycentric”
74 See Aronson and Dyer, supra n 13, at 431 -  438. See also G Craven, “Legislative Action by 
Subordinate Authorities and the Requirements of a Fair Hearing” (1988) 16 Melb U L Rev 569.
73 On this point, see the discussion of Franklin v Minister o f Town Planning [1948] AC 87, supra 
chapter 3, at 129 -  131. See also Aronson and Dyer, supra n 13, at 439 -  446.
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decision? 76 Must a decision-maker confer with every affected person on every 
aspect of the issue which affects them in order to establish the legitimacy of the 
decision-making process? This does not immediately commend itself as a matter 
of logic or as a matter of instinct.
The “Rule o f Law ”  Purpose
An alternate series of approaches to the conceptualisation of natural 
justice is to view the doctrine from the perspective of the needs of the citizen 
rather than those of the government -  which Craig rather uninspiringly termed 
the “non-instrumentalist” justifications.77 First among these is what might be 
termed the “rule of law” purpose. This holds that attentiveness to fairness in the 
course of governmental decision-making promotes confidence in the system of 
governance, which, in turn, promotes civic peace.
The rule of law justification for natural justice reflects a concern for one 
of the most critical features of our conception of the rule of law, namely that we 
do not require excessive police presence in society because compliance with the 
law is for the most part voluntary. This was a point emphasised by Lord 
Denning. In The Road to Justice, he wrote that people “do not obey the law 
simply because they are commanded to do so; nor because they are afraid of 
sanctions or of being punished. They obey the law because they know it is a
76 “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv L Rev 353, at 395. See also Aronson 
and Dyer, supra n 13, at 151 -161.
77 See supra n 63, at 282.
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thing they ought to do.” Likewise, when Hamilton LJ said in Local 
Government Board v Arlidge that “the more open the procedure is the better ... 
Time spent in removing a grievance or in avoiding the sense of it, is time well 
spent, and the Board’s officials will, like good judges, amplify their jurisdiction 
by rooting it in the public confidence,” 79 he was viewing the attractiveness of 
procedural fairness in “rule of law” terms. The cost of a denial of natural justice 
seen from the rule of law perspective was summed up nicely by the High Court 
in R v Watson, Ex parte Armstrong. In a joint judgment, Barwick CJ, Gibbs, 
Stephen and Mason JJ said:
It is of fundamental importance that the public should have 
confidence in the administration of justice. If fair-minded people 
reasonably apprehend or suspect that the tribunal has prejudged 
the case, they cannot have confidence in the decision. To repeat 
the words of Lord Denning MR which have already been cited, 
‘Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is 
destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: The judge 
was biased. ’80
The “Libertarian ” or “Rhetorical” Purpose
Closely related to this is what one might call the “libertarian” or
“rhetorical” justification for natural justice. This finds its home in the sort of
language used by Lord Kenyon CJ in the eighteenth century in R v Gaskin: that
• • 8 1audi aheram partem is one of the “first principles of justice”. The rhetorical 
justification probably comes closest to enshrining natural justice as a “pure”
78 (1955) at 2. Galligan spoke to this, as well. He said that “confidence in a process, confidence 
that the law has been properly applied or a discretion reasonably exercised, depends to a 
significait degree on confidence in the procedures as means to those outcomes” {supra n 67, at 
66).
79 [1914] 1 KB, at 203 - 204. See supra chapter 2, at 84-85.
80 (1976) 136 CLR 248, at 263.
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principle of constitutionalism. Not surprisingly, this justification for procedural 
fairness (or “procedural due process”, as it is known there) has featured in the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. In one case, for example, 
Douglas J said: “It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference 
between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.” Similarly, Frankfurter J 
once said that “[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of procedural 
safeguards.” 83
The “Dignitarian ” Purpose
A fourth purpose can be termed the “dignitarian” purpose. Inherent in 
this idea is the tailoring of decision-making procedures so as to promote of the 
dignity of the human condition. The value of fair procedures is measured 
according to how well they promote the more general goal of social well-being, 
rather than according to how well they promote “correct” decisions. According 
to this view, the preferability of a decision depends not so much on whether it 
meets some objectively verifiable criterion of “correctness”, but rather on 
whether it has satisfied our social demand for recognition as autonomous, free- 
thinking human beings. In Ridge v Baldwin, for example, Lord Evershed offered 
a dignitarian basis for the imposition of natural justice when he said that natural 
justice should be required “in cases where the body concerned can properly be 
described as administrative -  so long as it can be said, in Sir Frederick Pollock’s 
language, that the invocation is required in order to conform to the ultimate
81 (1799) 8 TR 209, at 210, 101 ER 1349, at 1350. See supra chapter 1, at 24.
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principle of fitness with regard to the nature of man as a rational and social
being.” 84
Dignitarianism was at the heart of much of Sir Isaiah Berlin’s writing
o  c
about freedom, but a powerful present-day champion of the dignitarian view is 
T R S Allan. Taking a view contrary to both Galligan and Fuller, Allan has 
specifically disassociated natural justice and instrumentalism:
A formal or ‘instrumentalist’ theory of natural justice overlooks 
its grounding in recognition of the moral status of the person 
affected by a decision. It is a legitimate expansion of the rule of 
law, which extends the scope of natural justice from judicial 
proceedings to a broader range of administrative decisions,
because the purposes of granting a fair hearing are not limited to
0/1
those of the efficient administration of law or policy.
Part of the basis for Allan’s dignitarianism is his view of the social 
contract:
The interpretation of law as a moral claim to the citizen’s 
allegiance rests in a view of the law’s subjects as morally 
responsible and autonomous persons entitled to respect. The 
fairness of ... procedures is an essential element in that claim to 
allegiance.
This view has been echoed by both John Finnis and the American 
administrative law scholar Jerry Mashaw. Finnis, for example, wrote that “a 
principle component of the idea of constitutional government... is the holding of 
the rulers to their side of a relationship of reciprocity, in which claims of 
authority are respected on condition that authority respects the claims of the
82 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v McGrath (1951) 341 US 123, at 179.
83 Mcnabb v The United States (1943) 318 US 332, at 347.
84 [1964] AC, at 86.
85 See supra chapter 4, at 177 -  179 and chapter 2, at 63 -  64.
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common good (of which a fundamental component is respect for the equal right 
of all to respectful consideration).” Another proponent of the dignitarian view 
has been Dawn Oliver. In a recent article in Public Law, she wrote that “the 
requirements of legality, fairness and rationality in judicial review protect 
applicants from exercises of power that would be adverse to their interests -  their 
security in the status quo, their status in society, their autonomy, dignity and 
respect.” 88
The “Republican ” Purpose
A final justification for the imposition of legal procedural requirements 
upon governmental decision-makers in fact draws heavily upon all of the other 
non-instrumental values. That is what might be called the “participatory” or the 
“republican” purpose. This view was explored by Allan in a rejoinder to 
Galligan’s book. In Allan’s view,
the value of participation is not merely, or even primarily, 
instrumental. It is democracy’s guarantee of the opportunity for 
all to play their part in the political process, in exercise of their 
moral responsibility as equal citizens, which explains the implicit
O Q
connection between participation and respect.
According to this view, public participation is thought to be a good per 
se, regardless of the merits of the actual decision in question. As one 
commentator has put it, this view holds that the purpose of procedural
86 Law Liberty and Justice (1993), at 29.
87 Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), at 272 - 273. See also J Mashaw, Due Process in the 
Administrative State (1985), chapter 4.
88 “Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/Private Divide” [1997] Pub L 630, 
at 631.
89 “Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect” (1998) 18 Ox J  Leg Stud 497, at 509.
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requirements associated with administrative decision-making is to “facilitate the 
representation of minority interests, while leaving the choice of substantive 
values to the processes of politics.” 90 It is a view that has had particular 
association with American constitutional and administrative law. A classic 
statement of a republican conception of administrative law can be found in 
Richard Stewart’s famous article, “The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law”, in which he argued that the consequence of the struggle between 
competing claims of individual autonomy and administrative efficiency had 
resulted in administrative decision-making procedures becoming a “surrogate 
political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected 
interests in the process of administrative decision.” 91
Translating this into the Australian context, one could argue that in a 
state founded upon a constitutional premise of popular sovereignty, it is 
axiomatic that the basic human right (beyond, one supposes, access to the 
necessities of life) is the right to participate in civil society. Indeed, the very 
notion of representative democracy is predicated upon people exercising their 
civil rights -  it was this view that lay at the base of the “representative 
government” cases. The courts may have neither the expertise nor the mandate 
to pronounce upon affairs of state, but for democracy to be effective, or for the 
notion of political accountability to have any real meaning, people must be 
accorded respect as individuals by the government. And that, precisely, is what
90 M Loughlin, “The Importance of Elsewhere” (1993) 4 Pub L Rev 44, at 47. See also P P 
Craig, Public Law and Democracy”, supra n 62, at 97 -  116.
91 (1975) 88 Harv L Rev 1667, at 1670. See also generally J H Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory o f Judicial Review (1980).
416
the doctrine of natural justice could be said to be intended to ensure -  that our 
importance as individuals is not overlooked by our agents in the political 
government. In this view, the doctrine of natural justice is, in republican terms, 
both the quid pro quo for the rule of law and the sine qua non for popular 
sovereignty.
The Limitations of Non-instrumentalism
At first glance, the non-instrumentalist purposes seem in their tenor to be 
more in keeping with the themes that emerged from the cases in the 1980s and 
early 1990s than instrumentalism. Most particularly, the advantage of the non­
instrumentalist justifications is that they view the doctrine of natural justice from 
the perspective of the citizen, rather than the state. Yet, the non-instrumental 
justifications plainly have their limits, too. Do we, for instance, tailor what are 
often expensive and time-consuming decision-making processes to suit the 
dignitarian demands of the overly sensitive -  the sorts of people who in private 
law would be described as the “thin-skulled”?
And of the various non-instrumental views, most would seem to suffer 
from an historical dis-rootedness. It is only fairly recently, for example, that the 
social contract could be argued to have included terms concerning governmental 
respect for our dignity, or ones which hold that participation in government is a 
good thing. For the greater part of our common law history, the social contract 
has instead been based upon the reciprocal feudal claims of loyalty and
02 Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, Australian Capital Television v The
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protection. In an historical sense, it is only what I have called the “rule of law” 
justification that can have any real basis in law, in the sense that it is concerned 
with the keeping of the Queen’s peace -  but this seems a defect in that it leads it 
to resemble the instrumental justification, at least to the extent that the starting 
point for ascertaining the importance of natural justice is the government’s 
interests (in maintaining public confidence in itself).
THE MODERN AUSTRALIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR 
NATURAL JUSTICE?
In earlier chapters, it was suggested that the doctrine of natural justice in 
Australia had suffered, in a comparative sense, from under-theorisation. The 
continuing truth of this observation is borne out by the fact that in the recent 
cases, the High Court has been somewhat erratic in its reference to the purpose 
served by natural justice. In an address to the Australian Legal Convention in 
1991, Sir Anthony Mason suggested that the High Court had more than one aim 
in mind in deciding the natural justice cases: “One is the protection of the rights 
and interests of the individual against abuse of executive power ... A second 
object is an insistence on compliance with procedural fairness in administrative 
decision-making.”93 In truth, though, it is difficult in the Australian context to 
point to any consistent enunciation of either a legal or a social purpose behind 
the High Court’s move to cast the net of procedural fairness as widely as it has. 
Insofar as Paul Craig was correct in asserting that the nature of procedural 
fairness can only be understood when considered against the background of
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 
189 CLR 520.
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political and constitutional theory,94 this failure to enunciate a purposive 
grounding for natural justice leaves us with a significant gap in the theoretical 
framework of our public law.
Let us consider this in the context of the legitimate expectation cases for, 
as discussed, they have been the driving force behind the evolution of natural 
justice during the past twenty-odd years. In England, as has been noted, some 
judges have expressed an instrumental view of natural justice -  that the 
protection of legitimate expectations is intertwined with the principles of good 
administration.95 On one reading of the legitimate expectation cases it could be 
thought that the High Court had the same ends in mind. This is certainly a view 
which could easily follow from the assertion that natural justice applies 
presumptively to all governmental decision-making. It would also seem to fit 
comfortably with the view in Teoh that there need be no actual expectation in 
order for a legitimate expectation to exist. But on the other hand, the actual 
outcomes of the cases -  reflecting as they seem to do a judicial concern about the 
degree of unfairness in individual treatment -  would suggest that something 
other than simple “correctness” of decision-making procedures has been in the 
back of the High Court’s mind in developing the concept.
To take just one example, it is not clear from his judgment in South 
Australia v O ’Shea (or his obiter in R v Toohey) whether at base Mason CJ was 
more concerned with instrumental or non-instrumental justifications for the 
imposition of natural justice. One way of reading his insistence that in the
93 Id, at 573.
94 Public Law and Democracy, supra n 62, at 1.
95 See supra 408.
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appropriate case, natural justice could extend to the Cabinet is as reflecting a 
concern that the effective decision-makers have all of the relevant information 
before them, so that they might offer the “correct” advice. Likewise, his 
judgment in Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin could be taken to 
support the view that the “correctness” of a decision concerning judicial 
appointment can only be determined by reference to the Executive’s assessment 
of individual fitness for office. But if one reads, say, his judgment in Kioa v 
West, it seems clear that one of the things which moved Sir Anthony to shape the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations in the way he did was his perception of a 
need for a means to redress official callousness. In this sense, one gets the 
impression that a form of dignitarianism has been at play in the Court’s mind.
This view is buttressed by the holdings in Heatley v Tasmanian Racing 
and Gaming Commission, Annetts v McCann and Haoucher. But what, then, of 
Teoh? One supposes that the result in Teoh could be justified by reference to 
dignitarian concerns, but the reasoning in the majority judgments does not make 
explicit reference to anything like this. On the contrary, the reasoning in Teoh 
reads almost completely in instrumental terms: that the accession to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child has made its contents a relevant 
consideration to the determination of the “correctness” of a decision whether or 
not to deport when the interests of children are involved.
Oddly, given its statements regarding popular sovereignty, the one 
purpose which does not seem yet to have found any favour in the High Court is 
administrative republicanism. In some ways, the republican/participatory
420
justification for natural justice fits most easily of all with the Court’s asserted 
constitutional premisses. One wonders why the Court has not taken it up.% But 
the fact that it has not been considered by their Honours serves as confirmation 
of the continued under-theorisation of natural justice in Australia. The 
inconsistencies in the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectations that 
were explored at the end of chapter five illustrate the lack of enunciated 
constitutional purpose behind the modem Australian doctrine of natural justice. 
To date, the doctrine of legitimate expectations remains a largely inchoate one. 
At best, one could argue that the purpose behind the judicially-imposed doctrine 
of procedural fairness seems a shifting one, being recast by the Court, when 
needed, to serve a series of ends. But however desirable this may be viewed 
from a pragmatic perspective, the inchoateness of the doctrine masks a 
significant concern when the doctrine is considered in terms of purposive 
constitutionalism.
NATURAL JUSTICE AND “THE NEW AGENDA” 98
During most of the period covered by this thesis, government -  and 
consequently, administrative law -  was in a state of expansion. Now, 
government is in a period of contraction. As a result, many of the assumptions 
which have nourished the law of judicial review are under question. The simple
96 Aronson and Dyer have suggested that in light of legislative initiative in this regard, “the High 
Court will probably be most reluctant to develop any general common law requirement of 
consultation” (supra n 13, at 456 -  457).
97 See supra 271 -  273.
98 This expression is taken from R Creyke and J McMillan, “Administrative Law Assumptions ... 
Then and Now”, in R Creyke and J McMillan, The Kerr Vision o f Australian Administrative 
Law, supra n 10, at 19.
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truth is, as Robin Creyke and John McMillan put it so bluntly, that
“administrative law has moved on.” 99 As they wrote:
The issues are no longer how best to control the burgeoning 
exercise of discretionary power by the state in relation to its 
citizens ... Today, as government retracts rather than expands, 
different issues have developed. Administrative law can no 
longer proceed from the premise that the exercise of functions 
that are funded by public monies is undertaken by government 
officials. The trend [is] towards the discharge of public functions 
by the private sector . . . 1()0
In chapter two, William Robson’s play on Sir Henry Maine, to the effect 
that society in the middle part of the century was moving from contract to public 
administration, was referred to. 101 Now, it might be possible to say that we are 
moving back to contract. The challenge facing administrative law, therefore -  if,
1 A A
to re-state another expression, it is to be anything other than a relic of the Lord 
Hewart era -  is to adapt to the new governmental reality, in which the private 
sector is entrusted with responsibility for carrying out many of the functions of 
the administration. As Mark Aronson has described it: “administrative law’s 
goals of accountability and participation are still important, but the way in which 
the state has restructured both itself and its delivery of goods and services, 
requires that the tools for achieving those goals might also have to be 
adapted.” 103
99 Id, at 33.
100 Ibid.
101 See supra 62.
102 See supra 176.
103 “A Public Lawyer’s Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing”, in M Taggart (ed), The 
Province o f  Administrative Law (1997) 40, at 70.
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Though to date, this project of adaptation has not been (as Aronson has 
discussed104) a successful one, success in the project is imperative. The Housing 
Act cases show the problems that can ensue if the law gets too far out of step 
with day-to-day governance and the reality of the workaday constitution. But 
the difficult part of the project should in fact not be in the creating of judicial 
responses to change. The cases discussed in the last three chapters show the 
extent of the Court’s ability to re-shape the law to suit what it perceives to be the 
needs of society. In this respect, already we are beginning to see judges draw 
more explicitly on the private law of equity in discussing administrative law. It 
is not unlikely that in the future, we will see another fusion take place -  this time 
between equitable principle and administrative law. Sir Anthony Mason, for 
example, has argued that the development of administrative law has “mirrored 
the way in which equity has regulated the exercise of fiduciary powers.”10 ' And, 
as noted in chapter six, as long ago as 1979 Mr Justice Murphy was urging that 
any broad-based assertion of private power which “affects members of the public 
to a significant degree” should be deemed to amount to an exercise of public 
power, and liable to the common law rules of natural justice.106
No, the difficult part of the task facing the common law, and the common 
law courts, is to reconcile the problems of principle that have been adverted to in 
this Conclusion. The emphasis on market cost that features so predominantly in 
today's “new administrative lawr” will focus the mind of the new decision-maker 
on efficiency -  but in a quite different form than that envisaged by the Anglo-
104 See id.
105 “The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World” 
(1994) 110 LQR 238.
106 Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242, at 274 -  275.
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Canadian scholars of the 1930s. Now, the emphasis will be on cost-efficiency, 
rather than mere alacrity and informality. Attempts by the courts to impose 
additional costs on decision-making processes, without an articulation of the 
basis therefor, and of the purpose thereof, will be met with resistance. A failure 
to articulate principle therefore runs the risk of harming the courts’ standing and 
undermining the common law constitution.
At the very beginning of this thesis, it was suggested that administrative 
law has its roots in our internal ambivalence. Hence the judicial role: to resolve 
the consequent political tension. The function of natural justice within this 
framework has been to ensure that the government does not fail to listen to us -  
that it continues to hear our ambivalence. Per signia sapientia. But for natural 
justice to do this, it must have a secure grounding in the legal system. This, 
then, is the High Court’s task for the future: to provide a basis for procedural 
fairness which is not only robust in its definition, but which also accords with 
the principles of the real constitution. A society governed by the rule of law can 
demand no less.
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